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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a theoretical investigation of economic 
implications of population ageing of the sort experienced in Canada, 
Australia and the United States as a result of the post-war baby 
boom. It analyses distributional effects in the framework of 
Samuelson’s consumption-loan model, and uses simulation techniques 
to study the behavior of models containing several age groups.
After a general discussion of the effects of population 
ageing the thesis considers the structure of the consumption-loan 
model and the form of the consumption functions to be used in the 
analysis that follows. We then undertake qualitative analysis of a 
small consumption-loan system, which provides insights into the 
behavior of the interest rate but is too small to display realistic 
demographic dynamics.
From there we go to simulation analysis of larger systems, 
one a pure consumption-loan system in which age specific incomes 
are exogenous and the other a model in which age specific income is 
determined by a neoclassical production function with capital and 
several ages of labour as inputs. We run simulations on this last 
system using current projections of the Canadian population to the 
year 2026.
The major conclusion of the thesis, demonstrated in the final 
simulations, is that the distributional effects of the post war 
baby boom operate against the baby boom cohorts not only when they 
reach the older years but through their entire working lives.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study is concerned with the economic consequences of the 
ageing process that the populations of developed countries such as 
Canada, Australia and the United States are experiencing. The fact of 
the ageing process is widely known, thanks mainly to cover stories in 
Newsweek and Time magazines, and the conventional wisdom is reasonably 
well summarized in a sub-headline from a review of Kettle (1980) in 
Maclean’s magazine of December 29, 1980: "As the baby boom ages the
future looks grim".
While popular discussions generally accept that the ageing process 
will have unfortunate economic consequences they seldom explain why, 
probably because economists have only recently been attracted to the 
question. Welch (1979) considered the labour market effects of the 
baby boom and the Economic Council of Canada (1979) considered the 
effects of the ageing of the baby boom cohort on public and private 
pensions, but there remain many areas for study. Kettle lays claim to 
having written the first book on the future of the Canadian baby boom 
cohorts and his study, though based on a version of the Easterlin 
(1968) model, is essentially an exercise in popular sociology.
Most studies of the effects of the ageing process base their con­
clusions on comparisons of such simple measures as the proportion of 
the population in different age groups. The purpose of the present 
work is to consider the demand and supply effects of the ageing process 
in the context of the neoclassical model of production and distribution.
Before proceeding to this, we review the literature on the ageing 
process, in Chapter Two. One commonly used index of the economic con­
sequences of ageing is the dependency rate, the ratio of retired to 
active workers, which shows a growing aged dependent population, each
1
2member of which is being supported by fewer active workers. This is 
what is generally termed the growing economic burden of an ageing 
population. Our review of the literature in Chapter Two will show that 
this is not a very useful indicator of the economic consequences of 
such population change. There is also in popular discussion, and in 
some of the economic literature on the question, a revival of the 
secular stagnation thesis of the 1930's. The most recent version 
assumes that the slowing population growth that is associated with 
ageing will depress key sectors of the economy and that these sectoral 
depressions will translate into a general recession. The most impor­
tant of these sectors is assumed to be housing, which is expected to be 
depressed because smaller families are assumed to want smaller houses. 
In Chapter Two we review the literature on the effects of changing age 
structure on consumption patterns, and on demographic factors in the 
demand for housing, and find no support for the stagnation thesis.
While the current economic literature allows us to reject the 
stagnation hypothesis it does not give much help in determining what 
the consequences of population ageing actually will be1. Population 
age structure enters mainly into consumption studies, particularly 
budget share studies. The other area of economic analysis that makes 
use of population is growth theory, reviewed in Pitchford (1974). 
Typically growth models assume a population growing at a constant 
proportional rate - in demographic terms a stable population - in which 
all age groups are growing at the same rate and can be aggregated into 
a single labour force figure. The current ageing of the Canadian popu­
lation is not a phenomenon of a stable population, and in fact it is 
highly unlikely that birth and death rates in any population would
1 We deal here with developed countries. The effect of an increase in 
the aged dependent group in underdeveloped countries will depend on 
local conditions of production and the local capital market.
3remain unchanged over the decades needed for the population to reach 
stability. The ageing process resulting from the baby boom in Canada 
will cover the next fifty years, and will probably be reflected in 
population changes for years after that. The questions we are inter­
ested in are related neither to a stable population nor to a population 
reasonably close to stability but to one still in the early stages of 
response to an "exogenous" shock2. The results of standard economic 
growth theory are of limited use to us here.
The economic-demographic model that is of use is Samuel son's 
(1958) consumption-loan model with its overlapping generation structure. 
Although Samuel son and the writers who used the model he developed 
assumed stable populations the overlapping generations structure can 
deal with the case of changing age distributions. Using it in this 
manner, though, means handling the model differently from the way most 
writers have used it. Samuelson originally used the consumption-loan 
system to determine interest rate behavior, concentrating on the equil­
ibrium interest rate under a stable population. The work that followed 
his, which we review in Chapter Three, took his conclusion that the 
equilibrium interest rate for a consumption-loan system with money 
would equal the intrinsic rate of growth of the population (the bio­
logical interest rate result) and studied its efficiency properties. 
Among these writers Gale dealt with the possible instability of the 
biological interest rate equilibrium, and as we show in Chapter Three 
his results are something of a special case. We wish to consider 
interest rate behavior derived from a consumption-loan model in which 
the population is not growing at a constant proportional rate.
Samuelson derived his biological interest rate result without 
reference to the explicit form of the utility or consumption function.
2 We are not concerned here with fertility choice models, so we can 
regard the baby boom as exogenous.
4This procedure does not apply when the population is not demographically 
stable, so we must pay attention to the form of the consumption function. 
To use the C-L model we must assign each age group a specific consumption 
function and derive interest rate dynamics explicitly. In Chapter Four we 
consider the form of the age specific consumption function. Since we 
are studying the economic effects of demographic changes, we use the 
life cycle approach to consumption. This lets us take account of the 
way demographic considerations affect consumption over the individual 
life cycle and the way changes in the proportion of the population at 
each stage of the life cycle will affect consumption decisions. In 
particular we are interested in the proportions of the population in 
the borrowing and lending stages of the life cycle, because this will 
determine the demand for and supply of loans, which in the consumption- 
loan system determines the interest rate in any period.
In Chapter Five we study the behavior of the interest rate in a 
small consumption-loan system in which individuals live at most three 
ages. While this gives us some insight into the behavior of the 
interest rate it is not sufficient to analyze changes of the sort 
experienced by the Canadian economy as a three age system cannot cap­
ture the full range of possible population dynamics. A simple three 
age model in which only one of the age groups reproduces (the other two 
being regarded as below and above the fertile years) cannot display the 
cyclical behavior typical of actual populations, although it will be 
shown that the interest rate may display a cyclical approach to 
equilibrium.
A demographic system large enough to display realistic population 
dynamics is too large to manipulate in the manner of the small system 
of Chapter Five. In Chapters Six and Seven therefore, we undertake 
simulation analysis of a consumption-loan system with five and six age
5groups, and in Chapter Seven also we add a production sector to the 
pure consumption system of the sort used in Chapter Six.
Simulation analysis has been used before in the analysis of 
economic-demographic models of developed countries, most notably by 
Denton and Spencer (1973, 1975). They start with a detailed population 
system to which they apply age specific productivity indices and which 
they then aggregate into a single factor of production, labour. They 
use labour and capital aggregates as the two inputs in a CES production 
function which determines aggregate income, set investment equal to 
saving which in turn is assumed to be a fixed proportion of national 
income, make government spending a function of income and calculate 
consumption from the national income identity. They use this system to 
determine the behavior of economic aggregates in response to changes in 
demographic factors. In a recent study (Denton and Spencer (1980)) 
they use a modified version of their 1975 model to study the effects of 
a national superannuation system like the Canada Pension Plan on the 
economic-demographic system.
Where Denton and Spencer consider demographic influences on 
economic aggregates, we consider the distributional effects of demo­
graphic changes. From this point of view the ageing of the population 
would place a burden on the younger age groups if the redistribution 
that results from the ageing of the baby boom cohort favours the older 
against the younger age groups. In the simulations of Chapter Seven 
these redistributions operate through changes in labour income and in 
particular the interest rate, affecting lifetime consumption levels 
and patterns. Our simulations indicate that any redistributions will 
be away from the baby boom cohort in favour of the younger groups, and 
that these changes occur not only when the baby boom group has retired 
but all through its life. If there is a burden due to the ageing of
6the baby boom group, our study indicates that it will fall on that 
group itself and that the birth cohorts that followed the baby boom 
will not be disadvantaged and actually may gain from the ageing process.
Thus the conclusions of our simulation study are opposite to 
those of popular discussion of the ageing process. In Chapter Eight we 
indicate a number of areas for future research, in particular related 
to the estimation of the equations needed to test the conclusions of 
our theoretical simulations on Canadian data. Our theoretical study 
indicates the nature of the effects of an ageing population, empirical 
work will be needed to determine the precise form these effects take.
We should note that in many ways our use of simulation is closer 
to that of demographers than to usual economic practice. Economists 
tend to use simulation to test the effects of changes in such policy 
variables as tax rates on the behavior of economic systems, as in 
Pindyck (1973), and frequently use it to compare the behavior of 
systems as parameters are changed. Demographers, following Coale and 
Hoover (1958), tend to simulate the behavior of economic systems under 
different assumptions about population growth and, as in Enke and Zind 
(1969), make only a few changes in the values of the economic parameters. 
This is the result of the nature of the questions the two groups consider. 
Since we are interested in the effects of demographic changes over a 
horizon of some fifty years we use simulation in a manner closer to that 
of the demographers. For the simulations of Chapter Seven a variety of 
coefficients were experimented with, some of which are reported briefly 
and others listed in the appendix and serve to support the results of 
the reported simulations. The most useful extension of this study seems 
to be empirical investigation rather than further theoretical simulation.
The simulations for Chapters Six and Seven generated a considerable 
amount of data. For information these are presented in the Appendix to 
this study.
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EXPERIENCE OF DEMOGRAPHIC AGEING
I___Causes of Population Ageing
The population of Canada, like that of most western countries, is 
ageing. The proportion of the population over 65 is rising from a 
current level of one in ten to a projected 2030 level of one in five. 
According to the Economic Council of Canada the proportion aged 65 
years and over in the population 20 years and over is expected to rise 
from its current one in seven to one in three over the same period.
Statistics Canada's Population Projection One is representative 
of projections showing an ageing population (Statistics Canada 1979a). 
This projection assumes a fall in Canadian fertility from its 1971 
level of 2.2 children per woman to 1.89 in 1976, then a rise to 2.1 
(the replacement level) in 1991 after which it is assumed to remain 
constant at the replacement level. Net immigration is assumed to 
average 100,000 a year and the total population rises from 22,992,600 
at the 1976 census to 30,980,700 in 2001, a 34.7% increase, then to 
37,047,900 in 2026, 19.6% above the 2001 level.
Between 1976 and 2001 under this projection the 65+ age group 
will grow 72.9%, the 45-64 group 37.6%, the 20-44 group 36.3% and the 
0-19 group 11.7%. By 2026 under this projection the 65+ group will 
make up 16% of the total population compared with its 1976 level of 
8.7%. The projected aged dependency rate (the 65+ group as a pro­
portion of the 18-64 group) and the total dependency rate (the 65+ and 
0-17 groups relative to the 18-64 group) for the rest of this century
are:
8Table 1: Aged and Total Dependency Rates 1976-2001
Year: 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
ADR : 14.66 15.13 15.68 17.08 17.96 18.00
TDR : 68.30 62.61 59.61 61.75 63.44 61.05
(Source: Statistics Canada 1979a)
Because of the reduction in the number of young dependents that will 
occur over the rest of the century due to the fall in birth rates 
during the 1960's and 70's (and on the assumption that fertility remains 
at replacement for the remainder of the century so that there is not 
another baby boom) the total dependency rate when the population is at 
its oldest will be somewhat lower than it is now (on Projection One an 
ADR of over 26 in 2026 and a TDR of roughly 66).
According to Statistics Canada the 65+ group will be the fastest 
growing segment of the Canadian population until 1986 because of the 
decline in mortality, relatively high fertility and heavy immigration 
experienced at the beginning of the twentieth century. A slower growth 
rate for this age group is projected after 1986 because of anticipated 
below average growth in the 45-64 age group during the period 1971-86. 
This demonstrates one major problem in bringing economic and demographic 
analysis together. A period that is medium term in a demographic sense 
is long term in the economic sense. The projected ageing of the 
Canadian population for example has nothing to do with increasing life 
expectancy, its immediate cause is the post World War II baby boom and 
the birth depressions that preceded and followed it. But while the 
baby boom is the proximate cause of the rather dramatic ageing that will 
take place over the next fifty years and which has captured a good deal 
of public attention it can also be regarded as an aberration, delaying 
a much longer established ageing process. Thus ageing is more apparent
9in Europe than in North America even though the European countries 
experienced very small post war baby booms and in some cases no booms 
at all, and even though the long term mechanism that leads to an 
ageing population may well be longer established in North America than 
in Europe.
In the long term ageing is the result of steadily declining birth 
rates. Such a decline reduces the proportion of children in the popu­
lation, drives up the average age and necessarily increases the prop­
ortion of aged in the total population. In most European countries the 
birth rate has been steadily declining since around 1870. In North 
America a steady decline can be traced back even further, to 1820 or 
even 1800. Current birth rates are often regarded as unusually low.
In fact if they are compared with the rates of the past century, 
particularly in the U.S., they are a return to long term trend after 
an unusual drop in the 1920’s and an abnormal increase in the baby 
boom period.
The baby boom as usually envisaged - a continuing high birth rate 
through the late 1940’s and the 1950's - actually occurred in only a 
few countries - the U.S., Canada and Australia notably1. Most countries, 
with the exception of Germany, experienced significant increases in 
birth rates immediately after the war but in Europe the upswing was 
short lived and did not last beyond about 1947-48.
This immediate and short lived post war upsurge in births was 
common to both First and Second World Wars. War itself has a reasonably 
predictable effect on births although perhaps not of the sort usually 
imagined. Military and civilian losses obviously affect births, and 
the countries most severely affected by this century's wars still show
1 Detailed demographic history can be found in Calot (1979'), Festy 
(1970, 1979), Pressat (1970), Reinhard and Armengaud (1961). Also 
Ridler (1979) and Economic Council of Canada (1979) for current trends.
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the effects of their age pyramids. The main demographic effect of a 
major war, though, is probably the postponement of marriages.
The result of wartime marriage deferment is a catch-up in 
marriages immediately after the war. This results in a larger than 
usual population at risk for first births in the years immediately 
after the war and because of this larger population a larger than 
usual number of births in the two or three years immediately following 
the war. This pattern is clear after both the First and Second World 
Wars. The difference between the two post war periods is that after the 
First war the birth rate dropped sharply and steadily through the 
1920’s and 30’s whereas after the Second war it levelled off in those 
countries that did not experience baby booms.
Most people are aware that the birth rate was unusually low 
before the Second war, but most assume this was a direct result of the 
depression of the 1930's. To a degree it was, but births fell off 
sharply from 1920 and continued to fall through the prosperity of the 
early 20’s. Most Western European birth rates fell below the zero 
population growth level and stayed low until the beginning of the 
Second war. In most countries the significant improvement in mortality 
rates that occurred during the 1920's and 1930's, particularly in child 
mortality, was large enough relative to the fall in birth rates to keep 
the population growing, though slowly. In France, however, the fall in 
birth was so dramatic that despite very heavy immigration the level of 
the population actually fell during the period.
The causes of this rapid fall are not agreed upon. Reinhard and 
Armengaud (1961) ascribe it at least in part to the social conditions 
of the 1920's, which decade they regard as having been devoted largely 
to the pursuit of pleasure. Whatever the ultimate cause there are 
demographic changes that can be identified: deaths in the flu epidemic
11
of 1918-19, a rapid decline in the marriage rate after the post war 
catch-up, and a rapid increase in the divorce rate probably as a result 
of overhasty post war marriages. Completed family size did fall, indi­
cating that families were having fewer children, although the drop was 
not as great as the drop in year to year birth rates, suggesting that 
the spacing between children was increased. Once the Depression began 
the discouraging effect it had on family formation was compounded by 
the fact that from the mid-1930’s the cohorts entering the fertile 
years were those born during the First World War. Since birth rates 
had been reduced during the war the new entrants to the fertile ages 
in the 1930's were fewer than would have been the case in the absence 
of the war effect and this further reduced births during the 1930's.
None of these is a complete explanation of the period, but all seemed 
to apply to one degree or another in most countries - the U.S. as well 
as France although the effect on France was greater. The effect in 
the U.S. was also strengthened by the strict limitations placed on 
immigration following the immediate post war influx. This was a sig­
nificant change in American demographic history since immigration had 
played a dominant role in American population fluctuations till then.
Whatever the cause, one effect was to reduce the number of 
children born during the 1920's and 30*s. Thus the baby boom cohorts 
look larger relative to the cohorts immediately preceding them than 
they would had the cohorts of the 1920's and 30's been closer to the 
century-old trend. (This applies equally to the post World War Two 
catch-up boom and to the U.S.-type boom that followed in some countries.) 
Another effect was to lower the proportion of the population in the 
young ages, and so age the population. This ageing effect was aug­
mented by the fact that First war casualties greatly reduced the 
productive work force of the 1920's and 30's in some European countries.
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This effect is still being felt - the birth slump in France in the 
period of the First World War is the reason the proportion of the 
French population over 60 has been declining over the past few years. 
According to Reinhard and Armengaud its consequences were severe: they 
say that this ageing of the French population was responsible for re­
ductions in activity, in the spirit of enterprise, and in France's 
demographic and military power.
Only Germany and Italy undertook pronatalist policies with any 
seriousness in this period. Italy appears to have had virtually no 
success, Germany to have moved the recovery of the birth rate to the 
mid-1930's. Births increased in North America and the rest of Europe 
during the Second World War. The post war baby boom was, in fact, 
preceded by a steady rise in the birth rate during the war.
The Second war, like the first, resulted in delays in marriage 
and family formation and consequently was followed by a couple of years 
of post war catch-up. This short lived baby boom was experienced by 
all of the Western countries except Germany. After the catch-up the 
pattern departed from the post World War One model. In France there 
was a gradual decline from the peak in 1946-47 and a slow approach to 
replacement fertility levels. In Britain births collapsed and by 1950 
were down to Depression levels, and did not begin to rise again until 
1955. By 1960 the British rate had risen to roughly the French rate. 
Germany appears to have experienced virtually no catch-up boom, hardly 
surprising considering her post war condition, and only a slow rise in 
births during the 1950's. Japan, which immediately after the war had 
a birth rate well above European or North American levels, began in 
about 1949 a strong anti-natalist drive and succeeded in rapidly re­
ducing its birth rate to the level of the lowest European rates. Japan 
is experiencing at the moment problems of an ageing population that are
still in the future for most countries.
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In the U.S., Canada and Australia the post war catch-up was 
followed by a slight drop in births and then the baby boom of the 
1950's. Again the demographic mechanics of the process are clear 
though the forces behind them are not. Age at marriage and age at 
maternity both dropped. Completed fertility of the cohorts involved 
shows that there was some increase in family size but not enough to 
account for the boom, indicating that the spacing between children was 
reduced. Reinhard and Armengaud, writing in 1961, quote with some 
approval a statement that the ideal of American women was no longer to 
work and maintain an independent life but to marry at twenty and have 
three or four children. Unfortunately for this thesis American birth 
rates had peaked in about 1958 and by 1961 were well on their way down, 
due to rising age at first marriage, later childbirth and increased 
spacing between children. Such data as are available on completed or 
near-completed fertility of the cohorts having children in the 1960's 
suggests that family size is declining towards the zero population 
growth levels reached in Europe already, but such projections are 
notoriously fallible.
The history of fertility over the past sixty years makes a number 
of things clear. One is that research into the area should aim at 
explaining completed family size and birth spacing rather than measures 
of current births per woman over time. Another is that the current 
ageing is part of a long term process. The baby boom and the reduced 
fertility on either side of it will impose an unusually large aged 
population in fifty years time in countries that experienced the boom, 
and after the boom cohort has passed the aged proportion will drop.
This will not indicate the end of the ageing process, only a change in 
its nature till it more nearly resembles the ageing of European 
populations.
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The final thing to note from this brief history of fertility 
behavior in this century is that during that period birth rates have 
dropped below the replacement (zero growth) level several times. 
Replacement can be maintained on average over a long period by cycles 
in the birth rate as well as by a steady birth rate at the replacement 
level as periods of rising births can be balanced in the long run by 
periods of birth rates below the replacement level. There is nothing 
in the recent history of fertility behavior to rule out this case. If 
that is the pattern births follow in the future the distributional 
effects we shall discuss later in the context of the baby boom of the 
1950's take on a much longer term interest.
In Table One at the beginning of this chapter we listed depen­
dency rates for Canada for the remainder of this century, under the 
assumptions of Statistics Canada's Population Projection One. We also 
noted that the 65+ age group would rise from 8.7% of the total popu­
lation in 1976 to 16% in 2026. In 2001 the 65+ group is 11.2% of the 
total under Projection One. Similar patterns are apparent for the 
United States (Cohen and Westoff, (1977)) and Australia (Australian 
National Population Inquiry, (1975)). Australia has a slightly younger 
population than has Canada as a result of higher recent past fertility 
and a steady flow of immigrants in the child bearing ages. In 1976 
Australia was still well above replacement fertility while other 
Western countries were rather closer, and in some cases had negative 
natural rates of increase (Westoff (1978)) .
While we can look to countries like the United States and 
Australia for developments paralleling those of Canada, Japan provides 
an example of a country further along in the ageing process than is 
Canada, and the Japanese case is in many respects closer to the 
Canadian than the European case. As noted above in a very short period
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after the Second World War Japan switched from having a very high birth 
rate to a very low rate. Drucker (1978) claims that half of the increase 
in Japanese productivity over the past twenty years was due to the avail­
ability of a young work force as a result of the post war Japanese baby 
boom, and further that the Japanese social system is geared to a young 
population. Most Japanese companies require their workers to retire 
at age 55. This policy was developed fifty years ago when the average 
life expectancy was 53 years. Today the average life expectancy is 
over 77 years, but Japanese government pensions do not start until 
age 65. It has been suggested that this is at least in part respon­
sible for Japan having one of the world's highest rates of suicide 
among the elderly.
The Japanese wage system is based heavily on seniority, and 
productivity is greatly influenced by the age structure of the work 
force. Drucker argues that Japan will need a significant increase in 
capital formation to offset the ageing of its workforce, and suggests 
that in the past the funds needed were available out of retirement 
saving (in part because few Japanese survived to retirement age).
Since the elderly are consumers rather than savers, Drucker argues 
that the Japanese ageing process will seriously reduce the funds 
available for capital formation.
It is likely that the behavior of the Japanese economy in the 
near future will give us some information about how the ageing process 
will affect the Canadian, Australian and American economies in the 
longer term. Drucker's comments about need for and lack of investment 
funds are suggestive of one effect the ageing process may have, 
especially in view of the work of Munnell (1977) and Feldstein (1974,
16
1978) on the effects of social security and private pensions on saving 
and capital formation. As the theoretical simulation models presented 
in later chapters will demonstrate there is reason to think that the 
effect of the ageing process on saving behavior will be one of the 
most important effects of the ageing of the Canadian population. We 
should note here that we are referring to saving in the sense of the 
allocation of lifetime income over the whole life, and not saving in 
the sense of the single period consumption function. Denton and 
Spencer (1976) test the direct effect of ageing on an aggregate con­
sumption function and find it to be insignificant. Later in this 
chapter we shall review studies of the effect of ageing on the distri­
bution of consumption expenditure across different goods, and show 
that the common result is that age distribution changes do not signifi­
cantly alter consumption patterns. The consumption effects that we 
anticipate will be significant are those associated with the life 
cycle model of consumption rather than single period aggregate con­
sumption functions or distribution across goods. Our theoretical 
simulation experiments will indicate that these life cycle effects may 
prove to be very important over the next fifty years.
Before proceding to a review of the literature on the economic 
effects of population ageing it is worthwhile presenting one more 
representation of the ageing process.
Figure la below shows the age-sex distribution of the Canadian 
population in 1976 in the form of an age pyramid. The baby boom is 
clearly evident in the bulge between the 10-14 and 30-34 age groups 
(if we take the period 1948-1960 as the baby boom period, by 1976 
those birth cohorts would be between 16 and 28 years old) . In the 
youngest age groups we see the effects of the decline in births in the 
1960’s and 70’s. The dip above the bulge is the result of the low
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birth rates during the Depression years. Note that there is not a 
significant dip in the 55-60 age group, nor in the age groups on either 
side. These groups would have been bom during the First World War.
The population pyramid for France, 1974, for example, shows a notice­
able dip in these ages resulting from the fall in births during the 
war.
Figures lb and lc below show the Canadian population in the years 
1991 and 2001 according to Population Projection One. They show the 
baby boom bulge moving up the age pyramid. Since Projection One assumes 
a drop in fertility below replacement before a rise to replacement in 
1991, the dip representing births in the 1960's and 70's is followed 
up the pyramid by another slight bulge. When the baby boom group 
reaches retirement age the 65+ group will form a much larger part of 
the population than it has in the past. Similarly as the survivors of 
the baby boom die and the birth cohorts of the 1960's and 70's retire 
the retired population will make up what will seem an unusually small 
part of the total population. The birth cohort of 1970 will reach 
retirement (age 65) in the year 2035, so in economic terms we are con­
sidering a long term question. Because of this we will analyze the 
effects of ageing using the techniques of neoclassical growth models 
in later chapters.
Figures 2a and 2b below show the Canadian population in 1991 and 
2001 under Statistics Canada's Projection Four. This projection 
assumes the fertility rate will settle at 1.7, below the replacement 
rate of 2.1, and that immigration will average only 50,000 annually as 
against the 100,000 assumed for Projection One. With these changes 
there is no significant bulge below the baby boom bulge, and the baby 
boom bulge is further exaggerated as the number of births falls. Under 
this projection the baby boom cohort, when it retires, will form an even
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larger part of the total population than under Projection One. In our 
simulations, in later chapters, we shall use Projection One with its 
assumption of an ultimately stationary population. Nevertheless 
Figures 2a and 2b show how a change in fertility can significantly 
alter demographic development over a long period.
II Dependency Rates
Most discussions of the ageing process use much the same terms 
as we used to describe it in the previous section. They deal with the 
aged as a percentage of the total population and with the aged depen­
dency rate, the ratio of the aged to people in the active labour force 
years. Canadian dependency rates were presented in Table One above, 
rates for countries like Australia and the United States are very 
similar. On the American rates see Cohen in Cohen and Westoff (1977), 
on Australian the National Population Inquiry (1975) . The precise age 
groups chosen to measure dependency vary. Frequently the groupings are 
0-19, 20-64 and 65+, but sometimes the young group is taken as 0-14 and 
the old as 60+. The choice must depend on the society being considered, 
allowing for such factors as typical length of schooling and availa­
bility of social security.
Though commonly used as such, the simple dependency rate is not 
a satisfactory measure of the burden of dependency. The problems 
encountered here are related to those discussed by Muellbauer (1977) in 
the context of household equivalence scales for the effects of house­
hold composition on consumption. Whether an aged or a young dependent 
can be taken as a greater burden on an active member of the workforce 
will depend on which class of dependent consumes more. Estimates of 
relative burdens show very little agreement, and the debate can be
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found referred to in various papers in Espenshade and Serow (1978) . It 
is a question that goes beyond simple consumption scales into the area 
of the time cost of dependents. Stassart (1965) estimates that the 
value of housework in Belgium in 1956 was equal to a quarter of GNP, 
and that of this a third was services devoted to caring for children 
under sixteen years of age. This question is an important one since 
the reduction in total dependency that is projected to occur (in the 
sense of the falling total dependency rate noted earlier) as the aged 
dependency rate rises opens the possibility that some or all of the 
increased cost of aged dependents can be met by reduced expenditure 
needed for young dependents. This is an important area for future 
empirical work, involving not only measuring but at a more basic level 
defining the costs of different age groups of dependents.
One study which attempts to show the importance of a precise 
definition of dependency and the dependency burden is by Kleiman (1967) . 
Kleiman assumes that the aged consume more than do children and that 
the burden of an aged dependent is therefore greater than the burden 
of a young dependent. There is not agreement on this point: while 
Kleiman gives full adult consumption weight to the aged, Johansen 
(1957) uses a scale that gives a full adult a weight of 1, a weight for 
the 65+ group of .75 and weights of .8 and .9 respectively to the 10-11 
and 12-13 age groups.
In addition to assigning consumption weights to different age 
groups, Kleiman notes that the simply defined productive age group 
(generally the 20-64 group) contains a number of dependent groups, and 
suggests that the dependent female section of the productive age group 
is larger than the whole of the aged dependent group. He assigns 
labour force participation rates to different groups to determine the 
size of the working population that is supporting the various dependent
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groups in the total population, and uses his index to determine 
dependency in the U.S. population over the period 1870-1960.
He finds that over this period the dependency burden was lower 
and its decline smaller than is generally concluded on the basis of 
the unweighted index. Between 1880 and 1940, he finds, the ratio of 
consumer units to population was growing while between 1940 and 1960 
it was declining. Considering the period to 1950 he finds a decline 
in dependency due to a fall in the relative size of the young group in 
excess of the increase in the older group even though under his weigh­
ting the importance of the increase in the aged group is larger than 
under the usual measures. The numerical ratio of aged to young in the 
period 1870-1950 rose from 0.06 to 0.24 while in terms of consumer 
units, depending on which of his two possible scales he uses the 
increase was from 0.09 to 0.37 or from 0.15 to 0.61. In both cases 
the weighted increase in old relative to young was considerably greater 
than the unweighted increase.
In the sub-period 1940-1950 with no change in the working age 
population the aged population rose, but at the same time there was a 
sharp increase in the number of children under five years (the 
beginning of the baby boom) , the lowest weighted group of children, 
and a decline in the 10-19 age group (due to low Depression birth rates), 
the highest weighted group of young dependents. As a result the con­
sumption intake of the average young dependent fell. Thus as the young 
became younger the dependency burden fell when an increase would have 
been expected due to the beginning of the baby boom.
Similarly an increase in the labour force participation rate 
(LFPR) acts to spread the burden of the dependent population. On the 
basis of the 1960 LFPR the number of dependents per worker fell from 
1.7 in 1870 to 1.3 in 1940 and rose to 1.55 in 1960. These standard-
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ized estimates are considerably larger than would be expected on the 
basis of age group size alone and vary less over the period than do 
the unweighted figures.
Using consumer and worker equivalents Kleiman finds that the 
number of consumer units per potential worker falls with the relative 
size of the young group but not as much when their labour force con­
tribution is considered as when all young are regarded as dependents. 
Similarly under the weighted definitions growth in the aged population 
increases the dependency load less than it does under the original, 
unweighted definition.
Between 1940 and 1950 the declining share of the young population 
exactly matched the increase in the aged so by the standard definition 
there was no increase in dependency. Since the LFPR of the aged group 
exceeded that of the young the number of dependents per potential 
worker should have fallen. This effect was outweighed by the decline 
in the average LFPR of the young as they became younger so that overall 
dependency rose between 1940 and 1950.
Kleiman's results show that careful definition of dependency and 
of the associated burden is necessary, since any conclusion about the 
level and change of the burden of dependent populations depends crit­
ically on the definitions used.
We will not consider the broad costs of the two main dependent 
age groups here. Information is reasonably easily available on such 
costs as education (Canadian Institute for Research on Public Policy 
(1977)) and health (in particular from the reports of the Canadian 
medicare programs: the report of the Quebec plan - Regie (1977) - is 
quite detailed in this regard). Information on health costs of various 
age groups could be combined with information on age specific 
morbidity, such as that in Statistics Canada (1975), to form pro-
jections of changing health needs and costs as the population age 
structure changes.
In the next section we will deal with the effects of ageing on 
consumption patterns. The debate about the effects of population age­
ing contains a significant element of a revived secular stagnation 
thesis. In particular it is often suggested that smaller families 
(resulting from falling birth rates and so associated with the ageing 
population) lead to less expenditure on housing and housing services 
and that, given the importance of the housing sector in the economy 
this slump in housing will lead to a general economic recession. We 
shall show from a review of the literature that there is no significant 
evidence in support of this revival of the stagnation thesis, but that 
the housing market does play a significant role in determining the 
effects of an ageing population through life cycle consumption patterns.
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Ill Consumption Patterns and an Ageing Population
It is often assumed that changing population age structures will 
alter consumption patterns in a way that will have significant macro- 
economic effects. Hansen's 1939 presidential address to the American 
Economics Association is in many ways typical of arguments heard about 
the current ageing. Hansen feared that declining population growth 
and the associated population ageing would cause a shift in consumption 
patterns away from goods produced by capital intensive processes, and 
that this would result in a reduction in capital investment and so in 
a general recession. There is still some support for this view, 
mainly, as we noted above, in connection with the market for housing.
It is obvious that products aimed at specific age segments of the 
population will be affected as the size of their market increases or
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decreases as the population age structure changes, but the macroeconomic 
significance of these changes is not clear.
This question was considered in a general way by the 1972 U.S. 
Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. The Commission 
argued that while there would be lower sales in markets aimed directly 
at the younger age groups - baby foods, for example - other markets 
could expect increased sales (convenience foods and airline travel).
The Commission concluded that slower population growth would increase 
total as well as per capita income and demand. They considered sixteen 
major industries2 and concluded that even with slowing population growth,
none would face demand below levels then experienced. Fortune Magazine 
(March 10, 1980) reached a similar conclusion on the basis of the 
increasing prevalence of two income families as number of children 
declines.
In a more rigorous analysis Eilenstine and Cunningham (1972) 
approach the consumption pattern question on the basis of U.S. Surveys 
of Consumer Expenditure. They construct a stationary population 
equivalent to (in the sense of being based on U.S. life tables for 
1960) the real, growing U.S. population in 1960 and devise a distri­
bution of spending units classified by age of head and size of unit.
They find that the average propensity to consume for the growing popu­
lation in 1960 was .908 while the APC calculated for the stationary 
population was .905 so stationarity would have no significant effect 
on aggregate consumption and saving. They do find a shift in consum­
ption patterns: an eleven per cent decline in educational expenditures, 
a four per cent rise in medical expenditure and roughly a four per 
cent drop in clothing, clothing materials and services expenditure.
2 Including cars, men's suits, frozen food, household equipment, 
clothing and shoes, steel, and airline travel.
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Overall they conclude that the structural changes caused by station- 
arity are minimal and that there is certainly no reason to expect a 
dramatic swing away from goods requiring a high capital input. They 
note, however, that they are dealing with a stationary population 
corresponding to 1960 U.S. fertility and mortality conditions and that 
the oscillations required to attain stationarity might have major 
economic consequences which could be difficult to adjust to. Our 
simulations in later chapters will indicate that the effects of these 
oscillations can be significant, though in a different context from 
that used by Eilenstine and Cunningham.
Sullivan (1966) looked at age specific consumption patterns, 
dealing with changes expected in the near future (as he was writing) 
rather than the effects of achieving stationarity. His concern was 
the effect of the birth decline of the 1930's. On projections avail­
able in the 1960's he expected that by 1970 there would be 1.4 million 
fewer people in the U.S. aged 35-44 than there were in 1966, but that 
the 30-34 group would be growing (the result of the early years of the 
baby boom). Consumption levels are generally higher for those groups 
that he expected would be declining in the 1970's than for those he 
projected would have stopped declining (the 30-34 group had been 
falling in the early 1960's), but he projected that the overall decline 
in consumption due to demographic changes would be smaller than the 
decline he projected for the decade following 1966. The fall after 
1970 would be less because the groups then declining would be ages 
which tend to have lower consumption than do the preceding ages anyway. 
He included the results of budget surveys of expenditure on certain 
categories of goods by age of family head in 1960-61. The percentage 
distribution of expenditure did not vary much with age. The 55+ group 
tended to spend a larger part of its income on shelter (20.2% while
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the lowest figure was 17% for the 45-54 group), more on food (25.4%, 
the lowest being 21.6% in the under 25 age group) and medical care 
(8.5% against 5.7% for the under 25 group) and less on apparel and 
furnishings and equipment but again the difference in the percentages 
was not large.
Other references to the effect of ageing on consumption patterns 
can be found in Espenshade and Serow (1978). In general they show 
that changing age structures does not lead to dramatic swings in the 
pattern of consumption expenditure.
IV The Effects of an Ageing Population on the Housing Market
The housing sector is frequently cited as one in which the age­
ing of the population and slowing population growth will be strongly 
felt, perhaps with unfortunate economic consequences. The housing 
sector is typically regarded as very sensitive to demographic and 
economic factors. It is also regarded as one of the more important 
sectors of the economy in that a slowing in the housing sector is 
often seen as indicating, and because of the size of the sector quite 
possibly causing, a slowdown in the economy in general. Neal (1978) 
in a study of the U.S. case, sees some benefit in this. He antici­
pates that a slowing in the housing sector resulting from slowing 
population growth would free construction workers and materials for 
nonresidential construction which might otherwise be constrained .- 
Neal’s suggestion is atypical, suggesting benefits from the release of 
resources to other sectors. More typical is the view that Espenshade 
and Serow (1978) cite C.L. Barber as putting, that a fall in popu­
lation growth will bring a sharp reduction in the marginal productivity 
of capital which will in turn lead to a drop in net investment that
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will be particularly severe in the residential construction sector. 
Equally important is the question of whether there is likely to be a 
slump in housing demand as population growth slows.
Most studies of housing demand that include demographic factors 
investigate effects on expenditure on housing services. To a degree 
this is because many such studies use data from surveys of consumer 
expenditure. Conclusions about the effect of this sort of expenditure 
on the housing sector depend on inventory questions. Because houses 
are built in discrete units the timing of demand relative to the exist­
ing stock can be important in determining cycles in the demand for 
labour and materials in the housing sector. Without constructing a 
complete model of the housing sector it seems reasonable to use the 
flow of expenditure on housing services as a measure of the demand for 
housing and the state of the housing market.
The revived secular stagnation thesis is well represented by 
Cornwall (1972). He regards it as operating through what he terms 
nonconsumption family related expenditures, including consumer purchases 
of housing and consumer durables, construction of residential buildings 
including rental buildings, construction of stores and restaurants, 
government expenditure on education, hospitals and other items of non­
consumption expenditure related to the number of families in an area. 
Because of its size he regards this sort of expenditure as having a 
major driving role in the economy with housing especially important 
because, he argues, monetary policy has its greatest effect on mortgage 
rates and conditions and therefore has its greatest impact on the 
housing sector. His position is not the Hansen version of secular 
stagnation, which depended on the capital-output ratio in the economy, 
but a modified version which holds that population growth by increasing 
family related nonconsumption expenditure acts as a stabilizing factor
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preventing economic decline. Slower population growth removes this 
stabilizer so the slower the population is growing the higher the un­
employment rate and the more severe is any recession that might occur.
Versions of the stagnation thesis are often found in popular 
discussion, as for example in the Financial Times of Canada, April 19, 
1979 where it is claimed that large and numerous families lead to an 
increase in the demand for consumer durables and housing, which leads 
to an increase in facilities used to produce them, which in turn 
increases capital expenditure (a secular stagnation thesis closer to 
Hansen's than is Cornwall's). The Times regards it as surprising that 
long term models of the Canadian economy do not take account of this 
relationship between the fertility rate and capital expenditure, and 
says that businessmen must modify their plans in view of the "bad news 
about the fertility rate".
Fspcnshade (1978) considered the effect on consumer expenditure 
of moving to a stationary population. He used data from the U.S.
Survey of Consumer Expenditure for various years, including the survey 
figure for expenditure on housing services. He found that neither 
family size nor age distribution variables had a significant effect on 
personal consumption of housing services per capita (he also found 
that the relative price of housing had a significant negative effect 
on expenditure) . He used the results of regressions explaining 
expenditure on various sorts of goods to project the distribution of 
personal consumption in a stationary population based on the U.S.
Census Bureau series B (three children per family) and series E (two 
children per family) population projections. In both cases the share 
of expenditure on housing services in total expenditure rose slightly, 
from 21.34% in 1975 to 25.03% in the series B stationary population 
and to 24.99% in the series E stationary population. Total consum­
ption expenditure and expenditure on housing services were larger in
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the series B population but the difference per capita never exceeded 
one eighth (reaching the maximum difference in 1995). He also found 
that the direct effects of demographic changes were offset by the 
increase in total consumption per head resulting from reduced fertility, 
and concluded that the belief that an ageing population would signifi­
cantly alter broad patterns of consumption was not supported although 
he acknowledged that there might be redistributions within the broad 
categories of consumer expenditure he considered.
Ridker (1978) cited several studies which found that different 
population growth assumptions made little difference to the pattern of 
consumption expenditure. Ridker did find some differences depending on 
which U.S. Census Bureau projections he used, and suggested that the 
reason for this difference was that his study did not take systematic 
account of demographic changes.
A number of studies have estimated demand functions for housing 
services and other goods taking explicit account of demographic 
variables. Parks and Barten (1973) and Lluch, Powell and Williams 
(1977) use Linear Expenditure System forms of the consumption function 
and test the effects of demographic variables on the threshold para­
meters (levels of committed consumption) and the budget shares (shares 
of each good in expenditure above committed expenditure - in the 
Extended LES equations described by Lluch et.al. these become marginal 
propensities to consume out of total income).
The value of each of these studies for our purposes is lessened 
by the form in which the demographic variables are tested. Parks and 
Barten use the proportion of the population in age groups 0-9, 10-19, 
20-64 and 65+. While this division gives some idea of the effects of 
changes in the dependent age group it misses the effect of changes in 
the distribution within the 20-64 group and does not therefore allow
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for the effect of movements through the life cycle of earnings even 
though it is this effect that, as we shall show later, is probably the 
most significant factor affecting the consumption of housing services. 
Lluch et.al. in their chapter on consumption patterns in Mexico divide 
households into Young and Old depending on whether the head is younger 
or older than 45, excluding retired households, and into large and 
small households with more or less than five members. The result of 
their use of 45 as the dividing line between young and old is that the 
older households have higher incomes than the younger in all cases, 
regardless of size or socioeconomic grouping (they classify households 
as workers, entrepreneurs or technocrats). Despite these weaknesses 
both of these studies are of interest to the question of demographic 
effects on housing demand.
Parks and Barten, using data from 14 OECD countries for the 
period 1950-67/68 estimated LES functions for Food, Clothing, Housing 
(defined as Rent in their source), Durables and Others (Services) .
They estimated two forms of the LES equations, one unweighted and one 
weighted to correct for heteroscedasticity due to differences in 
precision of the estimates for each country. In each case they esti­
mated LES equations for the five commodities from grouped data from all 
fourteen countries. In general they found that only income had a sig­
nificant positive effect on the threshold parameters. In the unweighted 
equations none of the age variables had a significant effect on housing 
expenditures and in the weighted case the only significant effect was a 
negative coefficient on the proportion of the population aged 0-9. The 
proportion 65+ might have a significant negative effect at the 10% 
level of significance but not at the 1% or 5% levels. They suggested 
that a 1% increase in the proportion in the 10-19 age group matched by 
a 1% decrease in the 20-64 group would tend to increase expenditure on
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housing, but since the coefficient on the 10-19 variable has a t 
statistic of only .87 the validity of this conclusion is doubtful.
They also tested the effects of demographic factors on the 
marginal propensity to consume housing services. They found that none 
of the demographic factors had a significant effect and that income 
had a significant effect but with so small a coefficient that there did 
not appear to be serious nonlinearity in the housing equation.
Parks and Barten concluded that the impact of the demographic 
factors they tested was mainly on the threshold parameters of the LES 
system. Their detailed results show clearly that the effect, while 
significant for the non-durable categories of food and clothing (the 
proportion of population 0-9 had a negative effect on both, not sig­
nificant in the case of clothing, while the other dependent age groups 
had a significant positive effect), is not a major factor determining 
expenditure on housing or durables. They concluded that an increase 
in the aged dependency rate would tend to lower cross price elastic­
ities across their consumption categories. The statistical weakness of 
their results tends to support Espenshade’s conclusion that any changes 
associated with ageing will, at least in consumption, tend to be very 
minor, and their results particularly with regard to housing provide no 
support for the secular stagnation hypothesis.
Lluch et.al. estimate LES equations for Mexico to test the 
effects of the rough division into age and family size noted earlier.
They also test for differences between Mexico City and other urban 
areas and for the effect of dividing the population into three classes, 
workers (paid workers, domestic servants and skilled and unskilled 
workers), entrepreneurs (employers and the self-employed) and technocrats 
(administrative employees and technical and professional workers).
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In general they found that the age of the head of the household 
had no effect on the level of the threshold, being significantly 
negative though small only in the case of durables, probably reflecting 
the fact that most households will have acquired most of their major 
durable goods by age 45. They also found that the own price elastic­
ities were generally larger (in absolute terms) at higher income levels 
(but as Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) show, estimates of price 
elasticities under LES systems are suspect) .
The patterns that Lluch et.al. report are not as clear as they 
suggest, and in many cases the statistical support for their conclusions 
is weak. Certainly their results, like those of Parks and Barten and 
of Espcnshade provide no support for the secular stagnation hypothesis.
A similar lack of support for stagnation is found in Reid (1962).
Reid finds that the differences in housing with age are minor 
compared with differences due to income differences. She finds that 
expenditures on housing do not change as much with age as associated 
income changes would suggest because family size also rises with age, 
competing with housing for budget shares. She and a number of other 
workers, including Lluch et.al. conclude that there are significant 
economies of scale in housing which cause expenditure on other, 
generally nondurable, goods to rise at the expense of housing in budget 
share terms as family size rises.
One other interesting study (interesting as much for its approach 
as for its conclusions, which agree with those of the studies already 
discussed) is by Rosen (1979). Rosen's aim was to determine the effects 
of mortgage interest and municipal tax deductions from U.S. income tax 
on the housing market, but in studying this he allowed for several 
demographic factors. lie included dummy variables for the age of the 
household head (ages 26-40, 41-55 and 56+) and the number of dependent
c h i l d r e n  (one,  two o r  t h r e e  or  more c h i l d r e n  under seven teen  y e a r s  o f  
age) .
Rosen e s t i m a t e s  a p r o b i t  e qua t ion  f o r  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  owning 
a house and an e q u a t io n  f o r  t h e  q u a n t i t y  o f  housing s e r v i c e s  pu rchased ,  
where q u a n t i t y  of  s e r v i c e s  i s  based  on the  va lue  o f  a house d e f l a t e d  
by a U.S. Bureau o f  Labour S t a t i s t i c s  index acc oun t ing  f o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  
in  g ro ss  housing  p r i c e s  f a c i n g  d i f f e r e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  
c i t i e s .  He f i n d s  t h a t  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  owning a house r i s e s  s i g n i ­
f i c a n t l y  with  age ,  a l l  t h e  age group c o e f f i c i e n t s  be ing  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
p o s i t i v e  and each l a r g e r  than  the  c o e f f i c i e n t  on the  age immediately 
b e f o r e .  He has  more d i f f i c u l t y  in the  case  o f  dependent  c h i l d r e n ,  
conc lud ing  t h a t  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  owning g e n e r a l l y  in c re a s e s , ,  though 
no t  m o n o to n ic a l ly ,  with th e  number o f  c h i l d r e n .  In f a c t  the  c o e f ­
f i c i e n t  on th e  v a r i a b l e  f o r  t h r e e  or  more dependent  c h i l d r e n  i s  
s l i g h t l y  s m a l l e r  than  t h a t  on two c h i l d r e n  and,  acco rd ing  to  Rosen, 
th e  d i f f e r e n c e  in  the  c o e f f i c i e n t s  i s  no t  s i g n i f i c a n t .  Ra ther  than  
i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ownership r i s e s  w ith  number o f  
c h i l d r e n  t h i s  may i n d i c a t e  a t h r e s h o l d  e f f e c t  by which f a m i l i e s  with  
more than one c h i l d  a r e  more l i k e l y  to  own and with  i n c r e a s e s  in  fami ly  
s i z e  beyond t h i s  t h r e s h o l d  having no s i g n i f i c a n t  impact  on the  p r o ­
b a b i l i t y  o f  buying a house .  O vera l l  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  owning a house 
i s  no t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  by demographic f a c t o r s  and Rosen f i n d s ,  
as  do o t h e r  r e s e a r c h e r s ,  t h a t  th e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r s  a r e  income 
and the  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  of  hous ing .
Rosen e s t i m a t e s  an e q u a t io n  f o r  q u a n t i t y  o f  housing  purchased  
u s in g  the  same e x p l a n a to r y  v a r i a b l e s  as in  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  purchase  
e q u a t io n .  He f i n d s  t h a t  q u a n t i t y  r i s e s  w i th  age o f  head and f a l l s  
with  the  number o f  dependent  c h i l d r e n .  He r e g a rd s  th e  n e g a t iv e
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c o e f f i c i e n t  on the  number o f  c h i l d r e n  as somewhat c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e  and
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s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i t  occurs  because  income was not  d e f l a t e d  by fam i ly  s i z e .  
He f i n d s  t h a t  j o i n t l y  th e  v a r i a b l e s  f o r  dependent  c h i l d r e n  do no t  add 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  t h e  e x p l a n a to r y  power o f  the  e q u a t io n  and so drops 
them, and concludes  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  i n f l u e n c e  the d e c i s i o n  t o  buy or  to 
r e n t  b u t  n o t  the  va lue  of  th e  house pu rchased .
One o f  the  most d e t a i l e d  s t u d i e s  o f  demographic i n f l u e n c e  on 
demand f o r  hous ing  and o t h e r  d u r a b l e s  i s  by David (1962) .  D av id ' s  
r e g r e s s i o n s 3 i n d i c a t e  s e v e r a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between demographic f a c t o r s  
and hous ing .  He f i n d s  t h a t  fami ly  s i z e  i s  i n v e r s e l y  r e l a t e d  to  th e  
q u a l i t y  o f  hous ing ( i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  e x p ec t  a q u a n t i t y - q u a l i t y  
t r a d e - o f f ) , t h a t  f requency  o f  home ownership r i s e s  w i th  t h e  age o f  the  
household  head ,  t h a t  ownership i s  more l i k e l y  f o r  m arr i ed  than  fo r  
s i n g l e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and more l i k e l y  f o r  coup le s  w i th  c h i l d r e n  than  f o r  
coup les  w i th o u t .  On U.S.  d a t a  f o r  1955 he f in d s  t h a t  f requency  o f  
ownership  r i s e s  with  fami ly  s i z e  f o r  f a m i l i e s  wi th incomes o f  $4000 
and up,  and f a l l s  as  fami ly  s i z e  i n c r e a s e s  f o r  incomes o f  $3000 and 
under .  There i s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  n e g a t iv e  r e l a t i o n  between fami ly  s i z e  
and house v a lu e  p e r  room and a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n  between 
income and number o f  rooms owned and house va lu e  p e r  room. Age o f  
head and age o f  o l d e s t  and younges t  c h i l d  were found to have no 
s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t .
David g e t s  s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  e x p l a i n i n g  number o f  rooms r e n t e d  and 
r e n t  pa id  pe r  room. He f i n d s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a l a r g e r  income e l a s t i c i t y  
fo r  rooms r e n t e d  than  f o r  rooms owned and s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  due to  
two main f a c t o r s ,  t h a t  r e n t e d  houses were g e n e r a l l y  s m a l l e r  than 
owner occupied  houses and t h a t  r e n t e r s  te n d  to  move more f r e q u e n t l y  
than  owners and can a d j u s t  t h e i r  housing  consumption to income more 
e a s i l y  than  can owners. R en te r s  a l s o  te nded  t o  have lower average
3 Simple r a t h e r  than  m u l t i p l e  r e g r e s s i o n s .
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incomes than d id  owners.  Economies o f  s c a l e  were found f o r  both 
owners and r e n t e r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  r e n t e r s .
David p r e s e n t s  much o f  h i s  d a t a  in t a b l e s  s u i t a b l e  f o r  a n a l y s i s  
o f  v a r i a n c e  t e s t s .  His t a b l e  5 .3 ,  f o r  example,  shows average  number 
o f  rooms occupied  by fam i ly  s i z e  and income c l a s s .  In c o n s i d e r i n g  
D a v id ' s  d a t a  we exclude  the  lowes t  income c l a s s  and the  l a r g e s t  f am i ly  
s i z e  as both have a l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  c e l l s  based on r e l a t i v e l y  few 
o b s e r v a t i o n s  and because  in  both cases  th e  r e s u l t s  a r e  l i k e l y  to  be 
h e a v i l y  in f l u e n c e d  by s u b s i s t e n c e  e f f e c t s  and l i m i t e d  b u d g e t s .
C ons ide r ing  th e  f i v e  by f i v e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  remains  we f i n d  
t h a t  th e  fam i ly  s i z e  e f f e c t  has an F v a l u e  o f  1.1725 w hile  t h e  c r i t i c a l  
F f o r  (4 ,16)  degrees  o f  freedom a t  th e  5% le v e l  i s  3 .06 .  The income 
e f f e c t  has an F of  22.36 so th e  r e s u l t s  do suppor t  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an 
income e f f e c t  bu t  do not  suppo r t  the  cla im David makes o f  having  found 
t h a t  fam i ly  s i z e  i s  a ve ry  s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  in  housing d e c i s i o n s .  Of 
th e  v a r io u s  fam i ly  s i z e s  c ons ide re d  only  th e  l a r g e s t  a r e  shown to  have 
a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t .  C ons ide r ing  D av id ' s  f i g u r e s  on fami ly  s i z e  and 
income r e l a t e d  to  va lu e  per  room we f i n d  t h a t  D av id ' s  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  
in c r e a s e d  fam i ly  s i z e  reduce s  va lu e  per  room i s  suppor ted  (F = 1 1 .5 1 ) .
In a l l  f am i ly  s i z e  groups income i s  found to  have a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  
on v a lu e .
David a l s o  i n c lu d e s  a t a b l e  which c l a s s i f i e s  t h e  va lu e  o f  hous ing  
by age o f  head (25-34,  35-44,  45-64 yea r s )  and number o f  peop le  in  th e  
fam i ly  (2, 3 or  4, and 5 or  over)  and fam i ly  income b e fo re  t a x .  T e s t i n g  
w i th in  age o f  head we f ind  t h a t  in each o f  t h e  age groups income has  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on th e  t o t a l  va lue  o f  th e  house w hile  f a m i ly  s i z e  
does no t  have a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t .  T e s t i n g  a c r o s s  ages in t h e  c a s e  o f  
f a m i l i e s  o f  t h r e e  or  fou r  persons  we f i n d  t h a t  income i s  s i g n i f i c a n t
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and s i z e  n o t .  All o f  t h e s e  t e s t s  sugges t  t h a t  income i s  th e  dominant 
f a c t o r  in d e t e rm in in g  t h e  demand f o r  hous ing .  David a l s o  f i n d s  t h a t  
age o f  head in f l u e n c e s  t h e  number o f  rooms occupied  more s t r o n g l y  than  
does  f am i ly  s i z e .
Value o f  hous ing i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a s u b s t i t u t e  fo r  s i z e  when 
the  demand f o r  l abour  in the  hous ing  s e c t o r  i s  be ing  c o n s i d e r e d .  I t  
may be t h a t  a h ig h e r  q u a l i t y  house r e q u i r e s  no more labour  to  c o n s t r u c t  
than  does a lower q u a l i t y  house o f  the  same s i z e .  In any case  the  
ev idence  o f  economies o f  s c a l e  in  housing i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  l a r g e r  
f a m i l i e s  cannot  be counted on to  cause a boom in  th e  hous ing  s e c t o r .
R e la ted  to  the  s t a g n a t i o n  t h e s i s  about  hous ing  demand i s  a s im­
i l a r  t h e o ry  about  the  e f f e c t s  on s lowing p o p u l a t i o n  growth on the  
demand f o r  consumer d u r a b l e s ,  but  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  no b e t t e r  suppor ted  
th a n  i s  t h a t  about  hous ing .  Parks and Bar ten  (1973) found t h a t  only  
th e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  p o p u la t i o n  aged 0-9 had a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on the  
t h r e s h o l d  consumption o f  d u r a b l e s  and t h a t  e f f e c t  was n e g a t i v e .  Both 
th e  p r o p o r t i o n  10-19 and the  p r o p o r t i o n  65+ in c r e a s e d  the  m arg ina l  
p r o p e n s i t y  to  consume d u r a b l e s ,  with c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  rough ly  equal  s i z e .  
Lluch e t . a l .  (1977) found s i g n i f i c a n t  economies o f  s c a l e  i n  t h e i r  
Mexican d a t a ,  and found on South American d a t a  t h a t  d u r a b l e  pu rchases  
fo l low  a c l e a r  l i f e  cy c l e  p a t t e r n ,  with  h ig h e r  spending  by th e  young. 
Sch ipper  (1964) found evidence  on the  e f f e c t  o f  fam i ly  s i z e  on p u r ­
chases  o f  d u r a b l e s  weak bu t  concluded t h a t  as  f am i ly  s i z e  ro s e  average  
e x p e n d i tu r e  on d u r a b l e s  f e l l ,  lie found t h a t  th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  age o f  
th e  head o f  th e  household was i n c o n c l u s i v e .
F i n a l l y ,  David found t h a t  t h e r e  may be a t h r e s h o l d  e f f e c t  o f  
fam i ly  s i z e  on purchases  o f  d u ra b le s  in  t h a t  on ly  f a m i l i e s  o f  two or  
more people  buy d r y e r s  and f r e e z e r s .  Family  s i z e  makes no d i f f e r e n c e
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to purchases of furniture or television sets, and purchases of furni­
ture tend to follow a life cycle pattern, being greater at younger ages. 
In general he found that family size and age structure did not signi­
ficantly affect total expenditure on durables.
V_____Age Structure and the Demand for Different Types of Housing
The studies surveyed in the previous section indicate that there 
is no support for the view that slowing population growth (and the 
ageing it causes) seriously affect the housing market in the sense of 
causing a slump which is transmitted to the rest of the economy.
There is one way that changing age distribution does affect the 
housing market, however. In this section we shall consider evidence on 
the effect of population age structure on the demand for different 
types of housing, and in particular the life cycle of housing demand. 
The papers reviewed here indicate that there is a significant life 
cycle effect - that the type of housing demanded alters at different 
stages of the consumer’s life. This is turn affects the economy 
through the pressure it puts on the mortgage market and interest rates. 
Our simulations in later chapters will show that interest rate effects 
can cause the changing age structure of the population to have signi­
ficant effects on the economy as a whole.
Hass (1972) considers the effect of the changing U.S. age dis­
tribution on the housing market in the period 1950-70. While he does 
not present statistical analysis of the effects he discusses, he does 
describe how trends in housing can be related to certain changes in 
the age distribution of the population.
According to Hass, in the period 1950-58 the most heavily popu­
lated of all five year age groups in the U.S. age structure were the
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0-4 and 5-9 groups. The 10-15 and 15-19 groups were unusually small 
because of the low births of the 1930's and the next four age groups 
were larger due to births in the 1910-29 period with a slight bulge in 
the 25-30 age group because of the slight post World War One baby boom. 
Excluding the two youngest groups this means that the 20-24 and 25-30 
age groups were the most populous ages in the U.S. in 1950. The 
median age at first marriage in 1950 was 22.8 years for men and 20.3 
for women (and in 1940 had been 24.3 and 21.5 years respectively). Of 
married women aged 20-24, 66.7% had at least one child, in the 25-29 
group 78.9% had at least one child. As a result the bulk of the labour 
force was in the early years of the life cycle of income, and follow­
ing the typical pattern of income over the life cycle could anticipate 
incomes rising rapidly but still below peak for some years. Hass 
argues that this age distribution created two specific demands, demand 
for housing adequate for the needs of a young family at the low end of 
the income cycle, and demand for loanable funds.
The supply of loanable funds is likely to place a significant 
constraint on young families. Cornwall (1972) regarded the mortgage 
fund market as so sensitive as to be the primary channel of monetary 
policy's to effect on aggregate demand, and Morgan (1965) found that 
expected lifetime income had no significant effect on housing 
consumption, probably because the structure of the labour and capital 
markets kept it from being fully realized. David also found that young 
families consumed less housing than their income and family size would 
have predicted, but he did not relate this to possible capital market 
constraints.
We also expect the type of housing demanded by young (as distinct 
from small) families to differ from that demanded by older families. 
David, for example, found that the age of the head of the household was
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more important in determining the quantity of housing purchased than 
was family size.
Given these conditions and the fact that rental requires a 
smaller capital investment than does ownership, and the tendency of 
young earners to dissave, it is not surprising that these families 
should tend to rent. On this basis Hass suggests that the U.S. should 
have experienced a boom in rental construction in the 1950's. He 
notes that there were factors operating against this effect: a rela­
tively large part of the age distribution was in the net saving years, 
tending to increase the supply of loanable funds, and at the same time 
U.S. Federal Housing Administration policies were encouraging mortgage 
lending so some of the demand that might have gone to the rental 
market could go to ownership, increasing the demand for small housing 
generally.
In the U.S. in 1950, according to Hass, most existing housing 
was larger than that generally demanded by young families. As a 
result there was a boom in the construction of small single family 
houses - the typical Fl 1A insured new home in 1950 was 838 square feet 
compared to existing FHA homes of 1006 sq. ft. New houses in the FHA 
insured class were generally cheaper than existing homes. The year 
1950 had the greatest number of housing starts and the largest single 
addition to inventory of any year in the period 1950-65. It also had 
the highest percentage of rental housing starts of the period 1950-58.’
Over the period 1950-58 young households aged and moved to 
higher income segments of the income curve. The population below 
seventeen continued to grow rapidly but the proportion 20-30 declined. 
As a result construction in 1951-58 was dominated by single family 
dwellings, but the floor space of FHA housing starts rose from 838 sq. 
ft. in 1950 to 924 in 1952, 962 in 1954, 1064 in 1956 and 1092 in 1958.
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Unfortunately Hass does not test for possible effects of growth in 
national income over that period and the possibility that housing size 
could be a normal good, rising with overall income levels.
In the period 1959-65 the first of the baby boom cohort entered 
the household formation years and the baby boom itself ended. The 
result, according to Hass, was a bimodal housing market with a large 
population in the late teens and early twenties, a small population in 
the mid 30’s and a large population in the late 30's and early 40's.
The upper mode was in the years associated with large houses, the 
younger mode in the rental years. The proportion of new apartments 
built rose from 14% of total in 1958 to 37% in 1964 (it had been 15% 
in 1950) and single family dwelling starts under FHA rose from 1095 
sq. ft. in 1959 to 1167 in 1965.
In the period 1965-70 as the later baby boom generation entered 
the housing market the demand for small, cheap rentals continued 
strong and multi-family dwelling starts continued high. The upper age 
mode passed the peak earning years and their demand for housing fell 
off, single family dwelling starts reaching their lowest level of the 
1950-70 period, the floor area of new housing starts fell after 1965 
and sale prices of new houses peaked in 1969.
In all of these periods Hass notes other factors that may have 
affected the housing market, in particular the probable tightening of 
the mortgage markets as the lower mode entered the heavy borrowing 
years while the upper mode passed the peak saving years. During 1964-70 
mortgage interest rates rose faster than household incomes.
On the basis of his analysis Hass made some rough projections of 
housing demand for the period after 1970. He noted that the population 
peaks would be in the lower and older ages, the groups least able to 
afford houses, while the peak saving years would have little growth in
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numbers. He anticipated continued demand for small, relatively low 
quality rental accommodation in the period 1970-75 but also rising 
demand for more expensive rental units as families in the 25-34 age 
group, which might have purchased small houses, would be forced to 
continue to rent by high mortgage rates. Since the 35-54 group would 
not grow much, housing starts related to this group would be limited 
mainly to replacement.
Assuming continued high mortgage rates after 1975 he anticipated 
that the demand for inexpensive rental units would fall off and be 
replaced by demand for more expensive rentals. There would also be the 
first significant rise in the 35-44 age group in fifteen years, leading 
to a substantial demand for middle price range housing but the decline 
in the 45-54 age group would lead to a fall in the demand for larger 
houses.
In the period 1980-85, he suggested, the population would con­
tinue to build up in the small and medium sized home ages with no 
significant increase in the demand for larger houses. If there were to 
be a continued trend to apartments for the 45-54 age group the demand 
for large houses would fall off still further.
Hass suggested that the years of the late 1970's and early and 
mid 1980's would be years of fairly high price elasticity of demand for 
housing as young families could switch to higher quality rental units 
rather than small but relatively expensive houses. Combined with a fall 
in the demand for large houses and a relatively slow rise in the demand 
for medium sized houses the secular stagnation thesis might seem to be 
supported in these circumstances. In fact such a slump would be a 
response to higher prices, not to slower population growth.
As the baby boom group ages it would tend to increase the demand 
first for small, later medium and large houses over twenty to forty
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years. The demographic factor that might cause a slump in the housing 
market would be the shortage of people in the net saving years as the 
number of borrowers rose and such a slump would result from the high 
mortgage interest rates this situation would cause.
A more recent study of the life cycle effects on the housing 
market is by Marcin (1976) . Marcin, like Hass, assesses the life cycle 
of housing demand and suggests that the apartment boom in the U.S. in 
the 1960's and 1970's could be accounted for mainly by demographic 
factors. Marcin observes that in the mid 1970's single family con­
struction began to pick up and apartment construction to fall off, and 
suggests that in the past rapidly rising mortgage rates and construction 
costs had tended to shift demand to rental units. He suggests that this 
shift would end by the 1980's, the apartment boom would end and although 
there would be a continued demand for higher quality apartments there 
would be a general oversupply of apartments.
VI Conclusion
The evidence in the literature reviewed in this chapter does not 
support a form of secular stagnation theory based on changing consum­
ption patterns as the age structure of the population changes. The 
literature on dependency rates, though, indicates that the demographic 
factor being examined must be carefully defined. If we start from the 
simple proposition that barring durable goods all of the consumption 
by the dependent classes in any period must come from the output 
produced by the active groups in that period we clearly have the basis 
for a notion of the burden of a dependent population. In analyzing the 
effects of a changing age structure we should look at a mix of con­
sumption and production effects. Conceptually the production factors
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a re  r e a s o n a b l y  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ,  a l th o u g h  t h e r e  may be e m p i r i c a l  
problems a s s o c i a t e d  with  measurement.  They depend on the  la b o u r  f o r c e  
a c t i v i t y  and p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  age g roups .  The consumption 
e f f e c t s  w i l l  come not  from the  consumption mix chosen bu t  from the  
t im ing  o f  consumption d e c i s i o n s .  We have seen one f a c t o r  in  th e  rev iew 
o f  the l i t e r a t u r e  on hous ing  demand where i t  i s  assumed t h a t  th e  popu­
l a t i o n  age mix w i l l  have a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on the  mortgage m a rk e t .
A young p o p u la t i o n  w i l l  have a l a rg e  p r o p o r t i o n  borrowing f o r  hous ing  
pu rp o s es ,  and t h i s  w i l l  tend  to  d r i v e  the  mortgage i n t e r e s t  r a t e  up .
We would expec t  s i m i l a r  e f f e c t s  in  o t h e r  a r e a s  as p a r t  o f  th e  t y p i c a l  
l i f e  cy c le  p a t t e r n  o f  consumption.  B io lo g ic a l  f a c t o r s  r e s t r i c t  c h i l d  
b e a r i n g  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  segment o f  l i f e ,  and once the  fam i ly  fo rm a t ion  
d e c i s i o n  has been made a s e t  o f  consumption d e c i s i o n s ,  o f  which the  
hous ing d e c i s i o n  i s  p robab ly  th e  l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  elemen t ,  f o l l o w .  The 
b i o l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  on r e p r o d u c t i o n  i s  undoubted ly  a majo r  reason  the  
observed l i f e  c y c l e  p a t t e r n  o f  consumption t a k e s  th e  form i t  does .
This means t h a t  the  l i f e  cy c le  model o f  consumption i s  a r e a s o n ­
a b l e  s t a r t i n g  p l a c e  f o r  any a n a l y s i s  o f  the  e f f e c t s  o f  p o p u la t i o n  
age ing .  We do not  wish to  use  a s i n g l e  l i f e  cyc le  a g g re g a te  consumpt ion 
fu n c t i o n  o f  the  Ando-Modiglian i  ty p e ,  s in c e  even augmented by demo­
g ra p h ic  v a r i a b l e s  such an e q u a t io n  i s  l i k e l y  to  smooth ou t  many o f  t h e  
i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  o f  p o p u la t i o n  age ing .  I n s t e a d ,  we p r e f e r  to  
d i v i d e  the  p o p u la t i o n  i n t o  s e v e r a l  age groups and a s s ig n  each group a 
s p e c i f i c  consumpt ion f u n c t i o n  chosen to  r e p r e s e n t  the  t y p i c a l  l i f e  
cy c l e  p a t t e r n  o f  consumption.  One advantage  o f  t h i s  approach i s  t h a t  
s in ce  the l i f e  c y c le  p a t t e r n  i s  in  l a r g e  p a r t  due to  the  p r e s e n c e  of  
dependent  c h i l d r e n  in  younger f a m i l i e s  we can ignore  t h i s  s i d e  o f  
dependency,  a t  l e a s t  in  our  formal a n a l y s i s ,  s in c e  i t  i s  a l low ed  f o r  in  
the  f u n c t i o n s  we work w i th .  Thus we can c o n c e n t r a t e  on th e  e f f e c t s  o f  
i n c r e a s i n g  th e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  th e  p o p u la t i o n  in  the  aged group.
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The theoretical system best suited to this sort of analysis is 
the consumption-loan system devised in Samuelson (1958), reviewed in 
Chapter Three. The later chapters deal with the important distri­
butional effects revealed by the consumption-loan framework and covered 
up in a more aggregative approach.
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CHAPTER 3
CONSUMPTION-LOAN MODELS: REVIEW AND DISCUSSION
I_____The Consumption-Loan Model - .
In the following chapters we shall analyze the effects of popu­
lation ageing in the framework of Samuelson's overlapping generation 
consumption-loan model. This chapter reviews the basic consumption- 
loan model of Samuelson's 1958 article, and a number of the articles 
which discussed the properties of Samuelson's system. We do not, in 
this chapter, deal explicitly with an ageing population. Instead we 
consider the nature of intergenerational exchange in the consumption- 
loan system. Later chapters will deal explicitly with an ageing 
population in the consumption-loan system.
According to Samuelson the aim of his 1958 paper was "to give a 
complete general equilibrium solution to the determination of the time 
shape of interest rates. This sounds easy ..." (p. 467). This aim 
waS quickly lost in the consumption-loan literature, however, and the 
work that followed Samuelson's dealt with the distributional impli­
cations of the model and with the optimum properties of steady state 
solutions based on different interest rates. Diamond's 1965 paper on 
National Debt seems to have ended the use of the consumption-loan (C-L) 
framework for determining interest rates until a set of 1979 papers by 
Kemp and Long on the use of the overlapping generation structure 
effectively rediscovered Lerner's 1959 objections to Samuelson's paper.
Samuelson's model was designed to eliminate all influences on 
interest rates other than life cycle considerations. He assumed a 
world of no durable goods so there could be no direct saving. The only 
way an individual could save was by lending to someone who wanted to
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consume in excess of their current income, in return for a promise 
that the debt would be repaid in the future out of the borrower's 
future income. Of Bohm-Bawerk's three reasons for the existence of a 
positive interest rate (the more abundant provision for needs in the 
future, the existence of physical investment possibilities, and the 
existence of positive time preference) Samuelson assumed away all but 
the first.
In Samuelson's basic model the individual is assumed to have a 
life of three periods, two as a "worker" during which he receives a 
fixed income or endowment, and a third in retirement during which he 
receives no income. Consumption by children is included in consumption 
by their parents and so ignored. A solitary person in this world 
would die at the beginning of his retirement period since he would have 
had no means of providing for consumption in retirement. Ignoring 
Samuelson's discussion of the beginning of the world, though, there are 
always three generations alive so the possibility exists for inter- 
generational exchange.
Consider this three-age, overlapping generation case with no 
durable goods and no money. In any period there are three individuals 
(or three classes of individuals identical within each class) alive: 
ages one, two. and three. Call the youngest- individual A, the second B 
and the oldest C and assume they are not altruistic. Then in period t 
we have
' Age____ 1 2 3
A B C
and in period t+1 a new individual, D, has been born and an old one,
C has died so we have
Age_ 1 2  3
D A B
51
Clearly there is no point in period t in either A or B making loans to 
C since in t+1 C will not be alive to repay them. Any transfers from 
A or B to C (who has no source of income in t) must be purely 
altruistic, and these we have excluded. Similarly even if B wishes to 
consume more than his income in t there is no point in A making a loan 
to B (and it is not possible for C to make a loan) since in t+1 B will 
have no income and so will be unable to repay A. The only feasible set 
of transfers in this barter world has B making a loan to A in t, and A 
repaying B (and making a loan to D so the process will continue) in 
t+1. A complication may arise if A has no great desire to consume 
more than his current income in t. Then for B to guarantee his own 
retirement consumption he will have to offer the loan to A at a nega­
tive real interest rate sufficient to persuade A to take it. Even 
though he recovers less than he lends B is better off in this case 
than in the no-trade case in which he has no retirement consumption 
at all.
Even though this is the only possible set of trades for a barter 
world, this is not the direction much of the consumption-loan liter­
ature took. Early in the literature the idea developed that two-and 
three-age models were essentially identical - that is, that the 
results of a model in which the individual lived only two periods and 
received an income only in the first could be extended to models in 
which he lived more periods. For some purposes the two sorts of model 
are equivalent, for others the differences are important. In a two- 
age model it is impossible for one generation to make a direct loan to 
the other because when the time came for the loan to be repaid one 
party to the trade would be dead - as though B made a loan to C in 
period t above. This complication lead to emphasis on the social 
contrivance of money and the existence of a central financial inter-
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mediary as a necessary third party in any trade. This in turn put the 
emphasis on the distributive features of the model, as in Cass and 
Yaari (1966), rather than on the determination of the interest rate in 
a world of intergenerational trades.
Samuelson’s 1958 paper did deal with a three-age model. He 
assumed that people produced one unit of output in each of ages one 
and two, and none in age three, and that they consumed in all three 
ages. All generations had the same intertemporal utility function 
UCC^jC^C^). Samuelson wished to eliminate the influence of time 
preference and in his examples worked with a utility function 
U = lnC^ + + lnC^. His biological interest rate result proved to
be independent of the form of the utility function used, which form 
determined the other possible equilibrium interest rates for the 
system. Since Samuelson found the biological rate (the term he used 
for the interest rate equal to the rate of population growth) to be 
unstable the form of the utility function determined the interest rate 
the system would actually tend to, and the form of the utility function 
would depend in part on the time preference of the individual .
Samuelson did not, therefore, succeed in completely eliminating the 
impact of time preference on the interest rate.
In a stationary population the number of births, B, is the same 
in each period. Since nobody dies before the end of his third period 
of life in this model in any period there are B people of age one, B of 
age two and B of age three, the retirement age, alive. Total output 
equals 2B.
The discount factor between goods of periods t and t+1 is 
R = l/(l+r^) where r^  is the single period interest rate. The aim of 
the model is to determine an equilibrium discount factor R for a 
market in which present and future goods are exchanged.
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Each individual beginning his life in period t faces an inter­
temporal budget constraint
(1) C* + C^+1 R + c\+2 R R . = 1 + 1R. + OR R .v J 1 2 t 3 t t+1 t t t+1
and by maximizing utility subject to this constraint finds demand 
functions of the form (dropping the time superscript)
(2) C.l ‘ ci (Rt ’ w * 1 = 1,2,3.
These consumption functions yield the savings
(3) si ■ w w = 1 - c d Rt ’Rt+i
S2 w w = 1 * C2('Rt ’Rt+l
S3 ■ S3'Rt*Rt+P = 0 - C3 (Rt,Rt+1
where must be negative and is matched by positive saving probably, 
but not necessarily, in age two. The budget constraint can be rewritten
(4) V V W  + S2(Rf Rf l )Rt + S3(Rt*Rt + l)RtRt + l
where the derivative of S_ with respect to R^ + ^ is positive and the 
other partial derivatives are ambiguous. Similarly for individuals 
born in t + 1 there is a savings relation (R  ^.R^^) • Total net 
saving in the community in any period must equal zero, meaning that all 
of any period's output must be consumed in that period. Because of the 
non-durability assumption any output that is not consumed in the period 
in which it is produced is wasted. This efficiency condition in any 
period t can be written as
(5) Bts i(Rt ,Rt+i) + Bt-lS2^Rt-l,Rt^ + Bt-2S3 (-Rt-2,Rt-3')
where B  ^ is the number of people born in t-i and therefore of age 
i+1, and R^ ? , R^ are historically given. In the stationary state
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B
(6b) Rt.x
where the constancy of B is necessary for demographic stationarity and 
the existence of a constant equilibrium R is being investigated. In 
the stationary state (5) is
shows that R=1 is a solution to the two-equation system with (7) written 
as
Samuel son argues that in a stationary economy everyone eventually 
goes through the same life cycle so that giving goods to the older 
generation is equivalent to giving goods to yourself when old. In a 
non-myopic steady state world this is a basis for a social contract 
assuring all generations a retirement income. It is also a one-for-one 
trade of present for future consumption, implying a discount factor R=1 
and a zero interest rate. This result is independent of the form of 
the utility function since the utility function is not used to derive 
it (but the biological rate R=B is only one root of the system and the 
others will depend on the form of the utility function).
Samuel son derives similar results for a population growing at a 
constant (positive or negative) rate m, such that B^. = B(l+m)t . The 
efficiency condition is
(7) BSj(R,R) + BS2(R,R) + BS (R,R) = 0
which with the stationary case of (4)
(4') S (R,R) + RS2(R,R) + R2S3(R,R) = 0
(7') B (S1(R,R) + S2(R,R) + S3(R,R)) = 0
B (1+m)tS](R,R) + B(l+m)t_1S2(R,R) + B(l+m)t 2S3(R,R) = 0(8)
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w h i c h .s i m p l i f i e s  to
(9) SjCR.R) + ( l +m ) ' 1S2 (R,R) + ( l +m)"2S3 (R,R) = 0
So from (9) and (4 ) ,  R = (1+m)-  ^ and r=m i s  one ro o t  o f  ( 9 ) .  Samuelson 
proposes  t h e  b i o l o g i c a l  i n t e r e s t  theorem, t h a t  every g e o m e t r i c a l l y  
growing consum pt ion- loan  economy has an e q u i l i b r i u m  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  
equal  to  th e  b i o l o g i c a l  p e r c e n ta g e  growth r a t e  ( in  demographic terms 
th e  i n t r i n s i c  growth r a t e )  . I f  the  p o p u la t io n  i s  d e c l i n i n g  th e  b i o ­
l o g i c a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  n e g a t i v e .
The resemblance  o f  th e  b i o l o g i c a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r e s u l t  to  the  
golden r u l e  o f  c a p i t a l  accum ula t ion  i s  o f t e n  noted and t h e  two a r e  
f r e q u e n t l y  r eg a rd ed  as ana logous .  The analogy  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o n s t r u c t  
in  economic te rm s .  The golden  r u l e  d e r iv e s  from a model c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n v e s t i n g  in  c a p i t a l  with a p o s i t i v e  marg ina l  p ro d u c t .
Per c a p i t a  consumption i s  maximized a l lo w in g  f o r  the  demand fo r  c a p i t a l  
widening t h a t  f u t u r e  p o p u l a t i o n  growth imposes.  The b i o l o g i c a l  r a t e  
r e s u l t  comes from a model with  very  l i t t l e  in  t h e  way o f  cho ice  
v a r i a b l e s .  P o p u la t io n  growth i s  exogenous so t h e  r e s u l t  i s  no t  a 
m a t t e r  o f  choos ing  an op timal r a t e  o f  inves tment i n  p r o d u c t i v e  p eop le .  
The r e s u l t  i s  independen t  o f  t h e  u t i l i t y  and sav ings  f u n c t i o n s  and 
d e r i v e s  from r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  under a s imple l i n e a r  p r o d u c t io n  p r o c e s s .  
While both  models  in vo lve  optimal i n t e r t e m p o r a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  o u tp u t  
growing a t  a r a t e  de termined  by the  r a t e  o f  p o p u la t io n  growth t h e r e  
seems l i t t l e  to  be gained  from pushing  the  analogy.
Samuc lson 's  a n a l y s i s  o f  the  o p t i m a l i t y  o f  th e  b i o l o g i c a l  r a t e  
deve lops  from h i s  c la im t h a t  under a s u i t a b l e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  g iv i n g  to  
th e  o ld  now i s  e q u i v a l e n t  to  g iv ing  to y o u r s e l f  when o l d e r .  He assumes 
the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a c r o s s  s e c t i o n  c l a n  whose age s t r u c t u r e  i s  unchanging 
over t ime because  o f  th e  b a l a n c in g  o f  b i r t h s  and d e a t h s .  Resources  a r e
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to be allocated to maximize a utility function that differs only in 
scale from that of any single individual. The representative indi­
vidual for this stationary population will maximize U(C^,C2,C3) subject 
to
(10)  C + c 2 + c 3 = 1 + 1
giving first order conditions
aU/3C2 3U/3C 
3u/ac1 = au/ac1
This formulation is identical with that of a single maximizing indi­
vidual facing Rj = R0 = 1 so the solution to (11) is that given by (3).
If the population is growing at a rate m, the clan's age distri­
bution is permanently skewed in favour of the young - the age dis- 
tribution is proportional to (l; 1/(1+m);1/(1+m) ) - with positive m 
(negative m skews it in favour of the old) and the clan's output is 
divided subject to
(12) Cl + C2/(l+m) + C^/(1+m)2 = 1 + l/(l+m)
Following the representative man through his life in a population 
growing at rate m would lead to the same budget equation. Maximizing 
utility subject to (12) gives R = l/(l+m) and
(13) 1 - ci = Sj(R,R)
1 - c2 = S2(R,R)
0 - c3 = S3(R,R)
Therefore the clan's optimal distribution conditions are identical with 
those of an intertemporal society facing the biological interest rate.
With more people to support them in a growing economy the aged 
live better than in a stationary state. Samuelson describes this gain
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as a return on their savings (strictly it is a return on their partici­
pation in the social contract) . Lerner (1959a,b) and Meckling (1960a,b) 
object to this approach. Lerner notes that the return is not a market 
return but is the result of a tax transfer program. Meckling objects 
to the imposition of an interest rate that is independent of the 
utility function.
Samuelson himself doubted that the biological rate was econom­
ically realistic since it implied that S^(1,1) was negative, which he 
thought unrealistic. His doubts rose from consideration of a two-age 
system and from his belief that the youngest generation was unlikely to 
wish to consume more than it earned in the absence of systematic time 
preference. Had he paid more attention to the effect of children on 
their parents'consumption levels he might have been more willing to 
accept this condition.
Samuelson concluded that the biological rate would not be the 
relevant rate for a free market without money. His demonstration of 
this depended on a two-age model and was extended to a three-age model 
by starting the model from the beginning of biological time, so that in 
year one there would be one generation alive, in the year two, two 
generations and in the year three, three generations alive. In this 
model with a utility function of the form U = lnC^, i = 1,2,3, he 
found that the difference equation representation of the optimized 
system was unstable at the socially optimal (biological) interest rate 
equilibrium. From this example and the logic of a two-age model he 
formulated his impossibility theorem, that if R^ approaches a limit it 
must be such that S^(R,R) is negative whereas for individuals not too 
subject to time preference is positive, which is logically impos­
sible in a barter economy since there is no-one to whom they can lend 
who will be in a position to repay them in the next period. Thus the 
biological optimum is impossible to attain.
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Samuelson concluded  t h a t  the  way to  r e a c h  t h e  s o c i a l  optimum was 
to  i n t r o d u c e  some s o c i a l  c o n t r i v a n c e  such as money. O therw ise  the  
c o m p e t i t i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  would be n e g a t i v e  no m a t t e r  what t h e  popu­
l a t i o n  growth r a t e  ( r e c a l l  t h a t  we noted  e a r l i e r  t h a t  shou ld  t h e  young 
group no t  wish t o  d i s s a v e  the  system would need a n e g a t i v e  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  to  p e rsuade  them) . The government should  p r i n t  money in  the  f i r s t  
p e r io d  a f t e r  which the  supp ly  o f  money would be h e ld  c o n s t a n t .  Then 
with o u tp u t  growing a t  a c o n s t a n t  r a t e  and t h e  v e l o c i t y  o f  money 
c o n s t a n t  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  would d e c l i n e  a t  th e  r a t e  o f  growth o f  o u tp u t .  
S ince  a l l  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  t r a d e s  would be in  money terms and the  p r i c e  
l e v e l  d e c r e a s i n g  a t  r a t e  m a o n e - to -o n e  t r a d e  f o r  one p e r i o d  in 
nominal terms would equal  a one to  1+m t r a d e  in  r e a l  t e rm s .  Thus t h e  
system would have an i m p l i c i t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  ( r e t u r n  on h o ld in g  money) 
o f  m%, th e  b i o l o g i c a l  r a t e .
11____ The Consumption-Loan Debate
L e r n e r ' s  two b r i e f  comments on Samuelson*s paper  cover  s e v e r a l  
a r e a s  t h a t  were l a t e r  r e d i s c o v e r e d  by econom is ts  and by a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  
o f  S o c ia l  S e c u r i t y  programs.  His f i r s t  pape r  d e a l t  e s s e n t i a l l y  with  
paradoxes  o f  i n f i n i t y .  Samuelson ' s  s o l u t i o n  had th e  o p t i m a l i t y  
p r o p e r t i e s  claimed fo r  i t  in  the  case  o f  an i n f i n i t e  h o r i z o n  b u t  in  a 
world with  a f i n i t e  h o r i z o n  was a cha in  l e t t e r  scheme in  which someone 
had to  l o s e .  Lerne r proposed an optimum in  th e  sen se  o f  maximizing 
s o c i e t y ' s  t o t a l  u t i l i t y  i n  each p e r io d  by e q u a t in g  the  m arg ina l  
u t i l i t i e s  o f  th e  t h r e e  age groups in  each p e r i o d .
In L e r n e r ' s  system the  op timal i n t e r e s t  r a t e  would be zero ,  
because wi th i d e n t i c a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  and no t ime p r e f e r e n c e  t h e  
op timal d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income would be such t h a t  i t  was equal  a t  a l l
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ages. This would be achieved by a tax-financed system of pensions 
which was in effect what Samuelson's social contract had been. In 
addition to this tax transfer Lerner would allow intertemporal trade to 
take place. If the pension paid were larger than optimal, workers 
would want to borrow for present consumption and repay out of pensions. 
If smaller they would want to make loans whose repayment would supple­
ment their pensions. In the first case a positive interest rate would 
result, in the second a negative rate. If individuals had positive 
time preference, the stronger the preference the smaller the optimal 
pension. Redistribution by tax transfers would then adjust pension 
size until the interest rate became zero.
The question that arises from this first paper of Lerner's is 
whether the individuals in the society will agree with the pension 
authority on the optimal allocation of resources. If people are allowed 
to trade after the pension has been established it may prove that 
Samuelson’s optimal equilibrium is not the stable equilibrium of the 
system determining the trades made by individuals. This clearly relates 
to the problem discussed in Thompson (1967) and Barro (1974) of the 
extent to which government debt is net wealth and how individuals react 
to government attempts at redistribution as in Feldstein (1974) .
Lerner's second note on Samuelson's model also dealt with a 
problem now being faced by social security systems. In a world with a 
finite horizon Samuelson's scheme is a pyramid scheme, and some gener­
ation must be disappointed in its expectations since a constant rate of 
interest can be paid only so long as the population is growing at a 
constant geometric rate. Lerner's objection was to Samuelson's 
referring to the return paid by his system as an interest return on 
saving. To remove what Lerner referred to as the element of larceny in 
the system it would be necessary to state that no return was being paid
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on social security taxes and that any pension paid was simply a redis­
tribution of current output, and that its level depended entirely on 
the level of current output and the current population. Some gener­
ations would still contribute more in taxes than they received in 
pension if the economy ceased to grow at its past rate but they would 
never have been promised a fixed return. The conclusion seems to be 
that not only is Lerner's plan the optimal one for a finite world, it 
is also more honest.
Lerner spends some time criticising the view that social 
security plans must be solvent in some sense and the view that in a 
world where physical investment is possible these plans should be fully 
funded. His defence of pay as you go plans sounds odd when read now 
when pay as you go plans are in trouble generally. The explanation is 
that these plans followed the Samuclson system rather than the Lerner 
system and that as a result they ran into the problems Lerner forecast 
for the Samuclson system. While social security plans have generally 
not promised a particular rate of return on contributions they have 
given the impression that social security taxes are contributions which 
are accumulated in trust funds which in turn yield the income that will 
be used to pay pensions in the future. Such plans are in trouble now 
only in the sense that they are being forced to explain that current 
pensions are in fact being paid out of current taxes and output. The 
fact that they are being forced into this admission just as it becomes 
necessary (and in fact because it is becoming necessary) to raise tax 
rates gives them the air of dishonesty that Lerner foretold for 
Samuel son's system.
Lerner's objection to fully funded plans has recurred in recent 
debates as the question of what level of support social security should 
attempt to provide for pensioners. The question has often been framed
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in s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  terms s i m i l a r  to  th o se  used  by Samuelson b u t  the
q u e s t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  one r a i s e d  by L e rne r .  In a f u l l y  funded system
pens ions  would depend on r e t u r n s  earned  on c o n t r i b u t i o n s  made d u r ing  
th e  c o n t r i b u t o r ' s  working l i f e .  Without  some s o r t  o f  tax  t r a n s f e r  
supplement t h i s  system de n ie s  th e  p e n s i o n e r  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  any p r o g r e s s  
made a f t e r  he r e t i r e s .  In a s t a t e  o f  r a p i d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  p r o g r e s s  t h i s  
may wel l  mean t h a t  the  p e n s i o n e r ' s  r e l a t i v e  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  w i l l  
d e c l i n e  s t e a d i l y .  Although the  t h e o r e t i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  fo l l o w in g  
Samue lson 's  pape r  d id  n o t  pay much a t t e n t i o n  to  L e r n e r ' s  comments 
r e c e n t  p o l i c y - r e l a t e d  work has  r e tu r n e d  to the  p o i n t s  he r a i s e d .
The t h e o r e t i c a l  developments o f  Samue lson 's  model tended  to 
fo l low the  l i n e  o f  Cass and Yaar i  (1966).  They dea l  w i th  a tw o-per iod
model in  which the  i n d i v i d u a l  ea rn s  dur ing  th e  f i r s t  o f  h i s  two p e r io d s
o f  l i f e  and no t  in  t h e  second b u t  consumes i n  b o th .  They f i n d  t h a t  no 
t r a d e s  a re  p o s s i b l e  s i n c e  no-one can f i n d  any a g e n t  w i l l i n g  ( o r  a b l e )  
to  t a k e  th e  o th e r  s id e  o f  th e  t r a d e .  With no p r o d u c t i o n  o r  t r a d e  the  
on ly  p o s s i b l e  a c t i o n  l e f t  i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  t a k i n g  from the  young and 
g iv i n g  to  the  o ld .  T h e i r  problem reduces  t o  th e  e s s e n t i a l l y  mathe­
m a t i c a l  one o f  f i n d i n g  an op t imal  a r b i t r a r y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s .
T h e i r  system o p e r a t e s  by d e f i n i n g  an i m p l i c i t  i n t e r e s t  f a c t o r  
2 1 i( l+ r^ )  = ^ / ( l -C j .  ^) where C. r e f e r s  to  consumption a t  age i  by a
member o f  the  g e n e r a t i o n  born in p e r io d  j . Th is  r a t e  i s  in t h e i r  words,  
"an  ex p o s t  r a t e  o f  exchange which i s  i n f e r r e d  from o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  the 
consumption p a t t e r n  o f  a member o f  g e n e r a t i o n  t - 1 ,  and i t  has r e f e r e n c e  
to  n e i t h e r  t r a d e  nor  e f f i c i e n c y "  ( p . 354) .  Using t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  along 
wi th  the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  l i f e t i m e  budget  c o n s t r a i n t  and the  s i n g l e  pe r io d  
agg rega te  e f f i c i e n c y  c o n d i t i o n  they r e p e a t  Sam ue lson 's  d em o n s t r a t io n  
t h a t  f o r  C*  ^ = cj. th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  l i f e t i m e  consumpt ion  must be so 
o rde red  t h a t  t h e  i n f e r r e d  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t  i s  t h e  b i o l o g i c a l  r a t e .
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Cass and Yaari note that if a member of generation t is asked
1 2what feasible distribution he prefers he will choose = 1, C = 1+m, 
a system that gives his generation all of the output that is produced 
in the two periods they live. They conclude that there is no scheme 
that would be preferred by all individuals to all other feasible 
schemes.
Much of their paper deals with the question of how to achieve the 
optimal distribution of resources. In the two-age model direct inter- 
generational trade is impossible, when durable goods are introduced 
hoarding is possible but inefficient since it means that in each period 
part of current output is not being consumed. In order to overcome the 
impossibility of direct trade they introduce a central financial inter­
mediary existing concurrently with all generations. People save by 
holding the liabilities of the intermediary on which interest can be 
paid at the biological rate if the intermediary uses the new deposits 
of generation t to repay the deposits of generation t-1. All output 
is consumed and the efficient allocation is reached.
They conclude, though, that such an intermediary cannot be 
privately owned. At the end of each period the intermediary has no 
assets, and liabilities equal to the deposits made by the current young 
generation. As a result its net worth is always negative and it could 
improve on the situation by closing down and having zero net worth. As 
a result competitive behavior will not lead to efficiency and the 
intermediary must be state-owned. Their intermediary serves the same 
purpose ns Samuelson's money: it creates a set of liabilities which can 
be redeemed for consumption goods in the future. There is a significant 
difference, however, in the fact that the liabilities of their inter­
mediary grow at the rate of population growth while Samuelson assumed 
a fixed stock of money. We shall return to the question of the rate of
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growth of this sort of liability below. In our simulations in later 
chapters we shall assume the existence of an intermediary with which 
people can deposit their savings and from which they can borrow.
In the case of the three-age model they demonstrate that trade 
is possible but argue that in the absence of an intermediary this trade 
will be efficient only by accident and that private exchange will not 
necessarily result in the biological configuration. The intermediary 
must enter the market with resources obtained on the basis of previous 
loan operations to ensure that all current output is consumed and 
efficiency attained. Under a three-age model they see the intermediary 
as a lender, so the problem of negative net assets is relieved and the 
intermediary can be privately owned.
Just as Cass and Yaari devoted a large part of their paper to 
formalizing Samuelson so Starrett’s 1972 contribution was to restate 
Samuelson’s conclusions in terms of intertemporal efficiency theory of 
the Malinvaud (1953) sort. Instead of a utility function he used a 
preference ordering and defined competitive distributions strictly in 
terms of their resource requirements. A lifetime consumption program 
was defined to be Golden Rule efficient if there existed no alternative 
proportional consumption program Pareto preferred by a representative 
generation and whose resource requirements were less than those of the 
first program. There could be a finite number of different types of 
people in the population.
Starrett works in terms of proportional consumption programs 
(see Starrett (1970)), defined as programs along which all elements 
grow at the same constant rate. A household of type i consumes cf at 
the k'th period of its life. With a population growth rate of m, if a 
proportional plan is Golden Rule efficient m is an interest factor 
associated with the program and if m is the interest factor, given the
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price vector associated with the program, the program associated with 
m is Golden Rule efficient. Samuelson's conclusions that programs not 
competitive at the biological rate of interest are inefficient holds 
up even when the length of life, distribution of tastes and number of 
commodities are all arbitrary.
If in each time period everyone in the first period of his life 
decided to forgo a unit of consumption and if this were allocated to 
one of the other generations then alive, presumably the single retired 
generation, then m would be forced to be the rate of exchange between 
present and future goods. The emphasis is strictly on distributional 
efficiency. Starrett finds that if C*° is a proportional distribution 
and r° the largest associated interest factor then C*° is inter­
temporal ly efficient or inefficient as r° exceeds or falls short of 
the growth rate m. Mien r° is less than m there is intertemporal 
inefficiency because the low interest rate does not induce the indi­
vidual to wait long enough before consuming. (In the growth models 
there is inefficiency at low rates of interest because producers are 
induced to build up too much capital.)
Starrett's explanation of the efficiency of the biological 
interest rate requires that length of life be known. At the end of 
Chapter Five below we shall show that his argument does not hold when 
length of life is uncertain, although we still expect efficiency from 
an interest rate sufficiently higher than m.
Kemp and Long (1979b) develop an overlapping generation model 
with money as the only asset. Their results are derived from a two- 
age life model but seem to extend readily to a three-age model. They 
assume a stationary population rather than the stable growing popu­
lation of Samuelson's paper. Their result in its simplest form is that 
even in the case of a stationary population with constant money supply
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the equilibrium price level is unstable, and the price level will (away 
from equilibrium) either rise or fall without stopping. Their results 
seem also to extend to the case of a growing population and growing 
money supply, and to Samuelson's case of a growing population and con­
stant money supply. Here we should note a difference between Samuelson 
and Kemp and Long: in Samuelson a declining price level over time re­
sulted in a growing real money supply with a constant nominal stock 
and was the device which enabled the social contrivance of money to 
move the system to the optimal consumption pattern. In Kemp and Long 
a constantly declining price level is referred to as the breakdown of 
the money system. Even so the Kemp and Long result does raise 
questions about how readily the social contrivance of money will move 
the system to optimum.
In essence Kemp and Long have rediscovered Lerner's chain letter 
criticism. For each period t, with price level p^ given, they cal­
culate the value of Pt+j which must be expected with certainty if the 
demand for money in period t is to equal the supply in that period.
The ratio p^/p  ^ is of course the return on holding money. As in 
Samuelson there is no production, just endowment, and no investment.
The changing price level is the return needed to induce people to hold 
money and the assumption of perfect foresight is the equivalent of 
Samuelson's social contract pension system. People not only must 
expect the desired return on holding money, under the social contract 
they must receive it. With no growth in output this can only be 
achieved through changes in the value of money. What Kemp and Long 
refer to as the failure of the monetary system is Lerner's complaint 
that Samuelson's system can survive only in a chain letter world with
an infinite horizon.
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We can demonstrate instability and collapse in a consumption- 
loan model with a chain letter pension quite easily. We assume a two- 
period life because the result derives from the chain letter nature of 
the system and can be extended to a three-age model with a similarly- 
operated pension. The pension is not identified as such, we operate 
in terms of the rate of return on savings, and just as Kemp and Long 
assume perfect foresight, we assume that expectations with regard to 
the return on savings will be realized.
We assume a consumption function linear in current income and 
expected future income, and initially allow the individual to have a 
second period income. The expectation an individual in the first 
period of his life has of his second period income is the income 
currently received by someone in the second period of their life. In a 
Samuelson world of fixed endowments this expectation will be realized. 
Each individual is assumed to live his full two periods.
The consumption function of an individual in the first period of 
his life is:
04) Cj = cJYj + c ^ / O + r p  C1 < 1 , c\, Yr  Y2 > 0
We discuss the use of a linear fixed coefficient function of this sort 
in the following chapter, and note here that a consumption function of 
this sort can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas intertemporal utility 
function. There is no necessary relation between the values of 
coefficients cj and c!,, although there is clearly an upper limit to the 
combined value they can take on. We could demonstrate this by optim­
izing subject to the constraint that consumption be non-negative in 
each of the two periods, and increasing the coefficient values. Rather 
than set out a consumption function for the second age we simply note 
that the individual’s intertemporal budget constraint must be met, so:
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(15) Y2 + v Y 1 - + rt-l5
the savings functions are:
(16)
(Yi ■ ci} (1 - c})y} - c ^ / d  + r )
(17) (Y2 -  C 2^ (V)-1 - cj’hci - rt_:)
and the feasibility condition is
(18) (1 + m)s( + S*
where m is the population growth rate. Then
(19) (1 + m) (1 - c})y( - (1 +m)c2Y2(l + rp*1 - (y(_1 - C*'1) (1 + r ^ )
and in equilibrium
(20) (1 + m)(l -cJ)Yj (1 + m)(l + r)_1c*Y2 - (Yx - C p  (1 + r) = 0
which, from (17) can be written
(21) (1 + m) (1 -cJ)Yj - (1 + m)(l +r)‘1c*Y2 - (1 -c})(l +r)Y1 + c!,Y2
Then
(22) (1 - c j) (m - r) Y L + c*Y2((r - m)/(l + r)}
so that at equilibrium r = m. The other equilibrium of the system is 
the no-trade position = S2 =
With constant over time we can call (19) L and find
(23a) 3L/3r (1 + m)c 2 Y 2/(1 + rt)2
(23b) 3L/3rt_j = - (1 - cj)Yj
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(23c)
3r
3rt-1
(1 - c j ) Y 1
(1 + m)c^Y2
(1 ♦ rt)2 > 0
The system is stable if 8r /Br^ .  ^ from (23c) is less than one. 
r = m (23c) becomes
At
3r.
(24) 9rt-1
t1 - < > i
c2Y2
(1 + m)
which is less than one if
(1 + m) < c*Y2/(1 - cI )Yx, m > -1
Now let c2 approach zero. This is clearly permissible with no change 
in cj, since while there may be an upper limit to the values cj, can 
take for any given cj letting c9 approach zero simply redistributes 
consumption toward the later period. Note that the discussion that 
follows also applies as Y9 approaches zero. As the term cj,Y2 approaches
1zero the equi1ibrium becomes unstable, approaches (l-c^)Y^ and C2 
approaches (Y^-C^)(1+r). Then writing the feasibility condition as 
(l+m)C-j + C2 \ Y^(l+m) implies that
(1 + m) (1 - cJjypCYj - c p  I (1 + r)
gives a critical value for r above which total command over resources 
(represented by consumption levels) exceeds total resources. Note that 
at r^ = -1 we have with c9Y9 positive but near zero, 9r /Sr^ .  ^ = 0 
along the relation L.
In this unstable case we can graph the system as:
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cr it
Figure 1
So either r approaches -1 and the no-trade position prevails or r 
explodes.
This simple linear case shows the effect of the responsiveness of 
C to r. As c^Y? approaches zero, 3C^/8r, which is negative, approaches 
zero. 9C2/3r is positive. Then in the explosive case as r rises rises 
while Cj does not fall enough to compensate for the second age group's 
increased command over resources. Since the system must satisfy the 
feasibility condition in each period, when r is greater than m r must 
rise sufficiently to drive Cj down to a feasible level. This further
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increases in the next period so there must be a greater increase in 
r in that period to satisfy feasibility and the interest rate explodes.
If r is less than m it is the requirement that the feasibility 
constraint be exactly satisfied that drives the system to the no-trade 
position. As r falls falls, so r must fall sufficiently in each 
period to increase enough to compensate for the fall in C^ , but this 
fall in r leads to a fall in in the next period. If feasibility 
could be satisfied as an inequality (free disposal) then would not 
have to compensate for a fall in and r would not fall to -1, making
the system stable at an inefficient position.
It is quite possible to construct intertemporal utility functions 
with the property that C is highly inelastic to the interest rate and 
C2 through the budget constraint highly elastic. This is also the 
chain letter that Samuel son is accused by Lerner of creating. If 
people are promised a certain return on their resources and that 
promise must be fulfilled it could be the case that in a system con­
trolled by the interest rate alone the interest rate becomes explosive 
in an attempt to satisfy feasibility. While this would not happen if 
the promised r were set equal to m it could occur if the level of m 
were misjudged or if m changed exogenously.
Similar results could presumably be found if the system were 
controlled by taxes and also in a system with prices. In the case of a 
system with prices we could find the situation that it has been suggested 
is operating now, where inflation is an attempt by the young to ease 
the burden the aged place on them, presumably by driving down the real 
return on the social security wealth of the retired group.
Gale's 1973 article is interesting for its explicitly dynamic 
approach to the consumption-loan model and for what this approach 
reveals about the nature of the intergenerational transfers typically
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imposed on the C-L structure. Gale uses a two-age model in which 
individuals receive an endowment in each period of life. He assumes 
that individuals have identical preferences and income streams and 
differ only in date of birth. He works with generalized preferences 
and consumption programs and uses specific utility functions only in 
examples. He finds that the population growth rate is always a steady 
state equilibrium interest rate and that the consumption program 
corresponding to the biological interest rate has optimum properties.
He also finds that the no-trade position, in which everyone consumes 
his own endowment in each period, is an equilibrium and that no other 
steady state equilibria exist. He classifies the optimal consumption 
program as classical or Samuelson as first period optimal consumption 
exceeds or falls short of first period endowment.
In Gale's notation endowments at ages 0 and 1 are and e^, con­
sumption at age i in period t is c^(t), the consumption program fol­
lowed by an individual born in period t is c(t)= (cQ(t),c^(t+1)). Like 
Samuelson, Gale assumes that no-one dies before the end of his two- 
period life. Thus if m is the rate of population growth (positive or 
negative) the two ages alive in any period are in the ratio (l+m):l.
In Gale's notation the population growth factor which we have written 
(1+m) is written as y. Similarly the interest factor (1+r ) in Gale's 
notation becomes p .
In each period the system must satisfy the efficiency condition 
(25) y(eQ - cQ(t)J + [el - c^t)) = 0
In equilibrium (steady state) c^(t) = c^, i = 1,2.
A consumption program is termed competitive if there exists an 
interest factor p such that the individual's lifetime budget constraint 
is just satisfied for that c(t):
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(2(3) pt (e0 " c0(t)) + (e1 - c1(t + l)) = 0
Then the equilibrium forms of (25) and (26) are written by replacing 
c^(j) with . Subtracting the equilibrium form of (25) from that of
(26) gives
(27) (p - y )(eQ - cQ) = 0
where p is the equilibrium interest factor. Clearly (27) is satisfied 
only when e = c, the no trade case, or when p = y, the biological 
interest case.
These results arc easily extended to the three-age case where
2the age groups are distributed as y : y: 1. But they fail when the 
probability of dying before the end of the third period is introduced. 
To see this let p^. be the probability that an individual of age i 
will survive to age j. Let be the population aged i in period t, 
and assume that only the second age group reproduces in any period so 
= yN^ where N* =  ^ or p 12yN2 ^* Now Nl can written
P12Y2n2 ^ ' Since ^3 = P23^2  ^ P°Pulati-on alive in any period is 
distributed across ages (setting the third age population at 1) as
(Y Pi2/p23: ■yP ^ /P12 1 23 1) .
Now if we set up the three-age equivalents of (25), (26) and (27) 
we find that the no-trade position is again an equilibrium but that now 
the equivalent of the second equilibrium in (27) requires
(28) Tf2Pl2/p23 = p2 and ™12/p23 = p'
This will only hold if p ^  = P23 an<i typically this condition is not 
met. This would seem to make the consumption-loan model inappropriate 
to a world in which people do die, but a C-L system can have an 
equilibrium other than the no-trade position since the possibility of 
allocating consumption over several periods makes up for the failure of
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2 2(28) to be met. The three-age equivalent of (27) is (y ^ 12^23  ~ P ^
(e0 C(P + (YPl2/P23 - P)(e1 - c d = 0, which is solved either at
r—
\
a> o
i o o v _
_
J II
( e i - c d = 0
or at
Y P 12 p P 23
c
1 e
yp !2 - PP23 c 0
If  P l 2  = P 23 there is a root at Y =
G 1 " eip and also at p = ------------
eo " c o
which depends on the form of the consumption function. Only a 
non-negative p is economically meaningful.
Having demonstrated the existence of only two possible steady 
states in his model and having shown that the biological rate steady 
state (which he refers to as the Golden Rule state) has optimum 
properties, Gale procedes to show that in what he terms the Samuelson 
case in which people wish to consume less than their endowment in the 
first period of their two periods of life and more in the second the 
biological interest equilibrium is unstable and the no-trade position 
stable. He argues that Samuelson's social contrivance of money is a 
device to move the system away from its initial position, which is the 
no-trade equilibrium. Gale argues that in the Samuelson case this 
device will fail and the system will return to the no-trade equilibrium. 
In the classical case, however, in which the individual wishes to 
consume more than his endowment in the first period of his life and less 
in the second the biological rate is the stable equilibrium and the no­
trade state unstable. The mechanics of Gale's system are interesting 
for what they reveal about the uses made of the consumption-loan model, 
the system itself is somewhat less interesting. Typically the life 
cycle pattern in a three-age model has the individual wishing to consume 
more than endowment in the first period of life, less in the second and 
more in the third. Thus Gale's stability results may apply only to the
two-age case (in the 1973 article he was not able to extend them 
beyond that case), which lessens their interest.
In Gale’s notation the interest factor that supports the no­
trade position is p. Denoting the biological state consumption program 
by c, the classical and Samuelson cases can be shown as in Figure Two.
Gale now introduces utility functions Ü (c^(t),c^(t+1)) and from 
the first order conditions for utility maximization finds
(29) U0(ct) - PU1(ct) = 0
where lb is the appropriate first partial derivative and c^ = c(t).
This condition lets him eliminate the interest factor from the budget 
condition, which can now be written as
(30) (eQ - c0(t))u0(ct) + (ej - Cj(t + 1)) (ct) = 0
which with the feasibility condition (25) describes the dynamics of 
the system he has constructed. Given some initial c^(0) equation (25) 
yields c^(0) which with equation (30) yields c (1) and so on.
(Eqn. (25): y(e^ - c (t)) + (e - c^(t)) = o). This system is shown
in Figure Three where the line AB is the graph of the equilibrium 
version of (25):
(25’) Y(eQ - cQ) + (e1 - c}) = 0
and the curve PQ is the graph of the equilibrium version of (30):
(30’) (eQ - c0)U0 (c) + (e2 - c ^ U ^ c )  = 0
and PQ cuts AB at the endowment point and at the biological consumption 
program.
Figure Three below shows the classical case, Figure Four below
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shows the Samuelson case.
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Classical Case
Slope
Slope
Figure 2: Samuelson Case (Gale 1973)
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c
Infeasable region
Figure 3: Dynamics in Classical Case (Gale 1973)
Along the AB line are the points c(t) = (c^(t), c^(t)) while 
along PQ are the points c(t) = (c^(t), Cj(t+1)). Thus AB represents 
allocation across generations in period t while PQ shows the inter­
temporal allocation of consumption by generation t. In the steady 
state they are identical.
According to Gale, in the classical case (Fig. 3) a redistri­
bution that moves the system from the endowment point e to the point 
c(0) = (c q (0), Cj (0)) with c0(0) > eQ and c^O) < e^  is all that is 
needed to set the system off toward c, the biological optimum. From 
C q (0) on AB he finds Cj(l) on PQ which yields cQ(l) on AB which in
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Figure 4: Dynamics in Samuelson Case (Gale 1973)
turn yields (2) on PQ. This can be achieved by a simple transfer 
from the older to the younger age group.
This dynamic mechanism is worth a closer look for what it reveals 
about the intertemporal behavior assumed in models in which the 
consumption-loan system is the basis for tax transfers between 
generations. Consider Gale's classical case, Figure Three. The system 
has been moved from e to c(0) with cq(0) > and c^(0) < e^. Then it 
moves to a point where c^(l) < c^(0), and then to one where c^(2) < c^(l) 
and so on. At the same time c^(l) > cq (0) > . The progress of the
system to c is marked by a continuing reduction in c^  and increase in c^.
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Plotting the intertemporal indifference map of the individual in 
the classical case in Figure Five below we have:
Slope = -y.Slope = -p
Figure 5: Intertemporal Indifference Map - Classical Case (Gale 1973)
where e is on a lower indifference curve than c and the process Gale 
describes moves each individual to a higher indifference curve as well 
as moving the system from e to c . But while he says that a single act 
of interference in the system is sufficient to set the process off, 
that single act must be precisely defined. Consider, for example, a
transfer from the older to the younger group by means of a tax on the 
older group. Assume that no conditions are attached to the transfer 
and that agents in the economy are not altruistic. Then the endowment 
of the recipient of the transfer has been changed from (e^ , e^) to 
(Cq , ep on Figure Five. Clearly this point is on a higher indif­
ference curve than the original. Clearly, too, the best an individual 
can do for himself is to consume this new endowment and stay at 
(Cq , ep, yet in Gale's system he will consume c^ < ej and voluntarily 
place himself on a lower indifference curve than he was on immediately 
after the transfer. Thus we must be careful in defining the nature of 
the single initial transfer that will move the system ultimately to the 
biological optimum.
Gale suggests a number of possible transfer systems: there may 
be a purely altruistic transfer from old to young, there may be a central 
tax office which taxes the old and sells to the young (in the classical 
case and reversed in the Samuelson case) or there may be a central 
financial intermediary which accepts savings or makes loans (and does 
both in a system in which people live more than two periods). Then, in 
Gale's terms, in the Samuelson case in which the contrivance of money 
has been introduced, in the initial period the intermediary prints an 
IOU of a certain value (worth a certain amount of real output) which it 
gives to the older group. The market interest rate adjusts so that the 
young group will want to sell precisely that quantity of real output.
This is the same mechanism as Kemp and Long use, but expressed in terms 
of interest rates instead of current and future prices.
Recall equation (30) which determines the allocation of consum­
ption across one individual's life:
(e0 - c0)lV c) + - c p U j C c )  =
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which can be r e w r i t t e n  as
(31) ( e 0 - c 0) / ( ei  - c x) = - U 1 ( c ) /U 0 (c)  (< 0)
whose r i g h t  hand s i d e  i s  the  s lo p e  o f  th e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u rv e  a t  co n ­
sumption program c .  In the  c l a s s i c a l  ca s e  t h e  numera tor  on th e  l e f t  
hand s i d e  i s  n e g a t i v e  and the  denominato r  p o s i t i v e .  The r e c i p i e n t  o f  
th e  t r a n s f e r  i s  r e q u i r e d  to  consume t h e  whole o f  t h e  t r a n s f e r  c^ - e^ 
t h a t  he has been g iv e n ,  t h i s  i s  c l e a r  from F igu re  Three .  A c o r n e r  
s o l u t i o n  such as (c^ ,  e p  i s  n o t  p e r m i t t e d  even though  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
might  p r e f e r  i t .  In s t e a d  he i s  r e q u i r e d  to  choose a v a l u e  o f  c^ such 
t h a t  th e  tangency  c o n d i t i o n  (31) i s  s a t i s f i e d .  The l e f t  hand s i d e  o f  
(31) i s  a budge t  c o n s t r a i n t  o f  an unusual  s o r t  s i n c e  i t  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
by r e q u i r i n g  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  to  choose h i s  second p e r io d  consumption 
g iven  a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  o f  f i r s t  in  such a way t h a t  tangency  i s  ach iev ed .
G e n e ra l l y  we expec t  to  be a b l e  to  f in d  such tangency  g iven  
i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u rv e s  w i th  the  u s u a l  p r o p e r t i e s .  I f  we p l o t  t h e  curve  
G a l e ’s system w i l l  f o l l o w  we see  t h a t  he r e q u i r e s  th e  system to  move 
along th e  o f f e r  cu rve  o f  the  young age group.  Normally th e  o f f e r  
cu rve  i s  used to  i n d i c a t e  th e  q u a n t i t i e s  demanded by p r i c e  t a k e r s  a t  
d i f f e r e n t  market  p r i c e s ,  and G a l e ' s  use  o f  t h e  cu rve  to  r e q u i r e  th e  
i n d i v i d u a l  to  s u r r e n d e r  j u s t  t h e  amount t h a t  a p re d e t e rm in e d  t r a n s f e r  
i s  worth to him seems a s l i g h t l y  odd one.  I t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  e s s e n ­
t i a l l y  the  same as t h e  p ro c e s s  used by Kemp and Long. In both  c a s e s  
( two-age  models)  the  i n d i v i d u a l  e n t e r i n g  th e  f i r s t  p e r io d  o f  l i f e  has 
no say in  the  amount o f  the  t r a n s f e r  he makes or  r e c e i v e s  in  t h a t  
p e r io d .  The r e t u r n  on th e  fo rced  t r a n s f e r  i s  de te rm ined  to  ensu re  
t h a t  he i s  happy with  t h a t  d e c i s i o n ,  meaning t h a t  he pays  n e i t h e r  more 
nor l e s s  than  th e  p ro c e s s  i s  worth to  him because  he would c l e a r l y  be 
h a p p ie r  in  G a l e ' s  model i f  he were a l lowed  to  s t a y  a t  th e  c o rn e r
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(Cq , e^). This process determines the amount of resources to be 
surrendered by the as yet unborn young generation of the next period.
As in the case of the Kemp and Long model we note that Gale’s result 
is essentially a version of Lerner’s objection to making too many 
promises about future transfers.
We can raise doubts about the usefulness of these models, par­
ticularly Gale's in which a presumably altruistic government with 
apparently enough information to enter into the sort of contracts 
required to keep the younger group on the offer curve fails to simply 
move the system immediately to the biological optimum. In the Kemp 
and Long model with non-altruistic individuals it is easier to believe 
that the interests of the earlier generations may lead them to impose 
a collapsing monetary system on later generations. The Kemp and Long 
model also has a certain appeal in the context of the various dis­
cussions of the possibility that inflation is a mechanism by which the 
young generations ease the burden the older generations impose on them. 
Despite the appeal of the different structure the mechanism leading to 
instability is the same in the two cases.
Ill The Biological Interest Rate and the Money Supply
Samuelson argued that the biological optimum could be achieved 
for a population growing at rate m by creating a fixed stock of money, 
so as population grew (or declined) and output grew at the same rate in 
Samuelson's system, the value of money would increase (decrease) at 
rate m. Thus in a growing population any money held over time would 
earn a zero nominal return and a real return of m.
The papers by Gale and Kemp and Long cast doubt on this conclusion, 
although as we have noted their perfect foresight features essentially
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repeat Lerner's objection to Samuel son’s system, so the generality of 
their results may be questioned. Much of the literature seems to 
regard Samuelson's money as being a special form of the central 
financial intermediary Cass and Yaari propose. There is one major 
difference, though, between a money-creating central bank and a central 
savings and loan institution. With a savings and loan type inter­
mediary so long as all members of the population hold accounts with it, 
its liabilities will increase at the rate of population growth. In 
Samuelson's model this would require the central bank to increase its 
liabilities, the money supply, at the rate of population growth.
In our simulations in later chapters we shall assume the 
existence of a savings and loan type central financial intermediary. 
Clearly, then, we wish to know whether this deviation from Samuelson's 
model is likely to have a significant effect on our findings. Consider 
a simple version of Samuelson's two-age model with money and different 
monetary growth rates. We find that, even in this simple version of 
his model, Samuelson's conclusion is not correct. A constant money 
supply with a growing population is not sufficient to keep the interest 
rate at the biological level. The use of a Cass and Yaari intermediary 
therefore does have a significant effect on our results since the money 
supply must grow at the rate of population growth if the interest rate 
is to be held at the biological rate1.
1 This is a general graphical discussion. A rigorous formulation of 
the problem would best be related to the work of Lucas (1972) which 
applies the overlapping generations model to the analysis of 
monetary effects. Instead of the perfect foresight version of Kemp 
and Long, Lucas assumes the young individual chooses a mix of 
present consumption and money holdings to maximize
U(ct) + J v ( m t / p e ) dF(pe) 
subject to y - Ptct - = 0
where p is the current price level and p^ is the expected future 
price with probability distribution F(p ). m^ is current money
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We assume a two-age model in  which younger i n d i v i d u a l s  produce  
ou tp u t  and o l d e r  ones do n o t ,  and t h e  amount o f  o u tp u t  produced by 
each younger i n d i v i d u a l  i s  f i x e d .  The o l d e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  have no 
endowment o f  o u t p u t ,  i n s t e a d  th e  i n i t i a l  money s to c k  and any a d d i t i o n s  
to i t  a r e  g iven  to  t h e  o l d e r  group who use  i t  to  p u rchase  o u tp u t  from 
th e  younger group.  The younger group a r e  w i l l i n g  to  supp ly  goods to  
th e  market  in  exchange f o r  money to  be used to f i n a n c e  t h e i r  own r e ­
t i r e m e n t  consumption one pe r io d  in  t h e  f u t u r e .  The p r i c e  o f  market  
goods i s  s e t  by th e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  demand and supp ly  in th e  market  in  
each p e r i o d .  Thus we avoid t h e  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  s i t u a t i o n  in  which 
t h i s  p e r i o d ' s  p r i c e  l e v e l  i s  e f f e c t i v e l y  s e t  l a s t  p e r i o d .  We use the  
term supply  o f  market  goods r a t h e r  than  supp ly  o f  o u tp u t  t o  avoid  any 
c o n fu s io n  with  p ro d u c t io n
The r e t u r n  th e  younger i n d i v i d u a l s  expec t  on t h e i r  money h o ld in g s  
i s  th e  r a t i o  o f  t h e  p r i c e  expec ted  nex t  p e r io d  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  market  
p r i c e  t h i s  p e r i o d .  So long as  the  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  f u t u r e  p r i c e  expec­
t a t i o n s  with  r e s p e c t  to  th e  p r e s e n t  p r i c e  l e v e l  i s  l e s s  than  u n i t y ,  an 
i n c r e a s e  in  th e  c u r r e n t  p r i c e  le ve l  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  an i n c r e a s e  i n  
the  expec ted  r e t u r n  on ho ld in g  money. In a two p e r io d  model an 
i n c r e a s e  in  the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r e s u l t s  in  a r e d u c t i o n  in  f i r s t  p e r io d  
consumpt ion and an i n c r e a s e  i n  second p e r io d  consumption  so long as  the  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  in  th e  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  v e r s i o n  o f  th e  S lu t s k y
demand and mt / P e t h e  expec ted  f u t u r e  r e a l  v a l u e  o f  money saved in
youth .  An in c r e a s e  in th e  expec ted p r i c e  o f  f u t u r e  goods r e l a t i v e  
to  th e  p r e s e n t  p r i c e  l e v e l  would i n c r e a s e  consumpt ion in  t h e  c u r r e n t  
p e r i o d .
Models o f  t h i s  s o r t  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  s p e c i f i e d  fo r  c o n s t a n t  p o p u l a t i o n s  
and used to ana lyze  the  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  v e c t o r s .
They could be extended t o  t h r e e  ages but  to  a n a ly z e  t h e  baby boom 
e f f e c t s  in  which we a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  they  would have to  be m od i f ied  
to  a l low  f o r  a p o p u la t i o n  growing a t  o t h e r  th a n  a c o n s t a n t  p r o p o r ­
t i o n a l  r a t e .  I t  was f e l t  t h a t  a L ucas- type  model would not  be an 
e f f i c i e n t  d ev ice  f o r  s tu d y in g  the  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e s e  p o p u l a t i o n  
c h a n g e s .
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equation outweighs the income effect. We shall make this assumption 
and place no other restrictions on the utility function. We also know 
that in a two period model an increase in the interest rate can result 
in an increase in first period consumption if the level of first period 
saving becomes large enough for the income effect to outweigh the sub­
stitution effect. In terms of a supply curve for market goods this 
means that there can exist a price-quantity point at which the supply 
curve becomes backward bending. While we shall generally assume a 
positively sloped market supply curve we shall indicate the effects of 
the supply curve's becoming steeper.
In any period the money supply (allocated entirely to the older 
group when money is first created) is fixed. This means that the 
demand for current market goods is a rectangular hyperbola, PD = M or 
D = M/P where P is the price level and D the quantity of market goods 
demanded (since money changes hands in a single direction we may regard 
the velocity of money as equalling unity). We assume no inheritance, 
so the older group spends the whole of the money supply in any period, 
since nothing is gained by not spending it. Our mechanism would be 
changed slightly if money were allocated to the younger group, but 
probably not seriously. If the initial stock of money were given to 
the younger group rather than the older group then alive, the younger 
group would hold it until their second period of life and then spend it. 
If the money supply were held fixed after that the system would proceed 
as though the money had been given to an older group initially. If any 
increases in the money supply were allocated to the young the level of 
market supply at any price in any period would fall, but so long as the 
increase in the money supply was small relative to the existing stock 
this would not seriously affect the system, and to tax the older group 
and give the money to the younger would defeat the purpose of creating 
money as a device to allow retirement saving.
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Aggregate demand for and supply of market goods with a given 
population and money supply can be plotted as
D = -
Figure 6: Aggregate Demand and Supply Two Age Model,
Given Population, Fixed Money Supply
In Figure Six above the productive age group surrenders a 
total Qq of market goods in exchange for M yielding a price of market 
goods of P . If the money supply is held fixed while the population 
grows the consumption demand function will not shift while the supply 
of market goods will increase at every price by the population growth 
factor. The equilibrium point will move along the demand curve, the
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aggregate level of market goods exchanged increasing as the price level 
falls. As Samuelson suggested the value of money increases as the 
population grows.
The members of the productive age group in the period in which 
money is first created surrender a total of Qq of goods in exchange 
for M. In the next period they use the same money stock to buy 
Ql > Qq goods for their retirement consumption, where is determined 
in next period's market. Their money holdings yield a return of 
r = (Qj ~ Q0)/Qq. Similarly the next period's productive group will 
earn a return (Q^ - Q^)/Qj. Money is increasing in value at the 
biological rate, m, if (Q - Q )/Q = m for all t. But Figure Seven
below shows that when the supply curve shifts from S^ to S^ = (l+m)S^ 
the total quantity of market goods exchanged rises from to
< (l+m)Q^, so the rate of return on holding money is less than m2.
There is one case in which the diagram suggests Samuelson's 
conclusion would hold. This is the case of a vertical supply curve 
for market goods which would require the productive age group to be 
willing to surrender goods at zero price. If we assume that supply 
equals zero at price zero then as population grows the supply curve 
pivots on the origin, but it is also possible that the supply curve 
could have a positive intercept on the vertical axis.
The nearest we could come to a vertical supply curve would be a
nonlinear curve with a vertical segment as in Figure Eight below.
With such a curve Samuel son's case could hold for several periods but 
eventually the demand curve would intersect the supply curve below the 
point at which the supply curve became vertical and the rate of return 
would begin to fall-. It is unlikely that the supply curve would have
2 In the special case of a linear supply curve from the origin the
rate of return will be half the rate of population growth.
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(1+m)S
(l+m)Q
Figure 7: Population Growth and the Price Level
a vertical segment, since inelasticity of supply of market goods with 
respect to price would require that the income and substitution 
effects cancel for the younger age group as the return on holding 
money increases, which seems improbable.
Figure Nine (a) below, with a linear aggregate supply curve 
pivoting on the origin as population grows, shows (for a constant 
money supply) equilibrium quantity increasing at a rate less than the 
rate of population growth. To maintain the rate of return it would be 
necessary to shift the demand curve out by increasing the money supply. 
In Figure Nine (b) the supply curve has an intersection on the vertical
88
Q
Figure 8: Growing Population - Supply Curve with Vertical Segment
axis and a linear segment at this threshold price as the growth of 
population shifts the supply curve out. Here the equilibrium quantity 
approaches a limit even though the population continues to grow. The 
amount offered by each member of the first age group must decline at a 
rate sufficient to keep the aggregate quantity of market goods offered 
constant.
Finally, it is apparent from the diagrams above that if the money 
supply is increased at the rate of population growth, so that the 
market demand curve shifts out each period in the same proportion as 
does the supply curve, the total quantity of goods exchanged will
o9
Figure 9(a): Money Supply Growth = Population Growth Rate
increase in the same proportion. Then r = ((l+m)Q^ - Qq)/Qq or r = m 
and the system will remain at the biological interest rate. It can be 
shown for this model that r = m only if the money supply grows at the 
rate of population growth.
Now assume that the issuers of money increase the money supply at 
a rate greater than the rate of population growth. Then in Figure Ten 
below the equilibrium price rises from P^  to P^ and quantity from to 
Q0 > (l+m)Qj. The rate of return for the group which sold is clearly 
greater than m and less than the rate of increase of the money supply 
which we call b. If this increased money supply were given to the
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Figure 9(b): Supply Curve with Horizontal Segment
young group the supply curve might shift to the left (assuming a 
fairly rapid inflation of the money supply so the increase in the 
stock was large relative to the initial stock) reducing the return 
earned by the retired group. In the next period if there were no 
further inflation of the money supply all of the stock of money would 
be in the hands of the retired group. It can be shown that the rate of 
price inflation in this system will equal the rate of excess growth of 
the money supply only if the supply curve is vertical. With a 
positively sloped aggregate supply curve it can be shown that
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(l+m)Si
(1+b) M.
b > m
(1+m) M
Figure 10
1n(1 + b) - 1n (1 + m) > (1/P )(8P /3t).
If one generation has inflated the money supply the next will have 
to maintain the higher rate of monetary growth just to ensure the 
biological interest rate. If the next generation simply increases the 
money supply by a factor m it will earn a return of less than m on 
money holdings.
If the income effect rises relative to the substitution effect in 
the Slutsky equation as money holdings increase the steeper the supply 
curve becomes. The steeper the supply curve at higher prices the
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faster the money supply will have to be increased over time just to 
maintain the rate of return over time.
If one young age group decides that the inflation of the money 
supply that they will have to generate will impose disutility or 
resource costs they may become reluctant to acquire money. Then with 
population growing at a rate m the supply curve will shift out by a 
factor less than m, driving the rate of return down and requiring 
greater inflation of the money supply just to maintain the return 
expected by the issuers of money. If resistance to inflation becomes 
strong it may drive the system back to the no-trade point.
If the money supply is being inflated in a world in which money 
is held solely to finance retirement consumption we can expect a demand 
to exist for a stable valued asset (see Tullock (1975) and in a related 
context the effects discussed in Kemp and Long (1979 a ) _ Such a stable 
valued asset would perform the only function money performs in this 
model and could be regarded as a competing money. Most studies in the 
consumption-loan literature follow Cass and Yaari in assuming that the 
issue of money, or the operation of a central financial intermediary, 
must be a government function. The work of Klein (1974) and Hayek 
(1976) on the private issue of money suggests that this is not 
necessarily so.
Gale's system in particular could be altered by the introduction 
of a private intermediary. Assume a two-age model in which the young 
wish to save for retirement. Then an intermediary can guarantee the 
current younger group some future consumption since it knows the next 
period's young group will wish to make deposits with it. In Gale's 
model the young are promised the minimum return sufficient to persuade 
them to save some given amount. The intermediary could be uncertain 
about the level of deposits it will receive in the future and therefore
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offers the lowest return it can (since the return will have to be paid 
from future deposits). But the next young group in Gale's model is 
permitted to deposit no more than the minimum sufficient to pay the 
return offered the first group. This seems a strange assumption, since 
the next young group has the same utility function as its predecessors. 
Suppose the minimum return needed to persuade the young to hold 
deposits is negative, as it can be. Then with a constant population 
the next young group will be willing to deposit the same amount as did 
the first, at the same negative interest rate, so there will be no need 
to pay the first group a negative rate. They can be paid a zero rate 
and recover the full amount of their savings. The interest return on 
savings can then be seen as consisting of a low certain return and an 
uncertain component, greater than zero, which depends on the amount 
deposited with the intermediary above the amount needed to pay the safe 
return. With the usual income and substitution effects this increase 
in the expected return should increase saving and so make a higher 
return possible. Then the system is not constrained to move along the 
offer curve, and Gale's demonstration of the instability of the bio­
logical optimum in the Samuel son case will not hold. The concern Cass 
and Yaari express about the negative net worth of the intermediary need 
not be a problem, since the operators of the intermediary can charge a 
fee for the intermediation service. Since this fee would come out of 
deposits the system would probably tend to settle at an interest rate 
below the biological rate and so not satisfy Starrett's intertemporal 
efficiency condition. It can be expected to come close to the 
efficient point, though, since the fee will be driven down by com­
petitive pressures. Even if there is a single intermediary, so long as 
there are no prohibitive information or start-up costs the general 
results of core theory should be applicable. In game theoretic terms
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the intermediary is a coalition and the lack of barriers to entry means 
that coalitions are relatively easy to form. Given ease of coalition 
the only equilibrium that is not blocked by some coalition is the com­
petitive equilibrium. This holds if the market is oligopolistic and 
should also hold in the case of a monopolistic intermediary since the 
monopoly is based on trust and not on actual ownership of resources. 
Free entry still exists and will be taken advantage of if the monopoly 
tries to exploit its position (see J.W. Friedman (1977)).
IV Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the structure of the consumption- 
loan model, which will be the basis of our later simulation analysis 
of the effects of an ageing population. As well as discussing the 
mechanism of the consumption-loan system the chapter suggests that the 
nature of the intermediary is important for the workings of the system. 
The savings and loan nature of the intermediary that we shall assume 
explains why, despite the argument of Gale and Kemp and Long, and the 
doubts expressed by Diamond (1965), we find that the interest rate in 
our simulations often tends to the biological rate. We have also 
indicated in this chapter that the presence of uncertainty about 
survival can alter the biological rate result. This explains why our 
simulations tend to an interest rate near, but not exactly at, the
biological rate.
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CHAPTER 4
CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONS
I_____ Introduction
Samuelson was able to derive his biological interest rate result 
without reference to specific forms of utility or consumption functions. 
He used explicit forms - a log linear intertemporal utility function - 
only in working an example of his system. He was able to work at this 
level of generality because he focussed on the biological equilibrium 
and its optimum properties and not on the other possible equilibria or 
their stability properties. He stated that he expected the biological 
optimum to be unstable in general in the absence of money and the 
stable equilibrium interest rate to be negative, and used the example 
of a log linear utility function to support the argument.
Samuelson's analysis suggests that if we are to consider the 
location of the other equilibria of the consumption-loan system and the 
approach to whichever equilibrium proves stable we must allow for the 
precise form of the intertemporal utility and consumption functions.
His argument for the general instability of the biological optimum 
implicitly acknowledges this, since its basis is his belief that young 
individuals will not wish to consume more than their current income. 
This assumes away consumption patterns of the life cycle sort in which 
individuals do tend to consume more than their income in their early 
years. If we admit these consumption patterns Samuelson's argument 
loses much of its force.
In the simulations reported in Chapters Six and Seven we use a 
particular form of the life cycle consumption function with coefficient 
values based on a study by Stearns (1971) . The Stearns study is the
96
most complete available to us dealing with age specific consumption 
functions. In order to use the consumption-loan system to study dis­
tributional effects of changing age structure we must take account of 
the consumption decision at each age. We do this through the use of 
linear age specific consumption functions, and the purpose of this 
chapter is to explain that choice.
Life Cycle consumption functions of the Ando-Modigliani sort are 
typically specified as aggregate functions. The function described in 
Ando and Modigliani (1963) is based, like that in Friedman (1957) on 
the intertemporal optimization problem of an individual facing an
intertemporal budget constraint, such that he maximizes U(C^ ..... C^ )
subject to
which gives a consumption function of the general form = C(r^ .... r^ ,
.... Y^). Both the Ando-Modigliani life cycle hypothesis and the
Friedman permanent income hypothesis imply that consumption in any
period for an individual of age a will be some proportion of the present
value of that individual’s lifetime endowment:
t t t(1) c = K Wa a a
where W is the present value at age a of the future income stream and K 
the factor of proportionality. Under conditions of relative economic 
stability, in particular, according to Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) 
relative constancy of the real interest rate, K can be treated as a 
constant of proportionality.
Friedman (1957) assumes homothetic intertemporal indifference 
curves which, given constancy of the real interest rate, allows a 
function of form (1) to trace out linear Engel curves with respect to
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l i f e t i m e  w ea l th .  In the  absence  o f  h o m o t h e t i c i t y  the  Engel curves  w i l l
be n o n l i n e a r  even with  cons tancy  o f  the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  and wi th  v a r i a b l e
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  even with  h o m o t h e t i c i t y  and in  p a r t i c u l a r  in  i t s  absence
the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  should  be in c luded  as an e x p l a n a to r y  v a r i a b l e  in  the
consumption fu n c t i o n  to a t t e m p t  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  income from s u b s t i t u t i o n
e f f e c t s .  The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  o f t e n  in c lu d ed  in  a g g re g a te  consumption
f u n c t i o n s  (see E l l i o t t  (1980) f o r  example)  bu t  we wish to  use age
s p e c i f i c  f u n c t i o n s ,  so f o r  reasons  we w i l l  d i s c u s s  l a t e r  in  t h i s
c h a p t e r  we a r e  fo rced  to  assume t h a t  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  the  consumption
f u n c t i o n  do not  vary  with the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .
Ando and M od ig l i an i  assume t h a t  e i t h e r  a l l  members o f  age group a
have  the  same f a c t o r  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  K , o r  K i s  a weighted  averagea a
o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l  f a c t o r s  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  w i th in  t h a t  age group and 
so i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h a t  age g roup .  This  i s  an assumption t h a t  we 
can acc ep t  so long as  we a r e  p repa red  t o  assume t h a t  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  
w i t h i n  the  age group have made ro u g h ly  th e  same fam i ly  fo rm at ion  
d e c i s i o n .  Then l e t t i n g  N r e p r e s e n t  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ’s e a rn i n g  span,  they  
w r i t e  the  consumption f u n c t i o n  fo r  age group a as
t  t t  t e t  t t - 1(2) C = K Y + (N - a)K Y + K Av a a a a a a a
f 0 • t  *" 1where Y i s  c u r r e n t  income, Y expec ted  f u t u r e  income and A th e  
v a lu e  o f  n e t  worth c a r r i e d  over  from t - 1  to  t  ( a s s e t s ) . In e q u a t io n  (2) 
the  va lue  o f  l i f e t i m e  wea l th  has s imply  been decomposed i n t o  t h r e e  
components,  each o f  which i s  m u l t i p l i e d  by th e  same va lue  o f  K.
Ando and M odig l i an i  then  a g g re g a te  th e  age s p e c i f i c  f u n c t i o n s  (2) 
i n t o  a s i n g l e  a g g re g a te  consumption f u n c t i o n :
(3) Ct  = c Y1 + c 2YCt + cJVt_1
They say t h a t  the  c o e f f i c i e n t s  in  (3) w i l l  be s t a b l e  over  t ime so long
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as three conditions are satisfied. The coefficients of (2) for each 
age group must be constant over time, as must the age structure of the 
population and the relative distribution of income, expected income 
and assets over the age groups. While we can accept the first of these 
three assumptions the nature of our study clearly requires that we 
reject the second and the third.
The distributional factors that are the object of this study 
provide another reason for doubting the usefulness of an aggregate 
function of the form (3). In the consumption-loan framework the interest 
rate will be influenced by the mix of borrowing and lending that makes 
up aggregate consumption. Thus while the same aggregate consumption 
level could result from saving by the older group associated with 
borrowing for consumption purposes by the younger group as from heavy 
consumption out of current income by the older group and positive 
saving by the younger group, the interest rate would probably not be the 
same in the two cases. Different interest rates would result in 
different distributional effects associated with the same aggregate 
consumption level and in particular would alter the distribution of 
expected future income.
Attempts have been made to estimate aggregate consumption 
functions allowing for demographic effects, in particular by Denton 
and Spencer (1976) and Heien (1972) . Heien argues that demographic 
factors were responsible for all of the increase in the U.S. marginal 
propensity to consume he found for the period 1948-65. He assumes a 
specific form of the intertemporal utility function where utility is a 
function of consumption in excess of subsistence consumption (in the 
linear expenditure system sense) in each period. Denton and Spencer 
assume that the individual also derives utility from the act of 
saving, since accumulated assets act both as a measure of social status
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and as protection against an uncertain future. They find that for 
Canadian data (1928-71 excluding 1940-46) variations in average house­
hold size and age distribution of the population have no direct effect 
on aggregate consumption although they note that their results are 
consistent with the possibility that age structure can affect the 
aggregate savings ratio.
A satisfactory empirical test of whether the aggregate consum­
ption function for any country has been significantly affected by the 
demographic changes that have occurred up to the present would 
probably require that variable coefficient estimation techniques be 
applied to the aggregate function. We would also want to test whether 
the aggregate consumption function satisfied the conditions for a con­
sistent aggregate of the age specific functions. This in turn would 
require estimation of the age specific consumption functions. Because 
we are interested in the distributional effects of demographic change 
it suits our purpose here to work directly with age specific consumption 
functions. In view of the possibilities our simulations reveal of 
significant distributional effects we consider it unlikely that the 
aggregate consumption function has been unaffected by demographic 
change. We also consider it unlikely that aggregate consumption 
behavior can be used as an indicator of the effects of changing age 
structures, if only because any level of aggregate consumption can be 
associated with a variety of different plausible distributions of con­
sumption across the age groups. Although the remainder of this thesis 
will deal with distributional effects and use age specific consumption 
functions, in Chapter Seven we report aggregate consumption levels 
associated with a simulation experiment using Canadian population 
projections. Although the projected demographic changes and the dis­
tributional effects they cause in our system are fairly significant,
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the aggregate consumption series gives virtually no indication that any 
change has occurred.
This chapter discusses the form of consumption function chosen 
for our simulations. Section II below reviews intertemporal consumption 
theory and the information that can be obtained from the general form 
of the problem, maximizing U(C^, C^ , C^) subject to an intertemporal 
budget constraint, where Ch represents consumption in i. Since the 
first order conditions for intertemporal maximization are straight­
forward this section concentrates on the intertemporal Slutsky equation 
and the information it yields about the effect of changes in the 
interest rate on the allocation of consumption over the individual’s 
life. This section also serves to show how the complication of the 
system increases as the number of ages increases and the difficulty of 
making general statements.
Section III of this chapter is a brief discussion of the basis of 
life cycle consumption theory, in a general optimizing form. It is well 
known that the basic intertemporal optimization problem has a solution 
such that consumption increases or decreases monotonically over time as 
the subjective discount rate is less than or greater than the market 
interest rate. Various authors have suggested modifications that would 
yield the observed inverted U pattern of lifetime consumption and the 
inverted I) savings pattern. In Section III we suggest a modification 
of the basic model based on the demographic factors that are the 
subject of this study, which can yield the observed consumption and 
savings pattern.
In Section IV we consider the specific form of the age specific 
consumption functions we have chosen to use in the simulations 
reported in later chapters. Section V briefly considers the role of 
inheritance and discusses the way chosen in our simulations to treat the 
role of the accumulated assets or debts of someone who dies prematurely.
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H _____I n te r t e m p o r a l  Consumption Theory
I n c r e a s i n g  th e  number o f  p e r io d s  an i n d i v i d u a l  i s  assumed to  l i v e  
i n  an i n t e r t e m p o r a l  model c o n s i d e r a b l y  i n c r e a s e s  th e  co m p l ic a t io n  of  
the  a n a l y s i s  o f  h i s  economic b e h a v i o r .  The demographic dynamics o f  a 
p o p u la t i o n  a r e  a l s o  g r e a t l y  com pl ica ted  by in c r e a s i n g  expec ted  l i f e  by 
only one o r  two p e r i o d s ,  so the  o v e r a l l  co m p l ic a t io n  added to an 
economic-demographic model by d i v i d i n g  a g iven l i f e t i m e  i n t o  t h r e e  o r  
fo u r  r a t h e r  than  two p e r io d s  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e .  This  i n c r e a s e d  com pl i ­
c a t i o n  i s  one r ea s o n  f o r  our cho ice  o f  s im u l a t i o n  as th e  majo r  a n a l y ­
t i c a l  to o l  o f  the  l a t e r  c h a p t e r s .
In the  two age model with a s i n g l e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  the  consumer ' s  
problem i s  to  maximize U(C^, C^) s u b j e c t  to  the  budget  c o n s t r a i n t  
(Yj - C p  + (Y^ - C2) C1 + = 0 where Y^  o r  Y  ^ may equal  z e ro .  The
f i r s t  o rd e r  o p t i m iz in g  c o n d i t i o n  i s  U ^/ l^  = (1 + r )  where IL i s  the  
a p p r o p r i a t e  m arg ina l  u t i l i t y  and U i s  tw ic e  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e .  Without 
f u r t h e r  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  we can w r i t e  th e  i n t e r ­
temporal  S lu t s k y  e q u a t i o n  as
(3 C , /3 r )  = ( a C j / a r ) .  + (YJ - C j ) ( l  + r ) _1(3C1/3Y)r
where Y i s  the  p r e s e n t  va lue  o f  the  l i f e t i m e  income s t ream ,  and Y^  i s  
assumed t o  have been c o r r e c t l y  f o r e c a s t .  The f i r s t  term on t h e  r i g h t  
hand s id e  i s  the  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  o f  a change in t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
and t h e  second i s  the  income e f f e c t  weighted by th e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  s a v in g s .  With n e g a t iv e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  and p o s i t i v e  income 
e f f e c t s  and assuming th e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  dominates ,  p o s i t i v e  
sav ing  i n  th e  f i r s t  p e r io d  makes (8C^/3r)  n e g a t iv e  and 
p o s i t i v e .  In the  case  o f  d i s s a v i n g  i n  th e  f i r s t  p e r io d  both  te rms in 
(9C^/3r)  a r e  n e g a t iv e  so the  whole e x p re s s io n  must be n e g a t i v e .
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The system becomes more complex as t h e  number o f  p e r i o d s  in  th e  
ho r izon  i n c r e a s e s .  In i t s  most gene ra l  form th e  t h r e e  age s t r u c t u r e  
r e q u i r e s  t h e  consumer to
Max U(Cj, C^) w ith  r e s p e c t  to  , C^, and
s u b j e c t  to
(Y1 '  Cl ) + (Y2 - C2)(1  + r)_1 + (Y3 '  C3)(1  + r ) " 2 = 0
(aga in  with  c o r r e c t  f o r e c a s t s  o f  th e  f u t u r e )  where we s h a l l  assume 
= 0 and where f o r  now we assume t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  c o n s t a n t  
over  t im e .  In t h e  usual  n o t a t i o n 1
For t h e  problem wi th  a c o n s t a n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  o f  maximizing
S
-------- ;r- = 0 t h e  f i r s t  o rd e r
(y2- c )
U(C1,C2,C3) s u b j e c t  t o  ( Y ^ C ^  + — —
d + r)
c o n d i t i o n s  a re  
U1 A, U2 = A / (1+ r ) , U3 = A/(1 + r )
where A i s  th e  Lagrangian .  D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  
c o n d i t i o n s  g iv e s
11
21
31
12
22
32
13
23
33
-1
-d+r) -1
- (1+r)
-1 - ( 1 + r ) " 1 - ( 1 + r ) ' 2 0
dC,1
dC„2 -
2 dC _3
dA
dY-
-A ( l+ r )  2d r  
-A ( l+ r )  ^dr
. rY2" C2 2 C 2
' ) + 1 2  ~ 3
( 1 + r ) Z (1+r)^
)di
from which,  l e t t i n g  D be the  d e t e r m in a n t  o f  t h e  m a t r i x  of  c o e f f i c i e n t s  
on t h e  l e f t  hand s i d e  and D. . the  c o f a c t o r  o f  t h e  element o f  th e  i^h  
row and j t h  column J
9C, -A
9r D(1+r)
(D22
D32>! , r Y2 C2
+ 1 + d  +  ^ ?
2Ct D . 0 3 i 42
f) in
where - 42
(1 + r)
8C2 Y2 
9 Y“ > d e f i n i n g  Y = Y: +
(1+r)
The s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  i s
9C,
9r
-A  ^ 31
D ( l + r ) 2 (1+r) 2 '  U33 + d  + r)
— 1 +rl 'd + r)
From the  budget  c o n s t r a i n t  we have,  fo r  th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on th e  income 
e f f e c t
V f 2_  _ 2C3
( 1 + r ) 2 ( 1 + r ) 3
Yr c i
1+r (1+r)
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(3C2/3r) = (-X/D(l+r)2)(u31(l+r)"2-U33+U23(l+r)‘3-U21Cl+r)'1)
where D is the determinant of the matrix of coefficients obtained by 
differentiating the first order maximization conditions and is negative 
by the second order conditions. Now with lh^ negative and if Ihj is 
positive we can show that the substitution effect on is positive if
"sd1 + r)"2 - U33 + W  + r>'3 > + ^
The coefficient on the income effect in (DC^/Sr) is
((Vj - Cj)(l - r)'1 + C3(l ♦ r)'3J
In a life cycle model we typically have (Y^  - C^) negative and 
positive so we cannot sign this coefficient and even assuming a positive 
substitution effect we cannot sign (dC^/dr). Similarly we cannot sign 
(3C^/9r) . In the case of (3C^/3r) we can show that the substitution 
effect of a change in the interest rate is negative. The coefficient 
on the income effect in this term can be written as
(1 + r)_1((Yj - C p  + C3(l + r)'2)
which in the life cycle model involves the two periods of dissaving in 
the individual's life, expressed in first period terms. This clearly 
requires the individual to trade off consumption in excess of income in 
the two dissaving periods of his life. From the budget constraint we 
can show that
(Yj - C p  + C3(l + r)'2 > 0 as -(.Yj - C p  < ä|((Y2 -C2)(l + r)'1)
or as the absolute value of first period dissaving is less or greater 
than half the value of second period saving in first period terms. This 
is obvious since both first and third period dissaving must be financed 
out of second period saving and if less than half of saving is assigned
to first period consumption, more than half is available for third.
With a positive substitution effect and a negative coefficient on the 
income effect an increase in the interest rate will stimulate second 
period consumption by lowering its price but at the same time dis­
courage it by increasing interest payments on first period debt, 
effectively lowering income. The increase in the interest rate also 
increases the amount of third period consumption that can be done, 
effectively increasing income and allowing some reduction in second 
period saving. When the coefficient on the income effect in (9C2/9r) 
is negative, repayment of first period debt takes more of any second 
period non-consumption than does net saving for the third period so the 
income reducing effect of the debt will outweigh the income increasing 
effect of saving for an effective net reduction in income and downward 
pressure on second period consumption.
As an example consider an intertemporal utility function of the
form
(4) U = InCj + klnc!,*1 + k2lnC^+2
where k = (1+y) * is the time preference factor and y is the rate of 
time preference. Clearly k is less than 1 for positive time preference 
and greater than one for negative preference. With a utility function 
of form (1), Ih is positive, negative and ILj, i / j, is zero.
Here we will allow the interest rate to change across periods. Writing 
the marginal utility of income as A, the first order optimizing 
conditions are
(5) Cj = 1/A, c‘ + 1 = k(l + rt)/A, c‘ + 2 = k2(l + rp (1 + rt+p/A
where r is the single period interest rate. Differentiating the first 
order conditions and letting D be the determinant of the matrix of 
coefficients of the endogenous variables in the resulting system we can
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write
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(6) (3C2+1/3rt) = -(k2/D) (1 + r,.)’2 (Cj+2)' (x + (Y* - c‘) (Cj) '2)
which using the first order conditions can be shown to be positive.
Since we have an explicit utility function we can solve for 
explicit forms of the consumption function for each age. We find
(7a) c1 = L1 (1 + k + k2)’](yj + y|+1 Cl + rtr h
(7b) ct+1z = k(l+ rt)(l+ k + k2)(y‘ + Y^+1 (1 + rp ~h
(7c) p t+2L3 = k2fl + rt)(1 + rt+1)(1 + k + k2)(yJ + y‘ + I
so that optimally derived age specific consumption functions are found 
to be strictly functions of lifetime wealth, where the form of the 
functions depend on interest rates over the lifetime of the individual 
in question and the rate of time preference.
At any point in time in a three age model there will be members 
of each of the three generations alive. Age specific consumption 
functions at any time t can be written as:
(8a) c 1L 1 = (1 + k + k 2) ~ 1Yj + (1 + k + k 2) _1Y2 + 1 (l + r t)_1
(8b) L 2 = k(l + k + k 2) _ 1 (l + r x) Y ^ -1 + (1 + k + k 2) ' ^
(Be) c tL 3 = k 2 (l + r t 2 )(l + rt l )(l + k + k 2)'1Y j ' 2 + k 2 ( l + rt l )
2 -1 t-1(1 + k + k Z) AY^
III Life Cycle Consumption
In the case of the log utility function of equation (4) in the 
previous section the first order optimizing conditions give us an 
explicit relation between consumption in any two periods,and the first
106
order conditions along with the budget constraint give us precise demand 
functions for each period. To determine whether there is dissaving at 
any age we must have information (or make assumptions) about the life 
cycle stream of income, the interest rate and the rate of subjective 
discounting. Working with the Slutsky equations derived from more 
general forms of the utility function than (4) we must make assumptions 
about patterns of saving and dissaving if we are to make any statements 
about the effect of changes in interest rates on consumption patterns.
The life cycle pattern of consumption and saving, with dissaving
in the early years, saving in the middle years and dissaving again in
the later (generally retirement) years is widely accepted as reasonable.
It is sometimes difficult to derive from the intertemporal optimization
problem, however. Consider the problem of maximizing 
T
(9) e <5tU(ct)dt
subject to
(10) At = rAt + yt - ct
where r is the market interest rate and 6 is the rate of subjective 
discount, A is accumulated assets and y^ and c^ are income and con­
sumption in t. The Hamiltonian for this problem is (dropping the time 
subscripts):
(11) H = U(c) + y (rA + y - c)
and the optimizing conditions are 
(12a) U ' = T
(12b) y = (6 - r)y
plus the transversality condition which determines the endpoint of the 
system. Then from (12) we have:
107
(13) c = (6 - r)U'/U"
which is negative or positive as the subjective discount rate is 
greater or less than the market interest rate. Thus in this case the 
consumption stream is monotonically rising or falling over the 
individual's horizon.
The Ando-Modigliani case in which consumption in any period is a 
constant proportion of lifetime wealth can be derived as a special case 
of the problem above, but the available data on lifetime income and 
consumption patterns (see, for example, Ghez and Becker (1975)) 
typically shows both following an inverted U pattern, peaking before 
retirement age is reached. A variety of modifications have been pro­
posed for the consumption model to yield the observed patterns. Thurow 
(1969) found a strong relation between income and consumption, both 
peaking in the age interval 45-54 in contrast to the simple life cycle 
theory result that there is no necessary relation between income and 
consumption patterns. He suggested that capital market imperfections 
prevent people from fully realizing the desired amount of their future 
income stream, especially while young, and so forcing them to match 
consumption more closely to income than optimal .
Nagatani (1972) suggested that the consumer adjusts expected 
future income for risk and so consumes less than he would if his future 
income stream were known with certainty. When his future income is 
realized the average consumer has consumed less than the optimal amount 
in the past and compensated by increasing his consumption level. This 
leads to a closer relation between consumption and income (since income 
typically rises with age) than the life cycle model predicts.
Heckman (1974) analysed the consumption pattern in a consumption- 
leisure model with exogenous wage growth and found that observed 
inverted U consumption patterns are consistent with a model in which
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goods and leisure are substitutes in utility and the market interest 
rate exceeds the subjective discount rate. Papers by Heckman (1976) 
and Blinder and Weiss (1976) extended the Heckman (1974) approach to 
include time invested in the production of human capital.
An alternate suggestion can be made in relation to the demo­
graphic factors that are of interest in this study. Models of the 
Blinder-Weiss sort show that the optimal allocation of time over the 
life cycle can include a period of retirement at the end of the life 
cycle. For most individuals retirement is mandatory at some prede­
termined age (Lazear (1979) discusses why mandatory retirement may be 
Pareto efficient) so the presence of a period of retirement for the 
representative consumer can be assumed2. The consumer’s life can then 
be divided into two parts, one active labour force period and the other 
a period of retirement with no labour income.
Consider the retirement period first, with the consumer retiring 
at age R and expecting to live to age T. The consumer's problem is 
then to maximize
(14) e 6tU(c) dt
subject to
»
(15) Ä = rA - c
The transversality condition requires that the accumulated assets which 
finance retirement consumption are just exhausted at the end of life.
The time pattern of consumption is again determined from equation (13) 
above and again depends on the size of the subjective discount rate 
relative to the market interest rate. If the two are equal c = 0 and 
the individual consumes the same amount in each period of his retirement.
2 I am indebted to lecture notes on Optimal Control by John Pitchford 
for the following formulation.
109
During the individual's working life he must maximize
0
subject to
(17) A = rA + y - c
where s (a (R)) is a measure of the utility to be received in retirement 
from consumption out of accumulated assets A(R). If no constraint on 
A(R) is given the transversality conditions require that T(R) = S' 
where S' is the first derivative of S(a (R)). This along with the 
maximum conditions give the time path of assets and consumption for any 
case. We now wish to use demographic considerations to place further 
restrictions on the time paths.
It is customary in analyzing intertemporal consumption to assume 
that the subjective discount rate 6 is constant over time. In our 
model it seems unlikely that this is the case. We would expect the rate 
at which the individual discounts the future to depend on the proba­
bility that he will survive to some future period. We would not expect 
someone in his seventies to apply the same discount rate over the next 
five years as would someone in his thirties. Assuming a typical real 
interest rate of five per cent or less this means that we would expect 
6 to be larger than r for the retired individual, giving c < 0 so that 
consumption declines over time. If we were to assume that the subjective 
discount rate changes abruptly at retirement we could assume it to be 
less than the interest rate during the working years so that c > 0 and 
consumption rising during the active labour force years. This would 
give us a rough representation of the typical life cycle pattern of 
consumption.
We can improve on this representation by assuming 6 changes over 
time during the labour force years, rising as demographic probabilities
(16) e 5tU(c) dt + S(A(R))
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of survival decline with age. Then for young individuals we can assume 
<5 to be less than r and consumption to be rising. Typical mortality 
rates for developed countries, as shown in Coale (1972), rise very slowly 
in the early and middle years, rising more rapidly after age fifty, but 
not particularly rapidly until after age 60. If we adopt this sort of 
pattern it is quite reasonable to assume that 6 rises gradually so that 
consumption increases at a decreasing rate until age fifty after which 
6 is greater than r and consumption begins to fall. This then gives 
the typical life cycle pattern of consumption, peaking before retirement.
With the subjective discount rate greater than the rate of interest 
in the retirement years consumption is falling over time. Given the 
requirement that assets just be exhausted during retirement this might 
lead to very low consumption levels during the final periods of life.
To guard against dying in misery we can impose the constraint that 
consumption (or assets) in period T not fall below some minimum level. 
This condition along with the equation determining the time path of 
consumption can be used to solve for a necessary level of assets to be 
held at the beginning of retirement. This in turn gives a terminal 
value of assets for the active years which further constrains the con­
sumption path. Since a target value is now given for A(R) the trans- 
versality conditions no longer place a condition on the value of T(R).
We can allow for the time path of income by adding to (16) and
(17) the condition3
(18) y = a(y)
where a is a multiplicative constant if income is growing at a constant 
proportional rate, while if we want the growth rate of income to fall 
prior to retirement we can specify a’ > 0 and a" < 0. If we wish to
3 The costate associated with income must satisfy = (6-a' 
where is the costate associated with assets.
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deal with the case where income peaks and starts to fall before 
retirement we can allow a ’ to become negative. This gives us the case 
of both income and consumption rising during the working years, with 
consumption peaking and falling before retirement and income either 
peaking or rising slowly to retirement.
To ensure the typical life cycle pattern of saving in the middle 
years with dissaving in the younger we can appeal to the biological 
constraint that family formation occur in the early years of the life 
cycle, typically in the mid-twenties, when income is likely to be low. 
For the representative individual we can impose the constraint that 
consumption at the beginning of the planning period exceed current 
income. This will require a period of saving in the years of higher 
income so that the target level of assets for the beginning of the 
retirement period will be met.
In this section we have introduced demographic factors into a 
model of intertemporal consumer behavior to yield observed life cycle 
patterns of consumption and saving.
IV The Form of the Consumption Function
In the simulations in the chapters that follow we shall use age 
specific consumption functions of the form
(19) Ca
avc . Y + 1 a c + c^W 3 a
where a represents age a, is current income, accumulated assets 
and W the present value of expected future income (which may be labour 
income or endowment income but excludes interest income). At this 
stage it is worth including an explanation of the form chosen.
Equation (19) is the general form of the consumption function 
used by Ando and Modigliani (1963) in their study of life cycle
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consumption behavior. It, like Friedman's (1957) permanent income 
consumption function, was designed to implement a consumption function 
of the form
(20) Ct = ct(W0)
where W is the present value at the beginning of life of lifetime human 
and nonhuman income. Allowing for uncertainty about future income 
streams (20) can be written
(20') Ct - ct(EW0)
where E is the expectations operator. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas 
intertemporal utility function (20') takes a multiplicative form:
(20") Ct - ctEWfl
where c is the elasticity of intertemporal utility with respect to 
consumption in period t. Since the Cobb-Douglas intertemporal utility 
function is intertemporally separable we can write
(21) Ct = c- EtWt
t-1
where c^  = 0^/(1 - c ) and E^W^ is the present value in period t of 
the income stream expected to be received after t. This consumption 
function, with consumption in t depending only on wealth in t, is a 
result of the separability property of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
In general consumption at t will depend on expected wealth at t and on 
consumption realized in the periods before t, Ct(C EW^), (Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980)).
It seems reasonable to assume that in formulating his consumption 
plan the consumer will treat expected future income differently from 
known current income. This may be a result of the consumer's degree of 
risk aversion, or it may result from institutional constraints. The
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consumer may, especially when young, face borrowing constraints that 
prevent him from consuming as much at present as he would wish on the 
basis of his expected future income. Given this we can write
(22) Ct - ct(Yt> Ct_x, nwp
where C  ^ represents the effect of past consumption on present 
consumption.
The function c (*) itself will depend on such factors as the 
consumer's age and family size so we could write (22) as
(22-) Ct - c;1 (Yt, Ct_T> GtWt)
where the superscript a represents the factors which can affect the 
form of the consumption relation.
We have noted that in the absence of intertemporal separability 
such as that found with a Cobb-Douglas intertemporal utility function 
current consumption decisions will depend explicitly on past decisions. 
Hall (1978) has argued that one implication of the life cycle- 
permanent income hypothesis is that all of the information needed to 
forecast current consumption will be contained in a single lagged value 
of consumption, and that consumption will follow a trend plus a random 
error. He argues that only a single period lag should be included and 
that to include second or higher lags implies that there should be 
regular cycles in consumption, which violates the notion that the 
consumer allocates consumption over time in an effort to smooth out 
any cycles. On quarterly U.S. data Hall finds that C j is the only 
lagged value significant in explaining C . He argues that this 
differentiates consumption from other economic series which, he says, 
generally do obey second order difference equations.
Hall is probably correct in arguing that the best forecaster of 
Cj. is C ^, but this does not mean that an analytical study should use
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Cj. = f(Ct p  . Included in the information contained in  ^ is the 
consumer's estimate of his future wealth. As this estimate changes 
the consumer will wish to change his consumption pattern and it is this 
sort of effect, not short term forecasting, that an analytical study is 
concerned with. Significantly, in this regard, Hall finds that lagged 
values of an index of real stock market prices do add significantly to 
the explanatory power of a consumption function based on a first order 
difference equation, although the effect is small. This is perfectly 
reasonable in that in an efficient stock market not recently subject to 
large shocks a relatively small part of changes in an index of stock 
market prices should represent unanticipated wealth changes, and we 
would expect consumption to respond significantly to such unanticipated 
changes.
While aggregate consumption functions are frequently estimated 
with lagged consumption as an explanatory variable, it is also common 
to replace lagged consumption with an accumulated asset variable as in 
the life cycle type function we use. The asset variable will clearly 
depend on past consumption decisions, and has the advantage of allowing 
for replanning in consumption decisions. Asset variables are not 
always significant in estimated consumption functions. Evans' (1967) 
survey article contains tests of a number of models which include 
assets as an explanatory variable in aggregate consumption functions. 
Evans finds that most studies which show assets to be important deter­
minants of consumption tend to have biased estimates, or estimates 
which can be shown to be nonsignificant. The only case in which he 
finds that the asset - income ratio is a significant determinant of 
consumption is an equation estimated on the period 1929-62 (which 
unlike most studies includes the Depression period). This result is 
perfectly reasonable. In relatively stable economic conditions assets
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can be regarded as a state variable in the consumer's intertemporal 
optimization problem, as we shall illustrate below. In a period like 
the Depression when (according to the figures calculated in Christensen 
and Jorgensen (1973)) income was falling more rapidly than assets the 
only way consumption levels could be maintained was by drawing down 
assets, so the level of current consumption would necessarily depend on 
the current asset level.
The fact that empirically it may be difficult to isolate the 
effect of assets on consumption (especially in aggregate consumption 
functions which average out the effects of people finding their incomes 
higher or lower than expected) does not mean that assets should be 
excluded from an analytical study. In general in the intertemporal 
optimization problem the consumer maximizes over his horizon subject to 
expected wealth and initial assets. At the beginning of life in a 
world with no bequests initial assets will be zero, but for any re­
planning initial assets at the beginning of the replanning horizon will 
equal the value of assets (debts) accumulated in the past.
Replanning may occur if the consumer's realized income stream 
differs from the expected stream. In a world where the probability of 
surviving from one age to the next is less than unity, uncertainty 
about expectation of life can also lead to replanning. To illustrate 
this consider the case of the consumer maximizing over some given 
horizon and discounting at the market rate of interest, where the 
number of years he will actually live is unknown but survival proba­
bilities conditional on his age at the time he makes his plans are 
known. His problem is to
Max
0
Ptu(ct)dt
where p is the probability at age 0 of surviving to age t. Similarly
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we shall write for the probability a consumer of age 1 surviving to 
age t, where in general p^ is greater than p^ for the same t. The 
change from a subjective discount form in Section III to a survival 
probability form here is simply a matter of expositional convenience. 
The instantaneous budget constraint is equation (10), the Hamiltonian 
is H = p^U(c) + ¥(rA + y - c) and the maximum conditions are
U' = T/p^ and ¥ = -r¥ = -rU' so c = (¥/U"p^) - (¥/p^p^)(3p^/9t)
then
-rU' 
U"Pt° U”(p^)2
a 03pt
at
and 3p /3t is negative since the probability of surviving from age 0 
to age t declines as t increases. The first term in the c expression 
is positive and the second negative. Beyond some t survival probabilities 
may decline sufficiently quickly to make c negative. This is one case 
considered in the previous section.
Now assume the consumer reviews his plans at time 1. Since 
p^ > p^ for given t and U* = ¥/p^ is less than ¥/p^ the revised consum­
ption plan would involve a higher level of consumption for any period t. 
Thus the period 0 plan will have to be revised and in order to replan 
the consumer must take account of his asset holdings4.
This replanning is inevitable in the absence of a complete set of 
actuarially fair contingent commodities. The individual of age 0 
planning over ages 1, 2 and 3 must use conditional survival probabil­
ities Pj, p^, p^ since to use p^, p^, p2 would be in effect to assume
that he will survive from age 0 to age 1 and then to age 2 with
probability one. This may be reasonable from one year to the next for
the young consumer but is not reasonable over the whole seventy year
4 This is related to Strotz (1955-6) myopia problems.
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lifetime. While the individual may be able to insure to some degree 
against premature death he cannot insure against living longer than 
expected. The only thing he can do in the absence of a complete con­
tingent security market is to accumulate assets to allow him to replan. 
Thus for reasons of demographic uncertainty alone it is desirable to 
include assets rather than past consumption in the consumption function.
Deaton (1972) has tested a life cycle-permanent income type con­
sumption function including accumulated assets in a form that allows a 
test of the proposition that assets enter the consumption function in 
response to uncertainty. lie finds that the uncertainty factor is 
significant in consumer behavior and that as a result assets do play a 
significant role in determining consumption. Thus the consumption 
relation can be written
(23) Ct = c“(Yt, At, EtWt).
As Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) emphasise, the coefficients of
consumption functions of the form (19) should, if possible, be
regarded as functions of the rate of interest. In the general form (1)
as Friedman (1957) indicated the term is a function of the interesta
rate. It is common to estimate a function of the form (19) with the 
interest rate as an additional explanatory variable, as in Elliott 
(1980), but typically the term K is taken to be a constant. Empirically 
K has been found to be very stable over time, at least in aggregate 
consumption functions. Friedman explained the secular constancy of K 
over a period of considerable variation in interest rates in terms of 
offsetting changes in the factors that determined K. Mohabbat and 
Simos (1977) found K to be stable during the post war years on U.S. 
data, when economic conditions were relatively stable, and found a 
greater degree of variability during the Depression and the period of
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the Second World War. Unfortunately their explanation of the behavior 
of K in terms of variations in the interest rate and in the ratio of 
nonhuman to human wealth was not rigorous, and they did not attempt to 
estimate K as a function of the interest rate.
Blinder (1975) estimates an aggregate life cycle consumption 
function with the interest rate as an explanatory variable. While the 
interest rate is statistically significant, Blinder finds that neither 
long nor short run MPC is particularly sensitive to the interest rate, 
with elasticities very close to zero. Friend and Lieberman (1975) 
estimate life cycle consumption functions containing capital gains as 
an explanatory variable for five age groups on 1963 U.S. cross section 
data. Capital gains prove not to be significant for any of the five 
age groups. Similarly family size is generally not significant. Thus 
while the coefficients of the consumption functions should in principle 
be functions of the interest rate we have no empirical guidance for 
either magnitude or direction of the effect, and as we saw in an 
earlier section of this chapter the theoretical effect is indeterminate. 
We therefore follow common practice and treat the coefficients of the 
age specific consumption functions as independent of the rate of 
interest.
We have more guidance on the matter of demographic influences on • 
the coefficients of the consumption function, although not a great deal. 
Consumption studies allowing for demographic factors typically fall 
into one of two broad categories. Aggregate life cycle studies tend to 
use fixed coefficient forms and include as explanatory variables such 
demographic factors as the proportion of the population in certain age 
groups. Studies that allow variable coefficients, making the 
coefficients functions of number of children, age and other demographic 
factors as in Muellbauer (1977) generally deal with budget shares,
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studying how differing family characteristics affect demand for 
particular commodities.
Since we are interested in the effects of changing population 
age structures we wish to allow for changes in the consumption function 
as an individual ages. We therefore use linear age specific consum­
ption functions of form (19) with constant coefficients in view of the 
discussion above of interest rate effects. The coefficients will also 
depend on the family formation decision, but since the only change in 
fertility we introduce (as opposed to changes in total number of births 
with constant age specific fertility, as a result of changes in the 
numbers in the fertile years) is in Chapter Seven where, under 
Statistics Canada’s Population Projection One total Canadian fertility 
rates are projected to fall from 2.2 children per woman to 1.89 then 
rise to 2.1 and remain at that level, we can reasonably regard the 
coefficients as constant.
The coefficients used in the simulations are based on a study by 
Stearns (1971) of age specific consumption functions using U.S. data, 
the most complete study of such functions available to us. The use of 
age specific functions allows us the convenience of linear consumption 
functions but at the same time the generality of allowing the indi­
vidual's consumption function to vary over his life. It allows us to 
examine the effects of changing population age distribution much more 
effectively than would be possible using a single aggregate consumption 
function containing age variables, since the changing pattern of age 
specific consumption during a process of ageing could not be studied in 
an aggregative framework.
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V______I n h e r i t a n c e
The u sua l  approach to  t h e  t r e a tm e n t  o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  in  i n t e r ­
temporal  consumption models  i s  to  a t t a c h  a b eq u es t  motive to  th e  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  to  be maximized and to  t r e a t  i n h e r i t a n c e  r e c e iv e d  as 
an i n i t i a l  a s s e t  and so p a r t  o f  th e  endowment. Th is  conven t ion  makes 
p o s s i b l e  t h e  c h a in in g  o f  g e n e r a t i o n s ,  so t h a t  s o c i e t i e s  o f  f i n i t e - l i v e d  
i n d i v i d u a l s  can be shown to  behave as though th e y  were s i n g l e  i n f i n i t e l y -  
l i v e d  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Then th e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  s o c i a l  o p t i m i z a t i o n  and 
i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  a r e  t h o s e  f o r  t h e  op t imal  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  consumption by an i n f i n i t e l y - l i v e d  i n d i v i d u a l .
Th is  i s  th e  conven t ion  employed in  growth models assuming popu­
l a t i o n s  growing a t  a c o n s t a n t  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r a t e .  Here we c o n s id e r  how 
t h a t  conven t ion  would have to  be adap ted  to  s u i t  our  framework.
In t h e  s t a n d a rd  growth th e o r y  s t r u c t u r e  th e  p o p u la t i o n  i s  t r e a t e d  
as a homogeneous whole,  so everyone can be r e g a rd e d  as  r e c e i v i n g  th e  
same i n h e r i t a n c e .  In a model t h a t  a l low s  f o r  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s e v e r a l  
age groups in each p e r io d  we must t a k e  accoun t  o f  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  
i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in  a l l o c a t i n g  i n h e r i t a n c e s ,  in o th e r  
words to  a l low  f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  i n h e r i t a n c e  one r e c e i v e s  from o n e ' s  
p a r e n t s  w i l l  no t  f i t  th e  same p a t t e r n  as t h a t  r e c e iv e d  from o n e ' s  
g r a n d p a r e n t s .  In t h e  usua l  n e o c l a s s i c a l  growth model labou r  i s  t r e a t e d  
as a homogeneous commodity, so t h e  r a t e  o f  growth o f  th e  a g g reg a te  
l a bou r  supply  can a l s o  be taken  as  an i n d i c a t o r  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  o f  one age and th o s e  o f  any o t h e r  age.  At our  
more d i s a g g r e g a t e d  l e v e l  we wish to  al low f o r  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
s u r v iv in g  one more pe r io d  v a ry in g  with  t h e  age o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  and 
f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  we a r e  not  d e a l in g  w i th  a s t a b l e  growing p o p u la t i o n .  
The c l o s e s t  analogy  to  th e  growth th e o ry  conven t ion  would be to  
a l l o c a t e  th e  a s s e t s  o f  anyone who d i e s  p re m a tu re ly  a c ro s s  th e  remain ing
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age groups in p r o p o r t i o n  as  he was r e l a t e d  t o  each.  K e y f i t z  (1977b) 
g iv e s  t h e  expec ted  number o f  female k in  a l i v e  f o r  a female  aged 40 in 
t h e  United  S t a t e s  in  1965. The e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  a l i v i n g  grandmother i s  
.156,  mother .780,  a u n t s  o l d e r  than  mother .339 ,  c o u s in s  by a u n t s  o ld e r  
than  mother .849,  a u n t s  younger th an  mother  .581,  co u s in s  by aun ts  
younger th a n  mother .986,  o l d e r  s i s t e r s  .620,  n i e c e s  th rough  o l d e r  
s i s t e r s  .924,  younger s i s t e r s  .713,  n i e c e s  th ro u g h  younger s i s t e r s  .788,  
d a u g h te r s  1 .370 ,  and g randdaugh te rs  .112.  S i m i l a r  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  can be 
c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  each age group and t h e  a s s e t s  o r  d e b t s  o f  someone dying  
p r e m a tu re ly  can be d i s t r i b u t e d  a c r o s s  t h e  o t h e r  age groups  in t h e s e  
p r o p o r t i o n s .  Th is  i s  t h e  case  o f  a s i n g l e  sex  model,  and could be used 
in Chapter  Six below. In Chapter  Seven,  however,  we use  S t a t i s t i c s  
Canada 's  p r o j e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  Canadian p o p u l a t i o n ,  which a r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  
two-sex  p r o j e c t i o n s .  In t h a t  case  account  would have to  be taken  o f  
a l l  male and female r e l a t i o n s h i p s  as w el l  a s  female  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  and 
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  invo lved  would d i f f e r  f o r  t h e  two sexes  due t o  th e  
d i f f e r i n g  s u r v i v a l  r a t e s  o f  males and females  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  females  
r e p r e s e n t  more than  h a l f  o f  th e  number o f  b i r t h s  in  any p e r io d  due to 
th e  h ig h e r  r a t e  o f  spontaneous  a b o r t i o n  o f  male f o e t u s e s  tha n  o f  female 
f o e t u s e s .  We might  s i m p l i f y  th e  mathematics  by assuming t h a t  i n h e r i ­
ta n c e  c a r r i e s  on ly  down from p a r e n t  t o  c h i l d  and n o t  from c h i l d  to  
p a r e n t  o r  a c ro s s  to  s i b l i n g s  o r  c o u s in s .  Th is  in v o l v e s  a l o s s  o f  the  
r e a l i s m  t h a t  i n t r o d u c i n g  an i n h e r i t a n c e  f u n c t i o n  would be in ten d ed  to  
i n t r o d u c e ,  however, s i n c e  in r e a l i t y  t h e r e  w i l l  be peop le  who d i e  
c h i l d l e s s  but  with  s u r v i v i n g  p a r e n t s  o r  s i b l i n g s .  I t  a l s o  com pl ica te s  
t h e  mathematics  s in c e  in our  model such i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l  occur  w i th  
w e l l - d e f i n e d  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and something must be done w i th  t h e i r  a s s e t s
or  d e b t s .
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There is a more important complication, though, in that while on 
Keyfitz's figures there is a probability of .780 that the mother of a 
forty year old female will be alive and so a probability of .22 that 
she will not and that the daughter will be eligible to receive an 
inheritance should her mother have died with net positive assets, this 
does not mean that all females aged forty will receive an inheritance 
but rather that 22% of them will. The size of the inheritance will 
depend on the mother's assets at death, the number of siblings the 
forty year old female has alive, the legal pattern of inheritance, and 
on whether the mother herself received an inheritance and if so how 
much. If the purpose of introducing an inheritance function is to 
introduce an additional element of realism then that function must 
allow for the fact that while there may be a well defined probability 
of inheriting, the actual distribution of bequests depends on a discrete 
event: living or dying. We cannot therefore simply adopt the con­
vention of single age models but must divide each age group into two 
classes, those who did and those who did not receive inheritances.
Each member of each class can then be regarded as the beginning of a 
Markov chain of descendants who must themselves be classed according to 
whether they receive an inheritance. With the assumption of no 
inheritance we are able to simplify the simulations by treating each 
member of any age group identically to all other members of the same 
age group. This will not be possible with a realistic inheritance 
function.
The inheritance of capital or claims to capital introduces 
additional complications. Our assumption in the following chapters 
that capital lasts only a single simulation period is clearly realistic 
only when the simulation period is fifteen to twenty years and not in 
the case of a five year period, as in Chapter Seven below. If we
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introduce capital that lasts more than a single period we must allow 
for the depreciation of capital in calculating the interest rate and 
add claims on capital to the pattern of inherited assets.
Most neoclassical models follow the convention used by Diamond 
(1965) and assume no depreciation, so capital equipment is infinitely 
long lived. In a single output model like Diamond’s, capital stock 
and consumption represent different uses for the same type of output, 
so part or all of the capital stock can be consumed in any period. 
Diamond makes the slightly unusual implicit assumption that all of a 
period's capital stock is consumed by its owners even though it could 
be held in the form of capital for an indefinite period. This allows 
him to set savings each period equal to the capital stock available 
for the next period rather than setting it equal to investment for the 
next period. This simplifies his calculations but does not appear to 
represent a great improvement in realism over our assumption that 
capital only lasts a single period.
The fact that individuals do receive inheritance cannot be taken 
as evidence of bequest motives on the part of their parents. Mirer 
(1979) cites the 1962 survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers 
carried out in the U.S. by the Federal Reserve as showing that only 
four per cent of the sample aged sixty-five and over gave "providing an 
estate" as an objective for saving while 47% were "providing for old 
age" and 34% were "providing for emergencies". Mirer also notes 
evidence that gifts from older to younger individuals, which could 
replace bequests and take advantage of gift taxes that are much more - 
favourable than estate taxes, are much smaller than would be expected 
in the presence of a bequest motive. This suggests that if there is a 
target asset value attached to the end of the individual's expected 
life it is not for purposes of bequests but rather to cover the
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contingency of the individual living longer than expected. In the 
control theoretic formulation of the consumer's problem the utility 
value attached to this asset target should not be the utility derived 
from leaving a bequest to the next generation but rather the utility 
derived earlier in life from the knowledge that should the consumer 
prove to be unusually long lived he will not starve in old age.
Bequests may be accidental not only for this reason but also 
because they may take the form of assets whose value could not be 
realized by the bequeathing generation. It is not always possible, for 
example, for the parents to realize the capital value of a house by 
selling it and renting in retirement. In addition, the Economic 
Council of Canada (1979) has suggested, in times of rapid inflation 
older individuals may be reluctant to sell a house and take on the 
obligation of a rent which will rise with the rate of inflation. It 
would be useful in testing the proposition that at least a part of 
inheritance is accidental inheritance of housing to have data on the 
proportion the value of housing represents of the total value of 
inheritances. The increasing use of reverse annuity mortgages in the 
U.S. and the U.K. may provide a test of the importance of this factor. 
Under a reverse annuity mortgage a loan is taken out with the house as 
security and used to buy an annuity. The annuity payment is reduced 
by the amount of the interest on the mortgage, but the principal of 
the loan is not repaid until the houseowner has died and the property 
is liquidated. If unintentional bequests of housing are a significant 
part of total bequests increased use of these mortgages should be 
associated with a reduction in the total value of bequests. The question 
of gifts made during the life of the giver remains open, of course. 
Similarly this does not mean that investments in the next generation's 
stock of human capital are not significant. It does mean that a bequest
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motive is not likely to play a large part in the intertemporal 
consumption decision.
In addition to the possibility that bequests are largely 
accidental we must allow for the fact that on average they are small. 
While N.S. Blomquist (1979) cites evidence that large fortunes are 
commonly based on bequests, and often perpetuated by bequests, and 
while it is true that bequests are a significant source of inequality 
crudely measured, this docs not make their overall significance great. 
Blinder (1974) cites a survey of households with heads aged 55-64 
years in 1960, which found that 72.3% had received no inheritance, and 
that for the groups which did receive an inheritance the most common 
level was between one and five thousand dollars. Only 2.7% had 
inheritances larger than $24,950, although some of these were very 
large. Blinder (1973) reports that for the same survey the mean 
inheritance of those who received anything at all was about $7500 and 
the overall mean probably around $3000. Bequests on this scale are 
unlikely to play any significant part in lifetime consumption planning.
Finally, bequests tend to arrive late in the life of the 
recipient. According to N.S. Blomquist (1979) a person does not 
normally receive his main inheritance until the age of about fifty. 
Discounting back to the beginning of the consumption planning period, 
applying the probability of surviving to receive the bequest, the 
probability of receiving a bequest at all, the probability distribution 
over the size of the bequest that might be received, and allowing for 
any expected estate duties, we seem quite justified in ignoring the 
effect of inheritance on consumption.
In the simulations that follow in later chapters, however, we 
must make allowance for the fact that some individuals will die before 
their maximum possible period of life. Some of these will die holding
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net positive assets and some net debts. One way of dealing with this 
would be to calculate for each age the total assets of those who die 
prematurely and to distribute those assets across the other age groups 
in proportion as the deceased individual was related to each of the 
other age groups. Everybody within any other age group would receive 
an equal share of that age group’s inheritance. This clearly is not a 
realistic inheritance pattern. Blinder's studies make it clear that 
inheritances are distributed very unequally within each age group, so 
that each group would have to be partitioned into those who did and 
those who did not receive a bequest. Further there is no reason to 
think that each recipient of a bequest within any particular age group 
will receive the same amount as other recipients of the same age.
That might be the case if all who die prematurely are assumed to die 
intestate and their assets distributed equally among their heirs, but 
this does not allow for deliberately unequal allocation within a will. 
The issue is complicated by laws such as those of Sweden which require 
that even if a will is made a certain minimal share be given to each 
child. In addition each recipient of a bequest would have to be 
classified by whether his parent received a bequest and if so how much. 
Considering Blinder's evidence on the size of bequests the returns to 
the development of anything approaching a realistic inheritance 
structure appear small.
According to Drazen (1978) current U.S. estate law will not 
fully enforce liabilities in excess of assets in estates. In other 
words one cannot bequeath bankruptcy to one’s heirs. In the real 
world this means that some creditors lose when their debtors die, 
unless all loans have an actuarial risk premium attached. Consider a 
perfectly competitive world with perfect capital markets, operated by 
a Cass and Yaari (1966) central financial intermediary. Then when a
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debtor dies prematurely there is no single creditor the bank can assign 
the loss to, it must be shared across all of the participants in the 
market. Typically we would expect a bank to make provision for 
absorbing this sort of a loss. The result of premature death in debt 
is then that the supply of loanable funds is reduced.
Suppose that premature death with positive net worth is treated 
the same way. The intermediary is a government operation which levies 
a 100% estate duty on net assets at death and uses the funds as part 
of the supply of loanable funds and, in effect, as insurance against 
losses when people die in debt. This is in fact not very different 
from the ability of some institutions in some countries to appropriate 
the balance of an account that has lain dormant for some minimum period 
of time. Thus instead of trying to set up an inheritance system we can 
treat assets symmetrically with the real treatment of debt in the U.S.. 
Deaths with positive net assets increase the supply of loanable funds 
and deaths in debt reduce the supply, the net effect depending on the 
survival rates and relative assets of various age groups. The interest 
rate may either rise or fall as a result of the change in the supply 
or demand for loanable funds.
This convention can be extended to the treatment of physical 
capital if we assume that all capital investment is financed by 
borrowing from the intermediary. This saves us having to deal with a 
special class of capital owners, who, like the class of inheritors in 
any age group would represent only a part of that age group. On the 
whole the loss of realism from adopting this convention seems slight 
relative to the gain in computational ease, especially since at least 
with regard to the treatment of debt this convention is probably more 
realistic than that of bequest models which assume that no individual 
dies in debt (see, for example, Yaari (1965)).
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CHAPTER 5
INTEREST RATE DYNAMICS IN A SIMPLE CONSUMPTION-LOAN MODEL 
I_____ Introduction
This chapter considers the behavior of interest rates in the 
simple three age consumption-loan model, looking at stability conditions 
and the nature of the approach to equilibrium. It serves three 
purposes, first to provide a link between the simulation results of the 
following two chapters and Samuelson's basic model, second to allow us 
to undertake qualitative analysis which will provide insight into the 
workings of the larger models, and third to demonstrate the rate at 
which the complexity of the system increases as the number of periods 
people can hope to live increases. Because of this complexity, in the 
final sections of this chapter in which we introduce capital and a 
production function we adopt a Cobb-Douglas production function and 
specify coefficient values.
Section II below contains a brief review of demographic dynamics 
and lists the demographic substitutions that will be used at various 
places through the chapter. The following sections consider several 
different versions of the system and the stability conditions and 
dynamic behavior of each.
In the systems that follow the biological interest rate is not 
always a stable equilibrium, although in the simple case where the 
probability of surviving from one age to the next is unity (so that no 
one dies before the end of his third period of life) it is always a 
root of the system. When we allow for the possibility of dying 
prematurely, by setting the survival probabilities less than unity the 
biological interest rate is no longer an equilibrium. This is expected
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in view of Starrett's discussion of the biological optimum. When all 
age groups grow at the same rate and everyone survives with certainty 
from one age to the next then in equilibrium the system does behave as 
though a series of altruistic transfers were taking place. In period t 
in a three age model each member of age two gives a unit of consumption 
to the members of age three in that period and in t+1 each receives in 
his third age a transfer from the second age group of t+1. With a 
growth rate of m, for every member of the third group in t+1 there are 
1+m members of the second. Since each member of the second group gives 
up one unit, each member of the third group receives 1+m units. Each 
member of the third group had given up one unit in the previous period
I
and so receives in effect a return of m on the unit given up the 
period before. In the case where survival probabilities are less than 
one some members of the second age group in t will not survive to the 
third age in t+1, so the effective return received by those who do 
survive will depend on the rate of survival between second and third 
ages. While the observed interest rate will rise in this simple 
example, it is not clear what will happen if we allow the first age 
group to borrow from the second and assume that the payments made by 
the second to the third age group are in repayment for borrowing done 
in the previous period. Now the effective interest rate will depend 
on the proportion of first age borrowers who survive to the second age 
and on the proportion of second age lenders who survive to the third 
age. It is clear that the biological rate in the sense of a rate equal 
to the intrinsic rate of population growth can no longer appear as an 
equilibrium for the system, but must be replaced by a rate based on the 
biological rate but adjusted to allow for the relative survival 
probabilities. The adjustment becomes increasingly complicated as the 
number of ages and therefore the number of different survival probabilities
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to be allowed for increases. As we shall show in the final section of 
this chapter,under this modification we also lose the simple explan­
ation of the optimality of the biological rate which Starrett was able 
to give for the case of assured survival.
One limitation of the three age model used in this chapter is 
that the Leslie matrix which determines the dynamic behavior of popu­
lation has only one root. In the three age example we will find three 
possible equilibrium values of the interest rate, one of which is, or 
is based on, the intrinsic rate of population growth. In the next 
chapter, where we deal with larger population systems whose Leslie 
matrices have several roots, we shal1 find a close correspondence 
between the roots of the Leslie matrix and the solutions to the equation 
used to find the interest rate in each period. The second and higher 
roots of the interest rate equation will prove very close to the second 
and higher roots of the Leslie matrix. This correspondence extends to 
the complex as well as the real roots.
The explanation for this behavior is an extension of Starrett’s 
explanation of the biological rate result. In a demographically stable 
population with all age groups growing at the same rate the simple 
transfer mechanism described above explains the interest rate result.
It also explains why as the population approaches demographic stability, 
the interest rate observed should follow a similar dynamic path to that 
of the population. If the population approaches stability cyclically, 
then during a cyclical upswing the second age group in period t will be 
greater than that of t-1 by more than a factor m where m is the 
intrinsic growth rate. This means, in the case of assured survival, 
that when the members of the second age group in t-1 retire in t, having 
made the unit transfer each in t-1, they find that there are more than 
1+m second age individuals for each third age individual and since each
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second age person gives up one unit of consumption each third age person 
will receive more than 1+m units and so will receive an effective (or 
apparent) return of more than m on his transfer of one unit in t-1. 
Similarly on a downswing the observed rate of return will fall. Looked 
at in terms of this mechanism the growth of each individual's assets 
(where we regard the transfer made in youth as an asset) will follow 
the same path as does the population. When we solve for the market 
interest rate we are actually solving for the roots of the equation 
representing the growth of this particular asset, so we should find a 
close correspondence between the solutions to the interest rate equation 
and the roots of the population matrix. This correspondence will extend 
to the common demographic case in which the Leslie matrix has only one 
real root, the remainder being complex. It fails in the case encoun­
tered in this chapter in which the interest rate equation has more 
solutions than the Leslie matrix has roots. In that case there must be 
solutions to the interest rate equation which do not correspond to 
roots of the Leslie matrix. The implication of this is that as the 
size of the population structure increases we expect the biological 
interest rate result (or some variant of it allowing for survival rates) 
to become more robust.
As noted above, in the three age model of this chapter we do find 
cases in which the biological rate is an unstable root. This reflects 
the fact that the system has more roots than has the population matrix. 
We discussed instability in an example in Chapter Three in terms of 
the relative responsiveness of consumption to the interest rate in the 
different periods of the consumer's life. In the example presented in 
this chapter the introduction of capital, another factor responsive to 
the interest rate, can convert the biological root from an unstable to 
a stable equilibrium. We have also found this to hold in the case of
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a two age model.  I t  appea rs  t h a t  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  and the  
r e q u i re m e n t  t h a t  th e  marg ina l  p roduc t  o f  c a p i t a l  equal  the  i n t e r e s t  
f a c t o r  adds a n o th e r  f a c t o r  s u f f i c i e n t l y  r e s p o n s i v e  t o  the  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  to  c o n v e r t  t h e  b i o l o g i c a l  r o o t  to  a s t a b l e  e q u i l i b r i u m .
Demographic Dynamics
Much o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  consum pt ion - loan  model i s  in  terms 
o f  two pe r io d  l i v e s .  Th is  i s  incomple te  from an economic p o i n t  o f  
view because  i t  p r e c l u d e s  d i r e c t  i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  t r a d e ,  and i s  
s i m i l a r l y  incom ple te  from a demographic p o i n t  o f  view s in c e  th e  f i r s t  
o r d e r  d i f f e r e n c e  e q u a t io n  i t  y i e l d s  on p o p u l a t i o n  s i z e  i s  no t  capab le  
o f  d i s p l a y i n g  th e  r i c h n e s s  o f  demographic dynamics.  Most consumption- 
loan a r t i c l e s  assume e i t h e r  a s t a t i o n a r y  p o p u l a t i o n  or  one in which 
each age group i s  growing a t  t h e  same c o n s t a n t  r a t e  ( i n  demographic 
terms a s t a b l e  p o p u l a t i o n ) .
In th e  q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  f o l l o w s  we assume a t h r e e  age 
mode l . At any t ime t  t h e r e  a r e  i n d i v i d u a l s  o f  age i  a l i v e .  The 
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  o f  age i  s u r v i v i n g  to  age j i s  p ^  so 
th o s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  o f  age 2 c u r r e n t l y  a l i v e  a r e  t h e  s u r v i v o r s  o f  age 1 
in t h e  p r e v io u s  p e r i o d ,   ^ anc* s i mü a r ly  = ?23^2
I n d i v i d u a l s  o f  age 1 in  p e r io d  t ,  r e f e r r e d  to  as  g e n e r a t i o n  t ,  a r e  the  
c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  second age group in  p e r io d  t .  The s i z e  o f  g e n e r a t i o n  t  i s  
de te rmined  by th e  b i r t h  f a c t o r  b = (1+m) where m i s  th e  given  b i r t h  r a t e  
and th e  b i r t h  f a c t o r  may be g r e a t e r  or  l e s s  than  one ,  th u s  = bN^.
This  i s  a r e s t r i c t i v e  r u l e  s in c e  in  models  w i th  longe r  l i f e t i m e s  each 
age group excep t  th e  groups  beyond the  f e r t i l e  ages  c o n t r i b u t e s  to  
b i r t h s  in  any pe r iod  and age groups w i th i n  t h e  f e r t i l e  yea rs  d i s p l a y  
d i f f e r e n t  f e r t i l i t y  w i th  e f f e c t s  t h a t  a r e  no t  caught  by a s s i g n i n g  a l l
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fertile ages the same (presumably average) fertility rate. By setting 
the fertility of the oldest group to zero we adopt the form of most 
demographic structures but lose the richness of the larger ones. We are 
forced to this for analytical tractability. In the later simulations 
we will use more detailed demographic systems.
The demographic structure with which most of our qualitative
results deal is
(1) "1- bN2
(2) "2 - P12N1
(3) »3 =
Mt-1
P23N2
from (1) and (2) we have
(4) MtNi = bp12Nl_1
which has positive root bp^0, greater or less then one as b is greater 
or less than l/p^- From (2) and (3) we obtain another relation we 
shall use frequently:
(3') Nj = (p^/b)^-1
We also note that we can write
N2 = bPl2N2_1 and N3 = br'l2N3'1
and recall that in demographic terms a stable population is one that is 
growing at a constant rate and each of whose age groups is growing at 
the same constant rate. Thus bp^ determines the demographic dynamics 
of the system and since bp^ ^ is positive, the system must display 
monotonic behavior and so is not capable of representing the sort of 
oscillations observed in actual populations and which Coale (1972) has 
shown to be inherent in the dynamics of populations.
Consider a three age model in which the third age group has 
positive fertility. Equations (2) and (3) are unchanged but in place
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of equation (1) we have 
(!’)
and in place of (4)
N1" = b Nb + b N1 1 12 2 13 3
<4') NJ ■ ti12Pl2Ni'1 + b13Pl2P23Nr 2
a second order difference equation with characteristic equation 
(5) A - t>12p12A - b13p12p23 = 0
and roots
Al,2 = 1^ b12P12 1 ^"b12P12') + 4b 13P12P23  ^^
Since -b^3p^2p23 is negative the roots are real and even this system 
can only display alternations, not oscillations. These alternations 
need not actually be observed. The sign pattern on the characteristic 
equation is + - - indicating that the system has one negative and one 
positive root, the positive root having the larger absolute value.
Because the population dynamics are represented by a homogeneous 
difference equation, stability tests are actually tests of whether the 
population will eventually vanish. A stationary population at a non­
zero level can only be found if (1 - b^2p12 - P13P12P2 3  ^ = and 
this condition holds the stationary population can be at any level.
Much economic-demographic literature deals with the influence of 
economic factors on demographic factors, in other words with analyzing 
changes in the b „  values which lead to zero population growth. In the 
demographic literature, Keyfitz (1977) deals with the behavior of a 
population undergoing such changes. Our interest is in the effects of 
a given demographic structure on economic variables so we use stability 
conditions on the population side for the information they give on the 
dynamic behavior of the population.
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To find the stability conditions for the system above it is 
convenient to convert it into a system of two first order difference 
equations,
„t-1(7a) N1 b12Pl2N1
(7b) Zb = Nb_1
for which the necessary
(8a) 1 b12P12 * 0
(8b) 1 - b12P12 - b:
where (8a) is the condi' 
If we extend to a
fertile we have
(1") = b12N2 + b
(4") N1 = b12P12N1
(S’) A " b12P12A
where the sign pattern
real there will be one
,t-2
13f 12f23 14*12f23f34
,t-3
demonstrated that neither sufficient stability nor sufficient 
instability conditions on the system are satisfied when the system is 
written in matrix form. Necessary and sufficient conditions can be 
written as above and consist of (8a+b) and
1_b12P12
-1
0
'b13P12P23
1
-1
_b14P12P23P34
0
1
The most we can say about this system is that it must display 
alternations and that we expect it to display oscillations. It serves
136
to  show t h a t  c o m p l i c a t i o n s  in  th e  demographic dynamics o f  th e  system 
i n c r e a s e  r a p i d l y  w i th  s i z e .  Coale (1972) p ro v id e s  a very  complete 
s tudy  o f  t h e  dynamic behav io r  o f  p o p u l a t i o n s  w hile  K eyf i tz  (1977) goes 
in to  m a t r i x  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  in some d e t a i l .
I l l  I n t e r e s t  Rate Dynamics in  a Three Age Consumption-Loan Model
We now u n d e r ta k e  q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  consumpt ion- loan  
model i n v o lv in g  i n d i v i d u a l s  w ith  a t h r e e  age l i f e  with  age s p e c i f i c  
consumption fu n c t i o n s  based on e m p i r i c a l  l i f e  c y c l e  s t u d i e s .
Consumption a t  each age i s  assumed t o  be a f u n c t i o n  o f  c u r r e n t  
income, expec ted f u t u r e  income and accumula ted  a s s e t s  where a s s e t s  a r e  
s imply p a s t  sav ing  or  d i s s a v i n g .  In a t h r e e  age model w i th  Y^ = 0 on ly  
t h e  f i r s t  age group has an e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  f u t u r e  income, and we assume 
no i n h e r i t a n c e  so th e  f i r s t  age group has no a s s e t s .  The second age 
group has a s s e t s  which a re  assumed to  be n e g a t i v e  - we assume a l i f e  
c y c l e  p a t t e r n  in  which t h e  f i r s t  age group d i s s a v e s  and so has  
n e g a t i v e  a s s e t s  accumula ted  when i t  e n t e r s  t h e  second age.  The 
i n d i v i d u a l  saves  in  h i s  second pe r iod  so t h e  t h i r d  age group i s  assumed 
to  have p o s i t i v e  accumula ted  a s s e t s  which i t  consumes e n t i r e l y .  This  
l a s t  assumption e n s u re s  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s i n t e r t e m p o r a l  budget  
c o n s t r a i n t  i s  s a t i s f i e d .
The age s p e c i f i c  consumption f u n c t i o n s  a r e
(9a) c) = C|Y |  ♦ q p j / y u  ♦ r t )
(9b)
(9c) rt rvt - 2  .2 , vt - l  rt - l u . sC3 = tYl - C1 ) (1 + rt -2 + (Y2 - C2 K1 + V l J
Note t h a t  in t h e s e  e q u a t io n s  we assume t h a t  EY^* = Y^. We a l s o  assume
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that individuals work with a long term debt/asset structure. Thus
first period dissaving is accumulated through life at the interest rate
at which it was incurred, and repaid in the retirement period. Hence
2our use of (1+r ^  i-n ecluation (9°) instead of (l+x_2) (1 + r^ )^ as
would be the case if debt (and asset) contracts were renegotiated each 
period at the new interest rate. We can think of the system as 
involving a central financial intermediary with which all savings/loan 
contracts are made, and which sets the interest rate in each period so 
that the efficiency condition is satisfied and aggregate saving and 
dissaving sum to zero.
The efficiency condition is written as
(10) n\s\ ♦ Np5* ♦ = 0
where
(1la) si = Yi - c‘ = (1 - Cj)Y^ - CjP12Y2/(1 + ip
(llh) S* = Y* - c\ - (1 - c’) Y2 " c2(Y|-1 " Cj"1)(1 + rt l)
( H e )  s\ = -C* = - ( Y p 2 - C p 2 )(l ♦ rt_2)2 - ( Y p 1 - C p b d  ♦ V l )
Then we have
(12) N p l  - c X  - N p p 12Y p ( l  ♦ r t ) ♦ N*( l  - cJ)Y*
- + rt - d + NX ' 2 - ci‘2j(i+rt-2)2
- N p y p ' - C p h o  ♦ rt_p = 0
which can be written as
N) + Np l  - c p Y2l  - (1 ♦ V X X X  - (1 * r t . p  
,t 3,%,t-l
(N2C2(Y1 - C p 1) + N p Y p 1 - C p 1))-(! + rt_2)2 N p Y p 2 - C p 2) =0
(13)
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a second order nonlinear difference equation in r, with coefficients 
that vary over time as the change. We shall refer to this equation 
as
L(rt' V i '  rt-2J = 0
We can linearize L about the equilibrium interest rate r^ = r  ^
rt-2 = r us -^nS
(14a) 3L_9r,
C1 Pl2 Y2
(l+r)2
> 0
(14b) 9L9rt-1
t 2 3 t-1N c c° p y L x
t 3 t-1 t-1. 2 1 2 *12 2
2 2 l 1 L 1 J ri ,(1+r)
- N j Cy ^ " 1 - c ^ 1 )
which is positive or negative as
- N^c^ C y J'1 - cj'1) + CjP12Y y x/(l + r)) ? N ^ Y p 1 - c y 1)
Substituting for (Y^  ^- C j b  from (11a) and writing and in terms 
of * from the demographic substitutions we have
P12C2(1 '  C1')Y1 <  ^ p23^b^ Y2 "  C2 ^
t-1 > x,t..,t-l .^t-1
which means that (14b) is negative. Finally
(14c) 9L9rt-2
ori .»,t rv t-2 „t-2. K,t 2 vt-2- 2(1 ♦ r)NJ (Y1 - C ) + N 3clPl2Y 2
which is positive given the life cycle consumption assumption. The 
linearised form of (13) at r is
9r. (r - V  + 37
9L
t-1
fr - r ) + —  1 t-lJ 3rt-2
(r - r ) = 0
a second order difference equation which yields a characteristic equation
of the form A + a^A + a^ 0 with
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9L/9r
(15a) t-1
- (1+r)2 [bp12 c^Cl -cj)Y^ X+ p 23 2
1 9 L/9r < 0,2 2 2 vt
b Pl2 C1 Y2
and
(15b)
9L/9rt-2 P23(l+r)2[3c2 p12 Y2'2-2(l+r)(l-cj)Yj"2]
9L/9r , 2 2  2 vtb p12 cx Y2
The sign pattern on the characteristic equation is + - +. Since 
a^ is positive we cannot guarantee real roots. From Descartes rule we 
know that if the roots are real they are both positive so the system 
will display only monotonic behavior, and it will only display 
cyclical behavior if there are complex roots.
In the pure Samuel son version of this model with p ^  = 1 and 
Y1 = Y2 ’ al rema^ns negative but a0 becomes
2(l+r)2 [3/2 c2 - (1+r)(1-cj)]
which may' be negative. Then the sign pattern is + - - and the system 
may show alternations although the positive root has the greater 
absolute value.
Sufficient stability conditions on the interest rate are
(i) 1 + a^ + a
(ii) 1 - a2 > 0
(iii) 1 - aj + a
Condition (ii) can be written as
(16) 12
b“p12 3Y
t-1
2 P23 (1+r)2
-(1 + r)(l - cj)Yb~2
2 2which is positive if b p ^  > 3p2^(l+r) > which in all probability will 
not hold. Certainly if b is close to the biological interest rate 
position the condition becomes p ^  > 3f23 which does not hold. If we
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t a k e  th e  pure  Samuelson case  a t  th e  b i o l o g i c a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  we have
(1 6 ' )  - c^Y2 > - (1 + r )  (1 - c | ) Y 1
( l + r ) ( l - c | ) Y 1
1 2  1 2where ( 1 + r ) (1 - c ^ ) / c ^  > 1 as ( l + r ) ( l - c p  > c^.  This  c o n d i t i o n  could 
r e a s o n a b ly  be s a t i s f i e d ,  so th e  pure  Samuelson case  can be adapted  to  a 
l i f e  c y c l e  income p a t t e r n  and s t i l l  s a t i s f y  t h i s  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n .
We a r e  unable  to  g u a ra n t e e  t h a t  c o n d i t i o n  ( i i )  ho lds  bu t  can accep t  
t h a t  i t  could hold f o r  r e a s o n a b l e  p a ram ete r  v a l u e s .
Condi t ion  ( i )  can be w r i t t e n  as
0 7 )  Y^-1 P23 [3c j P 12 - 1] - Y j - 1 (1 - c j )  (2 p - ^ U  ♦ r )  ♦ b pJ2
. 2 2  2 vt
r. t - l   ^ b P12 C1 Y2
P23 C2 > 2(1 + r )
( < 0)
where ( i )  c l e a r l y  ho lds  i f  t h e  l e f t  hand s i d e  o f  (17) i s  p o s i t i v e ,  but
2
we cannot g u a ra n t e e  t h i s .  The term (3c^p^9- l )  could be n e g a t i v e .  In 
gene ra l  we cannot  say  much about  whe ther  c o n d i t i o n  ( i )  w i l l  h o ld ,  and 
a l though  i t  seems t o  hold given  th e  pa ram e te r  v a lu es  we s h a l l  use  l a t e r  
i t  i s  b o r d e r l i n e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in th e  pu re  Samuelson case a t  t h e  b i o ­
l o g i c a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .
C ond i t ion  ( i i i )  i s  c l e a r l y  s a t i s f i e d  wi th  a^ n e g a t iv e  and a^ 
p o s i t i v e .  So we can g u a ra n t e e  one o f  the  s u f f i c i e n t  s t a b i l i t y  con­
d i t i o n s  and be r e a s o n a b l y  c e r t a i n  about  a second bu t  no t  t h e  t h i r d .
Whether t h e  system i s  monotonic or  c y c l i c a l  depends on whether
2th e  r o o t s  a r e  r e a l  o r  complex.  The c o n d i t i o n  f o r  r e a l  r o o t s ,  (a^)
4a^ > 0 i s
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(18)
( , >.4ri 3 f l w t - l  , vt -1 „ t - 1 . , 2q  + r)  [b p 12 c2 ( l - c 1)Y1 ^ P 23(Y2 - C 2 )]
,4  4 { 2 .2 , vt . 2
b Pl2 ( c P  (Y2}
8 p2 3 ( l +r ) 2 [3/2  c 2 p 12 Yb_1 - ( 1 + r ) ( 1- c J ) y‘ ' 2 ]
> 2 2 vt
b Pl2  C1 Y2
(1 8 ' )
/■ 1 , >2r 3 f  l w t - l  rvt - l  0 t - l . - , 2
( !  r ) [b P12 c 2 (1 c 1)Y1 + P23  ^2 ' C2 ^
, 2  2 2 vt
b P l2  C1 Y2
> 8 p 23 [3/2 c 2 p 12 V ^ - C l «  2 ) ( 1 - cJ ) yJ - 2 ]
The pure Samuelson s t a t i o n a r y  p o p u la t i o n  case  (b 
(18")
P±j = 1) g ives
-.2 r 3 ri l w t - 2  , vt - l  „ t - l . - . 2 (1+r)  [ c2( 1 - c 1)Y1 + (Y2 - C 2 )]
2c Y 1 2
> 8 [3/2  c 2 Y2_1 - (1 + r ) ( l  - c j )Y b ' 2 ]
and we cannot  say whether  t h i s  i s  s a t i s f i e d .  C e r t a i n l y  on r e a s o n a b l e
3 1p a ram ete r  v a lu e s  i t  does no t  ho ld .  S ince  c 2 and ( l - c ^ )  a r e  f r a c t i o n s
and  ^ - C2  ^ i s  small  r e l a t i v e  to  Yb and p ro b a b ly  a l s o  r e l a t i v e  to  
2 t
c^Y2 i t  appea rs  v e ry  l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  r e a l  r o o t s  w i l l  no t  
be met,  so we can r e a s o n a b ly  expec t  t h e  r o o t s  t o  be complex and t h e  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  to  o s c i l l a t e .
C o ns ide r ing  th e  e f f e c t  o f  demographic f a c t o r s  on t h i s  co n c lu s io n  
we r e t u r n  to  (1 8 ' )  and d i f f e r e n t i a t e  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  p^2 . ^e 
9LIIS/8p^2 < 0 and 9RllS/9p^2 > 0. S ince  r e a l  r o o t s  r e q u i r e  th e  l e f t  hand 
s id e  t o  be g r e a t e r  than  th e  r i g h t  h igh  p ^ 2 v a lu es  seem to  i n c r e a s e  th e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  o s c i l l a t i o n s .  D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  wi th r e s p e c t  to  g ives  
9LHS/9p23 > 0, 9RHS/9p23 > 0, 92LHS/9p23 > 0, 92RHS/9p23 = 0. So bo th  
s i d e s  r i s e  w i th  P2 3 , t h e  l e f t  a t  an i n c r e a s i n g  r a t e  and t h e  r i g h t  a t  a 
c o n s ta n t  r a t e .  I n c r e a s e s  in p23 t h e r e f o r e  i n c r e a s e  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  r e a l  r o o t s .
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We a l s o  f ind  t h a t  an i n c r e a s e  in  b lowers  th e  l e f t  hand s id e  o f  
the  e x p re s s io n  and has no e f f e c t  on t h e  r i g h t  so a h igh  b i r t h  f a c t o r  
(a young p o p u la t io n )  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  o s c i l l a t i o n s .  In 
most cases  we expec t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t o  o s c i l l a t e ,  and w hile  demo­
g raph ic  f a c t o r s  may a l t e r  th e  s i z e  o f  t h e  o s c i l l a t i o n s  we do no t  expect  
them t o  be a b l e  t o  e l i m i n a t e  c y c l e s  a l t o g e t h e r .  On th e  o t h e r  hand we 
cannot  d e f i n i t e l y  exc lude  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  monotonic b e h a v io r .
IV I n t e r e s t  Rate Dynamics in  t h e  Sho r t  Term Debt Case
In t h i s  s e c t i o n  we modify t h e  system so t h a t  th e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  
d e a l s  in s h o r t  term deb t  and a l low s  r e f i n a n c i n g .  Then consumption a t  
each age i s
(19a) Cj = cjVj + <^p12Y ^ / ( l + r t )
(!9b) C* = ♦ c ^ - 1 - c J - b c i T ^ p
(19c) C* -  ( Y p 2 - c J - 2) ( l +r t _2) ( l +r t _ p  ♦ (Y*’ 1 - C p 1) ( l T ^ )  
and the  e f f i c i e n c y  c o n d i t i o n  = 0 becomes
(20) nJ ( 1 - cJ)yJ - nJcJp j ^ C I ^ ) - 1 ♦ N p l - c p Y *
- C1+rt - l 3 CN2C2 CY1 1 ' C l ' 1) + N 3 (Y2_ 1 - CY^)
- ( i +r t - d ( i + r t - 2 ) (Yr 2 - c r 2)N3 = °
where aga in  we w r i t e  t h i s  as  LCr^ .r^  ^ , r  2  ^ = Then 8L/9r^ i s
unchanged from th e  p re v io u s  s e c t i o n ,  and
( 21 ) 9r
8L
t - 1
- N p p l - c p Y p 1 - N p Y p 1 + ( Y p 2- C p 2) (1+r) - C p 1)
which i s  n e g a t iv e  and
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( 22 )
t  -2
= - N^(l + r ) ( l - c 1)Y j ‘ 2
r
which i s  a l s o  n e g a t i v e .  The s ign  p a t t e r n  on t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t io n  
o f  t h e  system l i n e a r i z e d  a t  th e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  + - 
i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  the  s y s t e m ' s r o o t s  a r e  r e a l  and o f  o p p o s i t e  s ig n  with 
the  p o s i t i v e  r o o t  having th e  g r e a t e r  a b s o l u t e  v a lu e .  So going from 
long t o  s h o r t  term debt  e l i m i n a t e s  o s c i l l a t i o n s  and may i n t r o d u c e  
a l t e r n a t i o n s  bu t  s i n c e  th e  p o s i t i v e  r o o t  dominates  we need n o t  a c t u a l l y  
observe  a l t e r n a t i o n s  c l o s e  to  the  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t .  I f  we do observe 
a l t e r n a t i o n s  the  d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  p a t t e r n  in  th e  
long and s h o r t  term deb t  ca s e s  w i l l  depend on t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
o s c i l l a t i o n s  under t h e  long term deb t  c a s e .  I f  th e  o s c i l l a t i o n s  gen­
e r a t e  long c y c l e s  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  from a l t e r n a t i o n s  w i l l  be c l e a r .
S t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  ( i i )  i s  now a u t o m a t i c a l l y  s a t i s f i e d .
C o n d i t io n s  ( i )  and ( i i i )  need not  be though  we would expec t  t h e  system 
to  be s t a b l e .
V______I n t e r e s t  Rate Behavior Allowing fo r  U n c e r t a in ty :  An Example
Cons ider  t h e  s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  maximizing
s u b j e c t  to  t h e  usua l  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  budget  c o n s t r a i n t  with  s h o r t  term 
d e b t .  The age s p e c i f i c  consumption f u n c t i o n s  f o r  pe r io d  t  a r e :
U = lnC^ + kp^ lnC ***  + k^p ^lnC^
(23a) Cj = (1 + p 12k + p 13 k p12o +rtr ‘)
(23b) C* = (1 ♦ ♦ (1 ♦ kp23) - 1 ( l +r t _1) ( Y p 1 - C ^ 1)
(23c)
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The efficiency condition becomes
(24) (l + kp^ + k ^ r 1^  {kp12+k 2p13)Yj-Y^+1p12(l+rt)-1} +
(1 ♦ kp23)-V2(kp23Y^  - (Y^1 - Cj'b(l-rt l)) - n‘(yJ'2 - c‘-2)
(i+rt-2)(i+rt-i) - N3 (Yr 1 - c2"1)(i+rt-i) ■ 0
We can substitute into (24) for the lagged values of C to obtain
(25)
1 + kp19 + k p12 1 13
2 t Y2 p12
<kPl2 + k Pl3^Yl - "IT+r^T 1+kp,
kP23Y2 " (1+rt-l)
CkPi2 - k Pi3) t_!
2 1
Pl2 Y2
J  + kp12 + k p13 (1 + rt l)(l+kp12+k p13)_
-N3(1+rt_2)(1+rt_i)
,t-l
2 1 12(kpi2^k2Pi3)Y[-2 ___________
1 ♦ kp12 + k2p13 (It  ) (k2pn  ♦ 1 + P12k)J
r
N3(1+rt-P
1 + kp23 k p23Y2_1 - (1+rt-2)
(kPl2 + k2Pi3)Yp 2
1 + p12k + k p13
t-1 
12 ‘ 2P-~ Y
(l+rt_2)(1 + kp10 + k p1x)12 13-
( = L(rt, rt_lt rt_2))
From which
(26a) 3L 3r.
t + 1 Mt 
2 P12 N1
(1 + kp12 + k2p13)(1+r)2
> 0
(26b) 3L9rt-1
NY(kpi2 + k2p13)YY- 2 N3kp23Y2
r (1 *kp23)(l + kp12 + k2p13) +kp23
1 + kp23
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In (26b) the first two elements are negative and the last positive so 
the sign is indeterminate at this stage. 9L/3rt  ^ is positive or 
negative as
N2<kPl2 + k2Pl3)YÜ~2
(1 + kp12 + k2p13) - N3 kP23
Yt-12 (l+r)(Y‘-2 -c‘-2)kp23
or, after demographic substitution
P12b(kp12 + k2p13)Yk-2 
(i + kp12 + k2p13)
2 ,vt-l ,, ,,vt-2 _t-2,
P23kV2 < P23 1 + r Y1 -C1 }
In general we expect the left hand side of this expression to be less 
than the right so 3L/9r^ j will be negative. We also have
(26c) 9r
9 L 
t-2
-N^(l^r)(kp12^k2p13)Y^ 2 kp2
(1 + kp23)(l + kp12 + k2p13)
Since (26c) is negative the roots of the interest rate equation will be 
real and in the expected case of (26b) being negative the roots have 
opposite signs, the positive root having the greater absolute value. 
Qualitatively, then, the behavior of the system has not been affected 
by the use of this expected utility function.
VI Three Age Models and Production: With and Without Capital
In this section we introduce production into the three age 
consumption-loan model. In presenting the three age models first 
without and then with production we are following the same procedure as 
we shall with the larger systems of the next two chapters. Chapter Six 
reports simulations on a larger consumption-loan model without 
production while Chapter Seven extends the system to include a pro­
duction function.
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In this section output is produced with a constant returns Cobb- 
Douglas production function. We first present a production function in 
the two active ages of labour alone, then extend it to include capital. 
The labour income of each active age group equals its marginal product. 
In order to keep within the basic consumption-loan framework with no 
durable goods so that saving cannot be done by hoarding, we assume that 
capital is a producer good which depreciates completely within a single 
period. Given this condition, the marginal product of capital must 
equal the interest factor (1+r^) in each period. To simplify the cases 
with capital we assume that capital affects output in the period in 
which the capital is produced, rather than lagging its effect a period. 
Depreciation presumably occurs all at once at the end of the period.
The interest income earned on capital is paid into the central 
financial intermediary at the beginning of the following period. This 
is the same basic structure as will be used in Chapters Six and Seven.
As noted in the introduction to this chapter the increasing 
complication of a system of three ages with production makes the most 
useful approach to its study to introduce values of the coefficients in 
the production and consumption functions. The production function used
in this example is
.36 .64(27) ■ ANlt N2t
wh i ch, after the demographic substitutions
this chapter, gives age specific incomes as 
- 64(28a) A = . 36Ab
(28b) V2 =
, . . 3 6  . 64Ab
Note that with A and b constant these labour incomes are constant over 
time. This is entirely the result of the simple age structure we are
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using. With the introduction of capital, labour income changes as 
changes in the interest rate change the capital stock. The consumption 
functions used are (the function indicates that we use the short 
term debt model here)
(29a) C* = eft +
(29b)  = e f t  ♦ c f t f t  - C j " 1) ( l + r t  l )
(29c) ft  - ft'2 - f t 2) ( 1 * ^ ) 0 ^ )  + ft'1 - f t 1) U + V l )
The population age distribution in t is 
2N = b d N N = bn N N = d NIt p12 2t-l’ 2t p12 2t-l* 3t p23 2t-l
Then we can write the efficiency condition (Y^-C^)+N2t (Y2-C2)-N^C^=0 
as
(30)  [ . 36( 1  - c j )  + . 64( 1 - e f t  . 6 4 p 12c ^ c 2 ] b 1 ' 36p 12- . 64 b 2 ' 3 6 ( p 12) 2 c 2
(l + rt)-’ + [.64 c2p12p13 - .64 p23(l - c‘) - .64 P^Pjftc2 - .36 Pjft
(l-c1)]b-36(l+rt_1) - .36(l-cJ)p23b'-64(l-c3)(l+rt l)(l+rt_2) =0
1 1 2  3Setting p 2 = p?3 = 1, and using1 ft = .7, ft = .5, ft = .2, c2 = .1, 
b = 1.05 we have
(31) (l+rt)_1 = 3.27975-1.52776(l+rt ^  -. 655975(1+^^) (l+rt_2) 
or, with the equilibrium interest rate r and writing (1+r) = X:
(32) X5 + 2.329X2 - 4.9998X + 1,5245 = 0
which has roots
(33) (1+r) = 1.05, .3857, -3.7647
1 These were chosen as reasonable values on the basis of empirical 
studies consulted.
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where the first and third roots are unstable and the second stable.
The stable interest rate is -61.43%. If we set p = .98 and = .95 
the roots of the system become
(34) (1+r) = 1.0849, .3724, -3.1846
The biological rate is no longer a root, having been replaced by 
a higher interest rate reflecting the effects of the reduced survival 
probabilities. Again it is the second root that is stable, the first 
and third unstable.
The stability conditions for the simple three age case were 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Of interest here is the effect of 
adding capital to the system.
We write the production function with capital as
45 2 35(35) Q = AK Nj N2 3
where the coefficients on the labour inputs are in the same proportion 
as in the production function in (33). By setting the marginal 
product of capital equal to (1 + r ) in each period we can solve (41) for
(36) Kt = (.45ANltN2t (l+rt) )
Capital stock entered this way, inversely related to the interest rate 
through the marginal productivity condition, adds an element to the 
demand for loanable funds that will be in general more sensitive to the 
interest rate than will consumption demand given our linear consumption 
functions. In the example of an unstable system given in Chapter Three 
it was argued that the instability was the result of this unresponsiveness 
of consumption to the interest rate which in turn forced the interest 
rate to show large changes from period to period in order that the 
efficiency condition be satisfied. In the case with capital part of the
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ad ju s tm en t  now occu r s  th rough  changes in  t h e  c a p i t a l  s to c k ,  so th e  
n e c e s s a r y  change in  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  reduced .  C l e a r l y  t h e  more 
e l a s t i c  t h e  demand f o r  c a p i t a l  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  th e  
l e s s  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  must change from p e r io d  to  pe r io d  to g u a ran tee  
t h a t  t h e  a g g re g a te  budget  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  met.  The e f f i c i e n c y  c o n d i t i o n  
now becomes
1S1 + N2S2 + N3S3 - K  * ■ 0
where (1+r^  ^ i s  d e p r e c i a t i o n  p l u s  i n t e r e s t  earned from the
p re v io u s  ( t - 1 )  p e r i o d ,  which was funded by borrowing from th e  i n t e r ­
mediary  and i s  r e p a i d  t o  t h e  i n t e r m e d i a r y ,  and becomes p a r t  o f  the  
supp ly  o f  lo a n a b le  funds  w h i le  i s  c a p i t a l  demanded in  t ,  which adds
to  th e  demand f o r  l o a n a b le  funds .  In t h i s  example we can so lv e  th e  system 
fo r  
(37a)
t t z' 45  ^ 8182  2 1.8182
(Yj - Cp = (3^— ) (Ab-Z)
2 ( l - c J )  . 35c^p12
1+r,
rvt  ^ t ,  . c .8182rAU. 2 1-8182(37b) (Y2 - C2) = .45 (Ab ) ( i - c h . 3 5  U - )
1 3 . 8182
1+T
- c 2(1+r t - l )
1 ^ .8182
t - 1
2(1 c 1 p 12 .35
1+r t - 1
-^7  ^ ,-,t , . . 8 1 8 2  . 2 . 1.8182  ri  .(37c) - C3 = - .4 5  (Ab ) ( 1 + r ^ ) ( l - c 2) ( l +r t _2)
(ü H
8182
t -2
• 2 (1 - Cp c 1P12 * 35
1+r t - 2
1
u - c b . 3 5  )
.8182
t - 1
7 1.8182  t 1 f . i 1.8182
(37d) [Kt  - Kt _1 ( l + r t _1) J = [. 45Ab ’ Z  ] N2' bp 12
U - )
.8182
t -1
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With unitary survival coefficients and the consumption coefficients 
used in the previous example we find that the biological interest rate, 
(1+r) = b = 1.05, is the system's stable equilibrium. With the values 
Pl2 = -98, p^ 2  = -95 the system has a stable equilibrium at (1+r) = 1.002.
Other experiments, not reported here, confirmed that the intro­
duction of capital to the production function could make the biological 
root the stable equilibrium even when it had not been stable when 
production involved only labour inputs. In the context of our explan­
ation of this result we should note that given our simple age structure 
the production function with labour as the only inputs yields labour 
incomes that are constant over time. This corresponds with the 
endowment model used by Samuelson and considered in the early sections 
of this chapter. The introduction of capital makes age specific labour 
income vary over time as the marginal product of each age group of 
labour changes in response to changes in the level of the capital input. 
The capital input level in turn changes in response to changes in the 
interest rate. In this sense, the introduction of capital adds another 
element of flexibility to the system.
One purpose of the examples presented in this chapter is to 
provide some insight into the results obtained from the simulation 
experiments reported in the following two chapters. It is clear that 
even in the limited versions considered in this chapter the overlapping 
generations structure of the consumption-loan model can be used to 
analyze a large set of models and cases. The following two chapters 
will concentrate on the economic consequences of population ageing in 
the context of the consumption-loan model. The size of the population 
system relative to the interest rate equation is such that, given the 
correspondence between the roots of the two noted in the introduction 
to this chapter, there is only one eligible interest rate in each 
period, lying just above the intrinsic rate of population growth.
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Although our primary interest is in the distributional effects 
of an ageing population, the simple structure that has been discussed 
in this chapter can be regarded as a long term growth model. The fact 
that the population structure used here allows only monotonic approach 
to equilibrium in the population makes it possible to regard the model 
of this chapter as a special case of the neoclassical growth model, 
using explicit rather than general forms of the consumption and 
production functions. It is interesting to note that in both the three 
age case reported here (and in two age cases and other three age cases 
not reported) the introduction of capital converted an unstable bio­
logical equilibrium into a stable golden rule equilibrium. While this 
result will not necessarily hold for all special cases of the neo­
classical growth model, the fact that it holds for this very basic case 
is enough to suggest the common presumption in the growth theory 
literature that the economy will not tend to the golden rule on its own 
and so must be moved to it by deliberate policy action may not always 
be applicable.
VII bfficiency
Starrett, in his paper on the efficiency of the consumption-loan 
type model, found that the same efficiency conditions apply for inter- 
generational transfers as for growth models at the golden rule. If the 
interest rate is below the biological optimum the system is inefficient, 
if above, efficient. He was working in a system with p^  =1. In a 
stable population with growth factor b each age group will be growing 
at a rate (b-1). This means that in a world with capital each age 
group in the active labour force could be included in a single labour 
force aggregate which will be growing at rate (b-1). The conditions 
for a golden age (proportional growth) exist, and Diamond has shown
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that even with a retired group (growing at the common rate) the 
wealth maximizing properties of the golden age hold. In a pure con­
sumption economy the Samuelson/Starrett explanation of optimality applies 
With three ages if in each period each member of the youngest age group 
gives up one unit of consumption and the total amount surrendered is 
transferred to the second age group, the young will effectively earn a 
return (b-1) on their surrendered consumption. If it is transferred to
the third group each individual will (after two periods) earn a return 
2of (b-1) . (Each individual will recover his surrendered consumption 
plus a proportion b-1).
Now assume p^ _. <1. If at the beginning of time there are X 
first age individuals in existence then in period n the age structure 
of a three age population will be
(bp12) X
p23p12(bp12^  X
In a world with capital, because each age group is growing at the same
rate the wealth maximizing properties of the golden rule hold. In a
pure consumption world the implicit interest rates are different.
A transfer from the first to the second age results in a payment
of (bpj2)nX/Pj2(bPi2^n = b where (b-1) is the actual rate earned by
survivors. But since a probability p ^  < 1 is attached to surviving
the expected payment for each individual is p^b < b.
A transfer from the first to the third age yields an actual
2 2return to survivors of b p^/p-^. If = P23 this is b as above. 
But if p > p2„ as we have been assuming, the payment is greater than
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The payment expec ted  by each i n d i v i d u a l  o f  th e  f i r s t  age i s
2 2 ( P l ^ p ^ b  /P93) which w i th  p ^  > P25 > P-^3 i-s l e s s  than b . In t h i s
c a s e ,  th e n ,  th e  i n d i v i d u a l s  making th e  t r a n s f e r  expec t  a r e t u r n  o f  l e s s
than  (b-1) while  t h o s e  a l i v e  two p e r io d s  l a t e r  when the  r e t u r n  i s  pa id
2
r e c e i v e  a r e t u r n  o f  more th a n  ( b - 1) . The o p t im iz in g  n a t u r e  o f  the  
i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  t r a n s f e r  i s  no lo nger  c l e a r .  There a r e  two problems,  
f i r s t  t h a t  th e  t r a n s f e r  does not  make everyone b e t t e r  o f f  bu t  r a t h e r  
makes t h e  p ^  who s u r v iv e  one p e r io d  o r  t h e  P^2?23  w^ ° s u r v ^ve tw0 
p e r i o d s  (depending on th e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  t r a n s f e r )  b e t t e r  o f f  and the  
1 - p 12 (or  1 - P 12P23  ^ W^ ° no t  s u r v -^ve worse o f f ,  and second t h a t  the  
s u r v i v a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  do no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  f o l l o w  a p a th  n e a t  enough to  
l e t  them be simply lumped in w i th  a s u b j e c t i v e  d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r .
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CHAPTER 6
SIMULATION OF THE CONSUMPTION-LOAN MODEL
I_____ Introduction
In this chapter we use simulation to extend our study of popu­
lation age structures in a consumption-loan system. The use of 
simulation should be taken as an extension of the qualitative analysis 
of the previous chapter, and not as indicating that we are trying to say 
something specific about any particular economy. In particular the 
next chapter, in which we run simulation experiments using Statistics 
Canada's Population Projection One, should not be interpreted as fore­
casting the path of the Canadian economy over the horizon of the 
population projection, nor as trying to say something specific about the 
Canadian economy.
The advantage of simulation analysis is that it allows us to deal 
with larger systems than those of Chapter Five, and to introduce 
exogenous population behavior of the sort represented by the Canadian 
population projections. The projections we prepare for this chapter 
are based on a system large enough that its Leslie matrix can have both 
real and complex roots, and the reason we prepare a population series 
for this chapter rather than using the Canadian projections as in 
Chapter Seven is to indicate similarities between population behavior 
as indicated by the Leslie matrix and interest rate behavior resulting 
from the consumption-loan format. We have indicated earlier why we 
expect a close relationship, based on Starrett's discussion of 
Samuelson's biological rate result, although of course a close relation­
ship with the complex roots of the Leslie matrix need not actually be 
observed since, particularly if the system is close to equilibrium, 
complex roots can readily be dominated by real roots.
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Chapters Six and Seven follow the format of Chapter Five in that 
Six deals with a pure consumption system with no production sector and 
incomes being endowments, each age specific income being constant over 
time, while in Seven we add a production technology which determines 
labour incomes.
We follow Dolde and Tobin (1971) in regarding simulation as a 
device that can yield insights into the working of an economic model 
and not as a substitute for empirical investigation of a problem. The 
insights of simulation analysis indicate areas likely to reward 
empirical research. In the case of Chapters Six and Seven the first 
insight of interest to us is that the biological rate result carries 
over from the systems considered in Chapter Five. In Chapter Five we 
dealt with a three-age model in which we could change the age structure 
by altering the survival probabilities, as we did when we compared the 
biological rate result with survival probabilities equal one to the 
result of setting the survival probabilities less than one. The three- 
age model could not deal with cyclical approaches to equilibrium since 
the Leslie matrix could not have a complex root. By moving to the 
larger simulation systems of this chapter and the next we can study 
the behavior of the interest rate when the population approaches 
equilibrium cyclically.
The second insight is that the changes in the population age 
structure that accompany a cyclical approach to a stable population can 
cause significant changes in the level of the interest rate. We should 
emphasise that the level of the interest rate as calculated in the 
simulations is an artifact of the values used, except in that the 
biological result holds in a form modified by changed survival 
probabilities, so neither the absolute level of the interest rate 
calculated nor the absolute size of any change in the interest rate
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should be regarded as forecasts. Our interest is in the fact that 
simulation analysis indicates that the potential exists for significant 
changes (bearing in mind that by the biological rate result with a 
stationary population the real interest rate should be close to zero), 
and suggests that this is an area that should be subject to empirical 
testing. A number of writers have indicated that age structure changes 
associated with the baby boom of the 1950fs could have labour market 
effects detrimental to the baby boom cohort. We are interested in the 
result that there can also be capital market effects which could be 
large enough to be detrimental. We leave a discussion of how these 
effects could be tested to the concluding chapter.
Simulation analysis has been used in a related context by Aubry 
and Fleurent (1980) and in particular by Denton and Spencer (1973, 1975) 
who use a detailed economic-demographic model to study the effect of 
various demographic changes, including changes in fertility rates.
While Denton and Spencer concentrate on the effects of demographic 
changes on economic aggregates, we are dealing with distributional 
effects, and we suggest that the consumption-loan framework is a useful 
one for dealing with these distributional effects.
In this chapter, Section II reviews the structure of the model 
that is to be simulated, and Section III demonstrates the derivation of 
the equation used to calculate the interest rate for each period. 
Simulation was facilitated in that by substituting the consumption 
functions in the efficiency condition (and production function in the 
next chapter) a single equation in the interest rate could be found 
which, with the population figures for each period, could be used to 
find the interest rate for the period. These interest rate values 
could then be used to solve for age specific consumption and saving.
In Chapter 7 they could also be used to solve for capital and age
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specific income in each period. Section IV presents results on the 
interest rates calculated in the simulation experiments, and notes the 
relationship between the demographic dynamics and the time path of the 
interest rate. Section V presents results on the time path and life 
cycle values of wealth and consumption, and uses these to demonstrate 
our conclusion that the baby boom group is disadvantaged throughout 
its life. Section VI reports other experiments, in particular a baby 
boom experiment in which the population is projected to stability then 
subject to an abrupt change in its age structure. This experiment 
shows that the results of the previous sections did not depend critically 
on the initial conditions assumed. The figures for this chapter are 
grouped at the end of the chapter, as Section VII.
Finally, note that the interest rates calculated in this chapter 
and in Chapter 7 are rates of interest per simulation period, not per 
year, and so are larger than the annual rates depending on the length 
of the simulation period in calendar years.
II Structure of the Model
Samuelson, in his original consumption-loan model, used a greatly 
simplified demographic structure in which human life was three periods 
long and each individual lived his full three periods earning one unit 
of income in each of his first two periods and none in his third.
There was no capital and the only motive for saving was to allocate 
income from two periods over consumption in three. Individuals had 
neutral time preference, there were no durable goods so physical saving 
was impossible, and initially there was no money so cash saving was 
impossible. The only possible way for an individual to save was for 
him to make loans, when he reached the second period of his life, to
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individuals in the first period of their lives, to be repaid with 
interest when the lender entered the third period of his life. With 
the system subject to both the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
individual and the aggregate efficiency constraint that at all times 
aggregate saving should sum to zero (because if aggregate income were 
greater than consumption in any period the nondurable output not con­
sumed was wasted), Samuelson found that for a demographically stable 
population one equilibrium interest rate of the system was what he 
termed the biological interest rate, meaning that it equalled the 
intrinsic rate of population growth. There were other equilibria in 
the system and Samuelson found that in his three-age structure although 
the biological interest rate was optimal it was an unstable equilibrium. 
In the absence of money the stable equilibrium (real) interest rate 
would always be negative.
In the simulations we report in this chapter we assume a maximum 
life of five periods. Associated with each period is a probability 
that an individual of that age will survive to later ages, and an age 
specific income which in this chapter we assume to be constant over
time. Age.specific incomes are assumed to follow a life cycle inverted 
U pattern.
Associated with each age is a consumption function, specific to 
that age in that the coefficients of the function at that age are 
constant over time so that each person entering that age has the same 
form of consumption function as did previous cohorts at that age. 
Consumption is based on current and expected future income and on 
accumulated- assets, where the assets may be positive or negative. Since 
the income pattern is constant over time the income that any given 
individual expects to receive at a later age is equal to the known 
income associated with that age multiplied by the probability that the
i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  s u rv iv e  from h i s  c u r r e n t  age to  t h a t  l a t e r  age.  The 
p r e s e n t  va lue  o f  t h i s  expec ted  income s t ream  e n t e r s  th e  consumption
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f u n c t i o n  as a w ea l th  te rm. Thus i f  p_ _ . „ i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  an
d ^ d  + n
i n d i v i d u a l  o f  age a w i l l  r eac h  age a+n and r^ i s  t h e  s i n g l e  p e r io d  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  th e  p r e s e n t  va lue  a t  the  b e g in n in g  o f  h i s  l i f e  o f  an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  f u t u r e  income s tream ( h i s  expec ted  wealth )  i s
P 1 , 4 Y4
( 1 )
P1 ,2 Y2
1+r,
l’l >3Y3
( l + r p a + r p  ( l + r 1) ( l + r 2) ( l + r J )
P l , S YS
( l +r 1) ( l + r 2) ( l + r 3) ( l + r 4 )
S i m i l a r l y  fo r  ages two th rough  four  w ea l th  i s
(2a) P2 , 3 Y3 Cl+rx) +
P2 , 4 Y4 P2,5
( l + r 1) ( l + r 2) ( l + r x) ( l + r 2) ( l + r ^ )
(2b)
(2c)
p3 , 4 Y4 P3 , 5 Y5
( l + r x) ( l + r 1) ( l + r 2)
P4 , 5 Y5
( l + r x)
We s h a l l  t y p i c a l l y  assume t h a t  expec ted  f u t u r e  incomes a r e  a l l  d i s ­
counted  a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  S ince  no-one  l i v e s  beyond age 
f i v e ,  w ea l th  in  age f i v e  i s  ze ro .
We assume t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no b e q u e s t s  ( s ee  Chapte r  4) so a t  the  
beg inn ing  o f  t h e i r  l i v e s  peop le  have no a s s e t s ,  on ly  expec ted  w ea l th .  
The a s s e t s  they  accumula te  d u r in g  t h e i r  f i r s t  p e r io d  o f  l i f e  a r e  equal  
to  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e i r  income and t h e i r  consumption in  t h a t  
p e r io d  and may be p o s i t i v e  or  n e g a t i v e  depending  on whether  th e y  save 
or d i s s a v e  by borrowing a g a i n s t  f u t u r e  income. T h e i r  a s s e t s  in  t h e i r  
second p e r io d  o f  l i f e  th en  equal  t h e i r  f i r s t  p e r io d  saving  o r  borrowing
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accumulated at the interest rate that was in effect in the first period. 
Similarly for assets at later ages, so
(3a) Ai = 0
(3b) A2 (l+rpCYj-Cp
(3c) A3 = (l+r2)(Y2-C2) + (l+r1)(l+r2)(Y1-C1)
(3d) A4 = (1+r3H Y 3'C3) + (1+r2) (1 + r3) CV2-C2) + (1+r1)(l+r2)(l+r3)(Y1-C1)
(3e) A5 = (l+r4)(Y4-C4) (l+r3).(l+r4K Y 3-C3)
+ (l+r2)(l+r3)(l+r4)(Y2-C2)
+ (1+rp (l+r2) (l+r3) (l+r4) ( Y ^ )
The interest rate is the same on borrowing and lending. Later we shall
assume that all saving and borrowing is done in terms of long term
fixed interest contracts so, for example, savings accumulated over
3three periods will earn interest according to (l+r^)' where r is the 
interest rate that was in effect when the contract was entered into.
The general form of the consumption function at age a is
F(Y ,A ,W ) a’ a’ aJ
In any period t we can observe five age-specific consumption functions, 
one for each age, which we write
(4a) C4 = cj + c JYj + c^Aj + c^wj (A* = 0, all t)
r r t 0 lvt 2.t 3„.t
(4b) C2 “ c2 + C2Y2 + c2A2 + C2V2
fA , nt 0 lvt 2.t 3u,t
('4c') C3 “ C3 + c3^  3 + C3A3 + C3W3
(4d) cj = c°4 * c 'yJ + c24k\ +
(4e)
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For conven ience  th roughou t  we s h a l l  s e t  t h e  i n t e r c e p t  t e rm s ,  c , equal
ci
t o  ze ro .
Equa t ion  (4e)  s t a t e s  t h a t  in  t h e  f i n a l  age o f  h i s  l i f e  th e  
i n d i v i d u a l  consumes h i s  c u r r e n t  income p lu s  a l l  o f  h i s  accumula ted  
a s s e t s .  This  e nsu re s  t h a t  f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l  who l i v e s  a l l  f i v e  p e r io d s  
t h e  l i f e t i m e  budget  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  met w i th  e q u a l i t y  as  th e  no -beques t  
assumpt ion r e q u i r e s .
L e t t i n g  t h e  p o p u la t io n  a t  age a in  p e r io d  t  be N^, a g g re g a te
c u r r e n t  income and consumption a r e  2 N Y and 2 N C . D e f in ing  c u r r e n tr  a a a  a a a  0
saving  a t  age a in p e r io d  t  as  (Y1“ - C*) a g g r e g a t e  s av in g  in p e r io d  t  i sa a
(5) 2 Nt (Yt - C1) a = 1 .........  5a a v a a J
Aggregate a s s e t s  and w ea l th  in any p e r io d  can be s i m i l a r l y  d e f i n e d .
At t h i s  s t a g e  we l e t  ag g re g a te  sav ing  t a k e  on any s ig n ,  a l though  
fo r  th e  s im u l a t i o n s  we s h a l l  impose t h e  a g g r e g a t e  budge t  c o n s t r a i n t  and 
s e t  (5) equal  to  ze ro .  In th e  g e n e ra l  d i s c u s s i o n  t h a t  p re c e d e s  th e  
s i m u l a t i o n s  we s h a l l  s e t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  equal  t o  some a r b i t r a r y  
va lue  to  de te rm ine  how changes in t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  a lo n e  a f f e c t  th e  
model .
The v a lu e s  o f  t h e  c c o e f f i c i e n t s  in t h e  consumpt ion  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  
based on t h e  work o f  S t e a rn s  (1971).  S t e a r n s  used c r o s s - s e c t i o n  d a t a  t o  
d e r i v e  t y p i c a l  l i f e t i m e  age-income p r o f i l e s  f o r  v a r i o u s  a g e / e d u c a t i o n /  
o ccupa t ion  ( a / e / o )  c a t e g o r i e s ,  and a s s ig n ed  t h e s e  p r o f i l e s  to  v a r io u s  
a / e / o  groups  to de te rm in e  l i f e  cy c l e  consumption f u n c t i o n s .  In t h i s  
r e s p ec t  h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  i s  s i m i l a r  to  o u r s ,  u s in g  expec ted  
f u t u r e  income r a t h e r  than  p r o j e c t i o n s  o f  permanent  income based on 
d i s t r i b u t e d  la gs  o f  p a s t  incomes which most econom etr ic  s t u d i e s  use .
(See E l l i o t t  (1 980 ) ) .  In our  c a s e ,  a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  t h e  o n ly  u n c e r t a i n t y  
about  f u t u r e  income i s  whether th e  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  be a l i v e  to  r e c e i v e  i t .
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S t e a r n s '  income p r o f i l e  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  no t  e x p l i c i t l y  d i s c o u n te d  by th e  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  nor  i s  t h e r e  e x p l i c i t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t ime p r e f e r e n c e ,  
so whatever  d i s c o u n t i n g  i s  done i s  h idden  in  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  the  
consumption f u n c t i o n s  he e s t i m a t e s .
Where we fo l lo w  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  l i f e  c y c l e  e m p i r ic a l  s t u d i e s  and 
in c lu d e  accumula ted  a s s e t s  as  an e x p l a n a to r y  v a r i a b l e ,  S t e a rn s  used a 
p a s t  income v a r i a b l e  based on h i s  c a l c u l a t e d  age-income p r o f i l e s .  He 
found t h a t  t h e  p a s t  income v a r i a b l e s  had l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on consumption 
a t  f i r s t ,  r i s i n g  w i th  age u n t i l  in some o f  h i s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  the  
c o e f f i c i e n t  on a t  l e a s t  one o f  th e  p a s t  income l e v e l  v a r i a b l e s  
approached u n i t y  f o r  th e  o l d e s t  o f  t h e  s i x  age groups he used .
S te a rn s  found t h a t  f o r  a l l  bu t  one o f  h i s  s i x  age groups the  
c o e f f i c i e n t  on p r e s e n t  income exceeded th o s e  on p a s t  o r  f u t u r e  income.
The exce p t io n  was t h e  s i x t h  age group where th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on income 
in  the  f o u r t h  age in  a t  l e a s t  one o f  h i s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  (where th e  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  v a r i e d  in te rms o f  th e  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  t h e  consumption 
and income v a r i a b l e s )  reached  .9493.  Age f o u r  in  h i s  system was the  
45-54 year  group,  t y p i c a l l y  y ea r s  o f  peak income and h ig h ,  a l th o u g h  not  
peak, sav ing .  Peak sav ing  g e n e r a l l y  came in th e  55-64 age group where 
income was rough ly  th e  same as  o r  s l i g h t l y  below t h a t  o f  th e  45-54 group.  
Presumably t h i s  i s  because  household expenses  drop o f f  in  t h e  55-64 age 
group as c h i l d r e n  l eave  t o  form t h e i r  own househo lds ,  mortgages  a r e  in 
l a rg e  p a r t  pa id  o f f  and most pu rchases  o f  majo r  consumer d u r a b l e s  have 
a l r e a d y  been made.
While S t e a r n s  t e s t e d  s e v e ra l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  h i s  model some 
t y p i c a l  r e s u l t s  can be observed .  Apart from t h e  low c o e f f i c i e n t  ( .3851) 
on c u r r e n t  income in th e  65+ age group t y p i c a l  marg ina l  p r o p e n s i t i e s  to  
consume out o f  c u r r e n t  income ranges  from .5535 in  ages 45-54 to  .8861 
in ages 55-64.  The younges t  (18-24) age group had a t y p i c a l  MPC out  o f
c u r r e n t  income o f  .7663,
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For most ages  a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  S t e a rn s  found n e g a t i v e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  
on income earned in  th e  18-24 age group.  This  f i n d i n g  p ro b ab ly  r e l a t e s  
to  d i s s a v i n g  in t h e  youngest  age red u c in g  a s s e t s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  con­
sumption in  l a t e r  ages .
Exclud ing  th e  65+ group,  whose c o u n t e r p a r t s  in  our  model a r e  
c o n s t r a i n e d  to  have a m arg ina l  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  consume out  o f  c u r r e n t  
income equal  to  one ,  th e  MPC out  o f  c u r r e n t  income t h a t  S t e a r n s  found 
tended  t o  fo l low  a U shaped p a t h .  The c o e f f i c i e n t  on p a s t  income, which 
we r e l a t e  t o  th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on accumula ted  a s s e t s ,  showed a s l i g h t  
upward t r e n d .  In g e n e ra l  th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on f u t u r e  income was found to  
fo l low  an in v e r t e d  U p a t t e r n ,  peak ing  a t  t h e  second age (25-34 y e a r s ) .  
This  may be because  c a p i t a l  market c o n s t r a i n t s  kep t  t h e  younges t  group 
from r e a l i z i n g  as  much as i t  would l i k e  o f  i t s  expected '  f u t u r e  income, 
or i t  may be t h a t  t h e  younges t  group d id  no t  have a good id e a  o f  what 
i t s  l i f e t i m e  income would be.
Out s i m u l a t i o n s  use f i v e  age groups ,  c o r re spond ing  t o  ages 0-15,  
15-30,  30-45,  45-60 and 60+. In t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r ,  when we run simu­
l a t i o n s  based on p r o j e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  p o p u la t i o n  o f  Canada we s h a l l  modify 
th e s e  g ro u p in g s ,  bu t  w i thou t  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  to  our  b a s i c  r e s u l t s  
The d i v i s i o n  used in  t h i s  c h a p t e r  was chosen t o  f a c i l i t a t e  p r e p a r i n g  
our own p o p u l a t i o n  p r o j e c t i o n s .  We adopt  t h i s  approach so t h a t  we may 
r e l a t e  t h e  dynamics o f  our  economic system to  the  dynamics o f  our  
demographic system as r e v e a le d  in t h e  L e s l i e  m a t r i c e s  we use  t o  d e t e r ­
mine th e  t ime  p a th  o f  t h e  p o p u la t i o n ,
We assume a l i f e  c y c l e  p a t t e r n  o f  income with  = 100, = 2000,
Y  ^ = 5000, Y^  = 4000,  Y^ = 200. The low v a lu e s  o f  Y^  and Y^ ensu re  
d i s s a v i n g  in t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  and g e n e r a l l y  ensu re  sav ing  f o r  r e t i r e m e n t .  
The marg ina l  p r o p e n s i t i e s  to  consume ou t  o f  c u r r e n t  income t h a t  we use 
(c^ v a l u e s )  a re
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Age 1 2 3 4 5
MPC .7 .5 .6 .5 1.0
2The coefficients on accumulated assets (c )a
Age 1 2 3 4 5
c2 - .1 .16 .2 1.0a
3And the coefficient on wealth (c )a
Age 1 2 3 4 5
c3 .2 .3 .25 .1a
are
Since age specific incomes are constant over time and we have set the 
constants equal to zero in the consumption functions we can write
(6a) ci - .7(100) + .2W
(6b) C2 " .5(2000) + ,ia2 ♦ .,3W2
(6c) s -.6(5000) + • 16A3 + . 25W
(6d) C4 = .5(4000) + ,2A4 ♦ ,1W.4
(6e) CS = 200 + A5
The survival probabilities used in calculating the wealth terms 
were based on those for Australian Females, 1967, reported in Keyfitz 
and Flieger1 (1971) :
1 These rates and the initial population age distribution used in
preparing the projections were chosen as representative of a
developed country with a young (in terms of developed countries) 
but ageing population. We did not have access to a Leslie matrix 
for the Statistics Canada population projections used in Chapter 
Seven so could not use identical population series in the two 
chapters.
Table 1:
165
Survival Probabilities Australian Females 1967 
(Keyfitz $ Flieger 1971)
0-15 15-30 30-45 45-60 60 +
1 .97801 .96912 .94699 .86383
1 .99091 .96828 .88325
1 .97716 .89136
1 .91218
1
These show the conditional probability of surviving from age i to 
age j> j > given that the individual has already reached age i. The 
probability of reaching age 60+ is greater for an individual in the 
45-60 group than it is for someone in the 0-15 group who has to face the 
possibility of dying in any of the three intervening age groups before 60+ 
Using various fertility rates and the survival probabilities 
reported above we construct population time paths for use in our simu­
lation experiments. These time paths differ according to the fertility 
assumptions made, but all start from the same initial age distribution, 
chosen to give an age distribution similar to that for Australian 
Females in 1976.
Table 2: Initial Age Distribution
Age_______ 1___________2__________3__________4__________5_
pop 26.60 25.39 17.37 15.79 14,29
(%)
We construct a Leslie matrix for a stationary population, whose 
first row (the birth factor or contribution of females in each age 
group to the number of females in the 0-15 group at the end of one 
period2) yields an intrinsic growth rate of zero. This means that the
2 The subdiagonal of the Leslie matrix contains the probability of
surviving from one age to the next, the other elements of the matrix
are zeros.
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p r i n c i p a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t  o f  th e  m a t r i x  i s  1 .0  (because  o f  rounding 
a c t u a l l y  1 .0006) .  The o t h e r  r o o t s  o f  t h i s  m a t r i x  a r e  - .0506  and - .4341± 
.4087 i .  For th e  complex ro o t  A^  = - .4341 + 0 .4087 i  we f i n d  lnA^ = - .5171 
+ 2 .3 8 6 3 i .  W r i t ing  th e  im ag inary  p a r t  o f  lnA^ as  y we f i n d  t h a t  th e  
wave length  o f  th e  p r i n c i p a l  complex component,  27T/y, equa l s  (6 .2832 /  
2.3863) = 2.63  (K eyf i tz  and F l i e g e r  (1971 ) ) ,  g iv i n g  a waveleng th  o f  2.63 
p e r i o d s ,  each o f  which i s  f i f t e e n  c a l e n d a r  y e a r s  because  we a re  u s in g  
f i f t e e n - y e a r  age g ro u p in g s ,  o r  a cyc le  o f  39,49 y e a r s .
Table 3: L e s l i e  M atr ix f o r  S t a t i o n a r y  P o p u la t i o n
~. 0819 .5317 .3938 ,0190 0
.9780 0 0 0 0
0 .9909 0 0 0
0 0 .9772 0 0
0 0 0 .9122 0
Roots: Al  = 1 .0006 ,  A2 = - .0 5 0 6 ,  A5 , 4 = - .4341  ± .4087i
I f we i n c r e a s e  a l l o f  th e  b i r t h  f a c t o r s  by 10% the  f i r s t row o f
t h e  L e s l i e  m a t r ix  becomes
.0901 .5849 .4332 .0209 0
and th e  r o o t s  become
(1 .0427;  - .0 5 1 8 ;  - .4504 ± .41441)
i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  p o p u la t i o n  grows ro u g h ly  4.2% over  one f i f t e e n - y e a r  
pe r iod  and lias a c y c l e  o f  2.62 p e r io d s  o r  39.31 y e a r s .
I n c r e a s i n g  t h e  b i r t h  f a c t o r s  by 25% above t h o s e  o f  the  s t a t i o n a r y  
case g ives  as  the  f i r s t  row o f  t h e  L e s l i e  m a t r i x
.1024 .6646 .4923 .0238 0
with  r o o t s  (1 .1019;  - .0 5 0 8 ;  - .4744  ± .42211) ,  i n d i c a t i n g  a growth
r a t e  o f  c l o s e  to  10% pe r  f i f t e e n - y e a r  p e r i o d  and a cy c l e  o f  2.6023
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periods or 39.03 years. Population projections derived from each of 
these matrices are found in the appendix.
Before simulating the consumption-loan model subject to the 
efficiency constraint that aggregate saving equal zero in each period 
we consider the effect of different interest rates (held constant over 
time) on the savings behavior of the population, to give some feel for 
the working of the model. We assume that the population is held constant 
at the values shown in Table Two and that the interest rate is imposed 
from outside. Table Four below shows age specific values of wealth and 
saving as well as aggregate wealth and saving for several interest rates. 
We also calculate age specific and aggregate consumption for each 
interest rate.
Increasing the interest rate generally has the effect of increasing 
aggregate saving, at least until very high levels of the interest rate.
At an interest rate of 100% dissaving by the retired group is sufficiently 
large to make aggregate saving negative, after the increasing interest 
rates had turned it from negative (due to high dissaving by the younger 
groups) to positive. Table Five shows that at an interest rate of 100% 
the oldest group has the highest level of per capita consumption.
A rising interest rate reduces wealth at a rate which depends on 
the expected future income pattern the individual faces. Higher interest 
rates reduce the present value of future income and, given a life cycle 
pattern of income, peak income is discounted more heavily by the younger 
groups than by the older groups nearer their peak income.
At an interest rate of 30% the wealth pattern switches and the 
second age group becomes wealthier than the first. Table Six below 
shows relative wealth at each interest rate, setting the wealth of the 
youngest age group equal to one in each case.
Table Six shows a relative transfer of wealth from the youngest 
group in favour of the older groups as the interest rate rises. In
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Table  4: Wealth and Saving by Age and I n t e r e s t  Rate
r  (%) 0 3% 5%
Age W S W S W S
1 10762 -2122 10176 -2005 9672 -1904
2 9004 -1489 8654 -1390 8384 -1315
3 4086 1556 3962 1579 3883 1586
4 182 2393 177 2390 169 2381
5 - -338 - -361 - -414
Agg 588728 -34268 562021 -28618 540261 -24805
10% 15% 20%
W S W S W S
1 8746 -1719 7955 -1561 7270 -1424
2 7838 -1162 7353 -1026 6920 -905
3 3700 1612 3533 1636 3381 1657
4 165 2368 158 2354 152 2340
5 - -492 - -581 - -677
Agg 498525 -16868 462159 -10288 430209 -4800
25% 28% 30%
W S W S W S
1 6676 -1305 6304 -1231 6157 -1201
2 6533 -797 6284 -727 6184 -699
3 3240 1676 3149 1687 3111 1692
4 146 2325 142 2315 140 2310
5 - -782 - -826 - -897
Agg 402039 -300 384177 2605 377036 3353
50% 100%
W S W S
1 4613 -893 2674 -505
2 5075 -389 3468 61
3 2684 1744 1999 1804
4 121 2242 91 2028
5 - -1453 - -3680
Agg 300092 11301 195340 -1114
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Table
1
2
3
4
5
Agg
1
2
3
4
5
Agg
Table
Age
1
2
3
4
4/3
3/2
4/2
2
3
4
4/3
3/2
4/2
Consumption by Age and I n t e r e s t  Rate
0 3 5 10 15 20
2222 2105 2004 1819 1661 1524
3489 3390 3315 3162 3026 2905
3444 3421 3414 3388 3364 3343
1607 1610 1619 1632 1646 1660
538 561 614 692 781 877
240576 234927 231114 223176 216596 211108
25 28 30 50 100
1405 1331 1301 993 605
2797 2727 2699 2389 1939
3324 3313 3388 3256 3196
1675 1685 1690 1758 1972
982 1062 1097 1653 3880
206608 203972 202955 195007 207422
6: R e l a t i v e Wealth ( I n t e r e s t  Rate r%)
0 3 5 10 15 20
1 1 1 1 1 1
.8366 .8504 .8668 .8962 .9243 .9519
.3797 .3893 .4015 .4231 .4441 .4651
.0169 .0174 .0175 .0189 .0199 .0209
.0445 .0447 .0436 .0447 .0448 .4886
.4538 .4578 .4652 .4721 .4805 .0220
.0202 .0205 .0202 .0211 .0215 .0449
25 28 30 50 100
.9786 .9968 1.004 1.100 1.2969
.4853 .4995 .5053 .5818 .7476
.0219 .0225 .0227 .0262 .0340
.4959 .5011 .5033 .5289 .5765
.0224 .0226 .0226 .2382 .0262
.0451 .0450 .0449 .0450 .0455
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r e l a t i v e  te rms  th e  o l d e s t  group r e c e i v e s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  ga in  from r i s i n g  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  s in c e  most o f  i t s  consumption i s  ou t  o f  s a v in g s ,  p o s i t i v e  
sav ings  hav ing  been encouraged and n e g a t i v e  d i s c o u ra g e d  by t h e  h igh 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  faced d u r in g  e a r l i e r  y e a r s .  I f  t h e  age ing  p ro ces s  were 
to  lead  to  r i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  th e  aged group would ga in  a t  the  
expense o f  t h e  younger group,  and t h i s  could  be taken  t o  mean t h a t  t h e  
burden o f  t h e  age ing  p ro c e s s  was i n c r e a s i n g .  Samuel s o n ' s  b i o l o g i c a l  
r a t e  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  though,  sugges t  t h a t  age ing  r e s u l t i n g  from slower 
p o p u la t i o n  growth w i l l  lower th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  f a v o u r in g  th e  young a t  
t h e  expense o f  t h e  o ld  and i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  young p o p u la t i o n  
to  suppor t  t h e  o ld .
I l l  C a l c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  I n t e r e s t  Rate Equa t ion
To s a t i s f y  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  no o u tp u t  i s  wasted  t h e  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  must be c a l c u l a t e d  in  each p e r io d  so t h a t
(7) 2 Nt (Yt (Yt  - C1) = 0. a a v a a J a=l
In g en e ra l  form, d e r iv e d  from the  consumption f u n c t i o n s ,  sav ings
(Y - C ) a t  each age can be w r i t t e n  a a
(8a) Sj = U - c } ) Yl - CjWpX)
(8b) S2 = - c2A2 - C2W2 W
(8c) S3 ■ '  C3A3 -
(8d) S4 = O - c J j v J - X  - C4W3 ° °
(8e) c t  .tS5 = - \S
= l / ( l +r  ) and W^ 'CX) i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  w ea l th  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e
l  c l
where X
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c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  We assume t h a t  a l l  d i s c o u n t i n g  i s  done by th e
c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r a t h e r  than  by expec ted  f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  so,
4
f o r  example,  i s  d i s c o u n te d  by t h e  f i r s t  age group by (1+r^) . A sse t s
a t  each age ,  a r e  a f u n c t i o n  o f  p a s t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  no t  t h e  c u r r e n t
r a t e .
From th e  e q u a t io n s  (8) and with  a p p r o p r i a t e  grouping we can w r i t e
(7) as
(9) K ( l - c X  + - N2C2A2 + N3( 1 - CX  '  N5C3A3
+ (1 - c ] ) Y^4 4 4 N4C4 A4 N5 A5 i -  N j C j W j ( X )  -  N^c^CX)
- N3c 3W3 m N ^cV:(X)  = 04 4 4
The term in  b r a c e s  i s  g iv e n ,  a t  any t ime t ,  by th e  c o n s t a n t  v a lu e s  o f
Y and by p a s t  v a lu e s  o f  r ,  so a t  any t ime t  the  system can e f f e c t i v e l y  a
be w r i t t e n
(10) c ( t ) + f(X) = 0
where c ( t ) ,  a c o n s t a n t  (a l th o u g h  d i f f e r e n t  f o r  each t ime t ) } i s  the  term 
in b r a c e s  in  (9 ) .  Equa t ion  (10) must be so lved  f o r  th e  d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r  
X, where f(X) i s  f o u r t h  degree  s in c e  t h e  h i g h e s t  d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r  i s  
(1+r ) 4 in . The term f(X) and th e  va lu e  o f  X t h a t  s o lv es  (10) w i l l  
d i f f e r  each p e r i o d .
Using th e  income d i s t r i b u t i o n  (100, 2000, 5000, 4000, 200) and 
the  c '  c o e f f i c i e n t s  ( . 2 ,  .3 ,  .25,  .1)  on w ea l th  a t  ages one t o  fou r
ci
r e s p e c t i v e l y  we can w r i t e  (10) as
(11) C - Nj ( 3 9 1 . 2X + 9 6 9 .OX2 + 7 5 7 . 6X3 + 3 4 . 6X4 )
- N4 (1 4 8 6 .5X + 1161.6X2 + 5 3 . IX3)
- (3908X + 178 .OX2)
- N* ( 1 8 . 2X) = 0
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The f(X) portion of (11) can be written in matrix form as
(12) [»; n2 n3 Nh 391.2 969 757.6 34.6“ "X
1486.5 1161.6 53.1 0 x 2
3908 178 0 0 x 3
18.2 0 0 0 x 4
For convenience we transpose the system so that the coefficients 
on the powers of X are found by postmultiplying matrix (13) below by 
the then (4x1) population vector.
391.2 1486.5 977.0 18
969.0 1161.6 53.1 0
757.6 53.4 0 0
34.6 0 0 0
Then with the population vector (excluding as unnecessary for this 
part of the calculations)
(14) 26.60
25.39
17.37
15.79
we have coefficients
(15) 65406.023~ X
56190.771 x 2
on
21507.986 x3
920.360 1
X
i
We normalize the vector of coefficients in (15) so that the coefficient
4on X becomes unity
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(16) " 71.09 X
61.05
23.37
on
x 2
x3
1.00 A
We perform this operation as necessary to yield the f(X) portion 
of (10) and use the resulting interest rates (found by solving (10)) as 
the lagged values in later time periods, to give the C portion of (10). 
Note that the C portion of (10) is also adjusted when the normalized 
coefficients (16) are found.
The interest rate equation changes with each new population age 
structure so these operations must be repeated in each period. The 
appendix contains tables of coefficients for various values of the 
intrinsic population growth rate.
IV Simulation Results
In this section we report simulation runs on the system described 
in the previous sections. Each simulation is based on population pro­
jections for twenty five simulation periods. Since the simulation 
period is fifteen years, like the age groupings, this means that each 
simulation notionally covers 375 years. The population age distribution 
in each case stabilizes after fifteen periods, or 225 years. At the 
end of each simulation run the interest rate is very close to its 
equilibrium value but has not actually reached it. We do not suggest 
that our results predict what will actually be observed in any economy 
over two to three centuries, but they do give some idea of the long run 
influences of the economic-demographic interaction we are considering.
The interest rate series resulting from three values of the 
intrinsic rate of population growth are presented in Table Seven:
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Table 7: Interest Rates by Period and Growth Rate
Period A = 1.0006 A=1.0427 A=1.1019
0 16.92 16.92 16.92
1 10.75 12.93 16,06
2 5.85 10.42 16.93
3 5.94 12.20 21.08
4 -1.27 5.30 14.59
5 -2.43 4.06 13.81
6 -2.43 2.94 10.95
7 -2.30 1.87 8.34
8 0.06 3.61 8.97
9 1.52 5.03 8,80
10 2.68 5.98 10,17
11 3.35 7.07 11.45
12 2.99 7.01 12.18
13 2.42 6.72 12.83
14 1.62 6.20 12.72
15 0.93 5.52 12.39
16 0.61 5.14 11.90
17 0.57 4,93 11.38
18 0.80 4.97 11.09
19 1.14 5.19 10.97
20 1.46 5.43 11.04
21 1.67 5,67 11.24
22 1 .73 5.80 11.45
23 1.67 5.83 11.63
24 1.54 5.78 11.72
25 1.39 5.67 11.73
For periods t-i, i > 0, the interest rate is constrained to = 0 in 
each case.
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For each s im u l a t i o n  run th e  i n i t i a l  va lue  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  in  a l l  
p e r io d s  b e f o r e  t  = 0 was c o n s t r a i n e d  to  equal  z e ro .  This  was a m a t t e r  
o f  convenience  in  c a l c u l a t i o n  and does no t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  th e  
r e s u l t .
The c a l c u l a t e d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  p l o t t e d  in F igu res  One th rough  
Three .  Each s e r i e s  i s  c l e a r l y  s t a b i l i z i n g  a t  an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  j u s t  
over  one p e r c e n ta g e  p o in t  above t h e  b i o l o g i c a l  r a t e  (so S t a r r e t t ' s  
e f f i c i e n c y  c o n d i t i o n  would appea r  to  be met in  each c a s e ) . F igu re  Four 
emphasises t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  between th e  t ime p a th s  o f  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  
R a is ing  th e  p o p u la t i o n  growth r a t e  r a i s e s  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  va lu e  o f  th e  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  but  has l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on th e  dynamics o f  th e  r a t e s .  Note 
from S e c t io n  II  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  t h a t  changing t h e  f i r s t  row o f  t h e  
L e s l i e  m a t r ix  had i t s  g r e a t e s t  e f f e c t  on t h e  i n t r i n s i c  r a t e  o f  popu­
l a t i o n  growth and r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on t h e  complex r o o t s  t h a t  
de termined  t h e  approach o f  t h e  p o p u la t i o n  to  s t a b i l i t y .
The c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  t h e  X v a r i a b l e s  in  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  e q u a t i o n s ,
l i s t e d  in f u l l  in  th e  appendix ,  g ive  some i n s i g h t  i n t o  th e  b e h a v i o r  o f
3
t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The c o e f f i c i e n t  on X i s  found t o  s t a b i l i z e  ve ry  
q u i c k ly ,  and i t s  l e v e l  i s  l i t t l e  a f f e c t e d  by changes in th e  i n t r i n s i c  
r a t e  o f  growth.  I f  we compare th e  X c o e f f i c i e n t s  between th e  case  
w i th  r o o t  1.0006 and t h a t  w i th  r o o t  1.1019 in  p e r io d  t+25 we f i n d
X3 x 2 X
t—
‘ o o o O' 2 3 . 4 0 6 2 . 3 0 8 1 . 1 2
1 . 1 0 1 9 2 3 . 2 7 5 9 . 0 3 7 2 . 3 4
% change - .  55% - 5 . 2 5 % - 1 0 . 8 2 %
The c o e f f i c i e n t  on X i s  t h e  most v a r i a b l e  ( a f t e r  t h e  c o n s ta n t  te rm ,  no t  
shown h e r e ) .
We can compare t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  e q u a t io n  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  growth 
r a t e  cases  fo r  some p e r io d  a f t e r  th e  p o p u l a t i o n  has  s t a b i l i z e d  in  each
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case  and in  which th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  c l o s e  t o  i t s  e q u i l i b r i u m  v a lu e .  
The p e r io d  chosen was t+25.  R e c a l l i n g  t h a t  t h e  eq u a t io n  to  be s o lved  
was w r i t t e n  in  terms o f  X = l / ( l + r ) ,  from T ab le  Seven th e  r o o t s  o f  t h e  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  eq u a t io n  which gave us th e  i n t e r e s t  v a lu e s  were .98629 
in the  1.0006 ca s e ,  .94634 in  th e  1.0427 case  and .89501 in t h e  1.1019 
c a s e .
Each i n t e r e s t  r a t e  equ a t io n  had fo u r  r o o t s ,  on ly  one o f  which,  
th e  f i r s t ,  could  be conver ted  to  econom ica l ly  mean ingful  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
v a l u e s .  In each o f  t h e  t h r e e  cases  in  t+25 t h e  second ro o t  was 
-20 .593 ,  a p p ro x im a te ly ,  meaning t h a t  in  each ca s e  d e s p i t e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
in p o p u la t i o n  growth r a t e s  t h e  second r o o t  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  e q u a t io n  
in t+25 co n v e r ted  t o  an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  o f  -104.86%. This  second ro o t  
proved remarkably  r e s i l i e n t ,  be ing  found in  a l l  t h r e e  cases  no t  only  in  
p e r io d  t+25 but  a l s o  f o r  p e r io d s  b e f o r e  t+13,  t h a t  i s  fo r  p e r io d s  b e f o r e  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  had s t a b i l i z e d .  I t  a l s o  h e ld  f o r  t h e  case d i s c u s s e d  
below w i th  an age s t r u c t u r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  demographic s t a t i o n a r i t y ,  
even in a pe r io d  in which t h e  f i r s t  r o o t  gave an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  o f  55%. 
And, as  we s h a l l  no te  l a t e r ,  i t  lie1d when a s t a b i l i z e d  p o p u la t io n  was 
a b r u p t l y  d i s t u r b e d .  I t  seems t h a t  t h i s  r o o t  i s  r e l a t e d  to  t h e  second 
r o o t  o f  th e  L e s l i e  m a t r ix ,  which we showed above d id  not  change much 
as th e  i n t r i n s i c  growth r a t e  changed.
The complex r o o t s  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  e q u a t io n  in  p e r i o d  t+25 
a l s o  proved s i m i l a r  a c r o s s  the  t h r e e  c a s e s ,  i n d i c a t i n g  s i m i l a r  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  dynamics d e s p i t e  changes in th e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  as we 
no ted from F igure  Four.  The complex r o o t s  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  growth r a t e s  
in  o r d e r  (1 .0006 ,  1.0427,  1.1019) were
-1.7065 ± 1 . 790i
-1.8458 ± 2 . 1026i
-1.791 ± 1 .9616 i
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These roots imply interest rate cycles of 2.69, 2.74 and 2.72 of our 
fifteen-year periods each. The corresponding populations had cycles of 
2.63, 2,62 and 2.60 periods respectively. Clearly in our system the 
dynamic behavior of interest rates is closely determined by the dynamics 
of the population. We also calculated roots for the 1.0006 case in 
period t+1, when the interest rate has just been released from zero 
and the population is far from stability. That the first root differs 
considerably from its later values can be seen from Table Seven, where 
the early interest rates differ greatly from their eventual steady 
state value. The complex roots, though, indicate that in period t+1 
the cycle associated with the interest rate was 2.70 periods. This 
result also held up well in the case of the inconsistent age structure. 
These results suggest areas for future research both in more detailed 
theoretical models and in empirical models, perhaps using spectral 
analysis as has been done in simple tests of the long swing hypothesis, 
on the question of the extent to which natural population cycles drive 
economic cycles.
V____ Wealth and Consumption
Our simulations give some information about other effects of the 
ageing population, at least in the context of the simple consumption-loan 
model of this chapter. We have assumed that the current interest rate 
is used to calculate expected wealth, so the process of adjustment of 
the interest rate to its equilibrium will affect expected wealth at 
different ages. We showed some of these effects in a general way, 
unrelated to the ageing process, in earlier sections of this chapter.
In Table Eight below we show the expected wealth of individuals of 
different ages in the twenty-five time periods in the case of an 
intrinsic growth rate of 1.0006.
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T a b le 8: Expec ted Wealth
t - 1 , r = 0 t , r = 1 6 .92 t + 1 , r = 1 0 .75 t + 2 , r = 5 .85 t + 3 , r = 5 .94
w i
10762 7679 .66 8619 .76 9503 .9 9 9486 .47
lV2 9004 7181 .10 7761 .15 8286.24 8276 .02
W1 4086 3472 .67 3673 .79 3850 .89 3847 .4 8
W4 182 155 .66 1 64 .33 171.94 171 .80
t + 4 , r = - l .27 t + 5 , r = - 2 .43 t + 6 , r = - 2 .43 t + 7 , r = - 2 .30 t + 8 , r = 0 .06
W1 11069 .75 11363 .07 11363.07 11329 .60 10747.22
w
2
9174.91 9336 .23 9336 .23 9317 .90 8995 .60
W3 4 1 40 .88 4192 .31 4192 .31 4186 .48 40 8 3 .4 3
«4 184 .34 186 .53 186 .53 186 .28 181 .89
t + 9 , r = l .52 t + 1 0 , r = 2 . 68 t + 1 1 , r = 3 .35 t + 1 2 , r = 2 . 9 9 t + 1 3 , r = 2 .42
W1 10410 .97 10155 .04 10011.70 10088.31 10211 .53
W2 8806 .90 8661 .69 8579.78 8623.62 8693 .85
w
3 4022 .20 3974 .83 3947.98 3962.31 3985 .33
»4 179.28 177.25 176 .10 176.72 177 .70
t + 1 4 , r = l .62 t + 1 5 , r = 0 .93 t + 1 6 , r = 0 . 6 1 t  + 17 , r = 0 .52 t + 1 8 , r = 0 .80
W1 10388.52 10545.06 10618.93 10628.22 10574 .97
W2
8794.21 8882 .46 8923.95 8929 .1 6 8899 .27
4 0 18 .07 4046 .72 4060 .16 4061 .84 4052 .17
W4
179 .10 180.32 180 .90 180.97 180 .56
t + 1 9 , r = l .14 t + 2 0 , r = l .46 t + 2 1 , r = l .67 t + 2 2 , r = l .73 t + 2 3 , r = 1.67
W1
10497.02 10424.49 10377.31 10363.89 10377.31
W2
8855.44 8814.54 8787 .87 8780 .29 8787 .87
w
3
4037 .9 6 4024 .67 4016 .01 4013 .54 4016 .01
« 4
179.95 179 .38 179.01 178 .90 179.01
t + 2 4 , r = 1.54 t + 2 5 , r = l .39
W1
10406.47 10440.29
W2 8804 .36 8823 .45
W3
4021 .37 4027 .57
W4
179.24 179 .50
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Expected wealth at any period shows the present value of the 
stream of income that an individual of given age in that period expects 
to realize over the remainder of his lifetime. For example in Table 
Eight an individual of age 1 in period t+9, when the current interest 
rate is 1.52%, expects earnings (in dollars) with a present value of 
10,410.97 over the remaining four periods of his life. One period 
later, when the interest rate is 2.68% he expects to earn a present 
value of 8661.69 over his third, fourth and fifth periods. A period 
later he expects to earn a present value of 3947 over his fourth and 
fifth periods, and finally he expects to earn a present value of 176.72 
in his fifth period. When he reaches his fifth period of life his 
wealth or expected earnings equal zero since he does not expect to 
survive beyond the fifth period of life.
Had the interest remained constant at 1.52% over his life his
expectation of wealth would have changed according to the cross-section
of expected wealth observed in t+9, and as we formulate expected wealth
this is how he expects it to change. If we call his fixed interest
expectation at birth of his age-specific wealth in the future from
Table 8 his Myopic Expected Wealth, and the pattern of expectations he
experiences through his life as the interest rate changes his Actual
Expected Wealth (referring to these two definitions as MEW and AEW
respectively)(see the appendix tables), we can see how the pattern of
3
interest rates through his life alters his wealth expectations .
Since the interest rates are affected by the changing age distribution 
of the population a comparison of MEW and AEW gives us some idea of how 
people see their prospects at various stages of the ageing process in 
this model and therefore how they assess their ability to support an 
ageing population.
3 From Chapter Four, changes in the distribution of expected income 
across age groups was one reason for not working with an aggregate 
life cycle consumption function.
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For th e  i n d i v i d u a l  born in  t+9 ( i . e .  a member o f  th e  f i r s t  age 
group in  t h a t  p e r io d )  we have
T ab le  9a: 
Age MEW AEW r%
1 10,410 .97 10,410.97 1.52
2 8 ,806 .90 8,661 .69 2.68
3 4 ,0 2 2 .2 0 3 ,947 .98 3.35
4 179.28 176.72 2.99
I f  we s e t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  expec ted w ea l th  in age 4 equal to  one we can 
c a l c u l a t e  w ea l th  r a t i o s  to  show how changing i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r e d i s t r i b u t e  
expec ted  r e l a t i v e  w ea l th  over  th e  l i f e t i m e .  We a l s o  c a l c u l a t e  th e  
r a t i o  o f  myopic to  a c t u a l  e x p e c t a t i o n  a t  each age.
Table  9b
Age R e l a t i v e  MEW R e l a t i v e  AEW $MEW/$AEW
1 58.07 58.91 1
2 49.12 49.01 1.0167
3 22.42 22.34 1.0188
4 1 1 1.0145
Now c o n s id e r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l 1i v i n g  d u r ing a p e r io d  o f  d e c l i n i n g
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  such as one in th e  f i r s t  age in  p e r io d  t+11.
Tab le  9c
Age MEW r% AEW MEW/AEW
1 10011.70 3.35 10011.70 1
2 8579.78 2.99 8623.62 .9949
3 3947.98 2.42 3985.33 .9906
4 176.10 1.62 179.10 .9832
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And in r e l a t i v e  te rms
Table  9d
Age RMEW RAEW
1 56.85 55.90
2 48.72 48.15
3 22.42 22.25
4 1 1
As we would e x p e c t , a n  i n d i v i d u a l  l i v i n g  in  a pe r io d  o f  d e c l i n i n g  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f i n d s  h im s e l f  w e a l t h i e r  than  h i s  myopic e x p e c t a t i o n ,  
w i th  th e  g r e a t e s t  r e l a t i v e  ga in  in h i s  f o u r t h  age.  We cannot  draw a 
d i r e c t  l i n k  to  t h e  age ing  p r o c e s s ,  though.  As th e  appendix t a b l e s  
g iv in g  t h e  p o p u la t i o n  age d i s t r i b u t i o n  in t h e  case  o f  t h e  f i r s t  r o o t  = 
1.0006 show, from p e r io d  t+11 t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  in t h e  h ig h e s t  age group i s  
a c t u a l l y  d e c l i n i n g  s l i g h t l y  as th e  p o p u la t i o n  s t a b i l i z e s .  The i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  c o n t in u e s  to  cy c l e  a f t e r  t h e  p o p u la t i o n  has s t a b i l i z e d .
Taking th e  r a t i o  o f  th e  AEW o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  born in p e r io d  t+9 to  
t h a t  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  born in  t+11,  and s i m i l a r l y  f o r  th e  MEW we f i n d
Table  9e 
Age AEW9/AEW11 MEW9/MEW11
1 1.040 1.040
2 1.004 1.026
3 0.9906 1.019
4 0.9867 1.018
Because o f  h i s  lower i n i t i a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t h e  myopic i n d i v i d u a l  
born in t+9 has a g r e a t e r  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  wea l th  than  has h i s  l a t e r - b o r n  
c o u n t e r p a r t ,  whi le  in te rms o f  a c t u a l  e x p e c t a t i o n  he i s  w e a l t h i e r  on ly  in
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t h e  f i r s t  two p e r io d s  o f  l i f e  and poorer  in th e  expec ted  wea l th  sense  in  
t h e  l a s t  two. The magnitude o f  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  n a t u r a l l y  depends on the  
l e v e l  o f  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  and the  deg ree  to  which i t  changes from pe r iod  
to  p e r i o d .
Wealth myopia may seem d i f f i c u l t  to  j u s t i f y  s in c e  th e  pe r iod  9 
i n d i v i d u a l  has  simply  to  c o n s id e r  t h e  expec ted  wea l th  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  
born in an e a r l i e r  pe r io d  to  see  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  a changing i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  
S t i l l ,  t h e r e  i s  room f o r  co n fu s io n .  Suppose an i n d i v i d u a l  o f  g e n e ra t i o n  
9 c o n s i d e r s  th e  AEW o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  aged 4 in  p e r io d  t+ 9 .  That  o l d e r  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  l i f e t i m e  AEW p a t t e r n  was (11363.07,  9317.9,  4083.43,  179.28) 
whereas h i s  MEW a t  b i r t h  had been (11363.07,  9336.23,  4192.31,  186.53) 
(born in  t+6 when t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  was -2.43%).  The AEW o f  t h e  i n d i ­
v i d u a l  o f  g e n e r a t i o n  6 i s  g r e a t e r  a t  every  age except  th e  l a s t  than  the  
MEW of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  o f  g e n e r a t i o n  9, even though i t  i s  l e s s  a t  every 
age excep t  t h e  f i r s t  than  was th e  MEW o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  o f  g e n e r a t i o n  6 
and t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  was r i s i n g  (from -2.43% in  t+6 to  1.52% in  t+9) 
th rough  th e  whole l i f e  o f  th e  o l d e r  person .
An i n d i v i d u a l  who l i v e s  in a t ime o f  s t e a d i l y  r i s i n g  ( f a l l i n g )  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  f i n d  h i s  AEW f a l l s  s h o r t  o f  (exceeds)  h i s  MEW. An 
i n d i v i d u a l  whose a c t i v e  l i f e  c r o s s e s  a t u r n i n g  p o in t  in  th e  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  cy c l e  might  ga in  o r  lo s e  in th e  sense  o f  a s imple AEW/MEW 
com par ison .
We a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  in t h e  w ea l th  s e r i e s  fo r  th e  in fo rm a t ion  i t  g ives  
us about  r e l a t i v e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  l i v i n g  a c r o s s  g e n e r a t i o n s  and i t s  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  fo r  how heavy any burden c r e a t e d  by th e  p o p u la t io n  ageing 
p ro c e s s  a c t u a l l y  i s .  We can a l s o  o b t a i n  in fo rm a t io n  on t h i s  q u e s t i o n  by 
look ing  a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  consumption l e v e l  o f  each age group.  The con­
sumption p a t t e r n  wi l l  change as people r e a c t  to  changing i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
and p a t t e r n s  o f  w ea l th .  Tab les  showing p a t t e r n s  o f  consumption and
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s av in g  in  th e  case  o f  th e  p o p u la t i o n  w i th  a p r i n c i p a l  r o o t  o f  1.0006 a re  
in c lu d e d  in  t h e  appendix .  S i m i l a r  p a t t e r n s  could  be shown f o r  the  
o t h e r  two growth r a t e  c a s e s ,  g iven th e  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
p a t t e r n s  to  t h a t  o f  t h e  case  shown.
Consumption in  r e t i r e m e n t  p roves  t o  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  to  
t h e  s t a g e  in  th e  p o p u l a t i o n / i n t e r e s t  r a t e  c y c l e  in  which t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
i s  born.  The r e l a t i o n  i s ,  however, more complex tha n  some o f  th e  c la ims 
about  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  ageing  might  lead  us to  e x p e c t .  Consider  
i n d i v i d u a l s  born in  p e r i o d s  t+3 and t+ 4 .  They r e t i r e  ( i . e .  they  reach  
t h e  f i n a l ,  low income, s t a g e  o f  t h e i r  l i v e s )  in t+7 and t+8 when t h e  
f i n a l  age group makes up 17.99 and 18.00% o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Yet th e  i n d i v i d u a l  born in  t+4 in  t h i s  example has  r e t i r e m e n t  consumption 
over  2.5 t im es  as  g r e a t  as  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  born in  t+ 3 ,  who i s  a c t u a l l y  
consuming l e s s  than  h i s  income in  t h e  f i n a l  p e r i o d  o f  h i s  l i f e  because  
o f  the  need to  pay o f f  d e b t s  accumula ted  e a r l i e r .  The s i n g l e  p e r io d  
d i f f e r e n c e  in b i r t h s ,  having i t s  e f f e c t  th rough  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  p a t t e r n ,  
r e s u l t s  in  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  o f  g e n e r a t i o n  t h r e e  s h i f t i n g  so much o f  h i s  
consumption i n t o  t h e  e a r l i e r  y e a r s  o f  h i s  l i f e  t h a t  he e n t e r s  r e t i r e m e n t  
a n e t  d e b t o r ,  w hi le  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  o f  g e n e r a t i o n  fo u r  e n t e r s  r e t i r e m e n t  
w i th  accumulated  a s s e t s  as  l a r g e  aga in  as h i s  exogenous r e t i r e m e n t  income. 
Th is  i s  an extreme c a s e ,  caused by t h e  drop in t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  between 
t+3 and t+4 from 5.95% t o  -1.27%, but  i s  i l l u s t r a t i v e  o f  t h e  problems 
invo lved  in  t r y i n g  to  de te rm ine  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  age ing .
G en e ra t io n s  ze ro ,  one and two p r e s e n t  more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  c a s e s .  
They w i l l  r e t i r e  in p e r io d s  t+4,  t+5 and t+6 when th e  f i f t h  age group 
w i l l  make up 19.39%, 16.79% and 18.38% o f  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n .  T he i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  consumption l e v e l s  in  r e t i r e m e n t ,  out  o f  an income o f  200 
p lu s  a s s e t s ,  w i l l  be 138.18,  262.12,  and 158.74.  While t h i s  seems to 
i n d i c a t e  a f a i r l y  simple r e l a t i o n  between t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  aged group
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and t h e  l e v e l  o f  consumption by t h a t  group,  aga in  t h e  a c t u a l  r e l a t i o n  i s  
n o t  t h a t  c l e a r .  I f  we compare t o t a l  (und iscounted)  consumption over  a 
f u l l  f i v e - p e r i o d  l i f e  we f in d  t h a t  g e n e r a t i o n  two consumes more than  does 
g e n e r a t i o n  one,  10482.65 vs 10368.18. Genera t ion  two must be s h i f t i n g  
more o f  i t s  consumption ahead than  i s  g e n e r a t i o n  one.  The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
g e n e r a t i o n  one f a c e s  in i t s  f i r s t  age i s  almost  tw ice  t h a t  which 
g e n e r a t i o n  two f a c e s  in  i t s  f i r s t  age,  while  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
t o t a l  consumpt ion o f  th e  two g e n e r a t i o n s  i s  no t  a l l  t h a t  g r e a t .
We cannot  make d i r e c t  w e l f a r e  compar isons  a c r o s s  g e n e r a t i o n s  
w i thou t  an e x p l i c i t  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t io n  so we cannot  d i r e c t l y  
a s s e s s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  consumption p a t t e r n s  such as th o s e  
between g e n e r a t i o n s  one and two. One way o f  c o n s id e r i n g  some o f  th e  
g a i n s  and l o s s e s  i s  to  look a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  va lu e  a t  b i r t h  o f  consumption 
by an i n d i v i d u a l  over  h i s  l i f e t i m e  where each p e r i o d ’s consumption i s  
d i s c o u n te d  acco rd ing  t o  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t h a t  w i l l  app ly  in  t h a t  
p e r i o d .  We have,  o f  co u r s e ,  assumed t h a t  t h e  foreknowledge o f  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  t h a t  would be needed fo r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  to  make such a c a l c u l a t i o n  
does  no t  e x i s t .
Tab le  10 shows P re s e n t  Value Consumption (PVC) f i g u r e s  a long  w i th  
th e  und iscounted  t o t a l  consumption done over an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s l i f e ,  by 
d a t e  o f  b i r t h .  C l e a r l y  we a r e  only  c o n s id e r i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s  who l i v e  a 
f u l l  f i v e  p e r io d s .
Looking a t  t h e  PVC and t o t a l  consumption f i g u r e s  we see t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  born between t  and t+4 e x p e r i en ce  r i s i n g  l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s  
a c ro s s  g e n e r a t i o n s  while  th o s e  born in t+5 and beyond a r e  in a r e g io n  o f  
d e c l i n i n g  PVC. T o ta l  consumption fo l low s  a s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n  but  does no t  
begin  to  f a l l  u n t i l  t+6 .  While p a r t  o f  t h i s  i s  due to  th e  i n i t i a l  con­
d i t i o n s  o f  th e  system and th e  r e s u l t i n g  higli i n i t i a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t h i s  
does n o t  appear to  be th e  e n t i r e  cause .  P e r iods  t  t o  t+4 a r e  p e r io d s
Table 10: T o ta l  L i f e t im e  consumption ( C) and P re s e n t  Value o f  L i fe t im e
Consumption a t  f i r s t  age (PVC) by p e r io d  o f  f i r s t  age ($ ) .
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C PVC
t - 1 11233.47 9712.84
t  + 0 9911.16 8991.87
t+1 10368.18 9904.08
t+2 10482.65 10526.54
t  + 3 10741.10 11099.66
t+4 11392.28 11760.50
t  + 5 11554.17 11746.85
t+6 11654.54 11557.37
t  + 7 11607.93 11269.96
t  + 8 11393.81 10935.62
t+9 11236.22 10732.95
t  + 10 11087.69 10634.73
t  + 11 11009.86 10656.97
t  + 12 11020.29 10775.49
t  + 13 11070.98 10913.33
t  + 14 11155.62 11039.20
t  + 15 11231.54 11109.83
t  + 16 11275.65 11115.92
t  + 17 11292.15 11076.62
t  + 18 11268.33 11014.03
t  + 19 11234.39 10954.76
t + 20 11199.22 10915.12
t + 21 11174.16 10901.86
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t h rough  which t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i s  u n q u e s t io n a b ly  age ing .  Per iod  t  can be 
r ega rded  as p a r t  o f  a baby boom wi th  age groups one and two l a rg e  r e l a t i v e  
to  t h e i r  s t a b l e  l e v e l s .  The r e s u l t i n g  bu lge  moves th rough the  age 
s t r u c t u r e ,  working i t s e l f  out  a f t e r  t+4 .  We no te  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  born 
in t+5 and t+6 e x p e r i e n c e  lower PVC v a lu e s  than  do those  b o m  e a r l i e r  
( a l though  t o t a l  u n d iscoun ted  consumption i s  s t i l l  r i s i n g  ac ro s s  g e n e r a t i o n s )  
d e s p i t e  th e  echo o f  th e  boom which began in t+2 and worked i t s e l f  out  in 
t+6.  S ince  t h i s  echo i s  a minor e f f e c t ,  dominated by t h e  i n i t i a l  bulge 
f o r  a l l  bu t  two o f  t h e  p e r i o d s  in which i t  appears  we would not  expec t  
i t  t o  be a very  s e r i o u s  f a c t o r  compared t o  the  ongoing e f f e c t  o f  th e  
i n i t i a l  bu lge .
Whoever b e a r s  t h e  burden o f  an ageing  p o p u la t io n  in  t h i s  model i t  
i s  n o t ,  i t  seems,  th e  p o p u la t i o n  t h a t  i s  young when th e  t o t a l  p o p u la t io n  
has a h igh  p r o p o r t i o n  in  t h e  o l d e r  age groups .  The lowest  PVC i s  t h a t  
o f  t h e  g e n e r a t i o n  a t  age one in  pe r io d  t ,  t h a t  i s ,  the  bulge  p o p u la t io n  
and t h a t  which becomes th e  age ing  problem as t h a t  problem i s  u s u a l l y  
conce ived .  G en e ra t io n s  born a f t e r  t  have a p r o g r e s s i v e l y  r i s i n g  
s t a n d a rd  o f  l i v i n g  and a r e  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  suppor t  t h e  ageing  burden i f  a 
t a x - f i n a n c e d  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  system i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  We n o te  from the  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  s e r i e s  t h a t  p e r i o d s  t  t o  t+4 d u r ing  which th e  bu lge  i s  
p a s s in g  th rough  th e  p o p u la t i o n  a r e  p e r io d s  o f  d e c l i n i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
(w ith  th e  exce p t io n  o f  th e  s l i g h t  i n c r e a s e  in t+3 which i s  fo l lowed  by 
a sharp  drop t o  a n e g a t i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ) . And a l though  g e n e r a t i o n s  t+5 
and t+6 ex p e r i e n c e  d e c l i n i n g  PVC, both  have h ig h e r  PVC l e v e l s  than  has 
g e n e r a t i o n  t+2 which i s  t h e  echo o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  bu lge .
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VI A Baby Boom S im u la t ion
In th e  s i m u l a t i o n s  r e p o r t e d  above,  as  our i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n  we s e t  
lagged v a l u e s  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  equal  to  zero .  When t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  
was r e l e a s e d ,  a t  t h e  b e g inn ing  o f  th e  s im u l a t i o n ,  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r o s e  
and th e n  f e l l  s h a r p l y  b e f o r e  beg inn ing  a more r e g u l a r  c y c l i c a l  approach 
t o  e q u i l i b r i u m .  While our  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  may have some e f f e c t  on 
th e  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  c a l c u l a t e d  fo r  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d s ,  we 
have a s c r i b e d  most o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  observed to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  popu­
l a t i o n  age s t r u c t u r e  a t  t h e  beg inn ing  o f  t h e  s im u l a t i o n  p e r io d  was 
n o t i c e a b l y  younger than the  s t a b l e  p o p u la t i o n  would be.  To d em ons t ra te  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  we r e p o r t  in t h i s  s e c t i o n  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  an 
ab rup t  i n c r e a s e  in b i r t h s  i n  a p o p u la t i o n  t h a t  had reached  demographic 
s t a b i l i t y .
The p o p u l a t i o n  we c o n s id e r  i s  t h a t  a s s o c i a t e d  with  t h e  ro o t  1.0006.  
We have p r o j e c t e d  i t  ahead u n t i l  t h e  p o p u la t i o n  i s  s t a b l e  and th e  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  v i r t u a l l y  a t  i t s  e q u i l i b r i u m  v a lu e .
We th e n  in t ro d u c e d  an a r b i t r a r y  change in t h e  age d i s t r i b u t i o n .
We assume t h a t  t h i s  imposed baby boom i s  s h o r t  l i v e d  and t h a t  the  long 
term v a l u e s  o f  t h e  elements  o f  t h e  L e s l i e  m a t r ix  a r e  unchanged.  To 
ex a g g e ra te  t h e  change towards  a younger age s t r u c t u r e  we have reduced  
th e  s i z e  o f  t h e  p o p u la t i o n  in  each o f  t h e  o l d e r  age groups as well  as 
i n c r e a s i n g  th e  s i z e  o f  t h e  younger groups .  Th is  exper iment p robab ly  
most n e a r l y  approx im ates  th e  s i t u a t i o n  im media te ly  a f t e r  the  F i r s t  and 
Second World Wars in  F rance ,  when a d u l t  c a s u a l t i e s  ( m i l i t a r y  and 
c i v i l i a n )  had r e s u l t e d  in a r e d u c t io n  in  the  s i z e  o f  th e  o l d e r  age 
groups a f t e r  t h e  war (an e f f e c t  t h a t  can s t i l l  be seen in the  French age 
pyramid) ,  w h i le  th e  c a t c h -u p  in  m a rr i age  and fam i ly  fo rm at ion  immedia te ly  
a f t e r  th e  war r e s u l t e d  in  a sharp  i n c r e a s e  in the  younger age groups .
We might a l s o  assume immigra t ion in t h e  younger age groups,  aga in  s i m i l a r
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to the experience in France after the First World War when there was a 
rapid increase in immigration (although not enough to keep the French 
population from falling). We introduce the French case only as an 
example of how the sort of change we test could occur, and do not impose 
any economic shocks along with the demographic ones although there will 
be changes in aggregate consumption and income resulting from the sudden 
change in the age distribution.
The stable age distribution of the 1.0006 population is
Age 1 2 3 4 5
Population 21.04 20.57 20.37 19.89 18.13
If we let t stand for the beginning of our experimental period, recalling 
that the population has been stable for some time we find the interest 
rate pattern reported below. As an initial condition at the beginning 
of the interest rate series we again set lagged interest rate values 
equal to zero. Now, with the population at its stable age distribution, 
as Figure Five shows, there is no abrupt jump, but a fairly regular 
cycle to equilibrium.
Period t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t + 8
r% 1 .42 1.93 2.10 1.92 1.73 1.40 1.18 1.08 1.07
t + 9 t + 10 t + 11 t + 12 t + 13 t + 14 t + 15
1.17 1.29 1.41 1.48 1.50 1.47 1.42
The interest rate time path is clearly approaching equilibrium.
In period t+16 we impose a shock on the system by changing the 
age distribution to the distribution we used as the initial position in 
the simulations reported above:
Age 1 2 3 4 5
Population 26.60 25.39 17.37 15.79 14.29
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This population is clearly significantly younger than that used from t 
to t + 15. The interest rate time path that follows this change is
Period t + 16 t+17 t + 18 t + 19 t + 20 t+21
r% 18.11 10.97 5.75 5.32 -1.99 -2.88
t + 22 t+23 t + 24 t + 25
-2.70 -2.30 0.52 1.70
This series is plotted in Figure Five along with the result of 
the same simulation experiment on a system using the sort of short term 
debt instrument we discussed in an earlier chapter. Lifetime savings, 
wealth, consumption and interest patterns faced are reported in the 
appendix tables.
The PVC of the post baby boom groups rises across generations, 
and of the age groups living through the boom the baby boom group itself 
has the lowest PVC. The baby boom group and the echo generation have 
fifth age consumption levels that are less than their fifth age income, 
while the generation with the highest consumption level is that born in 
t+14 which is in its third age (the first age of positive saving) in 
t+16 when the baby boom group enters the money market to borrow for 
consumption purposes. If we trace fifth age consumption back through 
periods before t+13 we find it stabilizing at about 560, so the level of 
the t+13 group, 955.99, is also unusually high. Generation t+13 is the 
first to overlap the boom in years of active saving or dissaving since 
generation t+12 is in retirement when the boom occurs.
Comparing the MEW and AEW of the boom cohort we find that they do 
better in AEW than in MEW because of the decline in interest rates after 
t+16. For each generation that overlaps the boom, at the age of overlap 
the high t+16 interest rate reduces their wealth and, in the following 
period, affects their assets. The asset effect depends on whether the
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overlapping group was saving or dissaving at the overlap. Older age 
groups gain because their savings earn the high interest rates caused 
by the boom. Generations born after t+16 lose if they are dissaving 
during the period of high interest rates but none lose so much as does 
the baby boom group itself, and some gain when the interest rate is 
driven below its old level - in this case the rate becomes negative for 
three periods. These results demonstrate that the results of our 
earlier simulations were not significantly affected by the initial 
conditions imposed on the interest rates, and did actually represent the 
effect of age structures. We note that in this simulation with its 
initially stable population age distribution the initial condition of a 
zero interest rate apparently had no influence on the system, and that 
when the age distribution was shocked, even though the Leslie matrix was 
unchanged and the ultimate equilibrium interest rate also unaffected, 
the sudden change in population age distribution in favour of a younger 
distribution resulted in an abrupt increase in the interest rate, of the 
type associated with the initial periods of the simulations noted in the 
sections above.
We repeated the baby boom simulation in the short term rather than 
long term debt case, as discussed in the previous chapter. Before the 
shock the short term debt interest rate series approached equilibrium 
monotonically as our qualitative analysis of smaller, simpler systems 
suggested it might in the vicinity of equilibrium. This does not mean 
that a short term series cannot display cycles, since the interest rate 
equation in the short term debt case has complex roots which could 
generate a cycle of 2.725 of our fifteen-year simulation periods.
Figure Five clearly shows some cycling in the adjustment of the short 
term debt case to the shock, but it quickly seems to return to monotonic 
behavior. An interesting area for further research would be whether the
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short term debt case generally suppresses cycles, or whether there are 
situations in which cyclical approach to equilibrium occurs.
We conclude this section with a mention of other experiments 
carried out. One involved simulation of the pure Samuelson case in the 
five-age life model. First we tested a case in which all income (total 
income = 4000) is received in the first period of life. Since there is 
no expected future income there are only zero coefficients on the X 
terms in our interest rate equations. The constant term in the interest 
rate equation can still be found and depends on past interest rates.
We find that with a stationary population the only interest rate that 
will make the constant term zero and so satisfy the efficiency condition 
is the biological rate. Next we tested the pure Samuelson (with 
survival probabilities equal to one) system with a simple life cycle 
inverted U income distribution. With a stationary population the bio­
logical rate is again an equilibrium and, starting the system above the 
biological rate we find that it is a stable root and that the approach 
to equilibrium is monotonic although as usual the interest rate equation 
has complex as well as real roots.
Finally we tested the inconsistent age structure mentioned above. 
The results are shown in Figure Six. The age distribution was frozen at 
the Australia 1976 values used to start our other simulations, a 
distribution much younger than a genuine stationary population would 
have. The interest rate approached an equilibrium at around 25% although 
the chosen age distribution is older than the stable one resulting from 
an intrinsic growth rate of 25% per period. The chief complex root gave 
a cycle of 2.6643 periods for the interest rate, and the second root 
gave an interest rate of -104.86%, very close to that associated with 
the second root of the interest rate equation in demographically well
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behaved systems.  The r e p e t i t i o n  o f  t h e s e  v a lu e s  f o r  r o o t s  beyond th e  
f i r s t  in  th e  c a s e s  we have c o n s id e re d  would be an i n t e r e s t i n g  a r e a  f o r  
f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  i n t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between p o p u la t i o n  and economic 
c y c l e s .  Our r e s u l t s  with  t h e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  age d i s t r i b u t i o n  a l s o  sugges t  
t h a t  a t t e n t i o n  be g iven  to  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  age d i s t r i b u t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  not  
al lowed to  s t a b i l i z e  because  o f  immigra t ion  and e m ig ra t i o n .
O v e r a l l ,  t h i s  c h a p te r  has i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  g e n e r a t i o n s  p r e ­
ced ing  a baby boom gain  from th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  boom as do most o f  the  
g e n e r a t i o n s  f o l l o w in g .  The e x c e p t io n  would be th e  b i r t h  coho r t  
im media te ly  a f t e r  a boom and even th e y  do not  lo s e  as much as t h e  baby 
boom cohor t  does .  This  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  economy to  
suppo r t  an ageing  p o p u la t i o n  i s  g r e a t e r  th an  i s  o f t e n  claimed and t h a t  
t h e  baby boom c o h o r t s ,  which become t h e  ageing problem, must,  in  the  
absence  o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  bea r  a l a r g e  p a r t  o f  t h a t  burden .
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CHAPTER 7
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF AN AGEING 
POPULATION IN A CONSUMPTION-LOAN SYSTEM 
WITH PRODUCTION: CANADIAN POPULATION DATA
I______ I n t r o d u c t i o n
In t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r  we worked i n  a b a s i c  c o n s u m p t io n - lo a n  
framework  where i n d i v i d u a l s  o f  each  age were a l l o c a t e d  endowments w i th  
no p r o d u c t i o n  s t r u c t u r e  t o  s u p p ly  t h e s e  endowments . We p r e p a r e d  a 
p o p u l a t i o n  s e r i e s  f o r  t h e  two c e n t u r i e s  i t  took  p o p u l a t i o n  t o  s t a b i l i z e  
and beyond t o  l e t  us  s e e  t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a f t e r  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  had s t a b i l i z e d .  Even i g n o r i n g  th e  absenc e  of  a p r o d u c t i o n  
s e c t o r ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  any p o p u l a t i o n  w i l l  go u n d i s t u r b e d  long 
enough t o  s t a b i l i z e  i s  v e r y  s m a l l .  The pu rp o se  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r  
was t o  l e t  u s  i s o l a t e  t h e  c o n s u m p t i o n - l o a n  e f f e c t s  o f  demographic  
c h a n g e .  I t  a l s o  l e t  us  s t u d y  t h e  r e l a t i o n  be tween  th e  dynamics  o f  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  s e r i e s  and t h e  dynamics  o f  the  economic s t r u c t u r e ,  p r i m a r i l y  
o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  s e r i e s .  We were a b l e  t o  do t h i s  b e c a u s e  we 
p r e p a r e d  a p o p u l a t i o n  s e r i e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  a d o p t i n g  a p u b l i s h e d  p r o j e c t i o n  
and so c o u ld  f i n d  t h e  r o o t s  o f  t h e  L e s l i e  m a t r i x  t h a t  g e n e r a t e d  our 
p o p u l a t i o n  s e r i e s .
In t h i s  c h a p t e r  we move i n t o  t h e  framework o f  n e o c l a s s i c a l  models  
o f  economic g row th  by  i n t r o d u c i n g  a Cobb-Douglas  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  to  
g e n e r a t e  age s p e c i f i c  incomes .  We d i s c u s s e d  some o f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
i n t r o d u c i n g  c a p i t a l  and p r o d u c t i o n  t o  a c o n s u m p t io n - lo a n  model in  
C h a p t e r  5,  bu t  were l i m i t e d  i n  what we cou ld  d e t e r m i n e  by t h e  sm a l l  
s i z e  o f  t h e  m ode l s  we were u s i n g .  H e a t h f i e l d  (1980) r e c e n t l y  c o n c lu d e d  
on t h e  b a s i s  o f  a model s i m i l a r  t o  our  e a r l i e r  o n e s ,  in  which he found
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the interest rate rising when population was growing and declining 
when population was declining, that population change could not be 
an engine of economic growth. We shall show that, at least with 
the system we use in this chapter, this conclusion is not necessarily 
correct and that rising interest rates associated with changing 
population age structures need not reduce the rate of capital 
accumulation.
In this chapter we deal with a much shorter time horizon than 
was the case in the previous chapter. Instead of considering the 
approach of a population to stability we consider the population changes 
that are projected to occur in the next decades and with which popular 
discussions of the effects of an ageing population are concerned.
A number of projections of population behavior over the next decades 
exist for Canada, among the most detailed of which are the projections 
to the year 2026 reported in Statistics Canada (1979a) which we shall 
use here.
Despite the introduction of a production sector and the use of 
a shorter time horizon (although in economic terms fifty years is 
unquestionably long-run) the basic result of the previous chapter holds. 
If there is a burden of an ageing population it falls on the group that 
will be retired when the population is at its oldest, and it affects 
that group not only in retirement but through the whole of its working 
life. The groups that popular discussions suggest will be burdened by 
a large retired population may benefit from the process. For convenience 
all figures for this chapter are grouped at the end of the chapter as
Section XI.
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11____ Canadian P o p u la t io n  P r o j e c t i o n s
In t h i s  c h a p t e r  our s i m u l a t i o n s  w i l l  be based on P r o j e c t i o n  One 
of  the Canadian p o p u l a t i o n ,  p u b l i sh e d  in S t a t i s t i c s  Canada (1979a).
This  p r o j e c t i o n  i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of those  showing an ageing of  the 
Canadian p o p u l a t i o n .  I t  assumes a drop in the  t o t a l  f e r t i l i t y  r a t e  
from i t s  1971 l e v e l  of  2.2 c h i l d r e n  per  woman to  1.89 in 1976, then  an 
i n c r e a s e  t o  2.1 ( th e  rep lacem en t  or zero  p o p u la t i o n  growth l e v e l )  by 
1991, and c o n s t a n t  f e r t i l i t y  a t  2.1 c h i l d r e n  pe r  woman t h e r e a f t e r .
Th is  f e r t i l i t y  p a t t e r n  seems p r e f e r a b l e  to  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s  
Canada u s e s  in o t h e r  d e t a i l e d  p r o j e c t i o n s ,  under  which f e r t i l i t y  
c o n t in u e s  t o  d e c l i n e ,  s e t t l i n g  a t  1.7 in  1991 and s t a y i n g  a t  t h a t  l e v e l  
t h e r e a f t e r .  A t o t a l  f e r t i l i t y  r a t e  of  1.7 c h i l d r e n  per  woman i s  below 
rep lacem en t  w i th  the r e s u l t  t h a t  e a r l y  in the next  cen tu ry  t h e  Canadian 
p o p u la t i o n  would beg in  to  d e c l i n e .  P r o j e c t i o n  One a l s o  assumes ne t  
immigra t ion  av e ra g in g  100,000 a n n u a l ly .
Under P r o j e c t i o n  One the  t o t a l  Canadian p o p u la t io n  r i s e s  from the  
1976 census  l e v e l  of  22 ,992,600 t o  30 ,980 ,700 in  2001, a 34.7% i n c r e a s e ,  
then to  37,047,900 in 2026, 19.6% above the 2001 l e v e l .  The 65+ age 
group r i s e s  72.9% between 1976 and 2001 under  t h i s  p r o j e c t i o n ,  making 
up 8.7% of t o t a l  p o p u la t i o n  in  1976, 10.7% in  1991 and 11.2% in 2001.
By 2026 t h e  65+ p o p u la t i o n  would be 16% of the t o t a l  p o p u la t i o n .
The o t h e r  age groups  r i s e  much more s lowly  than does  t h e  65+ 
group.  Between 1976 and 2001 the  45-64 group grows 37.6%, the  20-44 
group 36.3% and the  0-19 group 11.7%. The e f f e c t s  of  t h e s e  d i f f e r i n g  
r a t e s  o f  growth can be seen in Table One below, which shows the  aged 
and t o t a l  dependency r a t e s  f o r  the remainder  of  t h i s  c e n t u r y  under  
P r o j e c t i o n  One. The aged dependency r a t e  i s  d e f in e d  as  the  p o p u la t i o n  
in the 65+ group as  a p e r c e n ta g e  of  the p o p u la t io n  18-64,  w hile  the
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total dependency rate is the population 0-17 and 65+ as a percentage 
of the population 18-64. The youth dependency rate is similarly 
defined as the population 0-17 as a percentage of the 18-64 group.
Table 1: Aged and Total Dependency Rates 1976 - 2001
Year: 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
ADR: 14.66 15.13 15.68 17.08 ■ 17.96 18.00
TDR: 68.30 62.6 1 59.61 61.75 63.44 61.05
(Source: Statistics Canada [1979a])
The pattern of the total dependency rate shown in Table One indicates 
that as the aged dependency rate rises the young dependency rate must 
be falling. In fact, by 2026 when the population is at its oldest in 
this series, with an aged dependency rate of 26, the total dependency 
rate will be 66, less than its 1976 level. This trade-off of young 
against old dependents has led to discussion about the possibility of 
financing the increased costs of old dependents out of the reduction 
in spending on young dependents. While there certainly appears to be 
room for some sort of cost trade-off the extent to which it is possible 
is not clear. The discussion on this point is wel1-summarized in 
various papers in Espenshade and Serow (1978) and by Stassart (1965). 
The conclusion seems to be that writers on the subject are in total 
disagreement. Part of the difficulty is that costs include not only 
the sort of health and education costs we mentioned in Chapter Two, 
but also time costs and the costs of nonmarket inputs. Stassart notes 
that the value of housework in Belgium in 1956 was calculated equal 
to a quarter of GNP and that of this a third was services devoted to 
caring for children under sixteen years. This is clearly a question to 
be dealt with in the context of the theories of home production, and 
which does not fit the approach we take here.
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I I I  P roduc t ion
In our  framework the  c a p a c i t y  of  the  economy to  suppor t  an 
ageing p o p u la t i o n  depends on the  l e v e l  of  income the economy g e n e r a t e s  
as the  p o p u la t i o n  ag es ,  and the  burden of  an ageing p o p u la t io n  on 
v a r i o u s  age groups i s  i n d i c a t e d  by th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  of  
age ing .  We found in  the  b a s i c  consumpt ion- loan  model of  the p rev io u s  
c h a p te r  t h a t  t h e s e  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  e f f e c t s  o p e ra t e  a g a i n s t  the  baby 
boom c o h o r t  and in favour  o f  th e  s m a l l e r  b i r t h  co h o r t s  on e i t h e r  s id e  
o f  i t .  In t h i s  c h a p t e r  by i n t r o d u c in g  a p roduc t ion  s e c t o r  we al low 
the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  changes in  r e l a t i v e  age s p e c i f i c  labour  income as 
the  p o p u la t i o n  age d i s t r i b u t i o n  ages .  We assume ou tpu t  to  be produced 
with  a Cobb-Douglas p ro d u c t io n  f u n c t i o n  w i th  c o n s t a n t  r e t u r n s  to  
s c a l e  in c a p i t a l  and labou r .  The g e n e ra l  form o f  the  p roduc t ion  
f u n c t i o n  i s
where M i s  a s c a l e  pa ram e te r .
For conven ience ,  g iven  the Canadian d a t a  we a re  u s in g ,  we d iv i d e  
the  p o p u la t i o n  i n t o  s ix  age g roups ,  co r respond ing  rough ly  to  ages 
15-24,  25-34,  35-44,  45-54,  55-64 and 65+. Th is  change from the  f i v e ,  
f i f t e e n  year  age g roup ings  o f  the  p rev io u s  c h a p t e r  has no s i g n i f i c a n t  
e f f e c t  on our r e s u l t s .
Labour in p u t  was c a l c u l a t e d  by d iv i d i n g  each age group by sex
1 -E 6
( 1) Y = MK a
as given  in S t a t i s t i c s  Canada (1979a) and m u l t i p l y in g  each age -sex  
group by th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  1971 l a bou r  f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e ,  as  
r e p o r t e d  in Kubat and Thornton (1974).
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The r a t e s  used were
Table 2: Labour Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n  Rates  by Age and Sex Canada 1971
Age 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 +
M .652 .926 .928 .903 .801 .236
F .493 .445 .439 .444 .344 .082
The twelve  a g e - s e x  labour  f o r c e  groups were then summed i n t o  s i x  age 
g roups ,  on t h e  assumption t h a t  w i th in  each age group male and female 
labour  were p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s  in  p r o d u c t io n .
There may be o b j e c t i o n s  to  th e  use  of  c o n s t a n t  1971 labour  fo r c e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  (LFPR), e s p e c i a l l y  in th e  case of  f em a les .  In f a c t  
the  LFPR of  Canadian females  25 y ea r s  and over r o s e  from 35.4% in 
1971 to  44% in  1978 w hi le  t h a t  f o r  men 25+ f e l l  from 82.7% in 1971 
to  81.0% in  1978.
P r o j e c t i o n s  o f  the LFPR a re  c o n t e n t i o u s ,  see f o r  example For tune 
magazine (1979) on American r a t e s .  According to  the  a r t i c l e  in For tune  
American LFPR f o r  females  16-24 yea rs  ro se  from 51% in  1971 to  62% in 
1979, f o r  females  25-44 th e  r a t e  ro se  from 48% in  1971 to  63% in 1979, 
and f o r  women 45-64 the  r a t e  f e l l  from 50% in 1971 to  48% in  1973 and 
ro s e  aga in  to  50% in 1979. All  t h r e e  of  th e se  s e r i e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  
marked changes  from th e  LFPR p a t t e r n s  o f  the 1950’s and e a r l y  ' 6 0 ' s .
The r a t e  f o r  the 16-24 age group was s tead y  from 1950-65 a f t e r  which 
i t  began a f a i r l y  s t e a d y  r i s e .  The 25-44 age group showed a slow r i s e  
over the e a r l i e r  pe r io d  a c c e l e r a t i n g  a f t e r  1965 and s t i l l  more a f t e r  
1970, and t h e  45-64 age group LFPR r o s e  s t e a d i l y  from 1950 to  1970
th en  l e v e l l e d  o f f .
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Incorporating these changes in our model would not greatly affect 
it. Since our basic population unit is the labour input an increase in 
participation rates for any age group would have an effect equivalent 
to that of an increase in the number in that age group. The observed 
effect would depend on whether participation rates moved in the same 
direction as or opposite to relative cohort size. To introduce this 
into our model we would have to adopt a theory of the behavior of labour 
force participation rates.
There is a popular view, which Fortune magazine (1979) quotes 
as held by demographers Nathan Keyfitz and Charles Westoff, that recent 
changes in female labour force participation rates are part of a 
fundamental, irreversible change in the nature of society, which has 
also led to what they regard as a permanent reduction in the birth rate. 
On this view the rapid increase in female LFPR observed in the late 
1960's and 1970's should continue into the future (presumably with an 
upper limit somewhere near the male LFPR). The chief difficulty with 
a theory based on observation of the behavior of LFPR in the 1970's 
is that it assumes that no part of that observed behavior is in any 
sense abnormal. In addition, in the absence of information relating 
LFPR changes to proxies for irreversible social change we have problems 
determining what growth pattern for participation rates we should use.
While some economists do accept the social change theory there 
is an alternative theory, associated with Easterlin and Wächter, that 
is in many ways more firmly based on economic theory. This does not 
mean that the notion of changing attitudes to female labour force 
activity should be rejected, but that there may be elements in the 
behaviour of LFPR in the 1970's that are related to economic 
conditions prevailing at the time. This model is related to the new
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home economics models of the female labour force decision, but the 
Easter1in-Wachter version is grounded in the demographic factors 
which interest us.
The best discussion of the Easterlin-Wachter hypothesis and the 
evidence supporting it is in Wächter (1977). It is related to the long 
swing hypothesis and explains the close correlation between significant 
changes in the labour force behavior of different age groups among 
American females and the arrival of the baby boom generation at those 
ages. Simply put the hypothesis is that the entry of the baby boom group 
into the labour force increased labour supply, reduced wages and increased 
unemployment, so that women who would not otherwise have entered the 
labour force did so to try and maintain an expected family income 
level.
Wächter's cohort theory in addition to standing up to data from 
the 1960's and '70's yields testable predictions about the trend of 
female LFPR in the 1980's (he emphasises that he is projecting basic 
trends, not forecasting levels). lie suggests that as the baby boom 
cohort enters the older age groups the LFPR in those ages will rise 
because of that cohort's tradition of smaller families and higher 
participation rates. The post baby boom cohort of younger workers 
will be smaller than its predecessor cohort and will face an improving 
labour market resulting in less pressure for two income families.
This may slow the growth of the female LFPR considerably, though 
Wächter does not predict a return to the old, lower LFPR levels. The 
participation rate for prime age males should remain constant. Overall, 
he suggests, the rate of growth of the US labour force should fall from 
its recent two per cent annual rate to one and a half per cent in the
early 1980's.
207
To i n c o r p o r a t e  the Wächter h y p o th e s i s  p r o p e r l y  in our model we 
would have to  s e t  up s im u l taneous  e q u a t io n s  f o r  income and the  labour 
f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e .  Simply p r o j e c t i n g  p a t t e r n s  based on 
W äch te r ' s d i s c u s s i o n  of  the  1960' s  and 1970' s  would not  p r o p e r l y  
c a p t u r e  the  h y p o th e s i s  and would a t  the  same t ime make i t  more 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  i d e n t i f y  changes in  the system due d i r e c t l y  t o  changes 
in r e l a t i v e  co h o r t  s i z e  a b s t r a c t i n g  from the secondary e f f e c t  of  
c o h o r t  s i z e  th rough LFPR. In i t s  s im p l e s t  form, in which female 
LFPR r i s e s  f o r  any age group as the  r e l a t i v e  s i z e  of  t h a t  group 
i n c r e a s e s  (due to  an i n c r e a s e  in i t s  a b s o l u t e  s i z e ) ,  Wacht e r ' s  e f f e c t  
should r e i n f o r c e  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  changing p o p u la t io n  age d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
Without more t e s t i n g  of  the  h y p o th e s i s  we have no p a r t i c u l a r  b a s i s  
f o r  p r o j e c t i n g  any a s p e c t  o f  the  r e c e n t  behav io r  o f  t h e  LFPR i n t o  the  
f u t u r e ,  c e r t a i n l y  no t  as  f a r  ahead as  the year  2026. For t h i s  reason  
we choose t o  use  the  1971 p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s .
In the  appendix we in c lu d e  t a b l e s  showing S t a t i s t i c s  C anada ' s  
p o p u la t i o n  p r o j e c t i o n  number one,  in  f i v e  year i n t e r v a l s  and t e n  year 
age groups  f o r  both  s e x e s ,  and th e  t o t a l  labour f o r c e  f i g u r e s  c a l c u l a t e d  
from t h e s e  p r o j e c t i o n s  t h a t  we use in  the s im u l a t i o n s  r e p o r t e d  below. 
The,, age ing  p ro c e s s  i s  c l e a r ,  bu t  we must a l low  f o r  the d i f f e r e n c e s  
in  age s p e c i f i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s ,  which cause the  bulge p a t t e r n  in 
th e  la bour  f o r c e  f i g u r e s  t o  d i f f e r  somewhat from t h a t  in  th e  t o t a l  
p o p u la t i o n  f i g u r e s .  The most s i g n i f i c a n t  a s p e c t  of  t h i s  e f f e c t ,  from 
th e  p o in t  of  view of  the  e f f e c t s  of an ageing  p o p u la t i o n ,  i s  the  f a c t  
t h a t  the  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  f o r  the 65+ group i s  v e ry  small  so t h i s  
group i s  a much sm a l l e r  p a r t  of  the labour f o r c e  than i t  i s  o f  the  t o t a l  
p o p u l a t i o n .  In the  p r o j e c t i o n  f o r  2026 the 65+ group i s  e a s i l y  the  
l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  t e n  year age group in the t o t a l  p o p u la t i o n  ( s i x t e e n
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per cent of the total population) but only 5.6% of the labour force.
The ageing effect is retained, though, since in 2026 the share of the 
65+ group in the labour force is at its largest for the entire 
1971-2026 period.
In choosing the coefficients of our system, we attempted to 
make the age specific pattern of income, based on the marginal product 
of labour, conform roughly to the actual pattern of income observed 
for 1971, although as we shall show these initial values do not match 
the actual levels of income reported in the data series we have 
available for 1971. This is expected since the actual 1971 data 
available to us are for family income rather than for single individuals, 
and include income earned by all members of the family in the labour 
force plus any income from capital the family may receive. They would 
also include any social security payments made to older members of the 
family. Our first simulation will be of a pure consumption-loan world 
in which each retired member of the population must live off his 
accumulated assets. We do not introduce social security until the 
second simulation reported below.
The 1971 pattern of family income by age of head for Canadian
f amil ies wi th male head was (in Canadian dollars)
Age -25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-69 70+
Average 8248 10435 11895 12361 11183 7901 5808
Median 8028 9875 10832 11180 9510 6176 3834
(Source: Canada Year Book 1974)
For■ simulation purposes we chose a Cobb-Douglas production
function with constant returns to scale in capital and the six ages
of labour. While the choice of a Cobb-Douglas function naturally
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affects our results, in the absence of firm evidence on the nature of 
the complementarity and substitutability between different age groups 
of labour it seems a reasonable choice and is certainly the most 
tractable form.1 As the elasticity of output with respect to capital 
we choose the common figure of .35, leaving .65 for the summed 
elasticities of the labour inputs. This labour income share is 
slightly higher than the ratio of Wages, Salaries and Supplementary 
Labour Income to GNP at market prices in Canada in 1971, but lower 
than the labour income share of net national income at factor cost. 
DeBever ct al. (1979) use a labour share of .70 in their simulations 
of four Canadian macro models.
The age specific labour output elasticities were based on 
relative Canadian incomes and on a relative income index for Canada, 
1961, calculated by Ii. Gauthier and reported in Chesnais (1978). 
Chesnais also reports a productivity index calculated by Spengler 
for U.S. data using relative incomes adjusted for rates of labour 
force activity. We made similar adjustments to the 1961 index and 
to the pattern of relative incomes for 1971. The elasticities used 
in the production function were
Age 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Elasticity .101 .148 .168 .142 .077 .014
For simplicity of computation we have assumed that the capital 
stock depreciates completely in a single five year simulation period 
(see Chapter Four). Because of this assumption we set the marginal
1 Ilamermesh and Grant (1979) survey the literature on substitution 
among ages of labour, and find the conclusions it permits "most 
tentative".
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produc t  of  c a p i t a l  in  each p e r io d  equal  to  (1+r^) where r  i s  the  
c u r r e n t  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t  ( r e a l  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t )  and 1 r e p r e s e n t s  
complete d e p r e c i a t i o n .  In 1971 the  r e a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  on Government 
of  Canada t e n  year  and over bonds ( the  nominal i n t e r e s t  r a t e  l e s s  the  
p e r c e n ta g e  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e  in  1971) was 4.51%. With g iven nominal GNP 
f o r  1971 we used our p ro d u c t io n  f u n c t i o n  to c a l c u l a t e  a c a p i t a l  s tock  
of  $28,617 m i l l i o n .  This  i s  c l e a r l y  too  low a f i g u r e  to  be an a c t u a l  
c a p i t a l  s to c k  s in c e  i t  g iv e s  a c a p i t a l - o u t p u t  r a t i o  f o r  1971 o f  
rough ly  1 /3 ,  bu t  i t  i s  o f  the  same o rd e r  of  magnitude as  t o t a l  g ross  
f ix e d  c a p i t a l  f o rm a t io n  f o r  Canada in 1971 o f  $20,128 m i l l i o n .  We can 
c o n v e n i e n t l y  r e g a rd  i t  as the  l e v e l  of  c a p i t a l  s e r v i c e s  used in 
p r o d u c t i o n .
C l e a r l y  the  low f i g u r e  f o r  c a p i t a l  i s  in p a r t  due to our assumpt ion 
t h a t  c a p i t a l  d e p r e c i a t e s  in  a s i n g l e  f i v e  year  s im u l a t i o n  p e r io d .  A 
f i v e  year  l i f e  f o r  c a p i t a l  i s  p robab ly  too  s h o r t  f o r  r e a l i s m ,  ten  to  
f i f t e e n  or  p o s s i b l y  twenty  yea rs  would be p r e f e r a b l e .  To go to  ten  
year  s im u l a t i o n  p e r i o d s ,  however,  would ha lve  the  number of  s im u l a t i o n  
p e r io d s  we could u se .  Denton and Spencer  (1973,  1975) in t ro d u c e  
c a p i t a l  d e p r e c i a t i o n  r a t e s  and c a p i t a l  accumula t ion  to  al low c a p i t a l  
s tock  to  b u i l d  up over t im e ,  c l e a r l y  d e s i r a b l e  in t h e i r  model s ince  
t h e i r  s im u l a t i o n  p e r io d  i s  a s i n g l e  y ea r .
In a d d i t i o n  t o  th e  assumption about  d e p r e c i a t i o n  we assume t h a t  
i n t e r e s t  income earned on c a p i t a l  i s  not  pa id  u n t i l  the beg inning  o f  
the  p e r io d  a f t e r  the c a p i t a l  s tock  comes i n t o  being even though c a p i t a l  
a f f e c t s  o u tp u t  in  t h e  p e r io d  in which i t  comes i n t o  b e in g .  Thus 
c a p i t a l  c r e a t e d  in  p e r io d  t  ou t  of  borrowing in t  a f f e c t s  ou tp u t  in t ,  
bu t  the  income from c a p i t a l  i s  not  paid  in to  the  f i n a n c i a l  in t e rm e d ia ry  
u n t i l  t+1 .  This  i s  s imply  a m a t t e r  of  convenience  with  no s i g n i f i c a n t  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  our r e s u l t s .
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This  conven t ion  a f f e c t s  t h e  way we i n t e r p r e t  the agg rega te  
e f f i c i e n c y  c o n d i t i o n  in t h i s  c a s e .  Before c a p i t a l  was in t ro d u ced  the  
a g g re g a te  budget  c o n s t r a i n t  could be i n t e r p r e t e d  as r e q u i r i n g  gross  
n a t i o n a l  e x p e n d i tu r e  to  equal  g ro s s  n a t i o n a l  p ro d u c t  in each p e r io d .
Now, a l lo w in g  f o r  the  need to  r e p l a c e  used-up  c a p i t a l  and the  lag in 
payment f o r  c a p i t a l  s e r v i c e s  we i n t e r p r e t  i t  t o  r e q u i r e  n e t  n a t i o n a l  
e x p e n d i tu r e  to  equal  n e t  n a t i o n a l  income.
At t h i s  p o i n t  i t  i s  u s e f u l  to  i n d i c a t e  a n o t h e r  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
our system and t h a t  o f  Denton and Spencer (1975) . S ince t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  
was in more a g g r e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  of  p o p u la t i o n  change than i s  ours they  
agg reg a ted  a l l  ages of  l a bou r  i n t o  a s i n g l e  e f f e c t i v e  labour  in p u t  
which th e y  combined with  a g g re g a te  c a p i t a l  in  a CES p r o d u c t io n  f u n c t i o n  
( in  t h e i r  s im u l a t i o n s  th e y  o f t e n  reduced t h i s  t o  Cobb-Douglas form in  
a s i n g l e  c a p i t a l  and s i n g l e  labour  i n p u t ) .  They had no e x p l i c i t  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  and no labour  income f u n c t i o n s .  I n s t e a d  the y  assumed t h a t  
sav ing  in  each p e r io d  was a c o n s t a n t  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  a g g reg a te  o u tp u t ,  
s e t  inves tm en t  equal  to  sav ing  in each p e r i o d ,  assumed t h a t  government 
spending was a lag f u n c t i o n  of  income, and c a l c u l a t e d  agg rega te  
consumption as th e  r e s i d u a l  from C = Y - I - G. D es p i te  the 
l i m i t a t i o n s  we have imposed on the  system we have chosen to u se ,  i t  seems 
t o  us t o  be s u i t e d  t o  a n a ly z in g  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  of  changing 
age s t r u c t u r e s .
The p ro d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  used in our s i m u l a t i o n s  (where the  
c o n s t a n t  term was c a l c u l a t e d  as a r e s i d u a l  from 1971 da ta )  was
( 2 ) Q 19.19K
. 148 .168. .142 .077
z L3 4 5
.014
L6
S e t t i n g  age s p e c i f i c  labour  income equal  to  age s p e c i f i c  marg ina l  
p ro d u c ts  o f  l abou r  gave labour  incomes f o r  1971 o f  ( in  Canadian
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d o l l a r s )
Age: 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 +
Income: 3760.17 6358.64 8260.41 7893.47 6672.72 4540.85
The l e v e l  of  t h i s  income s e r i e s  i s  below the  a c t u a l  1971 f i g u r e s  
r e p o r t e d  e a r l i e r ,  bu t  the  p a t t e r n  i s  q u i t e  r e a s o n a b l e .
IV Consumption
As in  the  p re v io u s  c h a p t e r  the  age s p e c i f i c  consumption f u n c t i o n s  
used in  our s i m u l a t i o n s  a re  based on the s tudy  by S te a rn s  (1971).  We 
have modif ied  the  f u n c t i o n s  on ly  t o  a l low f o r  the  use  of  s ix  r a t h e r  
than  f i v e  age g roups .  The age s p e c i f i c  consumption f u n c t i o n s  used 
were
Age
15-24 (1) c i = .5Yj + . 1W
25-34 (2) C2 = ,65Y2 ♦ ,1A2 ♦ .2W2
35-44 (3) C3 = • 6Y_ + . 16A + .25W
45-54 (4) C4 = ,6Y4 ♦ .3A4 ♦ .2W4
55-64 (5) C5 = ,5Y5 ♦ ,2A5 + .1W5
65+ (6) C6 = Y6 + A6
where W^ i s  the  p r e s e n t  va lu e  a t  the  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  of
expec ted  f u t u r e  income a t  age a ,  and A i s  t h e  accumula ted va luea
of  p a s t  sav ing  or  d i s s a v i n g .  We adopt  a myopic e x p e c t a t i o n  form of 
W r a t h e r  than an a d a p t i v e  or a r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  form. In the 
p rev ious  c h a p t e r  the i n d i v i d u a l  knew the  income lie would r e c e i v e  a t  
each age and the  only  u n c e r t a i n t y  was whether he would be a l i v e  to
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r e c e i v e  i t ,  while in  t h i s  c h a p t e r  age s p e c i f i c  incomes v a ry  over  
t ime accord ing  to  the  p r o d u c t io n  f u n c t i o n  so f u t u r e  income i s  no t  known 
w i th  c e r t a i n t y .  We assume t h a t  the  income t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  of  age 
a in  p e r io d  t  expec ts  t o  ea rn  a t  age a+i in p e r io d  t+ i  i s  t h e  
income earned  by an i n d i v i d u a l  aged a+i in  p e r io d  t ,  m u l t i p l i e d  by 
the  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s u r v iv in g  from age a t o  age a + i .
In r e - f o r m u l a t i n g  h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  each pe r iod  the  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  
making use  of  a l l  of  th e  economic and demographic in fo rm a t io n  in the  
system (a l though  he i s  no t  a b l e  to  i s o l a t e  the  i n d i v i d u a l  p i e c e s  o f  
i n fo rm a t io n )  so i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  he i s  making sy s t e m a t i c  e r r o r s  in  
forming h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n s .
The s u r v i v a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  used he re  to  c a l c u l a t e  the  expec ted  
w ea l th  s e r i e s  a r e  th o s e  f o r  Canadian females  1975-77 as r e p o r t e d  in 
S t a t i s t i c s  Canada (1979b).
Table 3: S u rv iv a l  P r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  Canadian Females 1975-77
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
15-24 1 .9948 .9882 .9733 .9376 .8596
25-34 1 .9934 .9783 .9425 .8641
35-44 1 .9849 .9488 .8698
45-54 1 .9633 .8831
55-64 1 .9116
65+ 1
( S o u rc e : S t a t i s t i e s Canada [1979b])
On th e s e f i g u r e s  with  myopic e x p e c t a t i o n s  of f u t u r e  age s p e c i f i c
incomes and a c u r r e n t  r e a l i n t e r e s t r a t e  of 4.51% the expec ted
w eal th  o f  a member o f  the f i r s t  age group in 1971 was $28,631.42
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Lack of sufficient pre-1971 data forced us to assume age 
specific incomes and real interest rates prior to 1971 to have been 
constant at the 1971 level. As in the previous chapter the initial 
conditions will not significantly affect our results. We can use 
the consumption functions to calculate age specific assets which 
in turn can be compared with actual data on assets by age of family 
head. As in the case of incomes we would not expect the individual 
figures to match the actual figures for families, so we are 
interested in the pattern rather than the level of assets.
With assets there is the additional factor that we are working 
in a non-durable goods world so all assets are financial, while 
published asset series include the value of durable physical assets, 
chiefly housing. This particularly affects the asset figures we 
calculate for the younger age groups since when they take on a 
mortgage debt they also acquire a large real asset. The age specific 
asset series calculated for 1976 in our model is (Canadian dollars)
Age: 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Assets: -660.26 -2462.12 -2193.95 242.90 3512.08
We show the 1976 series since the 1971 calculated series is affected 
by the initial conditions of the system. The 1976 series is more 
typical of the asset series calculated through the simulations, and of 
the sort of life cycle pattern of assets we generally expect to find. 
This pattern is not immutable, the pattern actually observed depends 
on the interest rate series individuals experience over their lives.
At various places in the simulations, for example, the interest rate 
in one period was sufficiently high and expected future income
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sufficiently low compared with saving out of current income at the 
first age that the first age group were found to have positive savings 
and not begin dissaving until the second age. The result of this was 
that they entered the second age of life with positive net assets 
instead of the negative values more commonly found. In the 1976 case 
the first age group was found to have dissaved -$594.04 each.
Actual asset figures for Canada, by age of household head, can 
be found in Chawla (1973), and figures classifying assets by family 
income in Lacroix and Chicoine (1977), among others. Chawla's figures 
are reproduced in our appendix. He was interested in the asset 
accumulation pattern of specific birth cohorts over time and attempted 
to analyze this with Canadian asset data for 1964 and 1970.
Chawla used age groups corresponding to ours for his 1964 
data, and on the 1970 data used age groups six years older than those 
used for the 1964 series, to follow the asset accumulation path of 
specific cohorts. Thus in 1964 he looked at the 14-24 age group 
and in 1970 the 20-30 group, on the assumption that the bulk of the 
members of the latter group will have been members of the former 
group (rather than immigrants), now older by six years.
None of Chawla's age groups in either 1964 or 1970 had negative 
net worth. The same holds for the classification by income given in 
Lacroix and Chicoine (1977), for 1970 data. In both cases total 
assets include "estimated value of home" as an asset. While debt 
includes mortgage debt on the home, Chawla notes that equity in 
housing (the difference between mortgage debt and market value of the 
house) was rising, with the percentage growth in equity over the 
1964-70 period highest for the group that was 16-24 in 1970 and lowest 
for the group that was 65+. Lacroix and Chicoine show that the value
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of  the  house was, excep t  in  the  case  of  the  h ig h e s t  income group,  
the  l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  a s s e t .  S ince  t h i s  a s s e t  i s  va lued  a t  i t s  
e s t im a ted  market  v a l u e  in any pe r iod  we would expec t  exc lud ing  i t  
to  b i a s  our s e r i e s  downward somewhat. Our c a l c u l a t e d  s e r i e s  a re  
p robab ly  b e t t e r  compared wi th  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between l i q u i d  a s s e t s  
and t o t a l  deb t  (LA-TD) in  Chawla ' s  s e r i e s .  Th is  LA-TD s e r i e s  f o r  1964 
( r a t h e r  than 1970 because  the  age groups used in the  l a t t e r  do no t  
p r e c i s e l y  match th e  ones we use)  from Chaw la ' s  d a t a  i s  (Canadian d o l l a r s )
Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 +
LA-TD -2875 -2996 -877 841 5187
from which i t  can be seen t h a t  our s e r i e s  does r e a s o n a b l y  reproduce  
the  c r o s s  s e c t i o n  p a t t e r n  of  a s s e t s  we would expec t  t o  f ind  in most 
p er  i  od s .
Taking th e se  v a r i o u s  f a c t o r s  i n t o  account  our s im u la t i o n  model 
seems q u i t e  r e a s o n a b l e  f o r  s tudy ing  the  g e n e r a l  p a t t e r n  of  the economic 
e f f e c t s  of  t h e  p r o j e c t e d  changes  in the  age s t r u c t u r e  of  the  Canadian 
p o p u l a t i o n .  Like Denton and Spencer we emphasise t h a t  the system i s  
no t  in t ended  to  be an a c c u r a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  the Canadian economy 
and t h a t  we a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  p a t t e r n s  o f  income, consumption and 
i n t e r e s t  and no t  a t t e m p t in g  to  p r e d i c t  l e v e l s .  In Dolde and T o b i n ' s  
(1971) te rm ino logy  t h e  system i s  in t ended  to  be only  s e m i - r e a l i s t i c ,  
meaning t h a t  the  magnitudes  have a f a m i l i a r  r i n g .  Our model d e a l s  
w i th  an economy with  no government and no c e n t r a l  bank,  on ly  th e  
market  c l e a r i n g  in t e r m e d i a r y .  Our aim i s  to  i s o l a t e  one of  the f o r c e s  
t h a t  w i l l  be o p e r a t i n g  on the  Canadian economy over the nex t  f o r t y  
to  f i f t y  y e a r s  and to  dem ons t ra te  t h a t  i t  should be s u b je c t  to e m p i r ica l  
s tudy  and taken  account  of  in  p o l i c y  making.
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I t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  in  what fo l lo w s  to  t r a c e  the  l i f e  cy c le  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  a s i n g l e  b i r t h  c o h o r t .  Our use  of  ten  year b i r t h  
c o h o r t s  and f i v e  year s im u l a t i o n  p e r io d s  may make t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  in 
some c a s e s  s in c e  i t  le ads  t o  o v e r l a p  of c o h o r t s  w i th in  s im u la t i o n  
p e r io d s .  S ince  the  m arg ina l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  any age group in any 
pe r iod  i s  assumed to  be the  same f o r  a l l  members o f  t h a t  age group 
we can t r a c e  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  income on the b a s i s  of  tw o-per iod  
a v e ra g e s .  S i m i l a r l y  the  o v e r l a p  w i l l  no t  cause s e r i o u s  d i s t o r t i o n  in 
a s s e t  s e r i e s .
S ince  we a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  in the  e f f e c t s  of  the baby boom bulge  
and the  age ing p ro ces s  a s s o c i a t e d  with  i t ,  we no te  t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  
who i s  in the  15-24 age group in 1971 would have been born between 
1946/47 and 1956, cover ing  most o f  th e  baby boom. The rem a inder  of 
the baby boom group would e n t e r  the  15-24 age group in 1975/6 when 
t h a t  p a r t  of the  boom born between 1946 and 1950 would have moved 
i n t o  the  nex t  age group bu t  the  p a r t  born between 1950 and 1956 would 
s t i l l  be in the  youngest  age group.  The income of the  1975/76 
e n t r a n t s  c l e a r l y  depends on whether they  a r e  sh a r in g  an age band with  
p a r t  of  the  baby boom group in any pe r iod  - f o r  example f i v e  yea rs  
a f t e r  the  1975 e n t r y  had e n t e r e d  the  l a s t  of  the  baby boom group 
would have l e f t  the  f i r s t  age group while  t h e  younger 1975 c l a s s  would 
s t i l l  be in  i t .
V_____ Adjustment f o r  the  R e t i r e d  Group
In e a r l i e r  s im u l a t i o n s  we have used h y p o t h e t i c a l  p o p u l a t i o n s  and 
have been a b l e  to igno re  the  problems t h a t  r e t i r e m e n t  in t r o d u c e s  to  the  
model .  In the  s i m u l a t i o n s  t h a t  fo l lo w  because  we a re  making use  of
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a c t u a l  Canadian p o p u la t i o n  p r o j e c t i o n s  we must make some al lowance f o r  
the  76.4% of males  and 91.8% of  females  aged 65+ who a r e  no t  in  the  
labour f o r c e .  Th is  f i g u r e  i s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  the  one on which most 
d i s c u s s i o n s  of  the ageing  problem a re  based .
We have been a b l e  to n e g l e c t  the  consumption e f f e c t s  of  c h i l d r e n  
by assuming t h a t  t h e i r  consumption i s  inc luded  in t h e i r  p a r e n t s '  
consumption f u n c t i o n s .  While i t  might  be a p p r o p r i a t e  to  t r e a t  the 
r e t i r e d  t h i s  way in some c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  i t  i s  not  a u s e f u l  dev ice  f o r  
d i s c u s s i o n s  of  ageing  in developed  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  Canada and A u s t r a l i a ,  
nor  do we wish to  a t t e m p t  to  model the c o m p le x i t i e s  of  the  m u l t i t u d e  of 
a c t u a l  r e t i r e m e n t  suppor t  systems.
In th e  s im u l a t i o n s  t h a t  fo l lo w  we s h a l l  assume t h a t  e i g h t y  per 
c e n t  o f  males  and f o r t y  pe r  c e n t  of  females  own a s s e t s  a t  th e  t ime 
th e y  e n t e r  th e  65+ age group.  These p e r c e n ta g e s  were chosen on the  
b a s i s  of  Canadian  labour f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  to  a l low  f o r  groups 
who were e i t h e r  never  in  the  labour f o r c e  or who were in i t  but  did 
not  accumula te  n e t  p o s i t i v e  a s s e t s .  The com ple te ly  dependent  groups ,  
with  no a s s e t s ,  a r e  assumed to  be inc luded  in the consumption f u n c t i o n s  
of  th e  younger groups .
The 65+ group in the  Canadian d a t a  i n c lu d e s  a l l  ages over s i x t y - f i v e ,  
not  j u s t  th e  65-75 group.  Thus in  any year (on the  d a t a  in Canadian 
l i f e  t a b l e s )  th e  new e n t r a n t s  t o  th e  65+ group make up about  f o r t y  
per  cen t  of ma les and t h i r t y  per  c en t  of  females  in t h a t  age group.
The female  f i g u r e  i s  lower because  of  the g r e a t e r  female l i f e  
expec tancy .  We assume t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  c o l l e c t s  h i s  a s s e t s  a t  age 
65 and consumes them wi thou t  r e i n v e s t i n g ,  and th a t  no i n d i v i d u a l  expec ts  
to  be in the  labour  f o r c e  beyond age s i x t y - f i v e  so th e  labour  income 
of the 65+ group i s  no t  taken  i n t o  account  in c a l c u l a t i n g  the wea l th  
of the  younger age g roups .  Any i n d i v i d u a l  who does  happen to  be in
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the labour force beyond 65 treats the income as a bonus and consumes 
it all. We are not working at a fine enough level to be able to isolate 
a class of workers who stay in the labour force beyond age sixty-five 
because they had not accumulated sufficient assets for retirement 
consumption, nor do we allow for partial retirement.
In the second simulation reported below we shall introduce a 
tax financed pension scheme which pays all individuals in the 65+ group 
a pension equal to one quarter of the average labour income of the five 
age groups below age sixty-five in that period. The pension is paid to 
all members of the 65+ group whether in the labour force or not, no 
account of the level of assets is taken, and those of the 65+ group 
who are in the labour force are not taxed to finance the pension. The 
younger five age groups are taxed at a common proportional rate chosen 
each period to raise just sufficient funds to pay the pension. The 
replacement rate of one quarter of the average labour income was chosen 
because it is the target rate for the Canada Pension Plan.
VI____Simulation Results
In this section we report the results of three simulation 
experiments on the model, based on the population series reported in 
Statistics Canada (1979a). The first is a base simulation and 
represents a closed economy with no tax-financed pension plan. In the 
second we introduce the pension described in the previous section. The 
third represents a small open economy with no pension, and capital 
markets perfect so the domestic interest rate always equals the 
world rate, which is assumed constant. Excess saving or dissaving 
spills over as capital inflows or outflows.
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The third simulation is introduced because a number of the 
developed countries in which the ageing process is well advanced are 
very open economies in which the domestic money market is closely 
integrated with world markets. This may be more the case in Canada 
than in Australia, but all countries lie somewhere between the two 
extremes of completely open and completely closed. The open economy 
case reproduces the base simulation below, which assumed a closed 
economy. These polar cases give some indication of how the degree of 
openness of an economy affects the economic consequences of an ageing 
population.
The complete system is set out in Table Four over.
VI (a) Case One: Closed Economy, No Pension
Table Five below shows the pattern of real interest rates the 
base simulation yields over the simulation horizon, with initial 
condition 1971 = 4.51%.
Table 5: Real Interest Rate, Simulation 1
Year 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
r% 6.08 7.06 7.58 6.63 4.06 0.62
Year 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
r% -3.08 -4.92 -5.23 -4.66 -3.83
An individual entering the first age group in 1971 would experience 
generally rising interest rates during his first three ages and 
declining rates during his last three. The first three periods are 
typically periods of dissaving, the fourth and fifth of saving, with 
the sixth a period of dissaving as accumulated assets are consumed.
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Table 4: Summary o f  the  S im u la t io n  Model
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Thus the baby boom generation faces rising interest charges during 
its borrowing years and declining returns during its lending years, 
while older cohorts lend to it at rising rates and younger ones 
borrow from it at declining rates. This result, placing the burden 
of the ageing associated with the baby boom on the baby boom cohort, 
was found in earlier simulations that did not involve capital or a 
production function and carries over to this more complete system.
The appendix tables include a table showing age specific income 
in each five year simulation period for this experiment. We can go 
from these cross section figures to figures showing the time path of 
income faced by an individual of a given birth (labour force entry) 
cohort over his life. Consider someone entering the labour force in 
1971, and recall that he spends two five year simulation periods in 
each ten year age group. His income pattern is shown in Table Six 
below.
Table 6: Age Specific Income by Period: 1971 Labour Force Ontry
Year 1971 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995
Age 1 1 2 2 3 3
Income 3760.17 368S.75 5319.50 5159.95 6973.93 6366.94
Avg. Income 3722 .96 5239 .73 6670 .44
Year 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
Age 4 4 5 5 6 6
Income 6867.09 6473.60 5197.28 4743.52 2847.42 2544.00
Avg. Income 6670.35 4970.40 2695.71
Note that the income in the second half of each ten year period is 
lower than the income he earns in the first half of each period. The
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reason is clear from the labour force figures, each age group is larger 
in the second five year period during which this individual is in it 
than it is in the first because of the baby boom bulge.
In addition to looking at the actual income of the baby boom 
group we can judge how well income expectations of this group are 
realized. Using the myopic expectations formulation described earlier, 
Table Seven below compares the expectation, in 1971, of future income 
for an individual entering the labour force in 1971 with the income 
he actually receives at the beginning of each ten year age group (from 
Table Six we can see the comparison with the average income he earns 
over each ten year period). Note that the expected incomes are not 
multiplied by survival probabilities.
Table 7: Expected and Actual Age Specific Income: 1971 Labour Force Entry
Age : 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Expected Y: 3760.17 6358.64 8260.41 7893.47 6672.72 4540.85
Actual Y : 3760.17 5319.50 6973.93 6867.09 5197.28 2847.42
Figure Five compares the life cycle incomes of cohorts entering the
labour force in 1976, 1955 and 1990. The numbers used to construct 
this and the other figures are included in the appendix tables. We 
can see the general disadvantage of belonging to the baby boom 
generation. A series for 1971 entrants is not plotted because it 
lies very close to the 1976 series. The appendix tables show that, as 
Figure Five indicates, life cycle income levels drop steadily from 
the 1955 entry to the baby boom entry, and rise again for the post 
baby boom entry. The cohorts closest to the baby boom on either side - 
the cohorts of the late 1960's and early 1980's - are disadvantaged by 
their overlap with the baby boom generation, but by 1990 the life
224
cycle pattern has recovered its 1955 level. It is the 1990 and later 
cohorts that will dominate the labour force when the baby boom group 
retires, and which popular discussion suggests will suffer the burden 
of the ageing population. Figure Five and the income results 
reported in the appendix tables suggest that their incomes will be 
higher than those of the baby boom group and their capacity to support 
the aged population greater.
In the present model changes in the population age structure can 
be shown to affect the system’s capital stock. With a constant interest 
rate and demographically stable population the capital stock will 
grow at a rate equal to the rate of population growth. In the case of 
a baby boom the capital stock will also be affected as the boom moves 
through the age structure of the population. In a Cobb-Douglas 
production function the cross partial derivatives are necessarily 
positive. This means that an increase in the level of the labour 
input raises the marginal product of capital. The elasticity of 
the marginal product of capital with respect to a labour input is 
equal to the coefficient of that labour input in the production 
function. This indicates that as a fixed stock of labour is 
redistributed from a lower to a higher productivity age group there 
will be conditions under which the marginal product of capital 
increases. So long as the increase in the marginal product of the 
younger labour resulting from the decline in its size, and the decrease 
in the marginal product of the older labour due to the increase in 
the size of this input as the younger labour ages is not so great 
that the marginal product of the younger labour comes to exceed the 
marginal product of the older labour, (which can happen if the older 
group is very large relative to the young group despite the fact that
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the output elasticity of the older group is greater than that of the 
young group - i.e. the coefficient on the older group in the production 
function is greater than that on the younger group), the marginal 
product of capital will increase as the baby boom group ages. The 
opposite clearly holds as the baby boom group moves past the years 
of peak productivity as measured by the production coefficient.
Typically the output elasticity of labour is greatest in the 
middle labour force years. This can be seen across various countries 
in the indices reported in Chesnais (1978). The years of greatest 
productivity typically overlap with the borrowing years of the life 
cycle (though not precisely: labour productivity can be high in the 
saving years). As noted earlier the movement of the baby boom group 
into the borrowing years tends to drive up the interest rate. While 
this would normally discourage investment the progress of the baby 
boom group into the more productive labour force years in our model 
increases the marginal productivity of capital more than enough to 
outweigh the rise in the interest rate. Similarly when the baby boom 
group moves into the lending years the interest rate falls, but as 
labour productivity begins to decline with age the marginal product of 
capital also declines. The net effect is shown in Table Eight below, 
showing the interest rate in each period and the percentage change 
in capital stock over the previous period. The capital stock grows 
most rapidly during the periods when the interest rate is rising and 
most slowly in the periods when the interest rate is lowest, even 
though the real interest rate actually becomes negative. While this 
effect is an artifact of our use of a Cobb-Douglas production function 
with a particular set of coefficients which are based on Canadian 
data but not estimated, it is clearly an effect that is worth empirical 
investigation.
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The a c t u a l  c a p i t a l  in p u t  f i g u r e s  f o r  each p e r io d  a re  shown in 
Table Nine ( in  $ m i l l i o n ) .
Table 8 : I n t e r e s t  Rate and % Change in C a p i t a l  Stock over  Previous
Per iod ,  S im u la t io n  1
Year 1971 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995
r% 4.51 6.08 7.06 7.58 6.63 4.06
UK - 7.11 7.18 8.34 8.85 11.02
Year 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
r% 0.62 -3 .0 8 -4 .92 -5 .2 3 -4 .66 -3 .83
UK 13.08 11.23 6.12 2.28 0.46 0.40
Table 9: C a p i t a l Stock,  S im u la t ion  1 ($M)
Yea r 1971 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995
K 28617 30652.05 32854.01 35595.30 38745.11 43016.42
Year 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
K 48644.83 54109.62 57431.24 58743.19 59012.90 59249.94
These f i n d i n g s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  c o n t r a r y  t o  H e a t h f i e l d s '  (1980) argument 
t h e r e  a re  c o n d i t i o n s  in  which p o p u la t i o n  growth can d r iv e  economic 
g row th .
F igure  One shows l i f e  cyc le  consumption p a t t e r n s  f o r  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  
co h o r t s  e n t e r i n g  in  1955, 1976 and 1990. We see  the  same p a t t e r n  in  
consumption as we d id  in  income, with  consumption d e c l i n i n g  a c ro s s  c o h o r t s  
to  t h e  baby boom group then  r i s i n g  a f t e r  i t .  The p o s t  boom c o h o r t s  b e n e f i t  
from th e  i n i t i a l  r a p id  r i s e  in the  c a p i t a l  s tock  and from th e  l a t e r
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fall in the interest rate. Only the cohorts overlapping the baby 
boom group in the ten year age groupings are likely to be adversely 
affected by the changes resulting from the movement of the boom cohort 
through the age distribution, and they will not be as badly affected 
as the boom cohort itself. While Statistics Canada's projections do 
not go far enough into the future to let us compare retirement living 
standards of post boom cohorts in detail we anticipate that they will 
continue to do well. Considering the series plotted in Figure Twelve 
below we see that the baby boom cohort has lower retirement assets 
than have earlier or later retirement groups, and that the cohorts 
born in the 1920's and '30's during the period of low fertility 
that preceded the Second World War have high retirement assets due 
to the rising interest rates they face during their saving years as 
the baby boom group moves through its borrowing years.
Population effects are often investigated at a highly aggregative 
level, and it is common for these studies to be inconclusive, especially 
when they arc dealing with age structure effects. Denton and Spencer 
(1976) find, for example, that aggregate consumption is not affected 
directly by household size or population age structure (this was an 
empirical study using a consumption function derived from the approach 
taken in their simulation studies). To consider this in the context 
of our simulations we have calculated aggregate and per capita 
consumption for the first five age groups in Case 1, and plotted them 
as Figures Sixteen and Seventeen.
The aggregate consumption series reveals no effects of changing 
age structure except the slower rate of increase of consumption at the 
end of the simulation period. The per capita series is a bit more 
hopeful, showing a slight irregularity at roughly the point when the
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baby boom switches over from the dissaving to the saving life cycle 
years. Even so the effect is slight and unlikely to stand out in a 
real world series subject to random shocks.
Thus neither aggregate nor per capita consumption studies are 
likely to reveal the effects of an ageing population. These effects 
seem to be mainly distributional, and our results suggest that 
empirical studies should concentrate on distributional effects and in 
particular on the effects that lead to our conclusion that not only 
is the burden associated with the ageing of the post war baby boom 
likely to fall mainly on the baby boom cohort, but that other, later 
birth cohorts, which popular discussion suggests will be burdened by 
the ageing process may actually benefit from it.
VI (b) Case Two: Closed Economy with a Tax Financed Pension
In this simulation we modify the base experiment to give all 
individuals over age 65 a pension equal to one quarter of the average 
labour income of the five younger age groups each period. We are 
looking at an extreme case with no tax on the labour income of the 
65+ group and no means test for the pension. We modify the definition 
of wealth here to include the present value of the expected pension, 
where the expectation is the current pension level multiplied by the 
appropriate conditional survival rate. Again the labour income of the 
65+ group is not included in the definition of wealth. We should 
emphasise that we are introducing a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension in a 
system where individuals already have complete access to the capital 
market, and not to a system where some individuals have been unable 
to save for retirement. This system is clearly subject to the problem
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discussed in Feldstein (1974), that it may reduce saving and so 
capital stock.
The social security tax rates required to just finance the pension
payments each year are (1971 = .051)
Year 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
g .052 .054 .055 .062 .065 .065
Year 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
g . 065 .068 .077 .087 .098
The social security tax rate rises slowly through the remainder of 
this century, accelerating in the early years of the next century.
By this stage the baby boom generation will have retired so the tax 
acts to reverse some of the distributional effects of the ageing process. 
Whether it is regarded as a burden on the labour force groups paying 
it depends on the extent to which it reduces their own consumption. 
Figures Six (a) and (b) and Two show income and consumption patterns 
for selected labour force entry cohorts, based on the income and 
consumption figures for this experiment included in the appendix 
tables.
The interest rate pattern for this simulation is
Table 10: Real Interest Rates, Simulation 2 (1971 = 4.51)
Year 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
r% 12.01 14.29 15.70 15.82 14.01 11.14
Year 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
r% 7.79 6.33 7.02 8.94 11.35
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The pattern of the interest rates is much the same as in the first 
case, but the effect of the pension plan by withdrawing funds from 
saving and transferring them to consumption through intergenerational 
transfers is to drive the interest rate up. The interest rate patterns 
for these two cases are plotted in Figure Fourteen below. While the 
real interest rate does not become negative the pattern is still 
clearly against the baby boom group.
Feldstein's (1974) argument was that if people regarded their 
social security contributions as forced savings they would reduce their 
other sources of saving to compensate and so, since social security 
was not funded, capital accumulation would be reduced. We have allowed 
for this effect by making expected pensions part of expected wealth, 
although in a myopic way rather than on the basis of careful calculations 
of the accumulated value of social security taxes. There is also, in 
our system, a pure income effect since for this case we make consumption 
a function of disposable income. To consider this effect we ran a 
simulation of Case Two which differed only in that the pension was 
not taken to be part of wealth. The interest rate pattern resulting 
from this experiment is reported in Table 10A:
Table 10A: Real Interest Rates, Modified Simulation 2
Year 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
r% 9.96 12.16 13.74 13.75 11.90 9.19
Year 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
r% 5.48 4.00 4.76 6.75 9.30
Although we cannot draw firm conclusions since simulation results 
are dependent on the numbers fed into the model, in this case the 
introduction of pensions as an element in wealth only pushed the
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i n t e r e s t  r a t e  up by about  two p e rc e n ta g e  p o i n t s  in  each p e r io d .  The 
main e f f e c t  was c l e a r l y  th e  t a x  e f f e c t .
C a p i t a l  s tock  in t h e  case where p e n s io n s  are t r e a t e d  as wea lth
was:
Table 11: C a p i t a l S t o c k , S im u la t ion 2 ($M)
Year 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
K 28192.07 29712.45 31826.52 34119.00 37379.93 41746.16
Year 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
K 45934.05 48356.26 48725.94 48070.42 47292.61
As would be expec ted  the c a p i t a l  s tock  i s  a f f e c t e d  by the  h ig h e r  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  In t h e  l a t e r  y ea r s  o f  th e  s im u l a t i o n  th e  i n c r e a s e d  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  make th e  c a p i t a l  s tock  f a l l .  C a p i t a l  
s tock  in t h i s  case  and c a se s  one and t h r e e  a re  p l o t t e d  in  Figure 
T h i r t e e n .
To i n d i c a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t r e a t i n g  p e n s io n s  as p a r t  o f  wea lth  
we r e p o r t  a c a p i t a l  s tock  s e r i e s  c o r re s p o n d in g  to  the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
s e r i e s  in  Table 10A above.
Table 11A: C a p i t a l  S tock ,  Modif ied S im u la t i o n  2
Year 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
K 29004.47 30584.70 32673.92 35078.59 38469.46 42898.28
Year 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
K 47490.29 50032.48 50351.99 49595.50 48663.64
As no ted  above consumption and income f o r  t h i s  s im u la t i o n  are 
r e p o r t e d  in  th e  appendix  t a b l e s  and p l o t t e d  f o r  the  1955, 1976 and 1990
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groups in Figures Two and Six (a) and (b). It is clear that even 
with the pension the greatest relative burden still falls on the baby 
boom cohort. From Figure Twelve and the corresponding series in the 
consumption table reported for this simulation in the appendix we see 
that the baby boom group still has the lowest retirement assets but 
that its assets are increased over the previous case. When the pension 
is included with retirement assets the 65+ group is considerably better 
off in this case than the last one. Again in relative terms the baby 
boom cohort is the poorest. The improvement in retirement living 
standards is at the expense of a noticeable reduction in pre-retirement 
living standards as Figures Four and Eight below show. Without an 
explicit welfare function we cannot say whether the ageing population 
is overall better off in this case than in the last one.
VI (c)____Case Three: Open Economy with Perfect Capital Markets
Our first two cases assumed a closed economy in which the interest 
rate was free to adjust to the effects of the changing age distribution.
In fact developed countries such as Canada and Australia where the 
ageing process is noticeable are typically part of efficient international 
money markets. This clearly must have some effect on the way the 
ageing process makes itself felt.
In this simulation we assume a small open economy with perfect 
capital markets, in which the domestic interest rate is always equal 
to the world rate which we assume constant at 4.51%. We assume fixed 
exchange rates so that adjustments take the form of capital flows.
Like the first, the third case assumes no PAYG pension. Age 
specific saving and the level of capital stock are calculated on the
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basis of the age distribution and the fixed interest rate. Any 
excess of saving flows out of the home country and any insufficiency 
is made up for by inflows of financial capital. Capital outflows 
(excess saving) are shown as positive values and inflows as negative 
values.
These capital flows are plotted in Figure Fifteen below and 
can be compared with the behavior of interest rates in the first 
experiment, plotted in Figure Fourteen.
The capital flows calculated for this simulation are
Table 12: International Capital Flows, Simulation 3 ($M)
Year 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
F -748.82 -1243.58 -2203.44 -1010.16 1594.75 5228.02
Year 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
F 8650.23 9387.91 8511.08 7084.10 5704.63
The peak outflows correspond to the entry of the baby boom cohort into 
the peak saving years. Similarly the peak inflows occur during the 
1980's when the baby boom birth cohorts are still in the peak 
borrowing years.
Looking at Figures Three and Seven we see that there is nothing 
in this case to alter our conclusion that the burden of the ageing 
process falls on the baby boom group. There are clear differences in 
consumption patterns which can be shown to result from the closed 
economy case having an interest rate either above or below the fixed 
interest rate of the open economy case, and differences in lifetime 
consumption patterns naturally depend on differences in the pattern of 
interest rates faced during the individual's life in the two cases.
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Comparing income and consumption of  a 1976 e n t r a n t  in  F igures  
Four and Eight  we see t h a t  someone in  the  open economy has h ig h e r  
income and consumption than someone in  the  c l o s e d  economy in the  f i r s t  
ages ,  and lower income and consumption l a t e r .  The f a c t  t h a t  the 
consumption d i f f e r e n c e  i s  much g r e a t e r  in  th e  e a r l i e r  y ea r s  and l e s s  
than the  income d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  l a t e r  y e a r s  shows th e  e f f e c t  o f  the 
h ig h e r  e a r l y  y e a r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  in  t h e  c lo s e d  economy compared with  
t h e  open economy's f i x e d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  We can see s i m i l a r  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  e f f e c t s  in th e  f i n a l  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  r e t i r e d  group p l o t t e d  in  
F igure Twelve bu t  here the  e f f e c t  i s  l e s s  c l e a r c u t  as i t  depends on the  
a c t u a l  l i f e t i m e  i n t e r e s t  p a t t e r n  e x p e r i e n c e d .  We can see t h a t  th e  baby 
boom group has h ig h e r  r e t i r e m e n t  a s s e t s  under  the  open than  the  c lo sed  
c a s e ,  the  r e s u l t  o f  the  f i x e d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  assumption  removing th e  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  v a r i a t i o n s  t h a t  had o p e r a t e d  a g a i n s t  the  baby boom 
g ro u p .
In the  p r e v io u s  c h a p t e r  we showed t h e  e f f e c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
changes in a system where incomes were f i x e d .  In the  t h i r d  exper iment 
r e p o r t e d  in t h i s  c h a p t e r  we have he ld  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  f ix e d .  The 
f a c t  t h a t  th e  baby boom group s t i l l  b e a r s  th e  e f f e c t  o f  the  ageing  
p ro c e s s  i n d i c a t e s  th e  im por tance  o f  th e  s o r t  o f  labour  market e f f e c t s  
co n s id e re d  by Welch (1979) and which p la y  a major  p a r t  in  th e  t h e o r i e s  
o f  E a s t e r l i n  and Wächter .  These r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  e m p i r i c a l  work 
on th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  th e  economic e f f e c t s  o f  an ageing  p o p u la t i o n  should  
i n v e s t i g a t e  both labour  market  and i n t e r e s t  r a t e  e f f e c t s .
VII E x te rn a l  E f f e c t s
Our t h i r d  s im u l a t i o n  exper iment showed t h a t  even in  a small  open 
economy with  p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  m arke ts ,  where the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  was
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fixed at the world rate, labour market effects still operated to the 
disadvantage of the baby boom cohort. We assumed a fixed exchange 
rate, but in the context of our model the difference between a fixed
and a flexible exchange rate is unimportant. Because of the structure 
of the system, particularly the assumption of full employment, there 
is a clear relation between the level of output and the capital inflows 
and outflows in the open economy case which spares us exchange rate 
problems. In the case of a high proportion of the population in the 
young, borrowing years,for example, the excess of borrowing at the 
world interest rate also reflects a desire to consume more than the 
current domestic output since the excess of borrowing is net of the 
amount of saving made available at that rate of interest. In other 
words it is the excess demand for consumption that cannot be satisfied 
out of the consumption made available by the groups in the saving 
years. Since it is dissaving it is also a demand for funds in excess 
of those received by the individual as payment for labour services.
This money is simply a bookkeeping notion in our system, since in a 
one-good world it is either converted to consumption of the single 
good or deposited with the intermediary. A similar bookkeeping 
convention applies when we introduce other countries with different 
currencies and floating exchange rates. Now the domestic intermediary 
cannot provide all of the funds demanded by the younger group to buy 
output in excess of their current income. The young therefore borrow 
abroad and since the consumption they demand is also in excess of the 
amount the domestic economy can provide they use the funds borrowed 
abroad to purchase goods produced abroad. Thus the capital inflow 
is matched by imports of equal value and any tendency of the domestic 
currency to appreciate in response to the capital inflow is cancelled
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by a tendency to depreciate in response to the imports. Taking the 
rest of the world as a single entity with a financial intermediary 
of its own, the borrowing and purchasing can clearly be done abroad 
with no exchange taking place in terms of the domestic currency at all.
Similarly during the capital outflows when the baby boom group 
is in the years of net saving the domestic economy is consuming less 
than it produces. While the capital outflows would tend to depress 
the value of the domestic currency the increase in exports (since this 
is a small country full-employment model) will tend to raise the value 
of the currency. Again even with a floating exchange rate there is 
no reason for the exchange rate to change and so no reason for there 
to be other external-related effects than those discussed in the third 
experiment.
This conclusion would change if we broadened our model to include 
traded and nontraded goods, but the results would depend on the 
conditions of production of the two kinds of goods and the relative 
demand for them by different age groups. For example if the nontraded 
good was housing of a sort which the young group had a high propensity 
to consume, and which was relatively inelastic in supply, the capital 
inflow associated with the baby boom would not be immediately balanced 
by an increase in imports but would tend to increase the price of this 
housing relative to other goods. Then with a flexible exchange rate 
the domestic currency would appreciate in response to the capital 
inflow, lowering the price of imported goods relative to domestic 
nontraded goods. Similar cases can be designed for different stages 
of the ageing process, and the complication of the model can be 
rapidly increased. Rather than design more such cases we simply note 
that it may be of interest within specific countries to study whether 
the mix of goods favoured by different age groups within that 
country can be shown to vary across ages in such a way as to alter
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the overall propensity to import. It seems unlikely, though, that 
such an effect would be a particularly powerful one.
The actual effects of the ageing process on any given country 
will depend on the degree of openness of its economy. Dornbusch (1977) 
discusses a theoretical model of capital mobility in which a distinction 
is drawn between foreign and domestic (nontraded) debt instruments.
The outcome of the system depends on the degree of substitutability 
in portfolios between traded and nontraded assets, so the greater the 
substitutability between the two sorts of assets the more any central 
bank operations in the market for domestic assets will be offset by 
international capital flows. Weaker substitutability allows the 
interest rate on nontraded assets to diverge from the world interest 
rate. In our context it is possible that some types of pension funds 
amount to a sort of nontraded asset. This may particularly be the 
case where funds face legal restrictions (or restrictions associated 
with their preferential tax treatment) on the quantity of foreign 
assets they can hold.
Porter (1979) has suggested that part of the reason for exchange 
rate volatility in the 1970’s was a low elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign assets. On data for eight countries 
he suggested the elasticity ranged between .3 and .5.
Kouri and Porter (1974) test a model of capital flows based on 
a portfolio equilibrium model of an open economy with a fixed exchange 
rate. They also estimate the degree to which domestic monetary 
operations are offset by international flows. They regard international 
flows as a device to eliminate domestic excess demand for money and 
explain them in terms of changes in domestic income, the current 
account balance, changes in domestic monetary instruments and changes
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in foreign interest rates. They find offset coefficients on four 
countries ranging between -.47 for Australia and -.77 for Germany (in 
the case of perfect capital mobility the offset coefficient would be 
-1). Both of these coefficients are significantly different from -1, 
indicating less than perfect substitutability between traded and 
nontraded assets. They also find that changes in domestic income 
have a significant effect on capital flows and take this as supporting 
the view that capital flows respond to the fluctuations in money 
demand caused by divergent growth rates and cyclical flows between 
countries.
Feldstein and Uorioka (1979) undertake a simple test of inter­
national capital mobility based on the relation between domestic 
saving and domestic investment. They suggest that with perfect 
capital mobility these should be virtually unrelated. They test data 
on 16 OECD countries in the period 1960-70 and find a strong positive 
relation between domestic saving and domestic investment (a coefficient 
of .87). Running separate equations for the different countries they 
find coefficients on savings ratios (in equations explaining investment 
as a fraction of GNP) of .138 for Australia (with a standard error 
of .4) and of .650 (with a standard error of .184) for Canada.
Germany has a coefficient of 1.279 with a standard error of .220.
They regard the individual country equations as a short run test and 
the combined equation as a long run test, and suggest that their 
findings arc consistent with the observed mobility of short run 
capital on the grounds that a small part of world capital moves in 
response to interest rate differentials while the bulk is not 
available for such arbitrage flows.
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These s t u d i e s  sugges t  t h a t  the  t r u e  s i t u a t i o n  may be c l o s e r  t o  
t h e  c lo se d  th an  th e  open economy c as e ,  a t  l e a s t  in some c o u n t r i e s .
None o f  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  p r e s e n t  c o n c lu s iv e  ev idence  f o r  Canada or  
A u s t r a l i a  but  the y  do sugges t  t h a t  in  both  c o u n t r i e s  the  ageing p r o c e s s  
w i l l  pu t  p r e s s u r e  on domest ic  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The wea lth  t r a n s f e r s  
r e s u l t i n g  from the  changes in  domest ic  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  should  c l e a r l y  
be given s e r i o u s  a t t e n t i o n  in  f o rm u la t in g  p o l i c i e s  over the  p e r io d  o f  
t h e  age ing  o f  th e  p o p u l a t i o n .
V III  S e n s i t i v i t y
The t h r e e  cases  r e p o r t e d  in  t h i s  c h a p t e r  were rega rded  as 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  th e  economic e f f e c t s  o f  p o p u la t i o n  ageing  in  a 
developed  economy such as t h a t  o f  Canada or  A u s t r a l i a ,  and i n d i c a t e  
a r e a s  where e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  i s  l i k e l y  to  be f r u i t f u l .  The appendix  
c o n t a in s  d e t a i l s  o f  the  p ro d u c t i o n  f u n c t io n  and consumption f u n c t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  used in  an a d d i t i o n a l  twenty  s im u l a t i o n  exper im en t s ,  a long  
with  th e  t ime s e r i e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and th e  p e r io d  to  p e r io d  
p e r c e n ta g e  change in  c a p i t a l  in each.  In t h i s  s e c t i o n  we r e p o r t  
b r i e f l y  on f i v e  o f  th o s e  e x p e r im en t s .  These exper iments  were based  
on Case 1 o f  Chapte r  Seven.
Case A below used t h e  same consumption fu n c t i o n s  as d id  Case 1 
o f  Chapte r  Seven bu t  m od i f ied  the  p ro d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  so t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  
f i v e  age groups a l l  had t h e  same p ro d u c t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t .  The 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  p a t t e r n  matches t h a t  o f  Case 1, but  the l e v e l  o f  th e  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  h ig h e r .  The r a t e  o f  growth o f  c a p i t a l  i s  h ig h e r  i n  
Case 1 than  in  Case A f o r  a l l  p e r io d s  excep t  2006-2016 when the  baby 
boom group i s  in the  l a t e r  la b o u r  fo rc e  y e a r s .  S ince  th e  i n t e r e s t
rate is higher in Case A than Case 1 during these periods the 
explanation appears to be the fact that the ageing is not accompanied 
by a rapid fall in productivity in Case A whereas it is in Case 1.
Case A: Production Function
L1 4 L3 L4 Ls L6
128 . 128 . 128 . 128 .128 .010
Consumption Functions
Y A W
C1 .5 0 .1
C2 .65 . 1 .2
C3 .6 .16 .25
C4 .6 .3 .2
CS .5 .2 0
1.0925, 1.1003, 1 .
1.0160, .9902, .9786, .9816, .9958
Period to period percentage change in capital 
3.49, 5.60, 6.48, 6.57, 8.42, 12.68, 12.88, 8.68, 3.99,
0.35, -0.98
Case B uses the same consumption functions as Case A but alters 
the production function coefficients so that the highest productivity 
group is the youngest, and productivity falls as the labour force 
ages. Now the interest rate falls steadily from the first period until 
the baby boom group has retired, when it rises slightly. The interest 
pattern is still against the baby boom group, forcing them to borrow 
at higher rates than those at which they save. Capital stock growth 
rates decline from the beginning to the years 1995-2006, which
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corresponds to an increase in the youngest age group as an echo of the 
baby boom (the youngest age group increases by 1.13% in 1995 after 
a 10.91% fall in 1990, then increases 13.35% in 2001 and 7.63% in 
2006, 0.239% in 2011 then begins to fall again). The result of this 
increase in the highest productivity labour input is an increase in 
the capital stock. Similar effects can be seen in the other cases 
in these time periods, with magnitudes and timing related to the 
relative productivity of the different age groups.
Case B: Production Function
L1 L2 4 L4 4 4
200 .150 .110 . 100 .080 .010
Consumption Functions
Y A W
C 1 .5 0 .1
C 2 .65 .1 .2
c_ .6 .16 .25
C4 .6 .3 .2
4 .5 .2 0
1+r : 1.0451, 1.0226, 1.0015, 1.0015, 1.0011, .9959, .9919,
.9645, .9437, .9345, .9382, .9528
Period to period percentage change in capital
22.95, 11.49, 5.92, 3.25, 5.35, 8.11, 10.91,, 7.63,, 2.91, 0.04,
-0.61
Cases C and D use the same production function as Case 1 of 
Chapter Seven but different consumption functions. In Case C the 
coefficients on wealth were chosen to result in very little dissaving 
by the younger groups. The result is a negative interest rate for
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Case C: Production Function
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 
.101 .148 .168 .142 .077 .014
Consumption Functions
1+r : 1.0451, .8794, .8489, .8344, .8213, .8126,
.7928, .7890, .7906, .7996
.8164
Period to period percentage change in capital 
44.61, 14.09, 12.07, 10.01, 8.71, 6.64, 8.20, 4.64, 2
0.68, 0.37
Case D: Production Function
L 1 L 2 L3 L4 Ls  Le
1 0 1 . 1 4 8  . 168 . 1 4 2 . 0 7 7  . 0 1 4
Consumption Functions
Y A W
c i
. 2 0 . 3
C 2
.5 . 1 . 4
C3 .4 . 2 . 4
C 4
.4 . 1 . 1
C5 . 4 . 1 0
1+r : 1.0451, 1.1832, 1.2036, 1.1836, 1.1530, 1.1053,
1.0122, .9983, 1.0061, 1.0098
Period to period percentage change in capital 
-8.38, 5.26, 12.00, 11.79, 14.13, 17.06, 10.28, 5.30,
-0.21, 1.57
.8006
53,
1.0451,
1.76,
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every period after the initial value. In Case D the coefficients 
were chosen to shift consumption more to the younger groups and the 
result was a higher interest rate.
Case E has the same consumption function as Case D but a 
production function that gives equal weight to each of the first five
age groups.
Case E: Production Function
L1 4 4 4 L5
128 . 128 .128 . 128 .128
Consumpti on Functions
Y A W
ci .2 0 .3
C2 .5 . 1 .4
C3 .4 .2 .4
C4 .4 .1 . 1
C5 .4 . 1 0
6
010
1+r : 1.0451, 1.1873, 1.2153, 1.2027, 1.1812, 1.1468, 1.0910,
1.0559, 1.0323, 1.0255, 1.0295, 1.0336
Period to period percentage change in capital
-10.81, 4.02, 9.39, 8.29, 10.95, 17.31, 12.69, 8.15, 3.17,
0.23, 0.61
In general we found that so long as a rough life cycle pattern 
of consumption and production was maintained our conclusions about 
interest rate patterns held, with the precise values depending on 
the values used for the coefficients. When the life cycle pattern is 
removed, the system can behave quite differently. Case C above recalls 
Samuelson's concern that the youngest age group would not wish to 
consume more than its income and that as a result the biological
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optimum would not be reached. In Case C the result was a negative 
interest rate through the simulation horizon, as Samuelson found in the 
example he worked. The negative interest rate increases expected 
wealth in present value terms and also increases the optimal stock 
of capital, so the efficiency condition can be met and all output 
consumed.
Our various experiments indicate that so long as the life cycle 
patterns hold so do our interest rate results. The next logical 
development of this study is therefore to investigate empirically the 
functions used in these simulations.
IX Negative Real Interest Rates
Our simulations in Chapter Seven, and the experiments listed in 
the appendix, frequently involve negative real interest rates.
Negative values are perfectly acceptable in a pure consumption system, 
but may be questioned in a consumption-production system with a 
neoclassical production sector. The explanation for negative rates in 
this case is the same as in the case with no production function: 
consumers are sufficiently intent on shifting some of their first period 
consumption into the second period that they are willing to accept a 
negative return on their savings. This means that the cost of capital, 
net of depreciation, is negative so it is optimal to expand the capital 
stock until the net marginal product is negative. If this were not 
done the efficiency condition would not be satisfied and the system 
would operate at an inefficient interest rate. The negative real 
interest rate result is unusual in a neoclassical model, but does not 
violate any of the usual neoclassical conditions.
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It comes about because of our assumption about depreciation.
If there were no depreciation, so capital were infinitely long lived, 
the marginal product of capital would have to equal the interest rate 
rather than 1+r and, given a Cobb-Douglas production function, the 
marginal product and therefore the real interest rate would always be 
positive. The question then arises whether this assumption is crucial 
to our results.
To demonstrate that it is not, return to the notation of Chapter 
Five and consider a two age model, with individuals in the work force 
in both of their two ages of life, production undertaken with a 
Cobb-Douglas constant returns production function in the two ages of 
labour and capital, and everyone assured of two full ages of life 
(so p^„ = 1). Then we have the production function
(1) Yt - AK“ L®t L ^ “'ß , a, ß, i-a-ß > 0
and consumption functions
(2a) c n  - c! v i +
(2b) C2t = Y2 + fY
2
c l V2 
1 + rt
t-1 „t-K r .
i - ci )(1 + V d
The marginal product of capital is
9 Y
(3) gjj- = aA^t Llt L2t
Then assuming no depreciation and setting (3) equal to the interest 
rate in the current period gives the equation for capital input in 
this period:
(4)
3 l-a-3
r“ALlt 4 t
1
1 - a
Labour income for the two age groups can be written 
Y.It
R. a 3-i l-a-3
ßAKt Llt L2t(5a)
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(5b) Y2 t  = Cl - a  -ß)  AK“ L®t  L '2 at ' ß
S u b s t i t u t i n g  in  e q u a t io n s  (5) f o r  K and us ing  the  demographic 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  = b L ^  where b = 1+m and m i s  the  r a t e  o f
p o p u la t i o n  growth we have
1 (3+oi-l
(6a)
(6b)
„ 1-a 1 _a i_a
Y = ßA b a
a a_ f
1 l _a
lV
1 ß a a
f 1 I’P*„ 1 _a i - a  1 _aY = (1 - a - ß) A b a
lv
The e f f i c i e n c y  c o n d i t i o n  i s  unchanged from the  e a r l i e r  c h a p te r s  so 
we can w r i t e  i t ,  a f t e r  s u b s t i t u t i o n s ,  as
ß+a-1 a
(7)
,,  h „ ,  1-a 1-a(1 - Cj)ßb a 1
lr +J
1 -a
b - (1 + r t . P
1 1-a
a ß a
r  \
1-a 2 , 1 -ac ^ ( l - a - ß ) b  \ b ( 1 1-a 1
I + r t  h t j LvJ
1-a
1 ß+a-1
1-a . 1-a+ a b
f a
f i l
1 r , 1 1
' 1 ' 1- °  - b 1-a + 1 | 1-a
r t - l - (rt J i r t - l J
j
I t  i s  im media te ly  obvious  t h a t  a t  the  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
r t  = r t  1 " r , th e  'two terms become zero  i f  b = 1+r and the
b i o l o g i c a l  s o l u t i o n  h o ld s .  Rear rang ing  the  term in b r a c k e t s  in  the  
t h i r d  term o f  (7) we f i n d  t h a t  i t  i s  equal  to  zero  (and t h e r e f o r e  
th e  whole o f  the  t h i r d  term becomes zero)  i f  b = 1+r, so t h a t  even 
wi th  no d e p r e c i a t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  and a p o s i t i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  in  each 
p e r io d  the  b i o l o g i c a l  r o o t  i s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  the  system. There 
w i l l  be o t h e r  r o o t s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  and the  s t a b i l i t y  and p a t t e r n  o f  
approach to  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i l l  depend on the  v a lues  o f  th e  c o e f f i c i e n t s
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as was the case in Chapter Five.
These results seem to contradict Diamond's (1965) result that 
a competitive equilibrium in a growing economy will not necessarily - 
in fact probably not - be the Golden Rule position. To consider this, 
we modify the system above to match Diamond's. Here only the first 
age group is in the labour force, so the production function is
(8) h =< l!C
Labour income, equal to the marginal product of labour, is
l a  a
1 1 1 -a(9) YIt
. . 1-a 1-a(1 - a) A a
and the equation for capital (assuming, as Diamond does, no depreciation) 
is
(10)
h  - <
aAL 1 -a It
1
1 -a
Diamond assumes that savings in period t do not alter the capital
stock until t+1, and interest earnings on period t capital are
paid in t at interest rate r . Retaining our notation, our b
1 2is Diamond's (1+n), our c.^ is Diamond's 3, and becomes
zero since Diamond derives savings functions from a log linear 
intertemporal utility function with zero second period income. 
Modifying the efficiency condition to allow for Diamond's assumptions 
about the timing of the impact of saving on the capital stock and 
making the usual substitutions we have:
(ID (1 - cx) (1 - a)a a f 1 ] 1-a f t  \- (1 + r.) r 1 )
Tt. t rt-l.
1-a
- ba 1-a
t+1
1-a
- f1 + V
1-a > = o
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Then a t  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  w ith  r t  + ^  = \  =  v > b = l + r  I s a
ro o t  o f  t h e  system. To f i n d  th e  second r o o t ,  w r i t e  (11) as
-1
( r H r 1' “ ) .
which i s  th e  s o l u t i o n  Diamond found f o r  h i s  example on page 1135 o f  
h i s  1965 a r t i c l e .  On page 1134 Diamond s t a t e s  t h a t  the  system w i l l  
be assumed th roughou t  t o  have a s i n g l e ,  s t a b l e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t .
In f a c t  t h e r e  a re  two and Diamond's approach leads  to  t h e  non- 
b i o l o g i c a l  r o o t .
This  r e s u l t  does not  i n v a l i d a t e  the  c onc lu s ion  t h a t  a 
com p e t i t iv e  system w i l l  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  te nd  to  the  Golden Rule 
p o s i t i o n  s in c e  th e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  the  b i o l o g i c a l  r a t e  e q u i l i b r i u m  in  a 
two age model o f  t h i s  s o r t  i s  k n i f e  edge,  as  can be seen by t r y i n g  
va lu e s  i n  th e  e q u a t io n s .  When the  p o p u la t i o n  i s  d e c l i n i n g  and the  
i n t r i n s i c  r a t e  o f  growth n e g a t iv e  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  b i o l o g i c a l  
r e s u l t  cannot  hold s in c e  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  must be p o s i t i v e  in t h i s
( 12 )
O c p ( l - a )
ba
fl] 1-a fi]
r - ( l+ r ) r
1 - a
1
r
and note  t h a t
1 -a
1
r
- ( l+ r ) 1r^
1-a
-a -a
1 -a 1-a , .. . 1-ar  and t h a t  r
Then r e a r r a n g i n g  (12) g ives
(13)
(.!-<+) (1 -a )  
ba
-1
-1
u  l " a  r,  'v l " a  b r  - ( l + r ) r
-1
, 1-a . 1-a-1 b r  - ( l + r ) r
from which
(14) a b
( 1 - c x) (1-a)
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system. Nevertheless the generality of the conclusion that the 
government must intervene to move the system to a Golden Rule 
position is in doubt.
X Concluding Comments
In this chapter we have been able to refer to one generation as 
better or worse off than another without reference to a specific 
utility function and interpersonal comparisons of utility because 
that generation has been able to consume more or less than the other 
at each period of its life. There may well be modifications of the 
system that would require some sort of utility measure be used. It 
might be the case, for example, that by increasing the demand for and 
driving up the price of some goods the baby boom bulge makes the 
cohorts that follow it worse off. This may hold for some goods, but 
we must recall that within the broad consumption categories considered 
in Chapter Two, many goods are age specific. It might be the case that 
the baby boom generation drives up the price of housing as measured by 
a single house price index, but as the literature review of Chapter 
Two showed, the type of housing demanded varies with age, and the 
baby boom cohort will drive up the price of the type of housing it 
is demanding at each stage of its life cycle. For the birth cohorts 
that follow the baby boom cohort, the increase in supply resulting 
from the higher price paid by the baby boom group will cause the next 
cohort to face an excess supply of housing and so a lower price. This 
will be the case generally for goods that are age related and whose 
supply is not perfectly inelastic with respect to price. This effect 
will have to be investigated through studies of how the demand for
particular goods, at a finer level than the categories considered in 
Chapter Two, is related to the age structure of the population.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS
I_____Summary
This study has dealt with the use of Samuelson's consumption- 
loan model to analyze some of the economic effects of changing 
population age structures, concentrating on the effects of an ageing 
process such as the Canadian population is experiencing. Chapter Two 
reviewed the literature on this ageing, the result of the baby boom 
of the 1950’s, and in particular dealt with the literature on the 
effects of changing age structures on consumption patterns. It has 
been suggested that as the population ages, this changing pattern of 
consumption demand will result in a recession. The housing market is 
often cited as vulnerable to the effects of ageing. We reviewed the 
literature on consumption patterns and housing demand and came to the 
conclusion that there is no evidence to support this revival of the 
secular stagnation hypothesis. This is of some interest since much 
popular discussion accepts some version of the stagnation thesis.
Our review of the housing literature indicated that age does 
affect the housing market in the sense that there is a definite life 
cycle pattern to housing demand. This life cycle pattern is part of 
the general life cycle of consumption, and is a major factor behind 
the typical pattern of consumption in excess of income in the early 
years of the life cycle. We therefore decided that the life cycle 
pattern of consumption should be used to investigate ageing effects.
For this we needed an economic model suited to the case in which
several different age groups, each at a different stage in the consumption
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life cycle, were alive in any one period. The most useful model 
was Samuelson's consumption-loan system.
Chapter Three reviews the literature on the consumption-loan 
model as a determinant of the interest rate. One advantage of this 
system is that it allows us to study distributional effects associated 
with population changes, as distinct from the aggregate effects dealt 
with by other studies. In Chapter Three, in addition to discussing 
the workings of Samuelson’s model we considered the suggestion that 
the biological interest rate is an unstable equilibrium, and suggested 
that this conclusion was a result of the assumption of perfect 
foresight with respect to the return on holding money. This explained 
why, with myopic rather than perfect foresight, we were able to find 
consumption-loan systems in which the biological equilibrium was 
typically (but not always) stable.
Since the consumption-loan system involves consumption decisions 
made by different age groups of labour, Chapter Four discussed the 
form of the consumption function and the use of age specific consumption 
functions. The empirical literature on age specific consumption 
behavior is rather limited and appears a fruitful area for empirical 
research, but there may be difficulties obtaining the necessary 
data. The data required for age specific functions of the form 
discussed in Chapter Four are not available for Australia.
Chapter Five involved qualitative analysis of a small consumption- 
loan system. While too small to contain realistic demographic 
dynamics it did let us consider the behavior of the interest rate in 
the absence of complicated demographic change, to show that the 
biological interest rate could be a stable equilibrium, to indicate 
how the biological rate result was affected by the introduction of the
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probability of premature death, and to see how changing the model 
affected our results. We found that an unstable biological equilibrium 
could be made stable by the introduction of a production function. We 
also found that the time path of the interest rate near equilibrium 
could be affected by changing from long to short term debt. This 
result was found to carry over to the larger model of Chapter Six.
In Chapter Six we undertook simulation analysis of a larger 
model with no production function. We found interest rate dynamics 
that clearly followed from the changing age structure of the population, 
and that held up through the use of different intrinsic rates of 
population growth, different assumptions about the time pattern of 
income and the imposition of a baby boom-like change in the age 
structure of a population near stability. One experiment involved 
freezing the population age structure in a form not consistent with 
demographic stability. In this case we found that the cycles in the 
interest rate that were needed to satisfy the equilibrium condition 
each period were much larger than those associated with the populations 
that were allowed to stabilize, and appeared to be tending to an 
equilibrium interest rate well above that associated with a stationary 
population. Since it is highly unlikely that any population will 
actually reach demographic stability the fact that the imposition of 
demographic disequilibrium on the system can have a significant effect 
on the economic system is of some interest.
Chapter Seven introduced a Cobb-Douglas production function to 
the consumption-loan system with an ageing population. We found that 
the interest rate effect observed in Chapter Six carried over, and with 
a Cobb-Douglas production function was supplemented by a labour market 
effect. We concluded that the economic consequences of the baby boom
and the resulting ageing of the population were likely to adversely 
affect the baby boom cohort through both the labour market and interest 
rate effects, not only in retirement but throughout their lives.
In this study we used simulation analysis to determine what 
aspects of the problem were likely to reward future empirical research. 
This is one of the less common uses of simulation. It is more often 
used, for example, in the context of macroeconometric models to 
determine the effects on economic aggregates of changes in such policy 
variables as marginal tax rates. We suggest that simulation has a 
useful function in indicating areas in which empirical research should 
be carried out, particularly in the case of complex economic models.
We will discuss some planned empirical extensions of this study below.
This study has dealt primarily with the interest rate effects of 
the ageing of the baby boom cohort. A number of articles, such as 
Welch (1979), have considered the labour market effects of recent 
changes in the age structure of the population, but the only other 
reference we are aware of to possible interest rate effects is in 
Heathfield's 1980 working paper. Heathfield suggests that because of 
the interest rate effect population growth cannot be used to spur 
economic growth. While not arguing that population growth should be 
used to try and drive economic growth, we suggest that this conclusion 
is too general. As the simulations presented in Chapter Seven indicate 
the production structure of the system is critical in determining how 
interest rate changes associated with population change affect 
capital accumulation in a neoclassical model. In Chapter Seven we 
assumed a Cobb-Douglas production structure, which necessarily 
constrained the elasticity of substitution between different ages of 
labour to unity. Hamermesh and Grant (1979) review the literature
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on the substitutability of different age groups of labour, and say 
that any conclusions drawn must be regarded as most tentative.
Certainly the studies they review cannot be regarded as being in 
agreement on the question, though they suggest that younger and older 
workers are more easily substituted for by capital than are middle 
aged workers.
Nor can we be regarded as having satisfactory evidence on the 
relative productivity of different age groups of labour although there 
is more evidence on this point than on substitutability (see Chesnais 
(1978)). The importance of this point was shown in Chapter Seven 
where the ageing of the population and the consequent reduction in 
labour productivity acted, through the positive cross-partial derivatives 
of the Cobb-Douglas production function, to reduce the marginal product 
of capital and discourage investment even though the interest rate 
was falling at the same time. Clearly the less labour productivity 
falls with age the less important this effect and the more any reduction 
in the interest rate due to an increase in the supply of loanable 
funds will increase investment. Thus a baby boom might be associated 
with a period of sufficiently rapid capital accumulation that the 
labour market effects need not result in a large reduction in age 
specific income for the baby boom cohort. As we saw in Chapter Six, 
where age specific income was fixed, there will still be interest rate 
effects operating against the baby boom group through the whole of 
their life cycle. Changes in the rate at which productivity declines 
with age will not eliminate the interest rate effect but, through 
capital accumulation and the effect it has on the income of other 
age groups, may increase the capacity of the younger groups to support 
a tax-financed pension plan.
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Our r e s u l t s  have i n d i c a t e d  a r e a s  where em p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  would 
be u s e f u l .  While our r e s u l t s  a re  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  outcomes o f  a 
n e o c l a s s i c a l  model,  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  they  j u s t i f y  our  use o f  s im u l a t i o n  
as an a n a l y t i c a l  t o o l .  H e a t h f i e l d ' s  c o n c lu s io n  i s  based on a simple 
g row th- type  model,  too  small  to  d e t e c t  complex economic-demographic 
i n t e r a c t i o n s .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between h i s  s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  p o p u la t io n  
growth cannot  s t i m u l a t e  economic growth because  o f  the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
e f f e c t ,  and ours  t h a t  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  e f f e c t  w i l l  d i sadvan tage  the 
baby boom g e n e r a t i o n  but  may b e n e f i t  the  g e n e r a t i o n s  t h a t  fo l low  and 
(as no ted  above) w i l l  have an e f f e c t  on c a p i t a l  accumula t ion  t h a t  
depends on the  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  p ro d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n ,  a r i s e s  because  o f  
the  d i f f e r i n g  c o m p le x i t i e s  o f  the  two models .  As th e  p o p u la t i o n  ages 
i t  w i l l  c l e a r l y  be im por tan t  to  t e s t  the  e f f e c t s  o f  the  f a c t o r s  
d i s c u s s e d  h e re ,  and we sugges t  t h a t  s im u l a t i o n  a n a l y s i s  o f  the  s o r t  
used here  i s  u s e f u l  in  i n d i c a t i n g  a r e a s  o f  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  f o r  e m p i r i c a l  
r e s e a r c h .
II_____Consumption
The nex t  l o g i c a l  development o f  t h i s  s tudy  would be the  e s t i m a t i o n  
o f  a system o f  s t r u c t u r a l  e q u a t io n s  o f  the  s o r t  used in Chapter  Seven.
To e s t i m a t e  the  age s p e c i f i c  consumption f u n c t i o n s  would r e q u i r e  da ta  
o f  th e  s o r t  found in  surveys  o f  consumer e x p e n d i t u r e ,  r e l a t i n g  
consumption and income by age group and i f  p o s s i b l e  by ed u c a t io n  w i th in  
age groups s in c e  e d u c a t io n  l e v e l s  may i n f l u e n c e  both e x p e c t a t i o n s  of  
f u t u r e  income and the  c a p a c i t y  t o  borrow a g a i n s t  expec ted  f u t u r e  income. 
I t  would a l s o  be d e s i r a b l e  to  o b t a in  d a t a  on a s s e t s  by age,  o r  to  be 
ab le  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a lagged income s e r i e s  f o r  each age group. F i n a l l y
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we need to be able to construct an expected income series for each 
age group in each period.
In some cases it may be difficult to obtain any suitable data: 
in Australia satisfactory asset figures do not appear to be available 
and surveys of consumer expenditure are available for only two years 
and do not contain asset series. In other cases there may not be 
sufficient observations for reasonable estimation. It is likely that 
a mix of cross section and time series data will have to be used.
Availability of sufficient time series observations - say 
thirty years of annual consumer expenditure surveys - would present 
its own problems. Such a time series would cover much of the baby 
boom and the fall in births of the 1960's and '701s. In Chapter Seven 
the change in fertility rates (from 2.2 to 1.9 to 2.1) was so small 
that we could neglect the effect of changes in fertility on consumption 
behavior. In a longer series we cannot properly ignore changes in 
the spacing between births, since the time pattern of child-bearing 
will certainly affect the time pattern of consumption even if the 
completed fertility rate does not change greatly. If it does prove 
possible to estimate age specific consumption functions over relatively 
long periods it will be desirable to test the stability of the 
coefficients of the functions over time and to test whether the 
coefficients are themselves functions of demographic factors to any 
significant degree.
Another experiment to be carried out given estimated age specific 
consumption functions is to determine whether an aggregate consumption 
of the life cycle type is a consistent aggregate of the age specific 
functions. Ando and Modigliani assumed that the conditions for 
aggregation were satisfied, and testing this assumption would assist in
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interpreting the results of studies using the aggregate life cycle 
consumption function.
Ill Production
Estimating the production side of the system involves a different 
set of problems from estimating the consumption side since it is 
reasonably likely that adequate data will be available on the size of 
the various age groups in the labour force. Our simulations used a 
Cobb-Douglas production function which is restrictive in that the 
elasticity of substitution between any pair of inputs must equal 
unity. One question to test is whether there exists complementarity 
between any pair of labour inputs, or any labour input and capital.
In particular there may be complementarity between the younger labour 
group and one of the older, more skilled age groups, and Denny and 
May (1977) found evidence of complementarity between aggregate labour 
and capital in the Canadian manufacturing sector. Hamermesh and 
Grant (1979) review the available literature on the substitutability 
of labour inputs but no unambiguous conclusions emerge on the • 
substitutability of different age groups of labour.
Since we are interested in the possibility of complementarity 
and differing degrees of substitutability between labour inputs the 
common Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions are too restrictive 
to use. One of the flexible functional forms, such as the Translog 
form, would seem a better choice.
Our simulations used a long run model in which all labour was 
continually fully employed and an increase in the input of any one 
labour input resulted in a reduction in its marginal product and income.
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In the short run it is likely that some of the effect of increases 
in the size of particular labour force cohorts takes the form of 
higher unemployment among those cohorts. Reid and Meltz (1979) found 
that almost half of the shift in the relation between unemployment 
and vacancies in Canada in the mid-1970’s was due to demographic 
factors. To the best of our knowledge the role of demographic factors 
in explaining differences in age specific unemployment rates in Australia 
has not been given much attention.
It is often assumed that when the present young unemployed age 
and reach the prime labour force age their unemployment rate will drop 
to roughly the historical level for the prime labour force. Our 
simulations showed that in a long term model the baby boom cohort's 
labour income would remain depressed through the cohort's life.
This may translate into a permanently higher unemployment rate and an 
upward shift in the non-inflationary unemployment rate for as long as 
this group makes up a large part of the labour force. The distributional 
effects of a long term increase in unemployment will differ from those 
of a full employment reduction in average income. There may also be 
an altered distributional effect if some of this group of unemployed 
take low skill jobs that would otherwise have gone to the next 
generation of young labour. This relates to the question of the 
substitutability of different age groups of labour in the aggregate 
production function.
In conjunction with this we would test the Wächter model of 
labour force participation on Canadian data. If the baby boom group 
proved to have an unusually high rate of labour force participation 
which did not carry over to the next cohorts the redistribution away 
from the baby boom cohort would be increased as its relative share
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in the labour force was increased. This effect would be difficult 
to test since the baby boom group is still entering the labour force 
and estimates of future entrants' participation rates would depend on 
the behavior of past small cohorts. There may be a trend to increased 
participation that could not be detected until the next birth cohorts 
entered the labour markets. Nevertheless tests of demand and supply 
equations for labour would be useful in forecasting future age 
structure effects.
IV Pensions
The shaky financial state of many private pension plans and 
problems associated with financing social security are often regarded 
as part of the problem of an ageing population. They are part of the 
problem but not quite in the way usually meant. The problem of 
financing social security is essentially the problem Lerner raised in 
relation to the chain letter properties of Samuelson's consumption- 
loan system and the answer depends on the rate of growth of the tax 
base. Given the redistribution indicated by our simulations it seems 
that the growth in income among the younger post baby boom groups may 
make increased social security taxes less of a burden. Denton and 
Spencer (1979, 1980) have recently modified their simulation model to 
include social security, and our Simulation Two of Chapter Seven could 
similarly be modified to investigate the distributional effects, 
particularly in relation to changes in female labour force participation 
rates and the resulting increased social security tax base.
A reading of Dearing's 1954 study of private pensions makes it 
clear that the reasons for recent pension plan failures (primarily
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due to operating on a chain letter principle and being unprepared for 
slower growth in membership and therefore being faced with inadequate 
reserves) are on the whole no different from the reasons pension plans 
have failed at any other time. All the ageing of the population adds 
is that an increasing number of plans are being faced with increasing 
liabilities and insufficient reserves, so the aggregate value of losses 
may increase in the future. The distributional effects of increasing 
pension failure will depend on the extent to which people whose 
pensions are lost fall back on Social Security, and the degree to which 
other countries follow the example of the 1974 US Pension Act and 
introduce government insurance of private pensions, placing the burden 
of failed plans on the taxpayers, many of whom had no pensions of 
their own (Ferguson (1981)).
An interesting question for theoretical analysis that is 
associated with the role of pensions as the population ages is why 
employees are willing to accept pension plans with insufficient funds 
in reserve. Arnott and Gersovitz (1980) discuss this in terms of 
risk sharing between employee and employer, but their analysis seems 
better suited to profit sharing schemes than to pension plans. We 
have assumed in our simulation experiments that everybody had full 
access to the capital markets. In fact for a large part of the 
population pension funds represent the chief form of retirement saving, 
and the distributional effects of population ageing will depend in 
part on the riskiness of pension plans.
Each of the matters discussed in this chapter represents an 
extension of the study reported here, and each would add to the 
understanding of the economic consequences of population ageing. It 
was felt that to investigate each properly would require a full study
rather than just an addendum to this, so each is regarded as a 
direction for further research into the economic consequences of 
population ageing.
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P o p u la t io n  P r o j e c t i o n ,  A^  = 1.0006
P e rc e n ta g e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  P o p u la t i o n ,  A^  = 1,0006
P o p u la t io n  P r o j e c t i o n s ,  A^  = 1.0427
P o p u la t io n  P r o j e c t i o n s ,  A^  = 1.1019
C o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  I n t e r e s t  Rate Equa t ion ,  A^  = 1.0006
C o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  I n t e r e s t  Rate E q u a t io n s ,  A^  = 1.0427
Age S p e c i f i c  Consumption by Pe r iod  and I n t e r e s t  Rate,
A^  = 1.0006 p e r io d s  t  to  t+7
In d iv i d u a l  L i f e  Time Consumption by Per iod o f  F i r s t  Age,
A = 1.0006
Age S p e c i f i c  Saving by P e r io d ,  A^  = 1.0006
I n d iv i d u a l  L i f e  Time Saving by P er iod  o f  F i r s t  Age, A^  = 1.0006
L i f e t im e  P a t t e r n  o f  I n t e r e s t  Rates  Faced,  by Period o f  F i r s t  
Age, A = 1.0006
Actual  Expected Wealth by Pe r iod  o f  F i r s t  Age, A^  = 1.0006
Myopic Expected Wealth by Per iod  o f  F i r s t  Age, A^  = 1.0006
Rat io  o f  Actual  to  Myopic Expected Wealth,  by Per iod  o f  F i r s t  
Age, Aj = 1.0006
Per Cent Change, Actual  Expected Wealth,  By Age, Genera t ion  
t + i  to  G enera t ion  t+ i+ 1 ,  A^  = 1.0006
Per Cent Change L i f e t im e  Consumption by Ages, Genera t ion  
t + i  to  G enera t ion  t+ i+ 1 ,  A^  = 1.0006
I n t e r e s t  Rate f a c e d ,  by Age, Baby Boom Experiment ,  Long Term 
Debt Case
Age S p e c i f i c  Consumption by P e r io d ,  Baby Boom Experiment,
Long Term Debt Case
Baby Boom Experiment L i fe  Cycle Consumption by Age, PVC and 
T o ta l  Consumption,  G ene ra t ions  t+13 to  t+19
Age S p e c i f i c  Saving by P e r io d ,  Baby Boom Experiment
MEW, Baby Boom S im u la t io n ,  By Age
6-21 AEW, Baby Boom Simulation, by Period of First Age
6-22 Interest Rates by Period, Long and Short Term Debt Cases,
Baby Boom Experiment
6- 23 Interest Rate Series, Inconsistent Age Structure Experiment
II____Tables, Chapter 7
7- 1 Canada: Population - Actual 1971, 76 by Sex, Projected
1980-2026, § Total Projected Labour Force
7-2 Percentage Age Distribution of Total Projected Labour Force
7-3 Income, Assets, Debt $ Net Worth of Families by Age Cohort
1964 § 1970
7-4 Age Specific Income by Year, Simulation 1
7-5 Age Specific Gross Income by Year, Simulation 2
7-6 Age Specific Income by Year, Simulation 3
7-7 Age Specific Consumption by Year, Simulation 1
7-8 Age Specific Consumption by Year, Simulation 2
7-9 Age Specific Consumption by Year, Simulation 3
7-10 Age Specific Assets by Year Simulation 1
7-11 Age Specific Assets and Pension by Year, Simulation 2
7-12 Age Specific Assets by Year, Simulation 3
III Additional Simulations, Cases 1-20
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Table  6-1 P o p u la t io n  P r o j e c t i o n  A^  = 1.0006 
L e s l i e  M atr ix :
.0819 .5317 . 3938 .0190 0
.9780 0 0 0 0
0 .9909 0 0 0
0 0 .9772 0 0
0 0 0 .9122 0
t+ 0 1 2 3 4 5
PI 26.60 22.82 25.93 24.61 24 .69 25.13
P2 25.39 26.01 22.32 25.36 24 .07 24.15
P3 17.37 25.16 25.77 22.12 25 13 23.85
P4 15.79 16.97 24.59 25.18 21 61 24.56
P5 14.29 14.40 15.48 22.43 22 97 19.71
6 7 8 9 10 11
PI 24.76 24.96 24.96 24.93 24 99 24.98
P2 24.58 24.22 24.41 24.41 24 38 24.44
P3 23. 93 24.36 24.00 24.19 24 19 24.16
P4 23. 31 23. 38 23.80 23.45 23 .64 23.64
P5 21.40 21.26 21.33 21.71 21 .39 21.56
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
PI 25.00 25.02 25.03 25.05 25.07 25.08 25.09
P2 24.43 24.45 24.4 7 24.48 24.50 24.51 24.52
P3 24.22 24.21 24.23 24.25 24.26 24.27 24.28
P4 23.61 23.67 23.66 23.68 23.70 23.70 23.71
P5 21.56 21.54 21.59 21.58 21.60 21.62 21.62
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
PI 25.10 25.11 25.12 25.13 25.14 25.15 25.16
P2 24.53 24.54 24.55 24.56 24.57 24.58 24.59
P3 24.29 24.30 24.31 24.32 24.33 24.34 24.35
P4 23.72 23.73 23.74 23.75 23.76 23.77 23.78
P5 21.62 21.63 21.64 21.65 21.66 21.67 21.68
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Table  6-2 P e rcen tag e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  P o p u la t io n  = 1.0006
t+ _______ 0______  1 2 3 4 5
PI 26.60 21.66 22.73 20.56 20.84 21.41
P2 25.34 24.69 19.56 21.19 20.32 20.57
P3 17.37 23.88 22.59 18.48 21.21 20.32
P4 15.79 16.11 21.55 21.04 18.24 20.92
P5 14.29 13.67 13.57 18.74 19.39 16.79
6 7 8 9 10 11
PI 20.81 21.12 21.06 21.00 21.07 21.03
P2 20.66 20.49 20.60 20.57 20.56 20.58
P3 20.11 20.61 20.25 20.38 20.40 20.34
P4 19.59 19.78 20.08 19.76 19.93 19.90
P5 18.83 17.99 18.00 18.29 18.04 18.15
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
PI 21.04 21.04 21.04 21.04 21.04 21.04 21.05
P2 20.56 20.57 20.57 20.56 20.57 20.57 20.57
P3 20.38 20.36 20.37 20.37 20.36 20.36 20.39
P4 19.87 19.91 19.89 19.89 19.89 19.89 19.89
P5 18.15 18. 12 18.12 18.13 18.13 18.14 18.13
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
PI 21.05 21.05 21.05 21.05 21.04 21.04 21.04
P2 20.57 20.57 20.57 20.57 20.57 20.57 20.57
P3 20.37 20.37 20.37 20.37 20.37 20.37 20.37
P4 19.89 19.89 19.89 19.89 19.89 19.89 19.89
PS 18. 13 18.13 18.14 18.13 18.13 18.13 18.13
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Table 6-3  P o p u la t io n  P r o j e c t i o n s  A^  = 1.0427 
L e s l i e  M atr ix :
.0901 .5849 .4332 .0209 0
.9780 0 0 0 0
0 .9909 0 0 0
0 0 .9772 0 0
0 0 0 .9122 0
t+ 0 1 2 3 4 5
PI 26.60 25.10 28.73 28.63 30. 08 31.64
P2 25.39 26.01 24.55 28.10 28. 00 29.42
P3 17.37 25.16 25.77 24.33 27. 84 27.75
P4 15.79 16.97 24.59 25.18 23. 78 27.21
P5 14.29 14.40 15.48 22.43 22. 97 21.69
6 7 8 9 10 11
PI 32.65 34.23 35.64 37.13 38. 75 40.37
P2 30.94 31.93 33.48 34.86 36. 31 37.90
P3 29.15 30.66 31.64 33.18 34. 54 35.98
P4 27.12 28.49 29.96 30.92 32. 42 33.75
P5 24.82 24.74 25.99 27.33 28. 21 29.57
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
PI 42.10 43. 89 45.75 47.70 49.72 51.84 54.05
P2 39.4 8 41.17 42.92 44.74 46.65 48.63 50.70
P3 37.56 39.12 40.80 42.53 44.33 46.23 48.19
P4 35.16 36.70 38.23 39.87 41.56 43.32 45.18
P5 2>0.79 32.07 33.48 34.87 36.37 37.91 39.52
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
PI c>6.34 58.74 61.24 63.84 66.50 69.39 72.34
P2 52.86 55.10 57.45 59.89 62.44 65.10 67.86
P3 c>0.24 52.38 54.60 56.93 59.35 61.87 64.51
P4 47.09 49.09 51.19 53.36 55.63 58.00 60.46
P5 41.21 42.96 44.78 46.70 48.67 50.75 52.91
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T a b l e  6 - 4  P o p u l a t i o n  P r o j e c t i o n s  A^ = 1 
L e s l i e  M a t r i x
1019
. 1 0 2 4  . 6 6 4 6  . 4 9 2 3 . 0 2 3 8 0
. 9 7 8 0  0 0 0 0
0 . 9 9 0 9  0 0 0
0 0 . 9 7 7 2 0 0
0 0 0 . 9 1 2 2 0
t  + 0 1 2 3 4 5
PI 2 6 . 60 2 8 . 5 3  3 3 . 0 0 3 5 . 1 9 3 9 . 2 6 4 3 . 2 8
P2 2 5 . 39 2 6 . 0 1  2 7 . 9 0 3 2 . 2 7 3 4 . 4 2 3 8 . 4 0
P3 17 . 37 2 5 . 1 6  2 5 . 7 7 2 7 . 6 5 3 1 . 9 8 3 4 . 1 1
P4 15 . 79 1 6 . 9 7  2 4 . 5 9 2 5 . 1 8 2 7 . 0 2 3 1 . 2 5
P5 1 4 . 29 1 4 . 4 0  1 5 . 4 8 2 2 . 4 3 2 2 . 9 7 2 4 . 6 5
t+ 6 7 8 9 10 11
PI 4 7 . 49 5 2 . 5 2  5 7 . 7 8 6 3 . 6 9 7 0 . 2 0 7 7 . 3 4
P2 4 2 . 33 4 6 . 4 5  5 1 . 3 6 5 6 . 5 1 6 2 . 2 9 6 8 . 6 6
P3 3 8 . 05 4 1 . 9 4  4 6 . 0 3 5 0 . 8 9 5 6 . 0 0 6 1 . 7 2
P4 33 . 33 3 7 . 1 8  4 0 . 9 8 4 4 . 9 8 4 9 . 7 3 5 4 . 7 2
P5 2 8 . 51 3 0 . 4 0  3 3 . 9 2 3 7 . 3 8 4 1 . 0 3 4 5 . 3 6
t+ 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
PI 8 5 . 2 5 9 3 . 9 4  1 0 3 . 5 1  1 1 4 . 0 7 1 2 5 . 6 9 1 3 8 . SI 1 5 2 . 6 3
P2 7 5 . 6 4 8 3 . 3 7  9 1 . 8 7  1 0 1 . 2 3 1 1 1 . 5 6 122.112 1 3 5 . 4 6
P3 6 8 . 0 6 7 4 . 9 5  8 2 . 6 1  9 1 . 0 3 1 0 0 . 3 1 1 1 0 . . S4 1 2 1 . 8 0
P4 6 0 . 3 1 6 6 . 5 1  7 3 . 2 4  8 0 . 7 3 8 8 . 9 5 9 8 . 32 1 0 8 . 0 2
P5 4 9 . 9 2 5 5 . 0 1  6 0 . 6 7  6 6 . 8 1 7 3 . 6 4 81 . 14 8 9 . 4 1
t+ 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
PI 1 6 8 . IS 1 8 5 . 3 4  2 0 4 . 2 4  2 2 5 . 0 6 2 4 8 . 0 1 2 7 3 . 30 3 0 1 . 1 6
P2 1 4 9 . 2 7 1 6 4 . 4 9  1 8 1 . 2 6  1 9 9 . 7 5 2 2 0 . 1 1 2 4 2 . 55 2 6 7 . 2 9
P3 1 3 4 . 2 3 1 4 7 . 9 1  1 6 2 . 9 9  1 7 9 . 6 1 1 9 7 . 9 3 2 1 8 . 11 2 4 0 . 3 4
P4 1 1 9 . 0 2 1 3 1 . 1 7  1 4 4 . 5 4  1 5 9 . 2 7 1 7 5 . 5 1 1 9 3 . 42 2 1 3 . 1 4
P5 9 8 . 5 4 1 0 8 . 5 7  1 1 9 . 6 5  1 3 1 . 8 5 1 4 5 . 2 9 1 6 0 . 10 1 7 6 . 4 4
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Table 6-5: Coefficients of Interest Rate Equation A^  = 1.0006
Raw/Normalized
t + 
R
1
N '
t + 
R
2
N
t + 
R
3
N
X 72481.22 91.80 68947.32 76.85 69394.59 81.50
X2 53661.79 67.96 52421.47 58.43 54479.84 63.98
X3 18677.37 23.66 20836.46 23.22 19998.75 23.49
X4 789.57 1 897.18 1 851.51 1
t + 4 t + 5 t + 6
R N R N R N
X 70384.10 82.39 69478.27 79.91 70028.13 81.74
X2 53218.73 62.30 53670.05 61.73 53815.25 62.82
X3 19990.48 23.40 20328.10 23.38 20070.75 23.43
X4 854.27 1 869.50 1 856.70 1
t + 
R
7
N
t + 
R
8
N
t + 9 
R N
X 69992.62 81.05 69930.98 80.97 70098.50 81.27
X2 53613.71 62.08 53815.30 62.31 53796.32 62.37
X3 20203.04 23. 39 20213.19 23.41 20190.46 23.41
X4 863.62 1 863.62 1 862.58 1
t + 
R
10
N
t + 
R
11
N
t + 
R
12
N
X 70080.84 81.05 70136.80 81.15 70187.84 81.14
X2 53819.61 62.24 53878.02 62.34 53888.97 62.30
X3 20234.32 23.40 20229.94 23.41 20244.56 23.40
X4 864.65 1 864.31 1 865.00 1
t +
R
13
N
t + 
R
14
N
t + 
R
15
N
X 70216.71 81.11 70269.71 81.14 70312.31 81.12
X2 53931.05 62.30 53965.04 62.31 53997.09 62.30
X3 20260.78 23.40 20269.43 23.40 20285.11 23.40
X4 865.69 1 866.04 1 866.73 1
.../
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Table  6-5:  co n t .
t
R
+ 16
N
t  + 
R
17
N
t  + 
R
18
N
X 70359.99 81.11 70388.54 81.11 70417.27 81.12
X2 54040.24 62.30 54062.07 62.30 54083.91 62.30
X3 20301.33 23.40 20309.44 23.40 20317.55 23.40
X4 867.42 1 867.77 1 868.11 1
t
R
+ 19
N
t  + 
R
20
N
t  + 
R
21
N
X 70446.00 81.12 70474.73 81.12 70503.46 81.12
X2 54105.75 62.30 54127.58 62.30 54149.42 62.30
X3 20325.66 23.40 20333.77 23.40 20341.88 23.40
X4 868.46 1 868.81 1 869.15 1
t
R
+ 22
N
t  + 
R
23
N
t  + 
R
24
N
X 70532.19 81.12 70560.92 81.12 70589.64 81.12
X2 54171.26 62.30 54193.10 62.30 54214.93 62.30
X3 20349.99 23.40 20358.10 23.40 20366.21 23.40
X4 869.50 1 869.84 1 870.19 1
t
R
+ 25
N
X 70618.37 81.12
X2 54236.77 62.30
X3 20374.32 23.40
X4 870.54 1
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Table  6-6 :  C o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  I n t e r e r e s t  Rate Equat ion X ^ = 1.0427
Raw/Normalized
t  + 1 t  + 2 t  + 3
R N R N R N
X 73373.16 84.47 73357.58 73.80 77199.39 77.93
X2 55871.11 64.33 57725.04 58.07 61675.35 62.26
X3 20404.69 23.50 23076.82 23.21 23190.63 23.41
X4 868.46 1 994.06 1 990.60 1
t  + 4 t  + 5 t  + 6
R N R N R N
X 81021.77 77.85 83717.37 76.47 87738.12 77.67
X2 63150.62 60.68 66306.96 60.57 69125.62 61.18
X3 24283.81 23.33 25541.49 23.33 26387.84 23.36
X4 1040.77 1 1094.74 1 1129.69 1
t  + 7 t  + 8 t  + 9
R N R N R N
X 91328.06 77.11 95167.94 77.18 99324.25 77.31
X2 71886.80 60.70 75105.61 60.91 78234.20 60.90
X3 27637.71 23.33 28788.70 23.35 29991.21 23.34
X4 1184.36 1 1233.14 1 1284.70 1
t  + 10 t  + 11 t  + 12
R N R N R N
X 103469.44 77.17 107897.80 77.25 112492.57 77.23
X2 81560.52 60.83 85053.71 60.89 88649.30 60.86
X3 31295.95 23.34 32608.17 23.34 34003.19 23.34
X4 1340.75 1 1396.80 1 1456.66 1
t  + 13 t  + 14 t  + 15
R N R N R N
X 117257.15 77.21 122255.37 77.23 127443.69 77.22
X2 92429.75 60.87 96354.10 60.87 100449.63 60.86
X3 35449.54 23. 34 36952.13 23.34 38526.64 23.34
X4 1518.59 1 1582.95 1 1650.42 1
. . . /
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Table  6-6:  c o n t .
t
R
+ 16
N
t  +
R
17
N
t  + 
R
18
N
X 132862.49 77.23 138523.44 77.23 144413.82 77.22
X2 104721.24 60.87 109176.38 60.87 113826.46 60.87
X3 40158.98 23.34 41870.83 23.34 43655.66 23.34
X4 1720.31 1 1793.66 1 1870.13 1
t
R
+ 19
N
t  + 
R
20
N
t  + 
R
21
N
X 150558.12 77.23 156953.94 77.23 163632.37 77.23
X2 118663.38 60.87 123704.60 60.87 128974.74 60.87
X3 45505.91 23.34 47443.76 23.34 49463.25 23.34
X4 1949.36 1 2032.40 1 2118.90 1
t
R
+ 22
N
t  + 
R
23
N
t  + 
R
24
N
X 170592.46 77.23 177852.75 77.23 185419.11 77.23
X2 134452.17 60.87 140178.43 60.87 146144.37 60.87
X3 51563.31 23. 34 53760.15 23.34 56046.20 23.34
X4 2208.86 1 2302.98 1 2400.89 1
t
R
+ 25
N
X 193299.94 77.23
X2 152349.12 60.87
X3 58428.51 23.34
X4 2502.96 1
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Table  6-7 :  Age S p e c i f i c  Consumption by P e r iod  $ I n t e r e s t  Rate,
= 1.0006 p e r io d s  t  t o  t+7
t , r = 1 6 . 92 t + 1 , r = 1 0 . 75 t + 1 , r = 5 .85 t + 3 , r = 5 .94
Cl 1605.93 1793.95 1970.80 1967.29
C2 2942.13 3152.28 3298.27 3284.79
C3 3290.41 3402.68 3429.16 3409.55
C4 1604.57 1694.00 1689.02 1585.66
C5 448.00 945.75 1479.90 977.64
t + 4 , r = - l .27 t + 5 , r = - 2 . 4 3 t + 6 , r = - 2 .43 t + 7 , r = - 2 . 30
Cl 2283.95 2342.61 2342.61 2335.92
C2 3554.65 3585.25 3582.06 3576.56
C3 3482.08 3467.19 3459.98 3464.05
C4 1604.29 1586.24 1570.63 1596.95
C5 138.18 262.12 158.74 181.34
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T a b l e  6 - 8 : I n d i v i d u a l
F i r s t
L i f e  Time 
Age A2 =
C o n s u m p t io n  by P e r i o d  
1 .0 0 0 6
o f
t - 1 t t  + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t+ 4
Cl 2 2 2 2 . 0 0 1 6 0 5 .9 3 1 7 9 3 .9 5 1 9 7 0 .8 0 196 7 .2 9 2 2 8 3 .9 5
C2 2 9 4 2 . 1 3 3 1 5 2 .2 8 3 2 9 8 . 2 7 3 2 8 4 . 7 9 3 5 5 4 .6 5 3 5 8 5 .2 5
C3 3 4 0 2 . 6 8 3 4 2 9 .1 6 3 4 0 9 .5 5 3 4 8 2 . 0 8 3 4 6 7 .1 9 3 4 5 9 .9 8
C4 1 6 8 9 .0 2 1 5 8 5 .6 6 1 6 0 4 .2 9 1 5 8 6 . 2 4 1 5 7 0 .6 3 1 5 9 6 .9 5
C5 9 7 7 . 6 4 1 3 8 . 1 8 2 6 2 .1 2 1 5 8 .7 4 1 8 1 .3 4 4 6 6 . 1 5
t  + 5 t + 6 t+7 t  + 8 t + 9 t  + 10
Cl 2 3 4 2 .6 1 2 3 4 2 .6 1 2 3 3 5 .9 2 2 2 1 9 .4 4 2 1 5 2 .1 9 2 1 0 1 .0 1
C2 3 S 8 2 .0 6 3 5 7 6 .5 6 3 4 8 0 . 2 3 3 4 3 0 . 0 0 3 3 9 0 .1 7 3 3 6 8 .4 7
C3 3 4 6 4 .0 5 3 4 3 2 .8 2 3 4 2 7 . 0 6 3 4 2 1 .9 1 3 4 2 0 .2 0 3 4 2 6 .7 4
C4 1 6 0 0 .4 6 1 6 1 3 .9 6 1 6 2 3 .6 5 1 6 2 2 . 2 8 1 6 2 1 .6 4 1 6 1 6 .2 4
C5 5 6 4 . 9 9 6 8 8 . 5 9 7 4 1 .0 7 7 0 0 . 1 8 6 5 2 .0 2 5 7 5 . 2 3
t  + 11 t + 1 2 t  + 13 t  + 14 t + 1 5 t  + 16
Cl 2 0 7 2 . 3 4 2 0 8 7 .6 6 2 1 1 2 .3 1 2 1 4 7 . 7 0 2 1 7 9 .0 1 2 1 9 3 .7 9
C2 3 3 8 3 .2 5 3 4 0 3 .4 5 3 4 3 2 . 1 6 3 4 5 6 . 6 5 3 4 6 7 .3 6 3 4 6 8 .0 9
C3 3 4 3 1 .3 4 3 4 3 7 .2 0 3 4 4 1 . 0 8 3 4 4 1 .4 6 3 4 4 0 .3 9 3 4 3 7 .7 1
C4 1 6 1 0 .3 4 1 6 0 6 .9 5 1 6 0 4 .5 7 1 6 0 5 . 1 5 1 6 0 7 .1 8 1 6 0 9 .5 3
C5 5 1 2 . 5 9 4 8 5 . 0 3 4 8 0 . 8 6 5 0 4 . 6 6 5 3 7 . 6 0 5 6 6 . 5 3
t  + 17 t  + 18 t  + 19 t  + 20 t+ 2 1
Cl 2 1 9 5 .6 4 2 1 8 4 .9 9 2 1 6 9 . 4 0 2 1 5 4 . 9 0 2 1 4 5 . 4 6
C2 3 4 5 9 .0 2 3 4 4 6 .4 6 3 4 5 5 . 0 6 3 4 2 7 .8 7 3 4 2 6 .1 3
C3 3 4 3 5 .0 5 3 4 3 3 . 1 3 3 4 3 2 .3 5 3 4 3 2 . 6 6 3 4 3 3 .5 7
C4 1 6 1 1 .6 6 1 6 1 2 .8 4 1 6 1 3 .0 1 1 6 1 2 .3 7 1 6 1 1 .3 4
C5 5 8 5 . 8 3 5 9 0 .9 1 5 8 4 . 5 7 5 7 1 . 4 2 5 5 7 . 6 6
Table  6-9:  Age S p e c i f i c  Saving by P e r iod
(Aggregate  Saving = 0 each p e r io d )
1.0006
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t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
SI -1305.93 -1693.15 -1870.80 -1867 .29 -2183.95 -2242.61
S2 - 942.13 -1152.28 -1298.27 -1284.79 -1554.65 -1585.25
S3 1709.59 1597.32 1570.89 1590.45 1517.92 1532.81
S4 2385.43 2306.00 2310.98 2414.34 2395.71 2413.76
S5 247.80 - 745.74 -1279 .90 - 777.64 61.82 - 62.12
t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t  + 11 t  + 11
SI -2242.61 -2235.92 -2119.44 -2052 .19 -2001.01 -1972.34
S2 -1582.06 -1576.56 -1480.23 -1430.00 -1390.17 -1368.47
S3 1540.02 1535.95 1567.18 1572.94 1578.09 1579.80
S4 2429.37 2403.05 2399.54 2386.04 2376.35 2377.72
S5 41.26 18.66 - 266.15 - 364.99 - 488.51 - 541.07
t  + 12 t  + 13 t+14 t+15 t  + 16 t+17 t  + 18
SI -1987.66 -2012.31 -2047.70 -2079.01 -2093.79 -2095.64 -2084.99
S2 -1383.25 -1403.45 -1432.16 -1456.65 -1467.36 -1468.09 -1459.02
S3 1573.26 1568.66 1562.80 1558.92 1558.54 1559.61 1562.29
S4 2378.36 2383.76 2389.66 2393.05 2395.43 2394.85 2392.82
S5 - 500.18 - 452.02 - 375.23 - 312.59 - 285.03 - 280.86 - 304.66
t  + 19 t  + 20 t+21 t+22 t  + 23 t  + 24 t+25
SI -2069.40 -2054.90 -2045.46 -2042.79 -2045.46 -2051.29 -2058.06
S2 -1446.46 -1435.06 -1427.87 -1426.13 -1428.55 -1433.35 -1438.75
S3 1564.95 1566.87 1567.65 1567.34 1566.43 1565.30 1564.28
S4 2390.47 2388.34 2387.16 2386.99 2387.63 2388.66 2389.64
S5 - 337.60 - 366.53 - 385.83 - 390.91 - 384.57 - 371.42 - 357.66
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Table 6-10:  I n d i v i d u a l  L i fe  Time Sav ings  by p e r io d  o f  F i r s t  Age
By Age, A^  = 1.0006
t t  + 1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
SI -1505.93 -1693.95 -1870.80 -1867 .29 -2183.95 -2242.61
S2 -1152.28 -1298.27 -1284.79 -1554.65 -1585 .25 -1582.06
S3 1570.84 1590.45 1517.92 1532.81 1540.02 1535.95
S4 2414.34 2395.71 2413.76 2429.37 2403.05 2399.54
S5 61.82 - 62.12 41.26 18.66 . - 266.15 - 364.99
t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11
SI -2242.61 -2235.92 -2119.44 -2052 .14 -2001.01 -1972.34
S2 -1576.56 -1480.23 -1430.00 -1390.17 -1368.47 -1383.25
S3 1567.18 1572.94 1578.09 1579.80 1573.26 1568.66
S4 2386.04 2376.35 2377.72 2378.36 2383.76 2389.66
S5 - 488.59 - 541.07 - 500.18 - 452.02 - 375.23 - 312.59
t+12 t  + 13 t  + 14 t+15 t  + 16 t+17
SI -1987.66 -2012.31 -2047.70 -2079.01 -2093.79 -2095.64
S2 -1403.45 -1432 .16 -1456.65 -1467 .36 -1468.09 -1459.02
S3 1562.80 1558.92 1558.54 1559.61 1562.29 1564.95
S4 2393.05 2395.43 2394.85 2392.82 2390.47 2388.34
S5 - 285.03 - 280.86 - 304.66 - 337.60 - 366.53 - 385.83
t  + 18 t  + 19 t  + 20 t+21
SI -2084.99 -2069.40 -2054 .90 -2045.46
S2 -1446.46 -1435.06 -1427.87 -1426.13
S3 1566.87 1567.65 1567.34 1566.43
S4 2387.16 2386.99 2387.63 2388.66
S5 - 390.91 - 384.57 - 371.42 - 357.66
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Table 6-11: Lifetime Pattern of Interest Rates Faced
by period of first age, A, = 1.0006
t-1 t t + 1 t + 2 t+3 t+4 t + 5
A1 0 16.92 10.75 5.85 5.94 -1.27 -2.43
A2 16.92 10.75 5.85 5.94 -1.27 -2.43 -2.43
A3 10.75 5.85 5.94 -1.27 -2.43 -2.43 -2.30
A4 5.85 5.94 -1.27 -2.43 -2.43 -2.30 0.06
A5 5.94 -1.27 -2.43 -2.43 -2.30 0.06 1.52
t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t + 10 t + 11 t+12 t + 13
A1 -2.43 -2.30 0.06 1.52 2.68 3.35 2.99 2.42
A2 -2.30 0.06 1.52 2.68 3.35 2.99 2.42 1.62
A3 0.06 1.52 2.68 3.35 2.99 2.42 1.62 0.93
A4 1.52 2.68 3.35 2.99 2.42 1.62 0.93 0.61
A5 2.68 3.35 2.99 2.42 1.62 0.93 0.61 0.57
t+14 t + 15 t+16 t+17 t + 18 t + 19 t+20 t+21
A1 1.62 0.93 0.61 0.57 0.80 1.14 1.46 1.67
A2 0.93 0.61 0.57 0.80 1.14 1.46 1.67 1.73
A3 0.61 0.57 0.80 1.14 1.46 1.67 1.73 1.67
A4 0.57 0.80 1.14 1.46 1.67 1.73 1.67 1.54
A5 0.80 1. 14 1.46 1.67 1.73 1.67 1.54 1.39
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Table  6-12:  A ctua l  Expected Wealth by Per iod  o f  F i r s t  Age A^  = 1.0006
t - 1 t t+1 t  + 2 t+3 t+4
W1 10762.00 7679.66 8619.76 9503.99 9486.47 11068.75
W2 7181.10 7761.15 8286.24 8276.02 9174.91 9336.23
W3 3673.79 3850.89 3847.48 4140.88 4192.31 4192.31
W4 171.94 171.80 184.34 186.53 186.53 186.28
t+5 t  + 6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10
W1 11363.07 11363.07 11329.60 10747.22 10410.97 10155.04
W2 9336.23 9317.90 8995.60 8806.90 8661.69 8579.78
W3 4186.48 4083.43 4022.20 3974.83 3947.98 3962.31
W4 181.89 179.28 177.25 176.10 176.72 177.70
t + n t  + 12 t  + 13 t  + 14 t+15 t+16
W1 10011.70 10088.51 10211.53 10388.52 10545.06 10618.93
W2 8623.62 8693.85 8794.21 8882.46 8923.95 8929.16
W3 3985.33 4018.07 4046.72 4060.16 4061.84 4052.17
m 179.10 180.32 180.90 180.97 180.56 179.95
t+17 t  + 18 t  + 19 t  + 20 t +21 t  + 22
W1 10628.22 10574.97 10497.02 10424.49 10377.31 10363.89
W2 8899.27 8855.44 8814.54 8787.87 8780.24 8787.87
W3 4037.46 4024.67 4016.01 4013.54 4016.01 4021.37
W4 179.38 179.01 178.90 179.01 179.24 179.50
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Table  6 - 1 2 ( a ) :  Myopic Expected Wealth by Per iod  o f
F i r s t  Age, A^  = 1.0006
t -1 t t+1 t  + 2 t+3 t+4
Ml 10762.00 7679.66 8619.76 9503.99 9486.47 11068.75
M2 7986.98 7181.10 7761.15 8286.24 8276.02 9174.91
M3 4086.07 3472.71 3673.79 3850.89 • 3847.48 4140.88
M4 182.00 155.66 164.33 171.94 171.80 184.34
t  + 5 t+6 t  + 7 t+8 t+9 t+10
Ml 11363.07 11363.07 11329.60 10747.22 10410.97 10155.04
M2 9336.23 9336.23 9317.90 8995.60 8806.90 8661.69
M3 4192.31 4192.31 4186.48 4083.43 4022.20 3974.83
M4 186.53 186.53 186.28 181.89 179.28 177.25
t  + 11 t  + 12 t  + 13 t  + 14 t  + 15 t+16
Ml 10011.70 10088.31 10211.53 10388.52 10545.06 10618.93
M2 8579.78 8623.62 8693.85 8744.21 8882.46 8923.95
M3 3947.98 3962.91 3985.33 4018.07 4046.72 4060.16
M4 176.10 176.72 177.70 179.10 180.32 180.90
t+ 1 7 t+18 t  + 19 t  + 20 t+21 t  + 22
Ml 10628.22 10574.97 10497.02 10424.49 10373.31 10363.89
M2 8929.16 8899.27 8855.44 8814.54 8787.87 8780.24
M3 4061.84 4052.17 4037.46 4024.67 4016.01 4013.54
M4 180.97 180.56 179.95 179.38 179.01 178.90
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Table  6-13:  Ra t io  o f  Actua l  to  Myopic Expected Wealth by
Per iod  o f  F i r s t  Age By Age = 1.0006
t -1 t t  + 1 t+2 t  + 3 t+4
R2 .7975 1.0807 1.0677 .9988 1.1086 1.0176
R3 .8991 1.1089 1.0473 1.0753 1.0896 1.0124
R4 .9447 1.1037 1.1218 1.0848 1.0857 1.0105
t  + 5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t  + 10
R2 1.0000 .9980 .9654 .9790 .9835 .9905
R3 .9986 .9740 .9608 .9734 .9815 .9969
R4 .9751 .9611 .9515 .9682 .9857 1.0025
t  + 11 t  + 12 t+13 t  + 14 t+15 t+16
R2 1.0051 1.0081 1.0115 1.0100 1.0047 1.0006
R3 1.0095 1.0141 1.0154 1.0105 1.0037 .9980
R4 1.0170 1.0204 1.0180 1.0104 1.0013 .9947
t  + 17 t+18 t+19 t  + 20 t+21 t+22
R2 .9967 .9951 .9954 .9970 .9991 1.0009
R3 .9941 .9932 .9946 .9972 1.0000 1.0020
R4 .9912 .9914 .9942 .9979 1.0013 1.0034
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Table 6-14: Per Cent Change, Actual Expected Wealth by Age:
Generation t+i to Generation t+i+1 A^ = 1.0006
t t + 1 t+2 t + 3 t+4 t+5
D1 -28.64 12.24 10.25 - 0.18 16.69 2.65
D2 8.08 6.77 - 0.12 10.86 1.76 0.00
D3 4.82 - .09 7.63 1.24 0.00 - 0.14
D4 - 0.08 7.30 1.19 0.00 - 0.13 - 2.36
t+6 t+7 t + 8 t+9 t + 10 t+11
D1 0.00 - 0.29 - 5.14 - 3.13 - 2.46 - 1.41
D2 - 0.20 - 3.46 - 2.10 - 1.65 - 0.95 0.51
D3 - 2.46 - 1.50 - 1.18 - 0.68 0.36 0.58
D4 - 1.43 - 1.13 - 0.65 0.35 0.55 0.79
t+12 t + 13 t+14 t+15 t+16 t+17
D1 0.77 1.22 1.73 1.51 0.70 0.09
02 0.81 1.15 1.00 0.47 0.06 - 0.33
D3 0.82 0.71 0.33 0.04 - 0.24 - 0.35
04 0.68 0.32 0.04 - 0.23 - 0.34 - 0.32
t+18 t+19 t+20 t+21 t + 22
D1 - 0.50 - 0.74 - 0.69 - 0.45 - 0.13
D2 - 0.49 - 0.46 - 0.30 - 0.09 0.09
D3 - 0.33 - 0.22 - 0.06 0.06 0.13
D4 - 0.21 - 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.15
Table 6-15 Per Cent Change Lifetime Consumption by age 
Generation t+i to Generation t+i+1 A = 1.0006
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t t + 1 t+2 t + 3 t+4
Cl -27.73 11.71 9.86 - 0.18 16.10
C2 7.14 4.63 - 0.41 8.22 0.86
C3 0.78 - 0.57 2.13 - 0.43 - 0.21
C4 - 6.12 1.17 - 1.13 - 0.98 1.68
C5 -85.87 89.69 -39.44 14.24 157.06
t+5 t+6 t + 7 t+8 t+9
Cl 2.57 0.00 - 0.29 - 4.99 - 3.03
C2 - 0.09 - 0.15 - 2.69 - 1.44 - 1.16
C3 0.12 - 0.90 - 0.17 - 0.15 - 0.05
C4 0.22 0. 84 0.60 - 0.04 - 0.04
C5 21.20 21.88 7.62 - 6.88 - 6.88
t + 10 t+11 t + 12 t+13 t + 14 t+15
Cl - 2.38 - 1.36 0.74 1.18 1.68 1.46
C2 - 0.64 0.44 0.60 0.84 0.71 0.31
C3 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.01 -0.03
C4 - 0.33 - 0.37 -0.21 -0.15 0.04 0.13
C5 -11.78 -10.89 -5.38 -0.86 4.95 6.53
t + 16 t+17 t+18 t+19 t+20 t+21
Cl 0.68 0.08 -0.49 -0.71 -0.67 -0.44
C2 0.02 -0.26 -0.36 -0.33 -0.21 -0.05
C3 i o o co i o o co -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.03
C4 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.06
C5 5.38 3.41 0.87 -1.07 -2.25 -2.41
Table  6-16:  I n t e r e s t  r a t e  faced  by Age, Baby Boom Experiment 
by g e n e r a t i o n  (Shock in  t+16) Long Term Debt Case
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t  + 13 t+14 t  + 15 t  + 16 t  + 17 t+18 t  + 19
A1 1.50 1.47 1.42 18.11 10.97 5.75 5.32
A2 1.47 1.42 18.11 10.97 5.75 5.32 -1 .99
A3 1.42 18.11 10.97 5.75 5.32 -1 .99 -2 .88
A4 18.11 10.97 5.75 5.32 -1 .99 -2 .88 -2 .70
A5 10.97 5.75 5.32 -1 .99 -2 .88 -2 .70 -2 .3 0
Table 6-17:  Age S p e c i f i c  Consumption by P e r io d ,  Baby Boom Experiment,
Long Term Debt Case (Shock in  t+16)
t  + 13 t  + 14 t  + 15 t  + 16 t+17
Cl 2153.10 2154.45 2156.70 1573.43 1786.63
C2 3434.39 3435.59 3437.42 2914.40 3147.67
C3 3434.27 3434.68 3435.09 3287.40 3405.17
C4 1611.41 1611.15 1610.75 1607.83 1695.95
C5 569.43 566.84 561.64 556.62 955.99
t  + 18 t  + 19 t  + 20 t+21 t+22 t  + 23
Cl 1974.70 1991.64 2320.13 2366.03 2356.62 2335.92
C2 3302.12 3305.83 3583.14 3602.47 3592.28 3575.80
C3 3431.03 3415.14 3487.81 3469.18 3460.87 3456.76
C4 1686.80 1580.94 1600.22 1582.07 1569.94 1597.80
C5 1468.44 926.70 66.75 212.43 130.93 190.32
Table 6-18: Baby Boom Experiment Life Cycle Consumption by Age
PVC Total Consumption by period of First Age, Generations 
t+13 to t+19 (t+16 = shocked distribution)
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t+13 t + 14 t + 15
Cl 2153.10 2154.45 2156.70
C2 3435.59 3437.42 2914.90
C3 3435.09 3287.40 3405.17
C4 1607.83 1695.95 1686.80
C5 955.99 1468.44 926.70
PVC 10484.76 10315.56 9296.02
TC 11587.60 12043.66 11090.27
t + 16 t + 17 t+18 t + 19
Cl 1573.43 1786.63 1974.70 1991.64
C2 3147.67 3302.12 3305.83 3583.14
C3 5431.03 3415.14 3487.81 3469.18
C4 1580.94 1600.22 1582.07 1569.94
C5 66.75 212.43 130.93 190.32
PVC 8905.34 9926.50 10617.53 11238.69
TC 9799.82 10316.54 10481.34 10804.22
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Table 6-19:  Age S p e c i f i c  Saving by P e r iod  Baby Boom Experiment
t+12,  r = l .48 t+13,  r = l .50 t+ 1 4 , r = l .47 t + 1 5 , r = l .42
SI -2054.00 -2053.10 -2054.45 -2056.70
S2 -1434.98 -1434.39 -1435.59 -1437.42
S3 1565.85 1565.73 1565.32 1564.91
S4 2388.64 2388.59 2388.85 2389.25
S5 - 368.14 - 369.43 - 366.84 - 361.64
t  + 16 , r = 1 8 . 11 t + 1 7 , r = 1 0 .97 t+18 ,  r = 5 .75 t + 1 9 , r = 5 .32
SI -1473.43 -1686.63 -1874 .70 -1891.64
S2 - 914.90 -1147.67 -1302.12 -1305.83
S3 1712.60 1594.83 1568.97 1584.86
S4 2392.17 2304.05 2313.20 2419.06
S5 - 356.62 - 755.99 -1268.44 - 726.70
t + 2 0 , r = - l .99 t+ 2 1 , r = - 2 .89 t + 2 2 , r = - 2 . 70 t + 2 3 , r = - 2 .30
SI -2220.13 -2266.03 -2256.62 -2235.92
S2 -1583.14 -1602.47 -1592.28 -1575.80
S3 1512.19 1530.82 1539.13 1543.24
S4 2399.78 2417.93 2430.06 2402.20
S5 133.25 - 12.43 69.07 9.68
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Table  6-20:  MEW, Baby Boom S im u la t io n ,  By Age
t + 1 2 , r = l .48 t  +13 , r = 1.5 0 t + 1 4 , r = l .47 t + 1 5 , r = l .42
W1 10419.98 10415.48 10422.23 10433.51
W2 8811.99 8809.44 8813.26 8819.62
W3 4023.86 4023.03 4024.26 4026.33
W4 179.35 179.31 179.36 179.45
t + 1 6 , r= 1 8 .11 t + 1 7 , r= 1 0 .97 t + 1 8 , r = 5 .75 t + 1 9 , r = 5 .32
W1 7517.17 8583.16 9523.51 9608.18
W2 7078.30 7739.00 8297.63 8346.93
W3 3436.38 3666.22 3854.68 3871.07
W4 154.09 164.01 172.01 172.81
t + 2 0 , r = - l .99 t + 2 1 , r = - 2 . 88 t+ 2 2 , r = - 2 .7 0 t + 2 3 , r = - 2 .30
W1 11250.65 11480.14 11433.09 11329.60
W2 9274.58 9400.21 9374.52 9317.90
W3 4172.70 4212.60 4204.46 4186.48
W4 185.70 187.40 187.05 186.28
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Table  6-21:  AEW, Baby Boom S im u la t io n ,  by Per iod  o f  F i r s t  Age
t  + 12 t  + 13 t+14 t+15
W1 10419.98 10415.48 10422.23 10433.51
W2 8809.44 8813.26 8819.62 7078.30
W3 4024.26 4026.33 3436.38 3666.22
W4 179.45 154.09 164.01 172.01
t  + 16 t+17 t  + 18 t+19 t+20
W1 7517.17 8583.16 9523.51 9608.18 11250.65
W2 7739.00 8297.63 8346.93 9274.58 9400.21
W3 3854.68 3871.07 4172.70 4212.60 4204.46
W4 172.81 185.70 187.40 187.05 186.28
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Table 6-22: Interest rates by period, Long $ Short Term Debt Cases
Baby Boom Experiment
Long Term Debt Short Term Debt
t 1.42 1.10
t+1 1.93 1.08
t+2 2.10 1.14
t + 3 1.92 1.30
t+4 1.73 1.31
t+5 1.40 1.31
t+6 1.18 1.33
t + 7 1.08 1.35
t+8 1.07 1.35
t + 9 1.17 1.36
t + 10 1-29 1.36
t+11 1.41 1.36
t + 12 1.48 1.36
t + 13 1.50 1.36
t+14 1.47 1.36
t+15 1.42 1.36
t + 16 18.11 18.11
t + 17 10.97 6.53
t + 18 5.75 - 2.06
t+19 5.32 1.98
t + 20 - 1.99 5.41
t+21 - 2.88 0.88
t+22 - 2.70 1.21
t + 23 - 2.30 0.97
t + 24 0.52 2.17
t+25 1.70 1.75
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Table 6-23: Interest Rate Series
t 16.92
t+1 24.72
t+2 37.53
t+3 46.50
t+4 50.03
t+5 55.00
t+6 50.35
t+7 44.12
t + 8 35.64
t+9 23.06
t + 10 18.63
t + 11 10.31
Inconsistent Age Structure Experiment
t + 13 15.31
t+14 19.81
t+15 25.73
t+16 30.17
t + 17 33.82
t+18 35.86
t + 19 34.79
t + 20 32.74
t+21 28.81
t+22 24.74
t + 23 21.73
t + 24 19.79
t+25 19.77t + 12 12.35
Table  7-1:  Canada: P o p u la t io n  - Actual  1971, 1976 By Sex P r o j e c t e d
1980-2026 ( S t a t .  Canada.  Proj 'n 1) $ T o ta l  P r o j e c t e d  Labour Force
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1971
Age
(000)
Male F ema1e Labour
15-24 2016.2 1987.5 2295.2
25-34 1461.6 1427.9 1988.86
35-44 1285.8 1240.6 1737.86
45-54 1132.2 1159.3 1537.19
55-64 854.1 877.6 986.04
65+ 781.9 962.5 263.45
1976
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2261.8 2217.3 2567.8
25-34 1823.2 1797.3 2488.1
35-44 1314.9 1282.0 1783.0
45-54 1226.2 1246.8 1660.9
55-64 928.1 996.4 1086.2
65 + 875.4 1130.0 299.3
1980
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2403.4 2322.7 2712.1
25-34 2070.8 2059.3 2834.0
35-44 1454.5 1419.6 1973.0
45-54 1241.4 1238.8 1671.0
55-64 998.5 1101.0 1178.5
65 + 969.8 1285.4 334.3
1985_
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2255.1 2171.7 2540.9
25-34 2337.0 2303.3 3189.1
35-44 1800.9 1764.4 2445.8
45-54 1259.3 1254.0 1693.9
55-64 1086.7 1196.9 1282.1
65+ 1068.4 1482.4 373.7
Table  7-1:  c o n t .
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1990
Age _____________ Male____________ Female Labour
15-24 2011.0 1931.9 2263.6
25-34 2545.9 2460.8 3452.6
35-44 2109.7 2091.7 2876.1
45-54 1408.3 1405.4 1895.7
55-64 1110.7 1197.5 1301.6
65 + 1198.8 1732.4 425.0
19_95_
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2035.2 1951.5 2289.1
25-34 2391.4 2310.9 3242.8
35-44 2371.1 2334.1 3225.1
45-54 1740.2 1743.7 2345.6
55-64 1127.0 1213.4 1320.1
65 + 1301.3 1923.9 464.9
2001
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2306.4 2212.8 2594.7
25-34 2126.9 2048.0 2880.9
35-44 2561.9 2481.2 3466.6
45-54 2094.3 2125.4 2834.9
55-64 1306.8 1405.3 1530.1
65 + 1385.0 2079.4 496.9
2006
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2482.5 2381.7 2792.8
25-34 2199.1 2114.8 2977.5
35-44 2377.3 2296.1 3214.1
45-54 2340.0 2350.6 3156.8
55-64 1614.7 1742.7 1886.7
65 + 1440.0 2183.2 518.8
• • • /
Table  7-1: c o n t .
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2011
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2488.3 2387.6 2799.5
25-34 2442.2 2352.1 3308.1
35-44 2164.4 2080.7 2922.0
45-54 2464.1 2443.6 3310.1
55-64 1871.4 2041.8 2201.4
65 + 1589.0 2380.7 570.2
2016
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2398.5 2301.6 2698.5
25-34 2615.5 2520.2 3543.5
35-44 2235.8 2147.4 3017.5
45-54 2286.0 2261.9 3068.6
55-64 2091.1 2255.8 2451.0
65 + 1841.7 2716.6 657.4
2021
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2384.6 2288.0 2682.8
25-34 2621.3 2526.0 3551.4
35-44 2474.3 2382.4 3342.1
45.54 2084.2 2052.0 2793.1
55-64 2196.4 2342.3 2565.1
65+ 2110.9 3103.5 752.7
2026
Age Male Female Labour
15-24 2495.9 2394.5 2807.8
25-34 2532.9 2440.4 3431.5
35-44 2644.0 2548.8 3572.5
45-54 2154.4 2118.1 2885.8
55-64 2034.2 2168.1 2375.2
65+ 2409.8 3522.7 857.2
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T a b l e  7 - 2 : P e r c e n t a g e  Age 
1971
D i s t r i b u t i o n
1976
o f  T o t a l  P r o j e c t e d  
1980
La bour  F o r c e  
1985
15- 24 2 6 . 0 6 2 5 . 9 8 2 5 .3 4 2 2 .0 5
2 5 -3 4 2 2 . 5 8 2 5 . 1 7 2 6 . 4 8 2 7 .6 7
35-44 1 9 . 7 3 1 8 .0 4 1 8 . 4 3 2 1 .2 2
4 5 - 5 4 1 7 . 4 5 1 6 .8 0 1 5 .6 1 1 4 .7 0
5 5 - 6 4 1 1 .1 9 1 0 . 9 9 1 1 .0 1 1 1 .1 2
65 + 2 . 9 9 3 . 0 3 3 . 1 2 3 .2 4
T o t a l 8 8 0 8 .6 9 8 8 5 . 3 1 0 7 0 2 .9 1 1 5 2 5 .5
% A T o t a l _ 1 2 .2 2 8 . 2 7 7 .6 9
1990 1995 2001 2006
15-24 1 8 . 5 3 1 7 . 7 6 1 8 . 8 0 1 9 .2 0
25- 34 2 8 . 2 7 2 5 . 1 6 2 0 .8 7 2 0 . 4 7
35-44 2 3 .5 5 2 5 . 0 2 2 5 .1 1 2 2 . 1 0
4 5 - 5 4 1 5 . 5 2 1 8 . 2 0 2 0 . 5 4 2 1 . 7 0
55-64 1 0 .6 6 1 0 .2 4 1 1 . 0 9 1 2 .9 7
65 + 3 . 4 8 3 .6 1 3 . 6 0 3 . 5 7
T o t a l 1 2 2 1 4 .6 1 2 8 8 7 .6 1 3 8 0 4 .1 1 4 5 4 6 .7
% A T o t a l 5 . 9 8 5 .5 1 7 .1 1 5 . 3 8
2011 2016 2021 2026
15- 24 1 8 . 5 3 1 7 .4 8 1 7 .1 0 1 7 . 6 3
2 5 - 3 4 2 1 . 8 9 2 2 . 9 6 2 2 .6 4 2 1 . 5 4
35-4 4 1 9 .3 4 1 9 .5 5 2 1 . 3 0 2 2 . 4 3
45 -5 4 2 1 . 9 0 1 9 .8 8 1 7 .8 0 1 8 .1 2
55-64 1 4 . 5 7 1 5 .8 8 1 6 .3 5 1 4 .9 1
65+ 3 . 7 7 4 . 2 6 4 . 8 0 5 . 3 9
T o t a  1 1 5 1 1 1 .3 1 5 4 3 6 .5 1 5 6 8 7 .2 1 5 9 3 0 .4
%A T o t a l 3 .8 8 2 . 1 5 1 .6 2 1 .5 5
Table 7-3: Income, Assets, Debt § Net
Age Cohort 1964 5 1970 - (Source:
Age in 1964 1964 ($Cda)
14-24
Liquid Assets 343
Total Assets 1976
Total Debt 1478
Net Worth 498
Avg Income 4344
25-34
Liquid Assets 864
Total Assets 7930
Total Debt 3739
Net Worth 4191
Avg Income 5427
35-44
Liquid Assets 1185
Total Assets 11455
Total Debt 4181
Net Worth 7274
Avg Income 6579
45-54
Liquid Assets 2183
Total Assets 14678
Total Debt 3060
Net Worth 11618
Avg Income 6774
55-64
Liquid Assets 2883
Total Assets 16842
Total Debt 2042
Net Worth 14800
Avg Income 6215
65 +
Liquid Assets 5895
Total Assets 18814
Total Debt 708
Net Worth 18111
Avg Income 4331
Worth of Families by 
Chawla (1973))
1970 ($Cda)
963
6935
4038
2897
8223
1648
17757
6250
11507
9468
3077
23501
5108
18393
10602
6189
24849
1198
23651
7230
6189
24849
1198
23651
7230
6660
22445
521
21924
4773
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T a b l e 7 - 4  Age S p e c i f i c  
1976
I n c o m e  b y  Y e a r  
1980
S i m u l a t i o n  1 (A g e s  
1985
1 - 6 )
1990
Y1 3 6 5 2 . 1 7 3 7 4 0 . 1 8 4 3 4 5 . 7 7 5 2 6 4 . 9 9
Y2 5 5 2 1 . 8 4 5 2 4 3 . 9 6 5 0 7 6 . 4 8 5 0 6 2 . 1 2
Y3 8 7 5 7 . 4 5 8 5 6 0 . 0 0 7 5 1 8 . 5 7 6 8 9 7 . 6 2
Y4 7 9 4 3 . 7 0 8 5 4 0 . 7 2 9 1 7 2 . 2 7 8 8 3 9 . 3 8
Y5 6 5 8 7 . 4 6 6 5 6 4 . 5 9 6 5 6 6 . 7 3 6 9 8 4 . 5 6
Y6 4 3 4 9 . 6 6 4 2 1 2 . 5 2 4 0 9 5 . 7 9 3 8 9 3 . 1 9
1995 2001 2006 2011
Y1 5 6 4 7 . 7 7 5 4 4 1 . 8 7 5 4 2 1 . 0 7 5 6 3 0 . 7 8
Y2 5 8 3 3 . 7 5 7 1 8 6 . 0 6 7 4 4 5 . 0 7 6 9 7 6 . 8 2
Y3 6 6 6 5 . 7 4 6 7 7 7 . 4 3 7 8 3 1 . 5 6 8 9 5 9 . 9 3
Y4 7 7 4 2 . 4 4 7 0 0 6 . 6 6 6 7 4 3 . 2 8 6 6 8 9 . 1 2
Y5 7 4 5 8 . 5 8 7 0 3 6 . 5 6 6 1 1 2 . 6 9 5 4 5 6 . 1 0
Y6 3 8 4 6 . 7 5 3 9 3 6 . 8 9 4 0 3 7 . 8 3 3 8 3 2 . 6 3
201 6 2021 2026
Y1 5 9 4 9 . 4 8 6 0 5 3 . 4 4 5 8 5 1 . 6 6
Y2 6 6 3 9 . 1 2 6 6 9 9 . 8 2 7 0 2 6 . 0 8
Y3 8 8 5 2 . 1 7 8 0 8 4 . 9 3 7 6 5 9 . 2 4
Y4 7 3 5 9 . 6 5 8 1 7 7 . 2 7 8 0 0 6 . 4 6
Y5 4 9 9 2 . 2 1 4 8 2 2 . 2 3 5 2 7 9 . 7 7
Y6 3 3 8 6 . 4 7 2 9 8 5 . 6 8 2 6 5 5 . 2 0
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T a b l e 7 - 5  Age S p e c i f i c  
1976
G r o s s  In c o m e  b y  Y e a r :  
1980
S i m u l a t i o n  2 
1985
(A g e s  1 - 6 )  
1990
Y1 3 5 4 8 . 7 5 3 6 1 3 . 2 2 4 1 8 2 . 0 4 5 0 3 7 . 7 1
Y2 5 3 6 6 . 7 3 5 0 6 6 . 8 8 4 8 8 2 . 5 6 4 8 3 9 . 8 0
Y3 8 5 0 1 . 0 7 8 2 6 1 . 5 3 7 2 2 6 . 7 5 6 5 9 5 . 0 3
Y4 7 7 1 3 . 6 6 8 2 4 5 . 0 0 8 8 1 9 . 7 2 8 4 5 7 . 2 8
Y5 6 3 9 5 . 8 3 6 3 3 9 . 2 8 6 3 1 8 . 6 3 6 6 7 9 . 2 1
Y6 4 2 2 0 . 2 4 4 0 6 3 . 2 2 3 9 4 1 . 4 8 3 7 1 9 . 2 1
A6 3 5 1 2 . 0 8 3 4 9 3 . 4 3 3 7 7 2 . 3 6 4 4 0 3 . 7 9
P6 1 4 9 5 . 8 8 1 4 8 9 . 0 6 1 4 9 7 . 7 6 1 5 2 4 . 6 4
1995 2001 200 6 2011
Y1 5 3 7 2 . 4 2 5 1 6 0 . 0 4 5 1 1 5 . 9 6 5 3 0 0 . 0 7
Y2 5 5 5 7 . 1 9 6 8 1 0 . 0 8 7 0 3 1 . 6 2 6 5 7 2 . 3 9
Y3 6 3 4 2 . 7 8 6 4 2 4 . 2 8 7 3 9 4 . 2 7 8 8 4 6 . 3 6
Y4 7 3 7 1 . 3 6 6 6 4 0 . 0 2 6 3 6 3 . 3 6 6 3 0 2 . 1 3
Y5 7 1 0 2 . 2 7 6 6 7 0 . 9 8 5 7 7 3 . 4 2 5 1 3 8 . 4 5
Y6 3 6 6 6 . 7 6 3 7 3 4 . 8 9 3 8 1 7 . 4 5 3 6 0 6 . 9 6
A6 4 4 1 8 . 8 6 3 8 3 6 . 4 4 2 7 4 7 . 7 4 2 2 2 6 . 0 8
P6 1 5 5 6 . 2 6 1 5 8 7 . 2 0 1 6 4 2 . 3 6 1 6 0 6 . 0 8
2016 2021 202 6
Y1 5 5 7 6 . 4 3 5 6 3 2 . 8 8 5 4 1 2 . 1 6
Y2 6 2 2 2 . 8 1 6 2 3 5 . 3 3 6 4 8 9 . 2 3
Y3 8 2 9 5 . 0 5 7 5 2 1 . 2 0 7 0 7 5 . 4 2
Y4 6 8 9 4 . 5 4 7 6 0 6 . 7 5 7 4 0 3 . 5 1
Y5 4 6 8 0 . 6 3 4 4 9 1 . 4 2 4 8 7 7 . 6 0
Y6 3 1 7 2 . 8 9 2 7 8 2 . 9 4 2 4 5 7 . 3 2
A6 2 6 8 9 . 5 7 3 2 8 8 . 2 5 3 5 1 8 . 9 7
P6 1 6 0 0 . 5 0 1 5 9 4 . 8 1 1 5 8 5 . 5 9
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T a b l e  7 - 6  Age S p e c i f i c I n c o m e  b y  Y e a r S i m u l a t i o n  3 (A g e s 1 - 6 )
1976 1980 1985 1990
Y1 3 6 8 5 . 7 5 3 7 9 3 . 3 6 4 4 1 9 . 6 3 5 3 2 7 . 1 4
Y2 5 5 7 3 . 9 1 5 3 1 9 . 5 0 5 1 5 9 . 9 5 5 1 1 7 . 8 5
Y3 8 8 2 9 . 2 5 8 6 7 3 . 4 3 7 6 3 7 . 3 0 6 9 7 3 . 9 3
Y4 8 0 1 1 . 4 5 8 6 5 6 . 0 7 9 3 2 0 . 7 8 8 9 4 3 . 1 6
Y5 6 6 4 2 . 7 4 6 6 5 5 . 3 3 6 6 7 7 . 6 0 7 0 6 2 . 9 4
Y6 4 3 8 3 . 1 6 4 2 6 5 . 8 0 4 1 6 5 . 4 0 3 9 3 2 . 8 9
1995 2001 2006 2011
Y1 5 3 9 2 . 8 9 5 3 3 6 . 5 0 5 2 0 4 . 5 9 5 3 6 0 . 7 5
Y2 5 5 7 8 . 3 6 7 0 4 2 . 9 7 7 1 5 3 . 4 4 6 6 4 7 . 6 4
Y3 6 3 6 6 . 9 4 6 6 4 3 . 9 7 7 5 2 2 . 3 7 8 5 4 3 . 0 7
Y4 7 3 9 9 . 4 5 6 8 6 7 . 0 9 6 4 7 3 . 6 0 6 3 7 4 . 2 9
Y5 7 1 2 9 . 3 3 6 8 9 9 . 1 1 5 8 7 3 . 4 4 5 1 9 7 . 2 8
Y6 3 6 8 0 . 7 3 3 8 6 2 . 6 1 3 8 8 3 . 5 9 3 6 4 8 . 2 6
201 6 2021 2026
Y1 5 6 5 1 . 3 5 5 7 6 3 . 3 9 5 6 0 3 . 0 7
Y2 6 3 0 6 . 4 2 6 3 7 9 . 8 0 6 7 1 8 . 1 4
Y3 8 4 0 6 . 5 0 7 6 9 5 . 4 7 7 3 2 5 . 0 1
Y4 6 9 8 7 . 1 7 7 7 8 3 . 0 0 7 6 6 4 . 6 6
Y5 4 7 4 3 . 5 2 4 5 9 5 . 4 9 5 0 4 9 . 6 5
Y6 3 2 1 5 . 5 2 2 8 4 7 . 4 2 2 5 4 4 . 0 0
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Table  7-7 Age S p e c i f i c  Consumption by Year S im u la t io n  1 (Ages 1 -5 ) ($ )
Age 1976 1980 1985 1990
1 4246.21 4239.13 4458.81 4918.20
2 7580.55 7396.24 7175.43 7166.09
3 8088.40 7994.42 7476.08 7179.22
4 5302.57 5744.91 5947.85 5624.55
5 3342.31 3390.84 3494.73 3673.47
1995 2001 2006 2011
1 5252.61 5403.38 5667.77 5905.43
2 7743.57 8701.57 9115.64 9022.83
3 7080.28 7169.68 7776.29 8282.43
4 5021.73 4659.91 4646.76 4806.68
5 3746.07 3366.70 2898.38 2715.70
2016 2021 2026
1 6064.76
2 8849.36
3 8189.15
4 5163.34
6067.70 5923.15
8833.24 8955.95
7841.91 7652.95
5445.56 5263.13
2653.59 2884.615 2648.35
Table 7-8:  Age S p e c i f i c  Consumption by yea r  S im ula t ion  2 ($)
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1976 1980 1985 1990
Cl 3709.28 3621.23 3775.15 4094.62
C2 6788.36 6511.97 6237.99 6096.13
C3 7426.73 7260.32 6756.07 6376.31
C4 4982.82 5332.65 5526.56 5209.12
C5 3202.63 3188.04 3288.96 3419.29
A6+P6 5007.96 4982.49 5270.12 5928.43
Y6+A6+P6 10228.20 9431.42 9211.60 9647.64
1995 2001 2006 2011
Cl 4306.48 4366.74 4520.85 4659.34
C2 6525.24 7313.98 7623.38 7465.28
C3 6236.43 6321.54 6875.24 7288.19
C4 4659.76 4384.46 4455.02 4623.10
C5 3474.18 3135.27 2744.42 2610.47
A6+P6 5975.12 5423.64 4390.10 3832.16
Y6+A6+P6 9641.88 9158.53 8207.55 7439.12
2016 2021 2026
Cl 4680.11 4548.18 4291.21
C2 7146.93 6941.20 6840.91
C3 7057.44 6588.04 6265.28
C4 4851.97 4966.02 4703.94
C5 2554.39 2517.13 2647.43
A6 + P6 4289.77 4883.06 5704.56
Y6+A6+P6 7462.66 7666.00 7561.88
A6
P6
Y6
A ss e t s  in  r e t i r e m e n t  
Pens ion in  r e t i r e m e n t  
Labour income: (65+) group
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T a b l e 7 - 9  A g e  S p e c i f i c C o n s u m p t i o n  b y  Y e a r  S i m u l a t i o n  3 ( A g e s  1 - 5 )  ( $ )
1 9 7 6 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 0
Cl 4 3 7 7 . 4 4 4 4 4 8 . 8 9 4 7 1 1 . 5 2 5 0 9 9 . 3 3
C2 7 7 6 1 . 3 4 7 6 8 3 . 9 1 7 5 0 9 . 7 6 7 3 9 0 . 2 7
C3 8 1 4 0 . 9 9 8 2 0 2 . 1 1 7 7 1 2 . 2 8 7 3 1 7 . 7 3
C4 5 2 9 3 . 6 0 5 6 8 2 . 7 1 6 0 1 7 . 6 3 5 6 3 2 . 8 2
C5 3 3 7 5 . 3 8 3 3 5 4 . 6 7 3 4 4 6 . 2 1 3 6 6 0 . 4 2
1 9 9 5 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 6 2 0 1 1
Cl 4 9 9 4 . 7 2 5 0 6 7 . 5 1 4 9 7 7 . 3 9 5 0 3 8 . 0 6
C2 7 3 6 2 . 9 5 8 2 5 2 . 0 4 8 2 3 7 . 4 7 7 9 6 8 . 9 3
C3 6 6 8 0 . 7 5 6 8 4 3 . 9 4 7 1 8 1 . 5 4 7 6 2 2 . 0 5
C4 4 6 5 1 . 7 2 4 4 4 9 . 1 5 4 3 9 7 . 4 8 4 6 2 9 . 7 2
C5 3 5 3 5 . 3 8 3 2 5 5 . 9 1 2 7 8 5 . 1 1 2 6 3 5 . 8 4
2 0 1 6 2 0 2 1 2 0 2 6
Cl 5 1 5 5 . 1 2 5 2 0 9 . 9 3 5 1 5 4 . 1 5
C2 7 7 6 6 . 0 1 7 8 1 4 . 6 1 8 0 2 4 . 0 6
C3 7 5 3 8 . 9 9 7 2 6 1 . 0 4 7 1 4 4 . 2 2
C4 5 0 9 2 . 4 4 5 4 3 3 . 6 7 5 2 9 8 . 1 4
C5 2 6 2 9 . 8 3 2 7 1 1 . 6 7 2 9 5 7 . 9 4
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T a b l e  7 - 1 0  Age 
1 9 7 6
S p e c i f i c  A s s e t s  
1 9 8 0
b y  Y e a r  S i m u l a t i o n  1 
1 9 8 5
. C $ 3
1 9 9 0
A2 -  6 6 0 . 2 6 -  6 3 0 . 1 2 -  5 3 4 . 1 8 -  1 2 1 . 6 1
A3 - 2 4 6 2 . 1 2 - 2 8 7 3 . 8 9 - 2 9 7 2 . 6 6 - 2 8 2 9 . 9 5
A4 - 2 1 9 3 . 9 5 - 1 8 6 3 . 3 8 - 2 4 3 2 . 3 1 - 3 1 3 0 . 2 9
A5 2 4 2 . 9 0 5 4 2 . 7 6 1 0 5 6 . 8 4 9 0 5 . 9 3
A6 3 5 1 2 . 0 8 3 7 3 1 . 7 0 4 0 0 9 . 0 4 4 4 9 7 . 5 1
1 9 9 5 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 6 2 0 1 1
A2 3 6 9 . 7 8 4 1 1 . 2 0 3 8 . 7 3 -  2 3 9 . 0 5
A3 - 2 3 7 4 . 2 8 - 1 5 9 3 . 0 6 - 1 0 9 7 . 0 3 - 1 5 7 9 . 8 2
A4 - 3 3 4 1 . 6 5 - 2 9 6 4 . 3 3 - 2 0 4 2 . 1 9 - 1 0 3 5 . 4 8
A5 8 3 . 9 0 -  7 5 7 . 8 8 -  7 8 9 . 8 2 -  6 9 . 2 4
A6 4 5 6 1 . 6 4 3 9 4 6 . 0 3 2 7 8 4 . 0 8 2 1 4 0 . 5 1
2 0 1 6 2 0 2 1 2 0 2 6
A2 -  2 6 1 . 1 3 -  1 0 4 . 2 5 -  1 3 . 6 0
A3 - 2 1 7 7 . 0 7 - 2 3 4 2 . 9 3 - 2 1 3 7 . 5 4
A4 -  8 8 5 . 8 4 - 1 4 4 5 . 8 4 - 1 9 8 9 . 3 8
A5 7 6 1 . 2 5 1 2 1 2 . 4 2 1 2 2 3 . 6 4
A6 2 4 1 3 . 8 4 2 9 0 2 . 1 0 3 1 8 7 . 9 4
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Table 7-11 Age S p e c i f i c  A sse t s  and Pension  by Year S im u la t ion  2 ($)
1976 1980 1985 1990
A2 - 660.26 - 386.50 - 232.15 204.65
A3 -2462.12 -2594.96 -2397.21 -2144.25
A4 -2193.95 -1864.89 -2220.44 -2645.17
A5 242.90 350.58 923.69 830.32
A6 3512.08 3493.43 3772.36 4403.79
P 1495.88 1489.06 1497.76 1524.64
1995 2001 2006 2011
A2 730.52 817.14 508.91 283.02
A3 -1565.85 - 669.43 - 120.40 - 564.92
A4 -2697.34 -2162.59 -1097 .78 - 65.60
A5 143.71 - 571.63 - 471.65 387.38
A6 4418.86 3836.34 2747.74 2226.08
P 1556.26 1587.20 1642.36 1606.08
2016 2021 2026
A2 298.06 499.71 647.80
A3 -1119.54 -1184.86 - 825.17
A4 30.76 - 545.01 - 966.44
A5 1285.89 1662.95 1585.49
A6 2689.57 3288.25 3518.97
P 1600.50 1594.81 1585.59
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Table  7-12 Age S p e c i f i c  A sse t s  by Year S im u la t ion  3 ($)
1976 1980 1985 1990
A2 - 722.89 - 722.89 - 685.09 - 305.05
A3 -3041.58 -3041.55 -3226.51 -3171.76
A4 -2459.45 -2459.37 -2686.10 -3450.33
AS 270.06 270.01 537.04 644.76
A6 3696.96 3696.80 3731.60 3938.28
1995 2001 2006 2011
A2 238.08 416.13 281.12 237.46
A3 -2693.71 -1616.26 - 828.72 - 839.13
A4 -3674.06 -3143.09 -1898.08 - 509.83
A5 - 146.42 - 968.20 - 758.06 186.00
A6 4229.68 3602.86 2795.49 2435.35
2016 2021 2026
A2 337.24 518.61 578.42
A3 -1132.72 -1172.98 - 957.54
A4 85.63 - 277.12 - 771.79
A5 1290.37 2069.61 2165.59
A6 2879.24 3557.51 4131.68
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Case 1 Production Function
Li L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
.101 .148 .168 .142 .077 .014
Consumption Functions
Y A W
ci .4 0 .1
C2 .65 .3 .1
C3 .5 .4 .1
C4 .4 .2 .1
C5 .4 .1 0
i+V 1.0451, .8794, .8489, .8344, .8213, .8126, .8164, .8006,
.7890, .7906, .7996
Period to period percentage change in capital
44.61, 14.09, 12.07, 10.01, 8.71, 6 .64, 8.20, 4.64, 2.53, 0.68,
Case 2 Production Function
L, L_ L_ L . F L,1 2 3 4 5 6
.128 . 128 .128 .128 .128 .010
Consumption Functions
Y A W
c i .4 0 .1
C2 .65 .3 .1
C3 .5 .4 .1
C4 .4 .2 .1
C5 .4 .1 0
1+r : 1.0451, .8888, .8675, .8540 , .8422, .8396, .8507, .8326,
.8091, .8085, .8198
Period to period percentage change in capital
39.28, 11.92, 10.26, 7.61, 6.52, 6.48, 10.76, 7.23, 3.96, 0.97,
.7928,
0.37
.8185,
-0.92
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Case 3 Production Function
L, L_ L_ L, L t1 2 3 5 6
.200 .150 .110 .100 080 .010
Consumption Functions
Y A W
ci .4 0 .1
C2 .65 .3 .1
C3 .5 .4 .1
C4 .4 .2 .1
C5 .4 .1 0
1+r : 1.0451, .8568, .8213, .8144, .8043, .8073, .8236, .8084
.7858, .7864
Period to period percentage change in capital
61.41, 15.23, 7.32, 5..17, 3.93, 4.29, 9.30, 6.45, 3.21, 0.52,
Case 4
Li
. 128
L2
.128
Production Function
L3 L4
.128 .128
Consumption Functions 
Y A
L5 L6
.128 .010
W
ci .5 0 .1
C2 .65 .1 .2
C3 .6 .16 .25
C4 .6 .3 .2
C5 .5 .2 0
1+r : 1.0451, 1.0779, 1.0925, 1.1003, 1.0919, 1.0761, 1.0510,
.9902, .9786, .9816, .9958
Period to period percentage change in capital
3.49, 5.60, 6.48, 6.57, 8.42, 12.68, 12.88, 8.68, 3.99, 0.35, -
.7950,
.42
.0160,
.98
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Production Function
L1 4 4 L4 4
.200 .150 .110 .100 .080
Consumption Functions
Y A W
ci .5 0 .1
S .65 .1 .2
C3 .6 .16 .25
C4 .6 .3 .2
C5 .5 .2 0
1.0451, 1.0226, 1.0015, 1.0015, 1.0011, .9959,
.9437, .9345, .9382, .9528
Period to period percentage change in capital
22.95, 11.49, 5.92, 3.25, 5.35, 8.11, 10.91, 7.63, 2.91
Case 6
1
.115
1+r : 1.0451,
.9923,
Production Function
L_ L . Lr2 3 4 5
.125 .130 . 140 .130
Consumption Functions
Y A W
ci .5 0 .1
C 2 .65 .1 .2
S .6 .16 .25
C4 .6 .3 .2
c s .5 .2 0
. .0851 , 1.1047, 1. 1139, 1.1035, 1.0849
.9808, .9848, .9990
Period to period percentage change in capital
1.25, 4.79, 6.48, 7.33, 9.30, 13.72, 13.21, 8.77, 3.90,
.010
9919, .9645,
, 0.04, -0.61
.010
1.0548, 1.0183,
0.07, -0.97
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Case 7 Production Function
L, L_ L . F L,1 2 3 4 5 6
.101 .148 .168 .142 .077 .014
Consumption Functions
Y A W
ci .2 0 .3
C2 .5 .1 .4
C3 .4 .2 .4
C4 .4 .1 .1
C5 .4 .1 0
1+r : 1.0451, 1.1832, 1.2036, 1.1836, 1.1530, 1.1053, 1.0451, 1
.9983, 1.0061, 1.0098
Period to period percentage change in capital
-8.38, 5.26, 12.00, 11.79, 14.13, 17.06, 10.28, 5.30, 1.76, -0.21
Case 8 Production Function
4 4 L3 L4 L5 L6
. 128 . 128 . 128 .128 .128 .010
Consumption Functions
Y A W
c i .2 0 .3
C 2 .5 .1 .4
s .4 .2 .4
C4 .4 .1 .1
C5 .4 .1 0
1+r: 1.0451,t 1.1873, 1.2153, 1.2027, 1.1812, 1.1468, 1.0910,
1.0323, 1.0255, 1.0295, 1.0336
Period to period percentage change in capital
-10.81, 4.02, 9.39, 8. 29, 10.95, 17 .31, 12.69, 8.15, 3..17, 0.23
0122,
, 1.57
0559,
0.61
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Case 9
1 + r .
Production Function
L1 4 4 L4 4
.200 .150 .110 .100 .080
Consumption Functions
Y A W
c i .2 0 .3
C2 .5 .1 .4
S .4 .2 .4
C4 .4 .1 .1
C5 .4 .1 0
1.0451, 1.1040, 1.0984, 1.0870, 1.0660, 1.0449
6
.010
.9742, .9676, .9719, .9813
Period to period percentage change in capital
9.29, 8.81, 7.65, 6.33, 7.78, 10.79, 11.38, 6.87, 2.40, -0.03,
Case 10
1 + r.
i Production Function
4 4 4 4 4
.101 .148 .168 .142 .077
Consumption Functions
Y A W
4 .8 0 .8
C2 .7 .5 .7
4 .4 .2 .4
C4 .7 .5 .7
4 .8 .5 0
1.0451, 1.7059, 1.6785, 1.5332, 1.2691, 1.0675
6
.014
.8743, .8895, .9417, 1.0120
Period to period percentage change in capital 
-47.81, 10.80, 25.46, 43.60, 39.54, 43.70, 5.90, 3.85, -0.91, 
-8.55
.9932,
0.29
8784,
7.48,
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Case 11 Production Function
1+r.
1
.128
9196,
L2 4 L4 4
.128 .128 .128 .128
Consumption Functions
Y A W
c i .8 0 .8
C2 .7 .5 .7
C3 .4 .2 .4
C4 .7 .5 .7
C5 •8 .5 0
.7298, 1.7496, 1.6269, 1.3596, 1.1474
.9121, .9432, .9988
6
.010
Period to period percentage change in capital
-50.00, 5.95, 20.32, 38.82, 37.64, 45.51, 8.42, 8.35, 3.41, -4.22,-7.32
Case 12 Production Function
Li 4 4 L4 4 4
.101 .148 . 168 . 142 .077 .014
Consumption Functions
Y A W
4 .2 0 .1
4 .4 .2 .1
4 .5 .1 .1
C4 .6 .2 .4
4 .8 .5 0
1+r : 1.0451, .9276, .9037, .8952, .8969, .9098 , .8834, .8640, .8483,
.8456, .8584
Period to period percentage change in capital
33.21, 12.51, 10.75, 7.05, 4.63, 8,.14, 9.10, 6. 67, 4.66, 1.48, -0.18
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Case 13 P roduc t ion F unc t ion
L, h o L_ L . t \ j .1 2 3 4 5 6
.128 .128 .128 .128 .128 .010
Consumption F unc t ions
Y A W
c i .2 0 .1
C2 .4 .2 .1
C3 .5 . 1 .1
C4 .6 .2 .4
C5 .8 .5 0
1+r : 1.0451, .9699, .9609, .9559, .9653,  .9849, .9829, .9588,  .9300
.9049, .8975, .9159
Per iod  t o  p e r io d  p e r c e n ta g e  change in c a p i t a l
21.73,  9 .3 8 ,  8 .51 ,  3 .75 ,  2 .80 ,  9 .00 ,  11 .33 ,  9 .4 6 ,  6 .5 2 ,  2 .12 ,  -1 .88
Case 14
1
.200
1+r : 1.0451,  
.8059,
P roduc t ion F unc t ion
L2 4 L4 L5
. 150 .110 .100 .080
Consumption F u n c t io n s
Y A W
c i .2 0 .1
C2 .4 .2 . 1
C3 .5 .1 . 1
C4 .6 .2 .4
C5 .8 .5 0
.8820,  .8475,  .8349,  .8391,  .8606,  .8643,  .8440,  .8230,  
.8021,  .8156
Per iod  t o  p e r io d  p e r c e n ta g e  change in c a p i t a l
54 .37 ,  14 .78 ,  8 .42 ,  2 .39 ,  .52 ,  6 .74 ,  10 .19 ,  7 .8 3 ,  4 .72 ,  1 .38 ,  -0 .80
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Case 15 Production Fu n c t i o n
L i L 2 4 L4 L 5 L6
.115 .125 .130 .140 .130 .010
C o n s u m p t i o n  Func t i o n s
Y A W
c i .2 0 .1
C 2 .4 .2 .1
C 3 .5 .1 .1
C 4 .6 .2 .4
C 5 .8 .5 0
1+r : 1.0451, ,.9794, .9735, .9698, .9790, .9970, .9931, .9680,
.9124, .9048, .9236
Period to peri o d  p e r c e n t a g e  change in capital
18.54, 8.71, 8 .49, 4.,27, 3.55, 9.56 , 11.53, 9.60 , 6.60, 1.99,
Case 16 P r o duction Fu n c t i o n
L i L 2 L3 L4 Ls L6
.101 .148 .168 .142 .077 .014
Consum p t i o n Funct i o n s
Y A W
c i .5 0 .5
C 2 .4 .2 .4
C,3 .1 .5 .1
C 4 .2 .5 .1
C 5 .5 .1 0
1+r : 1.0451, 1.1450, 1.1217, 1.0141, .9437, .8921, .8533, .8384,
.8540, .8641, .8796
Period to peri o d  p e r c e n t a g e  change in capital
-3.64, 11.55, 27.46, 19.94, 16.61, 15.01, 7.86 , 1.57, 0.39, -0.81,
330
Case 17 Production Function
L1 4 L3 L4 L5 L6
.128 .128 .128 .128 .128 .010
Consumption Functions
Y A W
ci .5 0 .5
C2 .4 .2 .4
C3 .1 .5 .1
C4 .2 .5 .1
C5 .5 .1 0
1+r : 1.0451, 1.1607, 1.1480, 1.0469, .9776, .9317, .8910, .8713,
.8697, .8691, .8756, .8914
Period to period percentage change in capital
-7.65, 9.67, 24.04, 17.02, 14.16, 16.37, 10.42 , 4.75, 2.24, -0.32,
-1.52
Case 18 Production Function
4 L2 L3 L4 LS L6
.085 .128 .142 .140 .130 .025
Consumption Functions
Y A W
4 .5 0 . 1
C2 .65 .1 .2
C3 .6 .16 .25
C4 .6 .3 .2
C5 .5 .2 0
1+r : 1.0451, 1.0795, 1.1169, 1.1291 , 1.1172, 1.0949, 1.0551, 1.0178,
.9926, .9825, .9867, .9997
Period to period percentage change in capital
-3.45, 2.46, 7.15, 8.81, 10.21, 14.87, 12.94, 8.71, 4.31, 0.55, -0.57
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Case 19 Production Function
Li 4 4 4 4
.200 . 150 .110 .100 .080
Consumption Functions
Y A W
4 .5 0 .5
C2 .4 .2 .4
C3 .1 .5 .1
C4 .2 .5 .1
C5 .5 . 1 0
1+r • 1.0451, 1.1125, 1.0806, 1.0003, .9427, .9030, .8818
.8667, .8664, .8709, .8861
Period to period percentage change in capital
8.00, 12.92, 19.29, 13.05, 11.65, 11.45, 9.09, 3.73, 1.43, -0.16, -
Case 20 Production Function
4 4 4 4 4 4
.115 .125 .130 .140 .130 .010
Consumption Functions 
Y A W
4 .5 0 .5
4 .4 .2 .4
4 .1 .5 .1
C4 .2 .5 .1
4 .5 .1 0
l+rt: 1.0451, 1.1657, 1.1550, 1.0508, -.9793, .9320, .8886, .8687
.8675, .8674, .8748, .8906
Period to period percentage change 
-9.31, 9.24, 24.74, 17.91, 14.92,
in capital 
17.17, 11.04, 4.74, 2.09, -0.62
-1.50
0.88
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